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Abstract 
This thesis seeks to answer the question of the meaning of the destruction of the urban 
environment in the 1992-95 Bosnian war. The inquiry begins with the destruction of the Old 
Bridge in Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina. This event constitutes an exemplary instance of the 
destruction of urban environments. The destruction of the Old Bridge is not, however, an isolated 
event: urban destruction was widespread during the Bosnian war. It is argued that a clue to the 
meaning of this destruction lies in the fact that it is shared spaces that are destroyed. 
The `logics' of urban destruction are then considered. Such destruction cannot be properly 
accounted for by either the traditional notion of military necessity or the regimes established to 
protect cultural heritage. Rather, it is argued that the destruction of urban environment comprises 
`urbicide'. Urbicide is defined as the destruction of that which characterises the urban: 
heterogeneity. It is argued that destroying buildings represents the destruction of the conditions of 
possibility of heterogeneity. 
The thesis then addresses the relation between shared spatiality and heterogeneity. Drawing on 
Heidegger's account of Being-in-the-world, it is argued that existence is both spatial and shared. 
The fundamental sharing of existential spatiality constitutes existence as a heterogeneous Being- 
with-others. The Heideggerian notion of Mitsein (Being-with) is proposed as an initial account of 
the nature of this heterogeneity. This account of Mitsein is developed through a consideration of 
the work of Jean-Luc Nancy. In particular the implication of Being in community is noted. An 
account is given of the politics of Being-with at stake in urbicide. 
In conclusion it is argued that urbicide comprises an ethno-nationalist attempt to cover over the 
heterogeneous nature of existence. The proper starting point for a response to ethno-nationalist 
violence must be a recognition of the heterogeneity and community at stake in urbicide. 
i 
Books like this one do not have a proper end. The footnote - the writer's self- 
defensive gesture - becomes an exhausting race in which the runner never reaches the 
finish. Every full stop demands the status of a comma, every sentence fights for a 
footnote. 
The footnote thus becomes a multiple metaphor, for the defeat of the writer 
and the human being. Everything that the author has written is just a footnote to the 
long lists of names of people who have lost their lives, families, friends, homes or the 
homeland which was until recently shared, a footnote to the texts written by the 
warlords... 
Terrible reality carries off the victory and the author aware of her defeat, must 
willy nilly accept an arbitrary end. The only thing left for her to do is to leave behind 
her fragile markers... 
- Dubravka Ugresic, The Culture of Lies 
I am well aware of the fact that all of this does not let itself be conceived of easily. It 
is not for us, not for our thinking, modelled as it is on the sovereign model; it is not 
for our warlike thinking. But this is certain: there is nothing on the horizon except for 
an un-heard-of, inconceivable task - or war. All thinking that still wants to conceive of 
an "order, " a "world, " a "communication, " a "peace" is absolutely naive - when it is 
not simply hypocritical. To appropriate one's own time has always been unheard of. 
But everyone can clearly see that it is time: the disaster of sovereignty is sufficiently 
spread out, and sufficiently common, to steal anyone's innocence. 
- Jean-Luc Nancy, War, Right, Sovereignty-Tech e 
Nothing seems to me less outdated than the classical emancipatory ideal. 
- Jacques Derrida, `Force of Law' 
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INTRODUCTION 
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE SHARED SPACES OF BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA 
Aida Musanovic... had. visited the hospital in Sarajevo and had seen the 
carnage brought by the war. Yet the burning of the library struck her with 
a special horror. In the fire of the National Library, she realised that what 
she was experiencing was not only war but also something else. The 
centuries of culture that fell back in ash onto the besieged city revealed a 
secret. 1 
`There is no more Old Bridge'2 
At around 10.15 am on 9t' November 1993, The Old Bridge, or Stari Most, at 
Mostar, Bosnia-Herzegovina collapsed into the River Neretva. The bridge had 
spanned the Neretva for over 400 years linking east Mostar (and the Bosnian 
hinterlands) to west Mostar (and routes to the Adriatic Coast). Having survived 
natural disasters and wars, including shelling by the Bosnian Serb army in 1992, the 
bridge had finally been destroyed by Bosnian Croat forces intent on separating 
Muslim east Mostar from Croat west Mostar. Despite having previously worked to 
protect the Stari Most from Bosnian Serb shells, the Croatian Defence Council (HVO, 
the Bosnian Croat army) subjected the bridge to a sustained bombardment. Beginning 
on 8`h November, the HVO relentlessly shelled the bridge. Sarajevo newspapers 
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reported that by the time the Stari Most actually collapsed it had been hit by over sixty 
shells. 3 
The siege and destruction of the Stan Most became an exemplary event in the 
1992-95 Bosnian war. The destruction of this Ottoman bridge epitomised the violence 
that was consuming the former Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Images of 
the siege and destruction of the Stari Most captured the imaginations of observers of 
the conflict. Pictures of the bridge prior to destruction, clad in rubber tyres and a 
makeshift wooden roof, served as a metaphor for `ethnic division'. The notion that the 
former Yugoslavia was being forcibly `unmade' found graphic representation in such 
images of the assault on a bridge literally linking east and west 4 The final collapse of 
the single-span stone bridge into the river it had spanned for over four hundred years, 
was captured on video by local news media and broadcast around the world. The 
fleeting image of the end of this outstanding example of cultural heritage became an 
icon of the savagery and tragedy of the 1992-95 Bosnian war. The footage of 
crumbling stone represented in a concise and vivid manner the failure of both 
international and Bosnian attempts to contest nationalism and maintain a `multi- 
ethnic' state. Furthermore, for those attempting to contest nationalism in Bosnia, the 
images of the collapse of the bridge were representative of the violence with which the 
division of Bosnia was being accomplished. 
The destruction of a structure as prominent and photogenic as the Stari Most 
served to highlight the campaign against the urban fabric of Bosnia that had seemingly 
become a feature of so-called `ethnic cleansing'. In Sarajevo, the National Library and 
the Oriental Institute were destroyed by Bosnian Serb shells. The shells set the 
National Library alight and as the collections burnt, the people of Sarajevo attempted 
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to save the books by hand. These events became landmarks in the siege of Sarajevo. 
Concerned observers mourned the loss of valuable collections of manuscripts, at a loss 
to understand the mentality of those who could, at the end of the twentieth century, 
bum books. In both cases the buildings were targeted deliberately and nearby 
buildings were left relatively untouched. 5 This deliberate targeting of landmark 
buildings was confirmed even by those who were shelling Sarajevo: 
[I]n September 1992, BBC reporter Kate Adie interviewed Serbian 
gunners on the hillsides overlooking Sarajevo and asked them why they 
had been shelling the Holiday Inn, the hotel where all of the foreign 
correspondents were known to stay. The officer commanding the guns 
apologised profusely, explaining they had not meant to hit the hotel, but 
had been aiming at the roof of the National Museum behind it. 6 
The National Museum was badly damaged, though its collections survived. The 
apologies of the Bosnian Serb gunners highlighted the manner in which buildings 
themselves had become the targets of the ethnic cleansers. 
Across Bosnia mosques were destroyed by both Bosnian Serb and Bosnian 
Croat forces. Catholic and Orthodox churches were also attacked, though with less 
vigour. A pattern emerged in the destruction of mosques. Typically a mosque would 
be targeted for shelling, despite its lack of strategic significance. After occupation of 
the town the mosque would be dynamited, and in some cases the rubble removed. In 
this way the urban environment was ethnically cleansed. The physical traces of a 
multi-cultural history were removed, creating green fields, or car parks, in their wake. 
Such was the fate of the Ferhadija Mosque in Banja Luka. On the 6`h May 
1993 the Ferhadija mosque was destroyed by an explosion. Witnesses alleged that the 
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Bosnian Serb army was responsible: the streets around the mosque had been closed 
off and army trucks were seen in front of the mosque. After the initial explosion the 
minaret remained standing. However, the Bosnian Serb authorities determined that the 
minaret would be demolished as it was unsafe. The minaret was demolished after 
midnight on the 8d' May. The remains of the mosque were removed by trucks and the 
vacant lot turned into a car park. 7 Attempts to rebuild this mosque subsequent to the 
signing of the Dayton Agreement have been continually stalled by Bosnian Serb 
nationalists! 
However, it is not only symbolic buildings or significant elements of Bosnian 
cultural heritage that have been targeted for destruction. The urban fabric of Bosnia 
has come under a relentless assault. As Nicholas Adams notes, along with `mosques, 
churches [and] synagogues', `markets, museums, libraries, cafes, in short, the places 
where people gather to live out their collective life, have been the focus of... attacks' 9 
In Sarajevo the list of target buildings circumscribed the central post office, apartment 
buildings, office buildings and markets. In Mostar the old town or Stari Grad, was 
shelled continuously following the beginning of ethnic cleansing by the HVO 
summer 1992. Moreover, in Mostar the Stazi Most was merely the most famous (and 
the last) of all the bridges to be destroyed. The bridges across the Neretva, as 
elsewhere, were not simply rendered impassable but razed to the ground. Throughout 
Bosnia entire villages have been reduced to rubble by either burning or dynamite. 
The 1992-95 Bosnian war was, however, characterised by what many 
observers have argued to be genocide carried out by the Bosnian Serbs against the 
Bosnian Muslims, or `Bosniacs'. 10 The violent logics of ethnic cleansing dominated 
the political imaginaries of those who sought to either intervene or understand the 
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conflict. The problematics that shaped both understandings of the war itself and 
concomitant attempts to provide humanitarian assistance or negotiate settlements were 
predicated upon images and events concerning the destruction of human life, the 
displacement of individuals or groups or the misery that human hatred can bring 
about. Thus news reports and academic accounts of the Bosnian war have concerned 
themselves largely with key events such as the bread queue or market massacres 
which highlighted the desperate situation of the people of Sarajevo and the failures of 
western interventions to bring about an end to the siege of the city. Reports such as 
ITN's from the concentration camps of Omarska and Trnopolje became iconic of the 
suffering of the people of Bosnia, images of starved Bosniac men staring out at the 
camera from behind barbed wire resonated with representations of the Holocaust. " 
The dominance of human miseries in our political imaginary has been further 
reinforced by reports such as that prepared by the United Nations concerning the siege 
and fall of the Safe Area of Srebrenica. 12 In short, understandings of and interventions 
into the Bosnian war have been refracted through an anthropocentric political 
imaginary. 
The rubble of Bosnia has been similarly seen through the lens of 
anthropocentrism. The destruction of the urban fabric of Bosnia has been interpreted 
as a phenomenon contingent to, and thus dependent upon, the violence perpetrated 
against the people of Bosnia. Thus the rubble of Bosnia is an element of genocide or 
war, rather than a phenomenon in its own right. And yet, as Kate Adie's interview 
with the Bosnian Serb Gunners shows we should be wary of `thinking in terms of 
"collateral damage, " incidental to the general mayhem of warfare'. 13 The urban fabric 
of Bosnia was targeted deliberately, a fact attested to by the manner in which the 
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violence against the architecture of Bosnia was disproportionate to the task of killing 
the people of Bosnia. This is the significance of the number of missiles used to destroy 
the Stan Most. In hitting a strategically insignificant, impassable, and effectively 
defaced, bridge with such excessive force the HVO indicated that this violence was 
intended to destroy the building itself. The bridge was the target and nothing less than 
its collapse would satisfy the HVO. 
`It is the expected thing to say that people come first, ' notes Nicholas Adams. 
`And they do, but the survival of architecture and urban life are important to the 
survival of people. ' 14 The destruction of the urban fabric of Bosnia poses questions 
equally as fundamental as those posed by the destruction of human life in Bosnia. Our 
political imaginaries are dominated by images of politics as the preserve of powerful 
elites and violent militias. We perceive the political problems of Bosnia to lie in the 
negotiations between the representatives of governments, in war crimes prosecutions 
and attempts to encourage the people of Bosnia to enter into (or remain in) a multi- 
cultural state. And yet the fundamental question for Bosnia is that of sharing a 
common space. Insofar as this is the demand made upon all those who observe, 
intervene in, or live in Bosnia it can only be achieved if a common space exists. The 
destruction of urban fabric is the destruction of a common space, and the attendant 
possibility of sharing such space. This is the logic of the destruction that is most 
dramatically highlighted in the collapse of the Stari Most, the `secret' that Aida 
Mu. anovic saw revealed in the ashes that fell from the burning National Library. 
In the destruction of the Stari Most can be seen the central problematic of the 
political: the constitution of community. Insofar as it is the condition of possibility for 
our being with others, the sharing of common space underpins community. Moreover 
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insofar as this community is constituted in such shared spaces, it is an agonistic, or 
heterogeneous, coexistence. That is, it is a heterogeneous ensemble of 
identity\difference gathered in common space(s). 15 The networks of identity and 
difference found in such spaces are agonistic insofar as they comprise a constant 
provocation of identity by difference. In these shared spaces identity is constituted in 
and through the differences with which it coexists. In these spaces identity and 
difference are in a mutually constitutive relationship. Insofar as identity can only be 
differentiated from its others by an exclusion of such otherness (a delineation of the 
boundaries of self and other), this coexistence comprises a constant relationship of 
agonistic provocation with difference: a perpetual exclusion/differentiation demanded 
by the continual and mutually constitutive presence of difference. 
This agonism of identity\difference is precisely what constitutes community, or 
being with others. Community is precisely this experience of being with difference, 
with others who are distinguishable as such. And this community is what we also call 
political insofar as the political can be said to comprise the delineation and 
contestation of the bounds of self and other, identity and difference. As I will note in 
Chapters 5 and 6, it is precisely this heterogeneous, agonistic community that marks 
our experience of the political. 16 
If, therefore, it is in and through shared spaces that the networks of identity 
and difference that characterise the political are constituted, the destruction of the 
urban fabric of Bosnia (and, hence, of such spaces) poses the fundamental question Of 
how `we' (as an agonistic community) are to live together, and what it is that 
constitutes the possibility of such living together. It is these questions that I intend to 
address in the following argument. I hope that through an examination of the `secret' 
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revealed in the destruction of the urban fabric of Bosnia, and the Stari Most in 
particular, it will be possible to delineate the manner in which common space (or 
spatiality in general) constitutes the condition of possibility of community, which is, 
in turn, that in which the experience of the political is possible. In this respect Martin 
Heidegger's understanding of Being-in-the-world as a fundamental Being-with-others 
will be central to my argument. In his account of `dwelling', Heidegger argues that 
buildings constitute existence as fundamentally shared. Destroying buildings thus 
comprises an assault on that which constitutes our `dwelling', or existence, as a shared 
event. I want to commence, however, with a detailed consideration of the destruction 
of the Stan Most as an exemplar of the destruction of urban fabric. 
The Bridge 
Source: Encurtu Online" 
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Mostar is a small town in western Herzegovina, the southern province of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina [See Appendix 1, Figure 1]. 18 It lies to the south-west of the 
capital Sarajevo, straddling the River Neretva (which runs from North to South) at a 
narrow point in the Neretva canyon. The Neretva has acted historically as an 
apparently natural barrier to movement from east to west across Bosnia. The river 
canyon thus divides off eastern Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria and, 
ultimately Turkey, from western Herzegovina and the Adriatic Coast. Though there is 
a long history of settlement in the Neretva valley, Mostar itself developed precisely 
because it was the site of a bridge across the Neretva which provided a route by which 
traders, travellers, and armies could pass from East to West and vice versa. '9 Thus it is 
only with the building of a bridge that the town of Mostar really began to develop. 
According to historians, there has been a bridge at Mostar since medieval 
times. The earliest record of a bridge is in 1452.20 This medieval bridge was wooden, 
`suspended from chains' and, according to the historian and geographer Katib celebi, 
`swayed to such an extent that people feared for their lives in crossing it'21 The bridge 
was constructed to `meet the needs of regional traffic'. Such traffic included `Turkish 
troops [who] crossed it when conquering western Herzegovina and Dalmatia', and 
presumably traders taking goods to the Adriatic coast to be shipped to ports around the 
Mediterranean. 22 Jezernik contends that the precarious construction of the wooden 
bridge conditioned the early development of Mostar. Though settlement occurred on 
both banks of the river around the ends of the bridge, the town developed on the left, 
or eastern bank. The development of residential districts and markets on the left bank 
is attributed to the fact that only those who needed to cross the bridge actually did. 
9 
The state of the bridge brought much of the flow of traffic to a halt at the eastern end 
of the bridge, resulting in the accumulation of settlers. This account would seem to 
indicate that the flow of traffic in the region was principally from east to west (which 
is indeed the direction in which the colonising forces of the Ottoman empire flowed at 
that time). The bridge was both the possibility of such a flow, and yet inhibited it in 
such a way as to lead to a concentration of settlement on the left, eastern bank. 
Mostar came under Ottoman rule from the latter half of the fifteenth centtury24 
By the middle of the sixteenth century the wooden bridge had become impassable and 
so the citizens of Mostar asked the Sultan Suleiman (1520-1566) `to authorise the 
building of a better, more substantial bridge across the Neretva'. 25 This bridge was 
built according to the plans of Mimar (architect) Haireddin, and was completed in 
1566. The bridge itself was a single span stone structure, measuring 28.7 metres 
wide. 26 The span stood some 19 meters above the river. 27 At either end of the bridge 
were stone towers (which stand to this day). The bridge was referred to as the `Great 
Bridge', and later, after the building of further bridges over the Neretva, came to be 
known as the `Old Bridge' (`Stara Most'). From the eighteenth century to the early 
twentieth century, Western historians attributed the building of the bridge to the 
Romans. This attribution is part of a larger, orientalist prejudice against the Turks: a 
refusal to credit them with building such a magnificent structure. 28 However, at the 
time of the destruction of the bridge it was admired as `one of the most beautiful and 
famous achievements of the Golden Age of Turkish architecture in the Balkans' 29 
Ottoman rule changed the urban environment of Bosnia. 30 The Stari Most, 
which carried the main route to the Adriatic coast over the river Neretva, brought 
about the development of Mostar as a regional centre. Now that the river could be 
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crossed easily and in safety, the settlement on the left bank of the Neretva spread onto 
the right bank. The bridge itself was built by a heterogeneous group of craftsmen. The 
project was overseen by the local representatives of the Ottoman empire but actually 
executed by `engineers and artisans' from a range of cultural backgrounds. 1 For Sells, 
the multi-cultural composition of the workforce is symbolic, a portent of the multi- 
cultural town that Mostar became under Ottoman, and later Austro-Hungarian rule. 
That the Bridge, which was the condition of possibility for the development of this 
multi-cultural community was, itself, the product of a heterogeneous workforce, is 
fittingly symbolic. 
The building of the Stari Most was fundamental to the town of Mostar in 
several ways: as the condition of possibility of its development from a small hamlet 
into a town in the first place; as a focal point for the everyday life of the town; and in 
terms of the symbolic presence (to itself and others) of Mostar as a community. It is 
possible to illustrate the `fundamental' role that the Stan Most played in several 
examples. 
Firstly, the building of the bridge preceded the establishment of a settlement 
that could truly be called a `town'. Jezemik notes that the bridge's `very existence 
conditioned the gradual concentration of the population' into a town. 32 `Existence' 
here can be read as referring both to the (mere) presence of the bridge across the 
Neretva and to its state of repair. As I have already noted, until the building of the 
stone bridge the crossing was dangerous, and, as the majority of traffic was from East 
to West, the settlement of Mostar was established on the Left/Eastern bank of the 
river. The building of the Stari Most had a profound effect on the settlement on the 
eastern bank of the Neretva. It made possible the expansion of the settlement onto the 
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western bank. For the settlement to become a town expansion would need to occur. 
Moreover, if expansion were to occur it would be because of the increasing 
importance of the settlement at Mostar. The bridge guaranteed this importance by 
providing a valuable river crossing over the Neretva. The Stari Most thus ensured the 
emergence of Mostar as a regional centre. Moreover, as the settlement expanded, the 
Stari Most made it possible to call this community - effectively divided into two by 
the Neretva canyon - one, single town. 
Secondly, the bridge gave a name to this growing community. Originally it had 
been thought that the name `Mostar' was a shortening of `Most-star', or `old bridge'. 
However, two points problematise this explanation of the derivation of Mostar. 
Firstly, as a name `Stan Most', or `Old Bridge', did not come into usage until the 
eighteenth century (before that the bridge was referred to as the `Great Bridge'), and 
secondly the name `Mostar' predates the building of the Stari Most itself (the bridge 
being built in 1566, and first recorded mention of the town of Mostar being in 1469). 33 
Accounts that attributed the building of the bridge to the Romans explained the 
derivation of Mostar from Most-star as evidence that there had been an ancient, 
Roman bridge at this point over the Neretva. These accounts argued that the derivation 
of Mostar from Most-star was not related to the current usage of Stari Most to refer to 
the Great Bridge. Rather Most-star was a literal translation of `Pons vetus', the Roman 
for old bridge. 34 These derivations of the name Mostar were however challenged by 
the Russian linguist Gil'ferding. Gil'ferding's account of the origin of the name 
Mostar is significant insofar as it makes the existence of a bridge the central aspect in 
the naming of the community of Mostar. 
12 
Gil'ferding noted that the derivation of Mostar from Most-star was not in 
accordance with the patterns followed by Slavic languages for the derivation of place 
names (if anything the Slavic place name derived from `old bridge' would have been 
Starimost) 35 Gil'ferding argued that the town of Mostar had evolved around the old 
bridge and that, in accordance with the patterns of Slavic place-naming, the 
inhabitants had referred to themselves as `Mostari', or `bridge keepers' (the shortening 
to `Mostar' is then logical). The use of `Mostari' to refer to the inhabitants predicates 
the evolution of the town of Mostar upon the existence of the bridge across the 
Neretva. Originally this term would have referred to the garrisons that protected and 
controlled this vital trade route. However, it appears that the use of this term was 
broadened out to include the inhabitants of the town. The mostari, or inhabitants of 
Mostar were thus, collectively `keepers of the bridge'. 36 All of these explanations of 
the derivation of Mostar draw upon the existence of a bridge as the central, 
constitutive characteristic of the town. This naming thus established the centrality of 
the bridge over the Neretva in constituting the community of Mostar. 37 
Thirdly, it is also possible to note how the bridge became a focus for the 
everyday life of the town of Mostar. `A number of customs and practices 
were ... connected with the Old Bridge', most famously that of the young men of the 
town jumping from the top of the parapet into the river below. 38 This was a ritual 
which developed into a tourist attraction, with children earning money from visitors 
for their `daring' jumps. 9. This practice continued after the destruction of the bridge, 
the jumps being made from the temporary bridge constructed by the NATO-led 
Stabilisation Force (SFOR). Other rituals also focused on this structure. One account 
of the centrality of the bridge to the life of Mostar suggests that it was traditional for 
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the bridegroom to carry his bride over the bridge 40 The bridge itself was originally 
guarded by a garrison stationed in its towers. This garrison had its own space for 
religious observance (a mesjid) in the tower on the left bank. Until the occupation of 
Bosnia by the Austro-Hungarian empire in 1878, The garrison muezzin `called 
worshippers to prayer while standing on the highest point of the bridge' 4' 
Finally, the Stari Most was fundamental to the symbolic presence of the 
community of Mostar. The `Old Bridge' as a monumental building that could be 
visited, seen, or conserved became synonymous with the town of Mostar. One visited 
Mostar to see or cross this bridge. The bridge itself was taken to represent the essence 
of Mostar -a town composed of two parts divided by a river canyon, united by this 
spectacular bridge that in its very construction bore witness to the multi-cultural 
character of the community of Mostar. The bridge thus spoke to Mostari's, 
symbolising the tradition of multi-cultural co-existence that constituted the 
community in which they lived. The symbolic nature of the Stari Most for the 
inhabitants of Mostar can be seen in the work of Amir Pasic, a Mostari architect who 
has campaigned for the rebuilding of the bridge. For Pasic, despite the present 
condition in which it finds itself, Mostar is a community whose history exemplifies 
the ideal of multi-cultural life that the Dayton Agreements are supposed to embody. In 
Pasic's writing the Stari Most is the symbolic representation of this ideal, and the 
rebuilding of the bridge represents the resurrection and restoration of multi- 
culturalism. 42 
Moreover, the Old Bridge (and by extension the town of Mostar that it had 
constituted) was taken to circumscribe, and represent, a history and ethos that was 
characteristically Bosnian. This bridge served as a sign to `the world' of Bosnia's rich 
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cultural heritage. The Stari Most, interchangeable with the name `Mostar', symbolised 
the achievements of `Bosnian' culture in a similar manner to the way in which Big 
Ben (a landmark that is interchangeable with the name `London') represents Britain 
and its culture. The Stari Most thus became a prolific sign, circulating in everyday 
representations of both Mostar and Bosnia-Herzegovina. As an image it appeared on 
Bosnian postage stamps and bank notes, tourist literature, and book covers. For 
example, the Old Bridge appears on the Ten Dinara banknote [See Appendix 1, Figure 
2]. This image had many meanings, each according to the context in which it 
appeared. In tourist literature the image of the bridge (an image which referred to a 
site of historical, cultural, and aesthetic interest) was substituted for the town itself. 
`Come and visit Mostar' was enounced as `Come and see the Stari Most'. On Bosnian 
postage stamps and bank notes the image of the Stari Most served to indicate to 
`Bosnians' the rich (shared) heritage of `their' nation. The Stari Most stood as an 
achievement in which it was right to have a certain `national pride'. The circulation of 
this symbol with such frequency served to make the Stari Most into the `soul and 
mind' - its reason (ratio and cause) - of the `body' of the town of Mostar. 
43 
Division(s) 
The Stari Most itself had already suffered attacks from the Bosnian Serb army 
during the early stages of the Bosnian war. The Bosnian Serbs had both shelled the 
bridge and made it impassable due to sniper fire before they were forced into retreat in 
late 1992. However, it was the second phase of the war, in which the Bosnian Croats 
turned on their former Bosnian Muslim allies, that was the most vicious. In a move 
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sponsored by Croatian president Franjo Tudjman, the HVO became the instrument by 
which the territory occupied by the Bosnian Croats would become the statelet of 
`Herceg-Bosna'. Herceg-Bosna would be a `homeland' for the Bosnian Croats, 
eventually joined to the `homeland' of Croatia itself. Mostar was to be the capital of 
this entity. 44 But in order for this to be possible, the future capital of Herceg-Bosna 
had to be cleansed of `non-Croats'. Thus from May 1993 Bosnian Muslims/Bosniacs 
were expelled from the west/right bank of Mostar. In effect this meant that most 
Bosnian Muslims/Bosniacs fled west Mostar fearing for their lives, although a 
substantial number were murdered, sent to concentration camps, or simply 
disappeared 45 This forcing of the town's Bosnian Muslims into the old part of the 
town effectively created a ghetto. 46 For the next six months this ghetto was subjected 
to one of the most intense siege bombardments of the Bosnian war. 
When the Stari Most itself became impassable due to sniper fire, the town was 
effectively divided: Bosnian Croats on the western/right bank, Bosn 
Muslims/Bosniacs on the eastern/left bank. A framework of wood and tyres had been 
erected by Bosnian Muslim residents of Mostar around the Stari Most in order to try 
and save it from destruction. However, the Stari Most was the last structure bearing 
witness to a unified (and, therefore, `ethnically mixed') Mostar. Hence, on 8t' 
November 1993 the HVO began shelling the Stari Most. The shelling continued 
through to 9th November, when, at 10.15 am, the bridge collapsed. 47 In this way the 
HVO destroyed the last remaining testament to the ethnically mixed character of 
Mostar and created the conditions under which they could claim an ethnic 
separateness from the Bosnian Muslims. After the Dayton Agreement, Mostar was so, 
bitterly divided that it was placed under European Union administration, and a plan 
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was drawn up for its reunification (and the restoration of its pre-war ethnically mixed 
character). This plan has, up to this point, been thwarted by the Bosnian Croats (who 
have achieved their aims and have no intention of ceding territory) 48 The gap left by 
the Stari Most has been temporarily bridged by SFOR to provide a point of crossing 
over the Neretva. In late September 1997 a stone from the Stari Most was 
symbolically raised by an SFOR team. This was supposed to signal the rebuilding of 
the bridge as part of a plan to reintegrate the town. However, the plan to rebuild the 
bridge has been contested and, though most of the masonry has been recovered from 
the Neretva, the bridge has not been rebuilt. 49 
The bridge as exemplary event 
The siege and destruction of the Stari Most was, for many of those who 
observed the unfolding conflict, a symbol of the Bosnian War itself. The 
collapsing/collapsed Stan Most was an image which immediately communicated to 
the world the finality with which Bosnia was being divided/partitioned. It was a 
superlative demonstration of the manner in which ethnic cleansing constituted an 
erasure of identity from territory. Susan Woodward, for example, used a picture of the 
beleaguered bridge, clad in a wooden framework and hung with tyres, on the front 
cover of Balkan Tragedy, her study of the disintegration of Yugoslavia [See Appendix 
1, Figure 3]. 50 This image is burdened with the representation of both Bosnia and its 
war. This single image is taken to represent the destruction and division of a country 
with a rich and diverse cultural heritage. 
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The Stari Most was taken by many observers to symbolise the history and 
achievements of Bosnian society. The bridge's history condensed in one structure the 
hybridity of Bosnian society. Built by the Ottoman Empire, linking the territories east 
of the river to those west of the river, the bridge spanned and bound together 
supposedly heterogeneous cultural communities. " The Stari Most thus represented for 
many people not only the town of Mostar, but the nature of Bosnian society. Bosnia 
was seen as a bridge between the European West and the Ottoman East where 
Orthodox, Catholic, Muslim communities co-existed: a meeting place in which these 
cultures were bound into one multi-cultural society. 52 In being established as that 
which captured the essence of Bosnian culture, the Stari Most was thus elevated to the 
status of cultural monument. It was taken to represent the common heritage of all 
Bosnian. As an example of cultural heritage it was taken to express the highest 
achievements of Bosnian culture. Moreover, it was acclaimed by many people as an 
exemplary achievement of human culture. 53 The Stari Most was thus a symbol of the 
heritage of humanity, an exemplar of the manner in which heterogeneous groups are 
united into communities. This metaphor of bridging that found concrete form in the 
Stari Most, exercised a strong grip upon the political imaginaries of those who 
observed, participated in, and fell victim to the Bosnian conflict. It was hoped that the 
image of the bridge, spanning, and thus uniting, separate groups could serve as the 
guiding principle by which the heterogeneous communities of Bosnia could be bound 
into a multi-cultural state. 
The assault on the Stari Most placed such hopes in jeopardy. The images of the 
eventual destruction of the bridge were taken by observers to constitute a radical 
problematisation of all that the Stari Most had previously symbolised. As the arch 
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collapsed, so too it seemed did all that the bridge had represented: a common Bosnian 
heritage; a united, rather than divided, community; human achievement; and the 
possibility of multi-cultural co-existence. For observers of the Bosnian war the 
destruction of the Stari Most thus condensed, in a series of graphic images, the proof 
that Bosnia was, as the prevalent political imaginary held, a dark and primitive place 
in which it was no longer possible for supposedly separate ethnic groups to live 
together peacefully. Images of the siege and destruction of the Stari Most were thus 
taken to represent all that was at stake in Bosnia: multi-cultural society; continued co- 
existence; common humanity. In this way images of the collapse of a four hundred 
year old bridge became exemplary, even iconic, of the Bosnian war. 
The act of destruction itself seemed, for observers of the Bosnian war, to 
exemplify the logics of violence of the Bosnian war. Insofar as the bridge was 
recognised as an outstanding example of Bosnian cultural heritage it represented the 
highest achievement of Bosnian society. Its history captured the complexity and multi- 
ethnicity of Bosnian society. Destruction of the Stari Most epitomised the manner in 
which the history of co-existence that characterised Bosnian society was being 
forcibly erased. Moreover, since the bridge was recognised as being part of the 
common heritage of humanity, the destruction brought about by the HVO gunners was 
deemed by many observers of the conflict to be an assault upon humanity itself. In 
destroying a building deemed to express the highest possible achievements of which 
human society is capable, the HVO were taken to be declaring that humanity and its 
achievements were no longer of any concern to them in their fight to create the mini- 
statelet of Herceg-Bosna. 
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The act of destruction was thus taken by many observers to demonstrate the 
barbarity of the Bosnian war. The very act of destruction itself resonated with 
savagery. The destruction of a 400 year old bridge that held little or no strategic value 
was taken to be excessive. This excess was confirmed in the manner in which the 
HVO shelled the bridge until it collapsed. The bridge itself had been impassable for 
some time (due to the damage inflicted by sporadic shells and the continual exposure 
to sniper fire of those attempting to cross the bridge). There was, therefore, no need to 
actually destroy it. The HVO action seemed vindictive and cruel and thus bore the 
hallmarks of savagery. 
The destruction was also taken by observers of the conflict to be an exemplary 
instance of the emerging war on culture that was integral to the process of ethnic 
cleansing. Ethnic cleansing was not accomplished simply by the killing or 
displacement of those ethnic groups that threatened the homogeneity of a given ethnic 
territory. The destruction of cultural property was integral to the campaign to create 
homogenous ethnic communities. Thus the seemingly savage and wanton destruction 
of symbolic buildings went hand in hand with massacres and displacement. This led to 
the destruction of urban fabric on a massive scale in Bosnia, well beyond what might 
be expected as collateral damage from a campaign to `cleanse' a territory, or as 
acceptable damage from the targeting of strategically important structures. 
The destruction of symbolic buildings and other cultural artefacts can be 
understood, following Andras Riedlmayer, as a process of `killing memory' 54 In 
destroying the Stari Most, Riedlmayer argues, the HVO were destroying the historical 
record, or collective memory, of the co-existence that had characterised Bosnian 
society for over 400 years. The destruction of the Stari Most is exemplary in this 
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regard for the clarity with which it displays such destruction of the collective memory 
of co-existence. The bridge itself had united the town enabling it to develop. All 
citizens had used the bridge in their daily lives and shared in rituals based around it. 
As such, the bridge held a rich symbolic position in all of their lives. To destroy the 
bridge is to deny this shared history. And this co-existence must be violently denied if 
one wants to build a new history based on the impossibility of co-existence and the 
demand for separate territories. Once the Neretva gorge stood, unbridged, between the 
Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims, the idea of separate communities possessing 
separate territories, looked much more natural. Nor could this separateness be 
contended, as the symbols that bore witness to the history of co-existence had 
disappeared. 
However, the deliberate destruction of the urban environment in the Bosnian 
war was not limited to such symbolic buildings. The destruction of the Stari Most 
concluded and represented a long campaign by Bosnian Serb and HVO gunners 
against the urban fabric of Mostar. Such destruction was, as I noted above, repeated in 
towns and villages across Bosnia. This violence is not easily subsumable, or indeed 
understandable, under the rubric of `genocide'. The argument for the inclusion of the 
destruction of symbolic buildings in the definition of genocide holds only insofar as 
those buildings provide what might be held to be the symbolic underpinnings of a 
distinct group. The ruthless onslaught against the common urban property of Bosnia 
has a different quality. Hotels and public offices, streets and squares were shared 
spaces, rather than the symbolic underpinnings of a specific national group. 55 
This violence against urban fabric is the most enigmatic element of the 
Bosnian war. The siege and destruction of the Stari Most neatly captures the opacity 
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of such violence. The reason, or logic, behind the wanton destruction of buildings that 
have no apparent strategic (or symbolic) significance is not immediately apparent 
(which explains the sense of waste we feel watching such buildings bum). Such 
violence can of course be taken as an index of, or metaphor for, barbarity. Moreover, 
insofar as it applies to symbolic buildings, the destruction can be understood as an 
integral component of genocide. However, such interpretations base their 
understanding of the reason for destroying a building on only one of the roles it 
performed: its significance as expression of the achievements of civilisation; or its 
role in the symbolic underpinnings of a `national or ethnical group'. Furthermore, all 
such interpretations are contestable. The relentless, seemingly excessive destruction of 
urban fabric captured in the image of the collapsing Stari Most poses a far more 
fundamental question. Beyond the interpretation of the destruction as either 
metaphorically representative, or instrumental in achieving an end, the collapse of the 
Stari Most poses the question of the meaning of the violence directed specifically at 
the urban fabric, and thus the shared spaces, of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Moreover this 
violence raises wider questions about the more general meaning of the destruction of 
shared spaces and the co-existence they make possible. 
`A Mostar Bridge Elegy' 
Shortly after its destruction, Croatian writer Slavenka Draculio wrote an 
4 56 obituary' for Mostar's Stari Most in the New Republic. Draculid's `Elegy' has 
exercised a strong grip on the imagination of those who have sought to understand the 
meaning of the destruction of the Old Bridge. Both Pasic and UNESCO have seen 
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DraculiE's thoughts as an evocative enunciation of the fundamental issues that lie 
behind the destruction of the bridges' The article itself is a meditation on the 
significance of the destruction of the Stari Most. DraculiE's thoughts concerning the 
disjuncture of memory which occurs when a thing disappears forever are a fascinating 
reflection on the constitution of identity through heritage. However, the aspect of 
principle relevance for the present discussion is Draculid's interpretation of the 
meaning of the destruction of the Stari Most. In particular, it is Draculio's 
consideration of what the Stari Most, as an element of the urban fabric, is, and her 
comments on the HVO (as those responsible for the eventual destruction of the Stari 
Most) which are of interest. 
Writing about the relation between a photograph of the space left between the 
two banks of the Neretva by the collapse of the Stari Most and a photograph of a 
Bosnian Muslim woman with her throat cut (after the massacre at Stupni Doi), 
Draculie asks, `Why do I feel more pain looking at the image of the destroyed bridge 
than the image of the woman? 59 She goes on to reply: 
Perhaps it is because I see my own mortality in the collapse of the 
bridge, not in the death of the woman. We expect people to die. We 
count on our own lives to end. The destruction of a... [bridge]... is 
something else. The bridge.. . was built to outlive us; it was an attempt 
to grasp eternity. Because it was the product of both individual 
creativity and collective experience, it transcended our individual 
destiny. A dead woman is one of us - but the bridge is all of us. 59 
At first glance, this assertion appears counterintuitive: it seems to contradict our most 
deeply held values. Our immediate reaction is one of scandal. Draculid's assertion 
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requires us to accept that it is possible for the destruction of a building to be more 
significant that the death of a human being. Indeed Draculic's comments are a radical 
challenge to the anthropocentric perspective from which destruction in Bosnia has 
been viewed. Her remarks require an inversion of that understanding of the world 
which portrays subjects living out their lives centre-stage against an ephemeral 
background. Instead, Draculie is suggesting that it is `life' which is ephemeral and that 
the `world' must be understood as being constituted by that which was previously 
thought to be the mere background for activity: buildings. Thus Draculid is arguing 
that it is not sufficient to regard the bridge as a part of a material backdrop against 
which lives are played out, or as equipment instrumental to the pursuance of this `life'. 
In order to make this argument Draculio focuses on the specificity of the destruction 
of this bridge, in an attempt to understand its meaning. 
For Draculib the Stari Most was more than a simple thing which satisfied a set 
of needs and calculations. It was more than a response to the logistical problem of 
how to traverse a canyon. To see the Stan Most as such is to misunderstand what it is. 
For Draculid the bridge must be understood as something which is experienced 
collectively. This collective experience of the bridge is the key, for Draculie, to 
understanding the meaning of the Stari Most and its destruction. That which is 
experienced collectively is that which offers the collective the possibility of duration 
as a community: in short, both a future and a past. Draculio is arguing that, without the 
bridge as a collectively experienced structure, the community of Mostar does not have 
the possibility of being the particular, multi-cultural community that it had been prioir 
to November 1993. That particular community no longer has any durability and, 
hence, no future. Of course, when I say `that particular community' I am introducing a 
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level of discrimination that is seldom utilised in discussions of community. A 
community is not to be understood as a body with many possibilities (an amorphous 
potential with many actualities), rather each `possibility', each historically realised 
community, is a different community. The community of Mostar prior to 1993 is an 
utterly different one to the one extant in 1994. 
Thus when the bridge is destroyed it is the end of the future for that particular 
community. Now, I am not saying that `human life' (whatever that is) is unimportant. 
However, existence is only possible as a community (even `personal autonomy' is a 
mode of community insofar as it is defined as an absence of hindrance by those others 
with whom we co-exist). 60 The existence of the individual is in community, and the 
possibility of this community is founded on the structures that give that community its 
future. And so members of the community come and go within the frame of the 
durability, the possibility of the future, provided by this built structure. Draculid sums 
this up in the assertion `the bridge is all of us'. Only in this framework of `us' am `I' 
(`you'/`(s)he'/`it') possible. And, furthermore, the foundation of `us' is not to be 
found in some form of explicit or implicit contract, but in that which gives this 
particular `us' (in this case the `us' that comprised Mostar pre-November 1993) 
durability: the Stari Most (amongst other structures). This understanding of the Stari 
Most then informs Draculie's final comments concerning the HVO, the Bosnian 
Croats paramilitaries who destroyed the bridge. 
With respect to this act of destruction Draculie writes, 
What kind of people do not need that bridge? The only answer I can come 
up with is this: people who do not believe in the future - theirs or their 
children's - do not need such a bridge... This is why I would say that those 
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people - whoever they might be - do not belong to.. . civilisation, 
civilisation built on the idea of time, civilisation built on the idea of a 
future. 61 
In this bold condemnation of the HVO it is possible to see Draculie's attempt to 
understand the meaning of the destruction itself. Draculic locates the meaning of the 
destruction through the following argument: if existence is framed by community (`I' 
by `us'), and community only comes into being (has duration and thus a future) 
through building (collective experience), then what does it mean to negate the 
building which is the foundation of community and, hence, existence? 
Draculid concludes that HVO are, quite simply, not capable of such 
`existence'. They represent a `radically other' force - the meaning of which is the 
negation of existence itself. Again this appears to be counterintuitive and, thus, 
requires some explanation. How are we to understand the statement that the HVO are 
not capable of `existence'? The HVO `exist' insofar as there were soldiers, mortars, 
and shells. However, this is to confuse mere presence with 'existence'. 62 
This distinction between `presence' and `existence' can be understood as 
analogous to the way in which Heidegger draws a distinction between Being-in-the- 
world on the one hand, and deficient modes of Being on the other. 63 Being-in-the- 
world represents the mode of existence proper to Being whereas deficient modes of 
Being are those in which one or more aspects of Being-in-the-world are disavowed. 
`Existence' in this sense would comprise being in a community that has duration 
through the buildings it builds. Presence, however would be a disavowal of such 
duration and, hence community, and would thus be a deficient mode of existing. 
Presence in this sense would comprise simply living without the duration and 
26 
community that constitute existence. Thus I will rephrase Draculia's assertion to say 
that the actions of the HVO, who were undoubtedly present (even `living') at Mostar, 
can only be understood as the negation (or disavowal) of existence. 
Through Draculid's `Elegy' we have arrived at a very particular understanding 
of `existence' - one that focuses on the constitution of community as its condition of 
possibility: one that takes `existing' to occur only in a collective sense and then only 
when such a collective has a durability and thus a future. And, insofar as this is the 
case, this understanding takes building to be the condition of possibility of such 
`existence'. In the framework of this understanding, the negation enacted by the HVO 
is not simply a modality of, or event within, the community of Mostar pre-November 
1993 - it is its cessation. Of course, we have arrived at an understanding of existence 
which separates mere presence from existence, an understanding that argues that `life' 
is very much separate from `existence'. The destruction of a building, that which is t 
cornerstone of existence, puts `us' at stake: it challenges (and negates) existence Huy' 
And in negating the `us' that provides the context of existence it is a radical violence 
to those who are forced to live through the loss of the future of the community in 
which they invested their life, and from which they drew their identity. 
I would point out that I do not envisage any `existence' being singular and, 
exclusive of other `existences'. Obviously in the discussion of Draculic's `Elegy' I 
have simplified the case somewhat. `The world', of course, comprises many 
existences - just as it comprises many communities, and so it is possible to `live' 
through the destruction of any given existence. Most importantly, one can live through 
the cessation of `existence', and it is, perhaps, this fact that is the root of Dracutio's 
trauma with regard to the image of the collapsed bridge. TM In `living through' the 
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negation of a particular existence one is not cast into some primordial state of nature. 
Indeed being a member of one community is in no way exclusive of being part of 
other communities. As one existence is destroyed those who live through destruction 
still have the other communities they are members of. Although the multi-cultural 
community of Mostar pre-November 1993 was destroyed, those who lived through 
this event on the east bank of the Neretva were still part of a community of Bosnian- 
Muslims. Moreover, in the destruction of one particular existence there is the 
possibility for new existences/communities to arise. This is precisely what lies behind 
the HVO's actions: the cessation of a multi-cultural/multi-ethnic existence and the 
inauguration of a separate, wholly Bosnian Croat ethnic existence (Herceg Bosna). It 
is precisely this violent ending of one existence to inaugurate another that constitutes 
the heart of Draculio's trauma with regard to the destruction of the Stari Most. 
Moreover, Draculio does not only ascribe the trauma of living through the 
destruction of the existence of pre-November 1993 Mostar to the inhabitants of the 
locality of Mostar. Draculio, a Croatian writing in English for an Anglo-American 
audience, clearly indicates that the destruction of this bridge is also a trauma through 
which the various international communities of observers must live. In this rnarmer 
Draculio notes that buildings do not only provide the possibility of community in a 
particular locality, but also the possibility of the existence of global communities. The 
communities of observers that crystallised around the image of the collapsing bridge 
are constituted through the bridge or its destruction. This bridge constituted particular 
existences such as cultural heritage experts or those that worked for multi-cuhuratism. 
The destruction of this building is also the destruction of these 
communities/existences. Thus the destruction of buildings in Bosnia does not simply 
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affect Bosnians. The destruction of the urban fabric of Bosnia affects all those whose 
existences are constituted in some relation to Bosnia or the questions (of, for example, 
violence, ethics, or multi-culturalism) that it raises. 
Moreover, the questions raised by the destruction of urban fabric are not 
confined to Bosnia alone. A diverse number of instances of violence against the urban 
fabric such as that seen in the case of the Stari Most can be found. From the Roman 
obliteration of Carthage, through the division of Berlin and the destruction of 
Palestinian homes by Israeli security forces, to the annihilation of the Chechen capital 
Grozny by Russian forces in 1999/2000, destruction of the shared spaces that underpin 
community is evident. The questions raised by urban destruction issue, therefore, from 
a diverse number of locations. This wider occurrence of urban destruction does not 
dilute the questions raised by the case of the Stari Most. Indeed, these cases only make 
the questions raised by the destruction of shared space more insistent. Any account of 
the destruction of the urban fabric of Bosnia must, similarly be an account of such 
instances of destruction And, hence, the questions raised in Draculib's analysis have a 
wider applicability than Bosnia alone. I hope, therefore, in approaching these 
questions that my analysis will be productive in relation to such other cases of urban 
destruction beyond the borders of Bosnia. 
The argument 
My enquiry into the destruction of the urban fabric of Bosnia will begin, in 
Chapter 1, with a consideration of the manner in which this destruction could be said 
to comprise a campaign of violence against buildings. It is important to note at the 
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outset that destruction was not confined to specific, symbolic buildings. That is to say, 
whilst I have developed my argument from the destruction of the Stari Most, we 
should note that urban destruction is widespread and, hence, deserving of considered 
analysis. A nascent literature treats this campaign of violence through the concept of 
`urbicide'. 
Insofar as I have identified that it is shared spaces that are at stake in such 
destruction, I will then turn to consider how an analysis of such space should proceed. 
Space and spatiality have been treated in a number of ways by both philosophy and the 
social sciences. I will consider these treatments of space in order to identify the 
manner in which to proceed with an analysis of shared spaces. If it is shared spaces 
that are destroyed in urban destruction, two questions must be asked: 1) what it is that 
these shared spaces constitute such that they becomes a target?; and 2) what it is that 
is lost in the destruction of such spaces? I will suggest that it is in the work of Martin 
Heidegger that we find a treatment of spatiality that is particularly productive for such 
an analysis. 
I will then turn, in Chapter 2, to a detailed consideration of the concept of 
urbicide. I will, therefore, undertake a more detailed consideration of the historico- 
conceptual contours circumscribed by the term 'urbicide'. The framing of urbicide as 
a phenomenon distinct from genocide will be set out and the meaning of the 
collocation of `urban' with the epithet `-cide' will be examined. Then three 
interpretations of the destruction of buildings will be examined: the strategic; the 
symbolic; and the metaphorical. These three interpretations will then be refuted - it 
will be shown in more detail that the destruction in Bosnia exceeds the conceptual 
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frameworks of each interpretation. Urbicide will be reaffirmed as posing a 
fundamental question of existence. 
Chapter 3 will begin to address the fundamental questions of existence posed 
by urbicide. I will show how, according to Heidegger, buildings constitute the 
spatiality of existence as public and, hence, both shared and heterogeneous. I will then 
elaborate Heidegger's concept of `dwelling' in order to explain the manner in which 
building constitutes Being-in-the-world as a series of shared `locales'. These locales 
comprise relational networks and, since they are public/shared, are ineluctably open to 
alterity/heterogeneity. Insofar as this is the case, I will argue that Heidegger's account 
demonstrates the manner in which buildings are the condition of possibility of an 
existential spatiality that always already implicates us in a Being-with-others, or 
heterogeneity. The destruction of buildings is, hence, the destruction of the conditions 
of possibility of heterogeneity. This Heideggerian account raises a crucial question. 
Insofar as urbicide is the destruction of the conditions of possibility of heterogeneity 
we must ask both what the nature of this Being-with-others is and what its loss entails. 
In Chapter 41 will turn, therefore, to the nature of the Being-with-others that 
comprises an ineluctable feature of Heidegger's concept of the locale. I will suggest 
that Heidegger is making heterogeneity an existential condition. I will distinguish this 
approach from what I will call the `anthropocentric imaginary'. Anthropocentric 
accounts treat heterogeneity as an ancillary characteristic of existence and, hence, 
cannot properly get to grips with the destruction of shared space. I will then elaborate 
the manner in which Heidegger treats heterogeneity, or the `Being-with' that he takes 
to be an existential condition. I will note that since Being is always already with, it is 
always already implicated in community. However, at this point Heidegger's account 
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falters both tragically and unforgivably. Heidegger notes the implication of Being in 
community and yet identifies this community as a national one. Moreover, 
Heidegger's notion of community - of the Volk - is aligned with his avowal of the 
ideals of National Socialism. I will show, however, that it is not necessary to jettison 
the entire Heideggerian schema because of his avowal of Nazism. The questions of 
Being-with raised by Heidegger will be taken as a vital provocation for thinking about 
the heterogeneity lost in the destruction of buildings. 
Chapter 5 will address Jean-Luc Nancy's reconsideration of the Heideggerian 
theme of `Being-with'. I will examine Nancy's elaboration of a notion of community 
radically at odds with anthropocentric understandings of such heterogeneity. I will 
look at the Nancy's understanding of the manner in which the western metaphysics of 
presence (of which anthropocentrism is a variation) is an attempt to found community 
on a universal substance of being. Nancy refers to this understanding of community as 
`figuration'. Figuration proposes that community is comprised by beings who are 
substantially the same. Such communities are both exclusive and homogenising 
insofar as they must distance themselves from, and erase, difference that would 
contest the substantial basis on which they are founded. In contradistinction to such 
figured notions of community, Nancy turns to the notion of `being-with' to note that 
difference is an ineluctable condition of existence. In this sense Nancy argues that 
figuration is always already contested by alterity. I will then show how Nancy's 
understanding of being-with is productive in the consideration of urbicide. More 
specifically, I will show how the destruction of buildings comprises the attempt by 
figures to exclude difference and homogenise the figuration of community. 
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Finally, I will turn to consider the political stakes of urbicide. In the case of 
Bosnia, I will show how urbicide comprises an exclusionary and homogenising force 
that is integral to ethno-nationalism. I will look at the manner in which the buildings 
that constitute existence as a being-with tremble/resonate in multiple discourses. A 
building is not exhausted by any single figuration. Insofar as this is the case, urbicide 
attempts to appropriate buildings to one figurative discourse alone, in order to 
suppress the multiple meanings any given building might have. Where this is not 
possible urbicide destroys buildings in order to disavow being-with. I will also look at 
the way in which the destruction of heterogeneity effected in urbicide can be contested 
by reconstruction. Finally, I will turn to look at the manner in which my analysis of 
urbicide can provide productive insight into instances of urban destruction beyond the 
borders of Bosnia. 
My conclusion will focus on the manner in which the account I have outlined 
in the preceding argument offers a vigorous challenge to current, anthropocentric 
accounts of the 1992-95 Bosnian war. In this manner I hope to be able to provide an 
account of the politics of urbicide that will cast new light upon the assumptions that 
political theorists and international relations scholars have made concerning what is at 
stake in the destruction of urban fabric in Bosnia. Moreover, in linking Heidegger's 
spatial account of existence, with Nancy's account of community in order to generate 
a cogent critique of the anthropocentric bias of contemporary attempts to understand 
conflicts such as the 1992-95 Bosnian war, I hope to offer an original analysis 
concerning the recasting of the political. 
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CHAPTER 1 
THEORISING SPATIALITY 
The present epoch will perhaps be above all the epoch of space. We are in 
the epoch of simultaneity: we are in the epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch 
of near and far, of the side-by-side, of the dispersed. We are at a moment, 
I believe, when our experience of the world is less that of a long life 
developing through time than that of a network that connects points and 
intersects with its own skein. ' 
A Campaign of Violence 
It might appear extravagant to make claims - such as those I made in my 
account of Dracilid's `Mostar Bridge Elegy' - concerning `existence itself' n the 
basis of a single incident. 2 Such a lengthy meditation on the destruction of the Stari 
Most might even be seen as something of a luxury. It could be argued that, in the 
absence of a genuine understanding of the conflict, it is particularly revealing that 
observers found a focus for their distress in the desecration of an object valued for its 
aesthetic and historical value. Indeed, it might be argued, had such observers valued 
`life' above (ill conceived) ideas such as `heritage', or `culture', then responses to the 
war may not have been so inadequate. Such an argument is, of course, a form of 
philistinism because it reduces all objects to a level below that of `human life' and 
regards any valuing of objects (such as paintings, sculptures, books, buildings, and so 
on) as a luxury whilst there is still `human suffering' in the world. 3 Moreover, such an 
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argument misses the point of Draculic5's assertions. The `Elegy' is a consideration of 
the meaning of the destruction of the urban environment in this particular case: it is 
not an appreciation of the Stari Most in terms of its aesthetic or architectural merit 
(this would indeed have been frivolous and irresponsible). As such, the assertions 
made in the `Elegy' could be generalised as claims concerning what is at stake in 
every such case. 
If the Stari Most was believed to be an isolated case -a sort of `cuhural 
vandalism' perpetrated by an isolated group of rogue soldiers -a short consideration 
of the destruction wrought on the urban fabric of Bosnia would demonstrate 
otherwise. Indeed, though Mostar's Stari Most may be one of the most prominent 
images of the war in Bosnia, this image is, as I have noted above, merely exemplary of 
a extensive violence which permeated the entire war. 
Some observers have chosen to regard this extensive destruction of buildings, 
monuments, and cultural artefacts, as `cultural genocide'. " These acts of destruction, it 
is argued, whilst part of a program to intentionally destroy the cultural artefacts of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, are to be regarded as separate from genocide itself. This 
separation of `cultural' genocide from `human' genocide is intended to distinguish 
between the value of human life and the value of the artefacts humans produce. 
Destruction of mosques, churches, museums, bridges and so on may well be part of an 
organised program, but this program is separate to (though not necessarily unrelated 
to) the program of killing and displacement carried out by either the Bosnian Serbs or 
Bosnian Croats. 
However, Michael Sells, argues that this destruction should rightly be seen as 
an integral component of the program of genocide committed against the Bosnian 
Muslims. 5 Insofar as the 1948 Genocide Convention is used to define the act of 
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genocide, the destruction of symbolic buildings and cultural artefacts can be construed 
to be circumscribed by the `intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, 
racial or religious group'. 6 Even though such groups consist of the individual persons 
that comprise it, the sense of being a member of such a group is provided by a shared 
culture. To destroy the shared culture is a de facto destruction of the national group: it 
deprives individuals of the shared culture that provides the condition of possibility of 
there being a sense of belonging to a group. The destruction of the Stari Most is, 
therefore, understood by Sells to be an exemplary event in the genocide against the 
Bosnian Muslims. When taken together with the destruction of mosques in Mostar, 
Sarajevo, Banja Luka and elsewhere, the destruction of buildings such as the Stari 
Most can be held to be an organised attempt to destroy in whole or in part that which 
makes it possible to speak of Bosnian Muslims as an `ethnic group': their shared 
culture. 
However, both `cultural genocide' and `genocide' are unsatisfactory concepts 
with which to address the extensive destruction of urban fabric. Cultural genocide is 
not recognised as a crime against humanity by international legal norms and thus 
remains a marginalised concept. And accounting for urban destruction under the 
rubric of genocide means subordinating such destruction to the genocidal aim of 
destroying a people. That is, if understood as part of genocide, urban destruction is 
understood merely as a means to the end of the destruction of a group of people (a 
wholly anthropocentric subordination of the destruction of buildings). 
Given this, a nascent literature has addressed urban destruction as, for want of 
a better term, `urbicide'. 7 The concept of `urbicide' is intended redress the fact that 
assaults on material culture were excluded from the 1948 Genocide Convention. 
Moreover, `urbicide' is a better term than `cultural genocide' as it indicates an assault 
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on the fabric of the community - its urbanity: the fabric of community as co-existent 
space established in and through buildings. It is `urbicide' that is being considered in 
Draculio's `Elegy', albeit in the form of a single exemplary episode. Hence, it is 
`urbicide' that demands our attention for, if my interpretation Draculid is correct, it is 
nothing short of the constitution of `us' (and, hence, `I'/'(s)he'/'it', etc. ) which is at 
stake in this phenomenon. 
If my interpretation of Draculid's `Elegy' is correct, it is that which is 
constitutive of the conditions of possibility of existence which is at stake in urbicide. 
Moreover, following my argument, `existence' must be qualified to mean the specific 
configuration of a particular community, an `us' (which is always the condition of 
possibility of the `I'). And the condition of possibility of existence, that which is 
exterminated in urbicide, the buildings or urban fabric of Bosnia, constitute the shared 
space within which existence is possible. At stake in an enquiry into urbicide then is 
the constitution of shared space. The consideration of shared space is not a simple 
account of the spaces into which unitary rational agents are placed. Rather, this 
account of the constitution of shared space will be an account of the manner in which 
existence comes into being in and through spatialisation. And insofar as such 
spatialisation can be both inclusive and exclusive it can be shared in certain ways. At 
stake in the urbicide of Bosnia is the extermination of spaces of heterogeneous 
coexistence without which a multi-ethnic existence is impossible. 
The analysis of urbicide should be seen as a properly political enquiry since it 
concerns the conditions of possibility of politics. That is, insofar as buildings 
constitute shared space in which specific instances of existence occur, they comprise 
the conditions of possibility of the agonistic relations of identity\difference, the 
networks of self and other, that we designate as politics! Insofar as the urban 
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environment is the condition of possibility for the spatialities on which existence is 
predicated, then it is the constitution of spatiality that lies at the heart of the political. 
An enquiry into urbicide is then, an enquiry into the constitution of spatiality that lies 
at the core of the experience of the political. Moreover, such an enquiry reverses the 
priorities that have governed our understanding of the political demonstrating that the 
spatiality that was taken to be the backdrop for politics (man being the animal that is 
taken to posses the attribute of being-political) is in fact that which is constitutive of 
politics. 9 In order to commence an enquiry into the logics of urbicide it is therefore 
necessary to outline the specific manner in which I want to consider the constitution 
of shared space. 
From neutral medium to existential condition: theories of spatiality 
It has become common-place to talk of a `spatial turn' in the social sciences. 10 
The novelty of this supposed discovery of the importance of space might seem, from 
the perspective of the disciplines of political theory or international relations, 
somewhat contestable. For example, the academic study of international relations has 
been predicated upon spatial concepts, perhaps the most important of which is that of 
territorial sovereignty. Indeed the category of the `inter-national' is, insofar as it 
designates the interstices of a territorial system, explicitly spatial: `inter' being a 
spatial designation of the zone that lies beyond and between bounded territorial 
entities, in this case nation-states. Inter-national relations is thus a discipline that 
derives its constitutive intellectual assumptions from the spatialities of its primary 
category. As R. B. J. Walker has shown, the division between political theory and 
international relations that constrains the latter to the study of that which occurs 
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outside the territorial boundaries of national-sovereignty ('the domestic'), is 
constituted in the designation by international relations of the site of the political as 
inter-national. 11 Such a designation is explicitly spatial and establishes the zone 
outside of and between the bounds of the national as the site of politics. Anything that 
occurs outside of this space is not the proper object of study for the scholar of 
international relations. Moreover, political theory and international relations have for 
a long time premised their understandings of the central categories of sovereignty and 
governance upon the explicitly spatial concept of territory. Definitions of `the state' 
have held territory to be a defining dimension. Sovereignty likewise, is often taken to 
consist of the extension of government (or in Weber's now classic formulation, the 
possession of a monopoly of force) within particular territorial limits. 
However, neither political theory nor international relations have made any 
concerted effort to enquire into the assumptions that underpin the spatial categories on 
which they have been traditionally predicated. In this sense the spatial turn is 
significant insofar as it enquires into the nature of the spatialities upon which these 
disciplines have based their conceptual schemas. The concepts of territory and 
sovereignty as they are traditionally used in either political theory or international 
relations, rest on the notion that politics occurs in the context of a homogenous, 
uniform space that is divisible (or naturally divided) into sub-units. This space exists 
as the a priori of political/social existence. Moreover though this space may be said 
(in somewhat Kantian terms) to establish the conditions of possibility of Being (for 
example, it allows movement in three dimensions only), it is both exterior to, and 
neutral in regards to, Being itself. It is the uniform background to, not the medium of, 
politics. In international relations theory the state is seen as the natural sub-unit of the 
homogeneous uniform space that comprises the surface of the globe. The territorial 
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boundaries of the state are set up to divide this uniform space and mark out the 
domestic from the inter-national. But the boundaries are not understood as external to 
that space, areas of non-uniformity that distort spatial movement. Rather they are 
natural barriers (such as oceans and mountain ranges) internal to that space that stop 
what would otherwise be potentially limitless movement within the context of this 
world-space. Politics is construed as being played out against the backdrop of this 
space, exterior to its features. Insofar as spatiality plays a role in politics it is a 
constraining exteriority (such as distance) to be overcome by political means. 12 It is 
precisely insofar as these notions of spatiality are uncontested, forming a received 
common-sense on which conceptual edifices are unquestioningly established, that the 
spatial turn is significant. 13 To enquire into the constitution of spatiality is to contest 
received understandings of the spaces of politics. 
The literature that might be considered to comprise the `spatial turn' has made 
two theoretical challenges to the unquestioning acceptance of conceptual schemas 
predicated on spatial categories. Firstly, a body of literature has emerged that 
questions the naturalness of the various regimes of spatial division. This literature is 
concerned with the manner in which the regimes of spatial division that constitute the 
spaces that we share are themselves constituted. Thus the division 
domestic/international has been shown to be a fictive division established and 
maintained through a complex of material narratives. Cartography, for example; 
establishes the so-called natural boundaries of the state, naturalising the idea of 
uniform space as the background context in which the world is situated. So-called 
`natural features' are set out in a particular non-perspectival, space. 14 This setting out 
is then used to present certain features as being natural indicators of the extent of a 
territory. Rivers, oceans, mountain ranges are rendered on maps as impassable barriers 
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beyond which a given territory will not extend. Moreover, cartography removes the 
contingencies of history from such representations, thus occluding the manner in 
which such `natural features' have been historically interpreted as the limit of a 
territory. For example, though the English Channel is presented as the `natural feature' 
that marks the south-eastern limit of British territory, cartography occludes the various 
historical processes that have contributed to such an interpretation, and effaces the 
counter-narratives (such as the historical extension of English territory to include parts 
of France). Other regimes of spatial division can be similarly questioned. The 
international refugee/migrant regime (an important component of the informal 
mechanisms of global governance that provide fictive support for the naturalness of 
the state) can be shown to rely on particular narratives concerning the crossing of 
borders. 
In political theory and international relations, genealogies (in the strictly 
Foucauldian sense) of such narratives of spatial division effectively challenge the idea 
that space is naturally divided/dividable into sub-units (such as the nation-state) by 
showing the contingent manner in which regimes of spatial division have been 
articulated. ' 5 The reassertion of contingency brings the politics of spatial division to 
the foreground. Indeed it shows that the spatial divisions within which existence is 
lived out are wholly fictive. It is the manner in which such fictions are maintained and 
the effects they have that is important to such theoretical accounts. On the whole these 
accounts highlight the manner in which spatial division always occurs in the form of 
bounding, a drawing of a line between what is to be taken to be included in a given 
spatial domain (which is often congruent to, though not necessarily identical to, 
territory) and what is excluded. In this way the primary political point of such work is 
to demonstrate that insofar as existence is spatial, and spaces are established through 
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the supposed division of one big uniform space, all regimes of division are, in some 
form, exclusionary. 
Secondly, and perhaps more significantly, a number of writers have 
demonstrated the manner in which space itself should not be taken to be a backdrop, 
or neutral medium, for existence. Rather, these writers have been concerned with the 
manner in which `space' can be said to be `socially constructed'. 16 Space, it is argued, 
is precisely not the external medium in which social/political existence occurs. Rather 
space is constituted by social/political existence. Such an idea exceeds the 
genealogical approach taken by those who demonstrate the manner in which regimes 
of spatial division establish exclusionary politics. Such genealogies can be said to 
question the manner in which space is divided without questioning space itself. Those 
who argue that space should properly be seen as a social construction are concerned to 
show how space itself must be seen as a product of social existence. Thus space 
cannot be said to exist in anticipation of division. Rather the regimes of division are 
one of the ways in which space is materialised. 
There are four main strands of thought in the literature concerned with the 
social construction of space. Firstly, and most obviously, there are texts such as Henri 
Lefebvre's The Production of Space which attempt to provide an ontological account 
of the social construction of space. ' 7 Insofar as ontology can be said to be the account 
of the logos of that which is, such writing precisely takes social construction to be the 
logos of the existential fact of spatiality. That is to say, though spatiality is taken to be 
an ineluctable aspect of existence, it is asserted that such spatiality is constituted by, 
and not external to, such existence. 
This argument leads to the necessary conclusion that different forms of 
existence constitute different forms of spatiality. A particularly sophisticated version 
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of such an argument can be found in Deleuze and Guattari's ideas of `smooth' and 
`striated' space. '8 For Deleuze and Guattari striated space is that constituted in and 
through the existence of the state and its apparatus. This space is striated, or clearly 
marked out in hierarchical patterns, that facilitate the performance of government. 
Smooth space, on the other hand, is that constituted by the `war machine' that exists 
beyond the bounds of the state and in the interstices of its governance. This `war 
machine is not a war making entity, but rather a nomadic principle constantly mobile 
and thus not subordinate to the hierarchies of governance. The political consequence 
of such constitutions of space are demonstrated by Thom Kuehls in his account of the 
encounter between the inter-state system (a striated space) and the `global ecumenical 
machine' of environmental protest epitomised by Greenpeace (which is constitutive 
of smooth space). 19 Kuehls shows how Greenpeace constitutes a smooth space in the 
interstices of state governance and, hence, evades subordination to the hierarchies of 
striated space. In this manner Greenpeace is, by virtue of its spatialities, a constant 
challenge to the governance of the state. 
A second body of literature develops upon such arguments by showing the 
specific way in which the constitution of space itself occurs. Walker, for example, 
shows how developments in Western thought provide the conditions of possibility for 
the emergence of sovereign, governable global space . 
20 According to Walker, 
Galileo's separation of primary and secondary characteristics provides the intellectual 
condition of possibility for the social construction of space that is divided between 
that which is inside the state and that which is outside the state. In other words, by 
establishing criteria for the distinction between what is to be included as primary and 
what is to be excluded as secondary, Gallileo provides the resources by which 
exclusionary spaces (such as the state) can be socially constructed. In this way Walker 
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shows how the global spatialities established by the Westphalian order are socially 
constructed. 
A third body of writing in a similar vein can be found in what might be loosely 
referred to as `critical geography'. It could be argued that geography is the discipline 
that studies space. However, it is only relatively recently that geographers have turned 
their attention to the question of the nature of the space that they have traditionally 
studied. 21 This work comprises a hybrid analysis that takes elements of sociology and 
cultural studies in order to complete an analysis of the manner in which space is 
constituted. Thus critical geographers are able to ague that particular networks of 
capital, technology and social/cultural resources constitute the space that the discipline 
had hitherto presupposed as mere backdrop. 22 Moreover this means that it is possible 
to argue for disjuncture of spaces, non-continuity of spaces and simultaneous 
overlaying of spaces. Thus for example the geography of the city need not be 
predicated on the idea that citizens inhabit and move through the same spaces. 
Networks of capital and social resources can be said to constitute space such that 
merchant bankers and the homeless exist in separate, though simultaneous spaces with 
few shared spaces. 23 
Fourthly, and as an extension of this critical geography, Gear6id 6 Tuathail 
has written about a `critical geopolitics'. 24 Insofar as a critical geography addresses the 
manner in geographical spaces are constituted it tends to do so without concern for the 
political implications of such constitution. Such geographical writing could be said to 
analyse the constitution of space alone, what b Tuathail calls `geo-graphing' 
(writinglinscribing the world). To the idea of `geo-graphy' b Tuathail adds the idea of 
`geo-politics' 25 In this concept the idea of the constitution of space is brought 
together with the idea of the political implications of such constitution. 6 Tuathail is 
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particularly concerned to demonstrate the exclusion, occlusion, distortion and 
repression that comprise the geo-politcs of geo-graphy. 
Both critical geography and critical geopolitics can be said to develop the more 
ontological analyses of writers such as Lefebvre and Walker into genealogies of the 
constitution (rather than simple division) of space. All of this work emphasises the 
manner in which specific networks/regimes constitute their own space, rather than 
occupying previously vacant space. In this manner the space produced by a regime is 
its politics. Thus, for example, the constitution of a territory as terra nullius, or the 
frontier, or the constitution of space as impenetrable boundary (bureaucratic or 
natural) is the politics of the regime. The legitimatisation of a policy of denial by the 
contemporary Australian state regarding the entitlement of Aboriginal peoples to land 
occupied during the formation of the state rests upon the constitution of this space as 
an empty space, a terra nullius. In this way the Australian state can claim that the land 
was empty and thus not possessed prior to its occupation during the formation of the 
Australian state. This constitution of space is remarkably effective insofar as it gives 
the impression that it was not possible for there to be owners of this space prior to the 
creation of the Australian state. 26 Thus political analysis must be first and foremost a 
study of the constitution of the spatialities in which politics becomes possible and the 
politics made possible, or even necessary, by those spatialities. Of course, if my 
interpretation of Draculib is to be followed, then it is building that lies at the heart of 
such spatialisation. 
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The territorialisation of existence 
The above literature could be said to comprise an account of the ontopolitics 
of space/spatialisation. These accounts demonstrate the political effects of the 
institution of particular assumptions about the `necessities and possibilities of human 
being, about, for instance, the forms into which human beings may be composed and 
the possible relations humans can establish'. 27 For example, to challenge the 
Westphalian international order by showing the contingent, historical nature of its 
various forms, is to challenge that which institutes the assumptions concerning 
existence enshrined in the notions of territorial sovereignty established at Westphalia. 
To challenge the Westphalian notion of territorial sovereignty is, moreover, to 
challenge Newtonian notions of uniform, homogenous space. Such accounts 
demonstrate the manner in which all forms of spatialisation are the institution of 
assumptions regarding onta ('that which is/exists'). Moreover, since such an 
institution occurs only by the suppression of alternatives these ontological 
assumptions are also political assumptions restricting the possibilities of existence 
through the institution of one understanding of Being. 28 
Such ontopolitical analysis brings to light precisely the manner in which plural 
possible forms of existence are occluded in the institution of singular assumptions 
concerning Being. It is precisely through the re-historicisation of spatial regimes, 
through the delineation of the contingency of a given understandinglinstitution of 
space, that ontopolitical assumptions are delineated. In such a delineation the given 
institution of space can be recognised as that which serves to suppress alternative 
possibilities of existence. 
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Such analyses are crucial to re-opening the political. Indeed, insofar as the 
Westphalian order represents the hegemony of a specific ontopolitics of spatialisation 
(an ontopological ontopolitics), we might say that the political has been foreclosed. 29 
It is only through the constestation of such ontopolitics that the political will once 
again be something that is `worthy of thought'. 3° I want to note, however, that these 
ontopolitical analyses open up a broader, existential question: the relation of Being 
and territoriality/spatiality. That is, though the analyses of the ontopolitics (the politics 
of spatialising assumptions regarding onta - really existing things) address the manner 
in which assumptions institute specific spatial regimes, the more fundamental 
question of the manner in which spatiality can be said to properly belong to existence 
is occluded by questions concerning the manner in which spatiality is 
constituted/interpreted/instituted. In other words, the conditions of possibility of 
spatiality are not, therefore, addressed. 
The question of the conditions of possibility of spatiality could be said to have 
been occluded by western philosophy insofar as that tradition has taken space to be an 
invariable external a priori condition of existence. This conception of space reaches 
its most sophisticated formulations with Descartes and Kant, though it neither begins 
with, nor is exhausted by, these thinkers. In Kant's Critique of Pure Reason 
especially, one has a powerful account of the manner in which the conditions of 
possibility of spatiality are placed beyond question . 
31 A powerful idea is at work in 
Kant's installation of space as the a priori intuition of outer sense. For Kant, space is 
that which is always already implicated in any existence. Indeed, not merely 
implicated, but the very possibility of such existence. And in making space this 
always already present condition of possibility, Kant effectively removes space from 
political contestation. Standard accounts of Kant's work assume that his idea of space 
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as intuition inscribes Newtonian space into the structure of reason. 32 Such an 
allegation need not follow from a reading of the Critique of Pure Reason. It is 
possible to interpret Kant as positing an experience of spatiality (of whatever kind) as 
the always already present condition of possibility for existence. Which is to say space 
is never experienced in a pure, true form but that all existence is ineluctably spatial. 
And yet the nature of space is removed from contestation as it is the simple condition 
of existence. In a similar manner, the analyses of the ontopolitics of spatial regimes do 
not in themselves question that space comprises a condition of possibility for 
existence. Rather they contest the manner in which certain interpretations of space 
achieve hegemony and therefore are naturalised as the only interpretations of space. 
That the fundamental nature of space needs investigation is not a question of 
originality, or primordial primacy (of the which came first, existence or space, type of 
question), but is central for the question of the relation of shared spaces and existence 
as I have posed it in my interpretation of Draculie's `Elegy'. 
It is in the work of Martin Heidegger that the ineluctably spatial nature of 
Being is given its strongest expression. 33 Briefly put, for Heidegger, Being is only 
insofar as it is in-the-world. Furthermore, for Heidegger the world and Being are 
copresent phenomena: Being is insofar as it is in-the-world, the world is insofar as 
Being is in it. World, moreover is that which is in-and-through-Being. For the later 
Heidegger the manner in which Being is in the world is dwelling. As I noted in the 
Introduction, dwelling, by which Heidegger means primarily (though not 
exhaustively) building and cultivation, is the fundamental mode of Being-in-the- 
world. For Heidegger dwelling is the manner in which (wo)man `gathers' his/her 
existence. The gathering of existence into locales is the manner in which the 
relationality that is the basis of worldliness for Heidegger is established. It is this 
48 
relationality that is the basis for space. The locale is thus that in-and-through which 
Being comes-to-be, in which Being is gathered, and, therefore, that in and through 
which world and Being achieve co-presence. And since the locale is relational and 
relationality is constitutive of spatiality, the locale is ineluctably spatial. 
It is the synthesis of this idea with the analysis of the ontopolitics of 
spatialisation that I want to achieve in the following argument. Though analyses of the 
ontopolitics of spatialisation give an account of the manner in which space is socially 
constituted, they leave the fundamental relation of existence and space unaccounted 
for. The Heideggerian account provides an understanding of the manner in which 
spatiality is an ineluctable aspect of existence. From this idea it is possible to make 
two important assertions. Firstly, if spatiality is an ineluctable aspect of existence, it 
must have existential conditions of possibility. If these conditions of possibility come 
under attack, it is not simply spatiality that is at stake, but existence. Secondly, it is 
precisely those moments in which existence is at stake (through practices that 
problematise the very possibility of spatiality) that constitute moments of acute crisis 
in socially constructed spaces and thus, by extension, in the ontopolitics of the 
regimes that constitute those social constructions. Accordingly, if a given practice 
(such as dynamiting buildings) destroys the very possibility of existence itself, it 
induces a crisis in the ontopolitics that had previously constituted the social space that 
that comprised existence. 
It is my contention that far from simply clearing extant space (the supposed 
`goal' of the ontopolitics of ethnic cleansing) those that destroyed 
architecture/buildings in Bosnia induced a crisis in the constructed shared space of 
Bosnia. This was a crisis in a space that had been (prior to the war) a heterogeneous 
space, supporting multicultural communities. 34 Through this crisis the space could be 
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reconstructed as intolerant, separate and monocultural. This is especially clear in 
Mostar where Croats and Bosniacs fought side by side, and yet subsequently Croats 
had to destroy such a space of multicultural existence in order to create the space that 
would permit the formation the Croat statelet of Herceg-Bosna. 
In order to begin an enquiry into the manner in which urbicide destroyed the 
shared spatiality of Bosnia, it is necessary first to address the question of the meaning 
of urbicide. That is, if I am to flesh out the comments made above regarding the 
relation between spatiality and urban destruction it is necessary to first of all give an 
account of the extensive nature of the violence against buildings in Bosnia. Such an 
account will direct us towards what it is that such violence destroys and what it lost in 
this destruction. This in turn will suggest what, precisely the spatiality at stake in 
urbicide comprises. 
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CHAPTER 2 
APPROACHING THE LOGICS OF URBICIDE 
New conceptions require new terms. 1 
In my introduction, I noted that the destruction of the urban fabric of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina in the 1992-95 war has, commonly, been viewed through an 
anthropocentric prism, principally as an adjunct to ethnic cleansing. However, I 
argued that this destruction merits attention in its own right. Through an interpretation 
of Slavenka Draculic's Mostar Bridge Elegy, I argued that the destruction of urban 
fabric - exemplified by the destruction of Mostar's Stari Most by the Bosnian Croat 
paramilitary organisation, the HVO - constitutes the destruction of the conditions of 
possibility of the existence of specific communities. I argued that the destruction of 
this `attempt to grasp eternity' is the destruction of the possibility of a future for the 
specific communities brought into being in and through the construction of this 
bridge. Indeed, I noted that this is the proper meaning of the HVO action: the Bosnian 
Croats understood themselves to be destroying a heterogeneous community that 
spanned the Neretva and contained both multiple extant and possible ethnicities, in 
order to constitute two separate communities and thus provide the condition of 
possibility of building the so-called `ethnically homogeneous' community of Herceg- 
Bosna. 
As I noted in Chapter 1, some writers have referred to this destruction as 
`urbicide'. This term captures two imperatives in the analysis of the destruction of the 
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urban fabric of Bosnia. Firstly, `urbicide' indicates that this destruction is an event in 
its own right, not simply a mode of, or adjunct to, the violence termed `ethnic 
cleansing' (or genocide). Secondly, urbicide points to the fact that this destruction 
aimed at nothing less than `the urban' itself. The destruction of `the urban' comprises 
the destruction of shared spaces. That is, `the urban' comprises spaces in which 
heterogeneous identities, flows and networks co-exist. Indeed, `the urban' constitutes 
the possibility of the coexistence of heterogeneous identities, flows and networks in 
and through the spaces it comprises. The destruction of urban fabric - urbicide - is 
thus the destruction, and thus also the (re)constitution (albeit in ruins), of such spaces. 
In Chapter 1,1 argued that since it is this destruction of shared spaces that is at 
stake in urbicide, an enquiry into the destruction of the urban fabric of Bosnia, is, 
therefore, an enquiry into spatiality. After reviewing the principle analyses of 
spatiality, I argued, following Heidegger, that spatiality is both a condition of 
possibility of, and is constituted in and through, existence. Destroying spaces, 
contesting particular spatialities, is, therefore, a way of destroying or contesting 
certain existences. Spatiality in this sense is the condition for the political, the 
condition of the relations of identity and difference that constitute politics. 
This thesis will, therefore, comprise an analysis of the constitution of spatiality 
understood as the (fundamentally political) condition of possibility of existence. In 
order to begin such an inquiry, it is necessary to consider the ways in which the 
destruction of the urban fabric of Bosnia has been thematised. I will begin my analysis 
by outlining the conceptual contours of the notion of `urbicide' since this term, and 
the phenomena it names, is central to the identification of the urban destruction with 
which my argument will be concerned. Interpretations of various instances of violence 
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against buildings reveal various ways of understanding the destruction of the urban 
fabric of Bosnia. I will argue that none of these ways of understanding the destruction 
of the urban fabric of Bosnia are sufficient for the purpose of an enquiry into the 
spatiality that underlies the condition of possibility of (political) existence. In 
examining these interpretations of instances of urban destruction, I will be able to 
outline the way in which the concept of urbicide provides a more adequate tool of 
analysis and guides the way in which my enquiry should proceed. 
`Urbicide' 
In 1992 the issue of the widespread destruction of buildings in Bosnia was 
thematised by a group of architects from Mostar in a publication entitled Mostar '92 - 
Urbicid. 2 The authors of Mostar '92 - Urbicid presented the destruction of buildings, 
indeed of the urban fabric, in Mostar, as a central aspect of the ongoing war. This 
collection of pictures and text attempted to demonstrate that the devastation of the 
urban environment manifest in (though not limited to) the destruction of bridges, 
mosques and churches, department stores, blocks of apartments, public buildings, 
hotels and public spaces (such as parks) was more than simple collateral damage. 
Implicit in this publication is the claim that the destruction has a meaning of its own, 
rather than being incidental to, or a product of, the `ethnic cleansing' that 
characterised the Bosnian war. Mostar '92 - Urbicid thematised the necessity of 
understanding the meaning of this violence against buildings. 
In order to approach such a problematic it is necessary to inquire into the 
meaning of the term `urbicide' (the Anglicisation of the Serbo-Croat `Urbicid'). 
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`Urbicide' derives its meaning from the collocation of `urban' with the epithet `-cide'. 
Taken literally, urbicide refers to the `killing, slaughter' or `slaying' of that which is 
subsumed under the term 'urban'. 3 At stake in the meaning of `urbicide', therefore, is 
what is to be understood in the concept of `the urban', what it is that is destroyed in 
this act of literally `killing the urban'. `Urban', derived from the Latin urbanus, refers 
to that which is `characteristic of, occurring or taking place, in a city or town'. 4 
Importantly, the term has a dual meaning. Insofar as, `urban' refers to the 
characteristics that identify towns or cities (originally in opposition to rural villages or 
estates), it refers both to the material conditions that constitute the town or city as 
such, and the way of life proper to such material conditions. That is, `urban' refers to 
the specific building patterns (in particular to the density and size of these patterns) 
that identify the city as well as to the particular experience of life in such an 
environment. 
The experience of city life, or `[fjollowing the pursuits [and] having the ideas 
or sentiments... characteristic of town or city life' comprises urbanity. 5 According to 
Anton Zijderveld, `Urbanity is usually seen as a synonym of suavity: a refined 
politeness or courtesy... It comes close to civility, derived from the Latin civilitas. '6 
Just as being humane, or displaying humanity, is taken to comprise the exercise of 
those virtues (such as compassion or mercy) that express the qualities that distinguish 
humans from animals, so urbanity, or being urbane, is taken to refer to the 
characteristics that distinguish city-dwellers. In this sense `urban' or `urbane' has a 
certain normative connotation. `The urban' is taken to be productive of a way of life 
that is in some way more civilised. 
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Whilst I do not want to dwell on this normative connotation, it is important to 
note the way in which urbanity derives its meaning through an opposition with the 
rural way of life. 7 Examination of this opposition will reveal the principle 
distinguishing feature of urbanity (understood as both the material context of urban 
life and the way of life produced in, and (re)productive of, that context). According to 
the opposition urban/rural, the city represents modern progress, whilst rural life is 
taken to exemplify the constraints of tradition that modernity is supposed to sweep 
away. 8 In order to understand the attachment of normative connotations to the urban 
experience it is necessary to understand the notion of progress that is implicit in this 
opposition. 
Habermas notes that `the term "modem"... expresses the consciousness of an 
epoch that relates itself to the past... in order to view itself as the result of a transition 
from the old to the new. '9 Moreover, after the French Enlightenment `the idea of being 
"modern"' incorporated `the belief, inspired by modem science, in the infinite 
progress of knowledge and in the infinite advance towards social and moral 
betterment. '10 Modernity, as it is manifest in urbanity, thus represents the idea of a 
transition, a normative advance on feudal, rural ways of life. The rural way of life is 
taken to be held in a timeless, feudal hierarchical order from which no progress is 
possible. In contrast, the city, according to a theorist of modernity such as Max 
Weber, represented a `sustained... fundamental challenge to the feudal system 
which... paved the way for the subsequent development of a rational legal, capitalistic 
social order. ' ' It is in this way that urbanity is normatively coded as a way of life that 
offers the prospect of progress toward `social and moral betterment' (a process that 
has been subsumed under the idea of `civilisation' or `civility'). 
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Modernity, conceived of as `the consciousness of an epoch', is characterised 
by a series of binary oppositions in which one term is valued over the other as a sign 
of progress towards `betterment'. It is, of course, precisely this faith in normatively 
coded binary oppositions that is challenged by the cultural/intellectual strands of 
thought such as post-structuralism, post-colonialism, post-modernism, 
environmentalism and feminism. 12 Notwithstanding these considerable intellectual 
contestations of the givenness of such oppositions, it is possible to gain some insight 
into the meaning of `the urban' through the manner in which it is opposed to `the 
rural'. Insofar as is possible, the examination of this opposition should act as if the 
normative implications of such opposition were in suspension. Which is to say that it 
should be recognised that the distinction urban/rural is fictive. Notwithstanding this 
recognition an examination of the distinction is illuminating in regard to the meaning 
of the concept of `urbanity'. Thus the question to be asked is as follows: what it is that 
is taken to be specific to the experience of the urban environment such that it can be 
illustrated through an opposition with the rural environment? 
The opposition of rural and urban echoes with early sociological attempts to 
grasp the phenomenon of modernity. Such attempts oppose the supposed organic unity 
of traditional, pre-modern societies, to the heterogeneity that is associated with 
capitalist modernity. Tönnie's concepts of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, for 
example, exemplify this opposition. 13 Where Gemeinschaft represents pre-modern 
social order, Gesellschaft` represents the modem, specifically capitalist, social order. 
Gemeinschaft represents a homogeneous feudal order `bound by shared values 
and... traditions', Gesellschaft refers to a social order characterised by `heterogeneity 
of values and traditions'. 14 And it is precisely the idea of heterogeneity that is at stake 
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in the concept of the urban, or urbanity. In his classic essay `Urbanism as a Way of 
Life', Louis Wirth argues that it is the size, density and heterogeneity of the 
populations of cities that constitute `those elements of urbanism which mark it as a 
distinctive mode of life'. 15 Despite naming three factors that characterise urbanity, it is 
heterogeneity that is its principle aspect according to Wirth. Indeed, the size of an 
urban population is pertinent insofar as it leads to a greater number of different 
identities and associations and thus heterogeneity of tradition and belief. Moreover, 
density of the urban population is important insofar as it is gives rise to a greater 
frequency of encounters between these heterogeneous traditions and beliefs. 
Heterogeneity, then, can be said to be the defining characteristic of urbanity. 16 
It is important to briefly note two additional arguments concerning this 
definition of urbanity before returning to my account of urbicide. Firstly, it should be 
noted that the heterogeneity that defines urbanity leads to a fundamental ambiguity in 
the experience of urban life. Whilst this heterogeneity is taken to be the condition for 
an individual freedom and capitalist development, it is also the root of a variety of 
anomic `pathologies'. That is, whilst heterogeneity leads to the dissolution of the 
constraints of tradition it also leads to isolation and a lack of social cohesion which 
can be seen as the roots of both social and, in some circumstances, individual 
pathologies: lawlessness, deception, immorality, mental illness, and suicide are all 
attributed to the heterogeneity characteristic of urbanity. '7 As such this pathological 
aspect of urbanity represents a common experience of modernity. 
Insofar as modernity signals the dissolution of the constraints of the feudal 
system it offers the possibility of individual freedom. This individual freedom, 
conceived of as possessive individualism and developed into the hegemony of liberal- 
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humanitarian political values, is predicated upon the lack of binding social values and 
thus the possibility of finding legal-political frameworks that accommodate 
heterogeneous traditions and expressions of self-interest. 18 However, this lack of 
hierarchical social order also entails a pathological side of modernity. Freedom 
becomes the freedom to exploit and the lack of hierarchical order leads to a relativism 
according to which it is never possible to refuse to accommodate any forms of 
heterogeneity (thus entailing the acceptance of all forms of difference). Indeed, the 
relativism that modernists like to foist upon their imagined `post-modern' 
interlocutors can be traced to the corner-stone of the experience of modernity: the 
dissolution of hierarchical (primarily theological) social orders. 
Secondly, it is also important to recognise one possible objection to the 
account of urbanity that I have offered. It might be argued that I have relied upon the 
opposition of urban and rural, and thus limited the scope of my argument to the 
destruction of cities. And yet this would be to accept the opposition of urban and rural 
as a natural and given fact. Instead it is possible, as I noted above, to use this 
opposition as an abstract model in order to determine what it is that is taken to define 
the concept of `urbanity'. Of course, it is impossible to note a factual distinction, an 
invisible line crossed at the city-limits, between urban and rural. Such an idea rests on 
the mental image of an imagined rural environment that exists beyond the city. But 
this is precisely an imagined rural existence, imagined in order to define the 
experience of the city. Moreover, it is precisely in the context of this imagined 
distinction that the concept of urbanity was itself defined. Indeed, this imagined 
distinction is a product of the modern tendency to frame existence as a series of 
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dualisms. It is instructive therefore, to look at the implications of such a dualism, at 
what, exactly was conceptually intended in the opposition of urban and rural. 
Such an exercise is wholly oriented towards a delineation of the conceptual 
entailments of the notion of `urbanity'. This exercise holds in suspension the question 
of the existence of such a duality and asks what meaning is delineated in this 
distinction. In this regard it could be argued that the distinction is, in our era, a fiction 
crafted for the purpose of identifying our present state of heterogeneity through a 
contrast with a supposed homogeneity. Indeed, it is the experience of heterogeneity 
that defines urbanity that is precisely the experience that is entailed in what is crudely 
termed `globalisation'. It is thus possible to say that `we are all urban now' insofar as 
heterogeneity is the mark of our lives. 19 There is, therefore, no simple opposition 
between a simple feudal rural existence, and a heterogeneous city existence. Rather, 
since it was through an imagined opposition of urban and rural that the notion of 
urbanity was fleshed out, such an opposition helps us to identify precisely what it is 
that is lost in `urbicide'. If we identify urbanity as entailing, principally, heterogeneous 
existence, we can say that the destruction of urban life is the destruction of 
heterogeneity. The destruction of urban fabric, is, therefore, the destruction of the 
conditions of possibility of heterogeneity. What is at stake in urbicide, the destruction 
of the buildings in and around which communities live their lives, is thus the 
destruction of the conditions of possibility of heterogeneity. 
Such a definition of urbicide is, however, merely a lexicographic clarification 
of what might have been an unfamiliar term. This clarification tells us little about 
urbicide in Bosnia. Moreover, it tells us little about the meaning of the destruction of 
the conditions of possibility of heterogeneity. In order to proceed with an examination 
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of these twin themes, I want to turn to look at the conceptual kinship between 
`urbicide' on the one hand and `genocide' on the other. By looking at the systematic 
nature of destruction implied in both concepts it is possible to identify a `logic' of 
destruction that guides urbicide. 
The distinctive character of `urbicide' 
In using the term `urbicide', the authors of Mostar `92-Urbicid noted both a 
kinship and a distinction between the violence brought to bear on the urban fabric of 
Bosnia, and genocide: the `practice of extermination of.. . ethnic groups'. 
20 On one 
hand, urbicide drew upon a lexical similarity with genocide in order to emphasise the 
scale and importance of the destruction that was occurring, whilst on the other, 
urbicide stressed that the destruction of urban fabric in Bosnia was an event that, 
whilst interrelated with genocide, was nonetheless distinctive and, therefore, deserving 
of treatment in its own right. In order to flesh out the lexicographic definition of 
urbicide already provided, it is worth examining both the kinship and differences 
between urbicide and genocide. 
In drawing an analogy with genocide, the authors of Mostar '92 - Urbicid were 
noting a logic of violence at work in the destruction of buildings in Bosnia. When 
defining genocide in 1944, Raphael Lemkin noted that it was necessary to coin a new 
word for the violence perpetrated by the Nazi's. Though there had been various acts of 
violence throughout history with which one might draw parallels in order to 
understand Nazi violence (Lemkin cites, amongst others, the example of the 
destruction of Carthage in 146 BC) it was necessary, argued Lemkin, to coin a new 
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term that took account of the systematic character of the Holocaust. `Genocide', 
argued Lemkin, signified a `coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the 
destruction of essential foundations of national groups, with the aim of annihilating 
the groups themselves. 21 
And yet in using a separate term, the authors of Mostar '92 -Urbicid were 
indicating that it was not sufficient to understand the destruction of urban fabric as an 
aspect of the genocide that was more commonly termed `ethnic cleansing'. 22 To 
subsume it in such a manner would essentially limit us to two possible ways of 
understanding the destruction of buildings: as either acts of symbolic destruction 
(destruction of the cultural symbols that underpin a national group); or acts of 
collateral damage attendant to the overall project of the elimination of a national 
group (things that were hit whilst driving out or killing a particular ethnic group). 
`Urbicide' was intended to signify that there was, in the context of the 1992-5 Bosnian 
war, a `coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction' of urban fabric: 
buildings, infrastructure, and monuments in particular. The use of `urbicide' noted, 
however, that this coordinated plan, and the violence attendant to it, had a logic that 
was not subsidiary to genocide. As such, Mostar '92 - Urbicid was a plea to observers 
of the Bosnian war to recognise the distinct logic of violence demonstrated by the 
phenomenon of the destruction of urban fabric, and buildings in particular. 
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The `logic' of urbicide 
In referring to a `logic' of urbicide I am not arguing that urbicide is `logical' in 
the sense of the necessary outcome of a particular set of circumstances or decisions. 
The notion that urbicide has a `logic' that is not subsidiary to that of genocide is 
intended to indicate that urbicide is a conceptual term for a set of events that, taken 
together, amount to a `coordinated plan of different actions'. The separation of `logic' 
and `logical' is significant in both sociological and political theory as it allows the 
identification of the co-ordinated combination of a set of elements in order to produce 
a given phenomenon whilst also recognising the contingency of such a co-ordination. 
That is, it recognises that this combination was neither inevitable, nor the product of a 
single will or intent. It is precisely in this regard that Bauman notes that the Holocaust 
is the contingent combination of a number of otherwise common and everyday 
elements. 23 Bauman argues that the `twisted road' to the Holocaust, the contingent 
combination of otherwise everyday elements, was `neither conceived in a single vision 
of a mad monster, nor was a considered choice made at the start of the `problem 
solving process' by the ideologically motivated leaders'. 24 This is not to say that there 
was neither an intent to destroy the European Jews, nor criminal responsibility for that 
destruction. However it is to argue that one should not, to paraphrase Bauman, 
confuse the attribution of guilt with the analysis of causes. That is, one should not 
confuse the delineation of a specific, contingent articulation of elements which 
produced a specific, and violent, political formation with the attribution of this 
phenomenon to the perceived idiosyncrasies of its leaders. Arguing that the holocaust 
represents the mad vision of the Führer is, as Bauman notes, one way to deny the 
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complex relationship that inheres between such violent political formations and 
modernity. 25 
In this sense we might say that the `logic' of a political formation such as 
genocide or urbicide is akin to Deleuze and Guattari's notion of `the concept'. The 
logic of genocide, or the logic of urbicide, is a delineation, after the fact, of the 
specific meaning of the contingent articulation of a set of elements. `Concepts', as 
Deleuze and Guattari note, `are connected to problems without which they would have 
no meaning and which can themselves only be isolated or understood as their solution 
emerges... [thus] concepts are... created as a function of problems which are thought to 
be badly understood or badly posed. 926 Genocide exists as a concept to name the 'co- 
ordinated plan' for the destruction of national groups. The Holocaust (or Shoah) exists 
as a concept to name the destruction of the European Jews. In both cases these events 
comprise problems that are thought to be badly posed under the concept of, for 
example, the destruction of civil populations in war time. In both cases these concepts 
name the contingent articulation of certain elements into a specific political formation. 
The political formation of genocide is different from international war, or civil war. 
This is precisely why the definition of the violence in Bosnia was contested: because 
certain observers and participants did not feel that the events that were occurring 
could be adequately understood as manifestations of civil-war. The violence and 
destruction - in particular the manner in which it was carried out - suggested a 
different type of political formation, one that was not only exclusionary, but 
exterminatory. 
`Concepts', argue Deleuze and Guattari have a certain `consistency' or 
`endoconsistency'. That is, concepts represent the specific conjunction of components 
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in such a manner that they are rendered inseparable insofar as the concept is 
concerned. The concept of genocide requires a certain set of interlocking components 
in order to be recognised as such. When a certain consistent combination of elements 
occurs, as it was argued to have done in the case of the violence against Bosnian 
Muslims or Rwandan Tutsis, the concept of genocide is recognised to be manifest. 
What is important here is the notion that `[c]omponents remain distinct, but something 
passes from one to the other'. 27 Which is to say when `radical... anti-Semitism of the 
Nazi type; transformation of that anti-Semitism into the practical policy of a powerful, 
centralised state; that state being in command of a huge, efficient bureaucratic 
apparatus; states of emergency... which allowed the government and the bureaucracy it 
controlled to get away with things which could, possibly, face more serious obstacles 
in time of peace; and the non-interference, the passive acceptance of those things by 
the population at large' come together, one has what can be recognised as genocide. 28 
In this combination, anti-Semitism is not simply an isolated event, but rather gives 
something to bureaucracy, which, in turn, takes something from the powerful state in 
order to become radical (that is exterminatory). 29 
Those who argue that urbicide is deserving of attention in its own right argue 
along similar lines. Urbicide is, according to this perspective, the name of a problem 
that is inadequately understood as part of the logic, or concept, of genocide. Urbicide 
is the consistent, though contingent, combination of a number of elements such that 
together these elements generate a specific phenomenon with its own conceptual 
logic. The destruction of buildings happens in many contexts. However, it is argued 
that in the case of the destruction of buildings in the Bosnian war a contingent set of 
events were articulated together in a consistent manner that cannot be understood 
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under previously extant conceptual logics. That is, the widespread destruction of the 
urban fabric is distinct from the destruction of either strategically important or 
symbolic buildings or the collateral accidents attendant to war or genocide. The 
destruction of the urban fabric of Bosnia suggests a `co-ordinated plan', a consistent 
articulation of a number of elements: the destruction of all types of buildings; the 
destruction of the basis of urbanity; the eradication of shared spaces; and, importantly, 
the creation of new, homogeneous, communities as a consequence of this destruction. 
However, noting a conceptual logic in the destruction of urban fabric in Bosnia 
is at best an analytic tool. Identifying the concept itself tells us little about the meaning 
of the particular conjunction of elements that the conceptual logic represents. And it is 
here that the kinship between urbicide and genocide is particularly productive. The 
meaning of the logic of genocide, the specific phenomenon that emerges out of the 
contingent articulation of a number of elements into a form recognisable under the 
concept of genocide, can be illuminated by reference to Lemkin's original attempt to 
understand Nazi occupation techniques. Lemkin argues from the outset that Nazi 
occupation techniques comprised a coordinated practice to destroy the occupied 
nations. Lemkin argues that this `practice of extermination of national and ethnic 
groups' can be understood as consisting of two distinct phases. Firstly, the 
`destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group' and secondly, `imposition 
of the national pattern of the oppressor', an imposition that may be upon either `the 
oppressed population that is allowed to remain, or upon the territory alone'. 30 
It is these two phases that provide the key to the meaning of the contingent 
articulation of elements that are recognisable as genocide. The events that comprise 
genocide entail both the destruction of a particular national or ethnic culture (this need 
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not be achieved through extermination since destruction of the conditions under which 
a culture can exist will be sufficient) and the imposition of another national or ethnic 
culture. It is precisely the manner in which genocide is directed at the destruction of a 
national group that defines the concept of genocide. Without this defining feature, 
manifest in the two phases of genocide, the various elements that combine to give the 
concept of genocide would be seen merely as a forced relocation or a bloody 
massacre. This defining feature led Lemkin to conclude that in genocide, violence `is 
directed against the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed 
against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of the national 
group , 3i 
The concept of `genocide' entails an understanding of destruction in relation 
to that which is destroyed. It is implicit in our understanding of killing as part of the 
logic of genocide that we do not simply see the killing of each individual as a means 
to the end of extermination. In fact it is not extermination - however (in)complete this 
may be - which defines genocide. 
32 Rather, what we understand to be the meaning of 
`genocide' is played out in each and every death, each and every time. Since genocide 
is enacted in each and every death it expresses a relation between what is destroyed 
and the meaning of destruction that is other than the simple death of the individual - 
that is why each death is an instance of genocide and not simple homicide. It is 
integral, therefore, to our understanding of the conceptual logic/consistency of 
`genocide' that we recognise what `it' is that is destroyed, and the meaning of the 
destruction. In genocide `it' is a member of a national or ethnic group and the 
destruction has the meaning of the eradication of this group. 
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It is precisely here that the simultaneous kinship and difference between 
urbicide and genocide can be noted. In drawing an analogy between the destruction of 
urban fabric and the destruction of ethnic groups, the authors of Mostar'92-Urbicid 
noted that the destruction of urban fabric derived its meaning from the relationship 
between the destruction and what `it' is that is destroyed. At the same time, they noted 
that what `it' is that is destroyed is distinct from that destroyed in genocide. If we 
draw on the previous lexicographic definition of urbicide, it is possible to outline the 
relationship of destruction to that which is destroyed that gives urbicide its specific 
conceptual logic. Put simply, urbicide entails the destruction of buildings and urban 
fabric as elements of urbanity. Buildings are destroyed because they are the condition 
of possibility of urbanity. Urbicide is, therefore, the destruction of urbanity for its own 
sake. The logic of urbicide then is the destruction of the conditions of possibility of 
heterogeneity. 
This destruction is, like, genocide a two phase affair. Firstly the conditions of 
possibility of heterogeneity are destroyed, followed by the imposition of homogeneity. 
The destruction of the conditions of heterogeneity is, as I have noted before, the 
destruction of the condition of possibility of the networks of identity and difference 
that constitute the political. Urbicide then is a fundamentally political matter since it 
represents the violent foreclosure of the possibility of the political. Such foreclosure is 
the exemplary totalitarian moment, a violent foreclosure of the heterogeneous political 
arena that precedes the determination of society according to one single figure. 33 What 
an understanding of the meaning of urbicide will yield is an opening onto an inquiry 
into precisely what it is that constitutes this condition of possibility of heterogeneity 
that I have argued comprises what we understand as political existence. 
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At this point I want to attempt to demonstrate the above assertions concerning 
urbicide in the context of the 1992-95 Bosnian war. That is, I want to show how the 
destruction of buildings and other urban fabric should be understood as manifesting 
the conceptual logic of urbicide as I have defined it. It is possible to demonstrate this 
through the examination of three principle interpretations of the destruction of urban 
fabric. These three interpretations are not self-consciously defined as such. However, 
within the responses to the destruction of urban fabric in Bosnia, I have identified 
three common interpretative themes. These three interpretations can be defined as (a) 
strategic, (b) symbolic, and (c) metaphorical. That is, these interpretations understand 
urban destruction through notions of (a) military necessity, (b) the protection or loss of 
cultural heritage, and (c) the metaphor such destruction provides for political analysis. 
This examination will, I hope, show that these three interpretations fail to 
grasp the meaning of the destruction of urban fabric precisely because they fail to see 
this destruction as the manifestation of urbicide. Which is to say, these interpretations 
do not understand the urban fabric of Bosnia as the condition of possibility of 
heterogeneity, and therefore do not see buildings as something that might be destroyed 
in and of themselves. Thus these interpretations cannot disclose to us what the urban 
fabric is such that its destruction could effect the destruction of the conditions of 
possibility of heterogeneity. 
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Interpretations of urbicide 
Collateral damage and military necessity 
Perhaps the most conventional interpretations of the devastation of the urban 
environment in Bosnia conceive of the destruction as either collateral damage or as 
the result of militarily necessary actions. `Collateral damage', a term that was widely 
used in the 1990-91 Gulf War, refers to `incidental casualties and... property damage' 
that results from military action. 34 On the whole, collateral damage is viewed as an 
undesirable, and yet possibly unavoidable, consequence of military action. The 
various laws of war can be interpreted as requiring belligerents in a conflict to restrict 
all collateral damage to either accidental and unintended events, or to justify such 
damage according to the rule of proportionality: that the risk of incidental civilian loss 
of life or damage to civilian property must be in proportion to the military gain 
expected from such an action. This rule will, of course, mean that some collateral 
damage is always both sustained and acceptable in military action. Of principle 
importance in understanding the idea of collateral damage is that it is an unintended 
(or incidental) consequence of military action. Even where a military action is clearly 
seen to risk such destruction, in order for any resultant destruction to be classified as 
`collateral damage' it must be assumed that a given military action, whilst risking 
damage, did not intend the resultant destruction. 
The destruction of buildings in Bosnia could thus be seen as incidental to the 
military action undertaken in the 1992-95 war. According to such an interpretation, 
the bridges, mosques and churches, houses, public buildings and so on, would have 
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been unintentionally destroyed in the course of legitimate military actions. The 
simplest interpretation of the idea that urban destruction in Bosnia comprises 
collateral damage is that it is the consequence of munitions either missing their 
targets, or hitting other buildings on the way to their legitimate targets. A more 
complex interpretation might argue that the destruction of the urban environment was 
incidental to attempts to achieve certain military objectives. That is, given the nature 
of the combat in the Bosnian War (a large part of which was in urban environments), 
military action risked the incidental destruction of the urban fabric. Urban destruction 
could then be explained as the incidental consequence of such risks. This 
interpretation would depend upon the idea that the military actions in which such 
incidental damage occurred were seeking legitimate military gains and, whilst risking 
urban devastation, did not intend this to occur. 
Such an idea introduces into the interpretation of urban destruction the idea of 
legitimate military action, or `military necessity'. A narrow definition of `military 
necessity' is found in the St Petersburg Declaration, which states that `the only 
legitimate object which states should endeavour to accomplish during war is to 
weaken the military force of the enemy'. 35 However, such a definition is distinctly 
problematic in the context of the 1992-95 Bosnian War. The principle problem is that 
this definition is framed in order to regulate inter-state violence. Whilst some 
observers and participants claim that the Bosnian war constituted an inter-state war 
(these claims rest upon the status of the Yugoslav National Army [JNA] and the part it 
took in the violence), the conflict was, on the whole, seen as an non-international 
armed conflict. 36 This problem of definition is further compounded by the fact that 
such conflicts are not the simple `winner-takes all' meeting of two armed forces. Non- 
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international armed conflict, or civil war, is motivated by political claims and aims, 
and thus the objective of armed violence may not be simply the surrender of the 
opposing force. 
A broader definition of military necessity might be `those measures which are 
indispensable for securing the ends of the war, and which are lawful according to the 
modern laws and usages of war. '37 Military necessity might then be said to be those 
actions indispensable for achieving the ends of a war. Such a minimal definition can 
be used in the case of the 1992-95 Bosnian war. In respect of damage to the urban 
environment, it could be argued that certain buildings had to be destroyed in order to 
achieve certain military ends. The clearest case in which such an argument might 
apply is in relation to bridges. 
Bridges are often destroyed in military conflict. Bridges are commonly taken 
to constitute a military (as opposed to civilian) object. A bridge, it is argued, 
comprises a link in communications, movement and logistics networks. In 
contemporary warfare such networks are perceived to constitute a legitimate object of 
military action. That is, in order to weaken the enemy, or achieve the objectives of 
war, it is legitimate to attack the logistical structure that supports an opponent's war 
effort. The destruction of a building that might only seem to have incidental military 
use, can, therefore, be justified as militarily necessary. 
Such an argument was prominent during the NATO bombardment of Serbia in 
1999. In April 1999, at the beginning of its military action against Serbia, NATO 
destroyed a number of bridges, including road and rail bridges across the Danube in 
both Novi Sad and Belgrade. Several observers questioned the logic behind the 
destruction of these key bridges on the basis that the bridges constituted civilian 
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objects designed for civilian infrastructural purposes (principally transport and trade) 
and were only incidentally used by the Serbian military. These observers argued that 
the bridges did not comprise legitimate targets since the impact of their destruction 
would fall disproportionately upon the civilian population. However, in reply to such 
questions at press briefings, Air Commodore Wilby, justified the destruction as 
militarily necessary, noting that 
the targets we go against are military-related facilities... now... the 
highway bridges that we have been taking down recently. Of course they 
do interrupt the flow of civilian traffic and for that we are very sorry, 
but... [w]e are really having to press hard against the Serbian military and 
special police units. We know that taking those bridges down, whilst it 
causes some inconvenience to civilians, it is causing immense 
inconvenience to the units that we are trying to stop resupplying their 
forces down in.. 
. 
Kosovo with the ammunition, the fuel, and the supplies 
to keep up their activities. 38 
Later Wilby clarified this statement, saying: 
every target we have struck has been one that has been considered to have 
great military significance to affect the Serbian military or the MUP 
[Serbian special police units]... bridges... have been selected because they 
are major lines of communication and... affect resupply of those 
troops... So, very firmly, I would say to you that all our targets have been 
justifiably military targets. 39 
The destruction of bridges and other buildings in Bosnia could, similarly, be justified 
according to the logic of military necessity. That is, the argument could be used that 
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the buildings destroyed represented elements in logistical networks, and, hence, 
militarily legitimate targets. 
Neither of these interpretations seem very satisfactory, however, in the context 
of the devastation of the urban environment in the 1992-95 Bosnian war. Though they 
may offer superficial justification for the destruction of certain buildings they do not 
adequately account for the widespread destruction of urban fabric. The argument that 
this destruction comprises collateral damage sustained in the pursuit of legitimate 
military objectives can be easily refuted. For example, we could recall the testimony 
of the Bosnian Serb gunner interviewed by Kate Adie. As I noted in the Introduction, 
in an interview, the officer commanding the artillery that was firing towards the 
Holiday Inn in Sarajevo (where the press were staying) explained to Adie that they 
had intended to hit the National Museum behind the hotel 40 Here we have a clear 
example of military personnel rejecting the idea that the destruction of civilian 
buildings such as the National Museum is incidental to the achievement of military 
objectives. The gunner makes it clear that the National Museum constituted a target in 
its own right. 
The idea that the destruction comprised collateral damages can be further 
problematised through the findings of the Information Reports on War Damage to the 
Cultural Heritage in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina delivered to the Council of 
Europe Committee on Culture and Education by the Parliamentary Assembly Sub- 
Committee on the Architectural and Artistic Heritage. In respect of the destruction of 
the Oriental Institute in Sarajevo, the fourth Information Report notes: 
In view of the location of the Oriental Institute and the force of flame 
produced, it is fair to presuppose that the shelling was carried out to plan: 
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the Institute was directly targeted. This is even more believable in view of 
the fact that sources have provided details of how the invaders possessed 
remarkably precise military maps, and it is well-known that on the 
occasion of sorting through the Yugoslav Army material left in its 
building in Sarajevo after it withdrew, maps were found which had 
marked on them in precise detail all the targeted objectives in Sarajevo. 41 
In relation to the destruction of the minarets of mosques in Bosnia, the first 
Information Report notes that `[i]t may have been inevitable that mosques in a 
military "front" zone would be hit, but it is highly doubtful that a minaret can be 
brought down with a single large calibre shell, which implies a certain amount of 
deliberate targeting on these structures. A2 That the urban fabric of Bosnia was 
deliberately and not incidentally targeted is confirmed by the conclusion of the fourth 
Information Report that `the small historic core of Mostar... was clearly targeted by 
the heaviest guns available to the HVO. '43 
If the destruction of the urban fabric of Bosnia cannot be understood as 
collateral damage, can it be seen as militarily necessary? This argument is even easier 
to refute than that of collateral damage. For the destruction of all of these buildings to 
have been militarily necessary, they would have had to have played some form of role 
in the communications, transport, and logistics networks of the various armies in 
Bosnia. There are instances in which such arguments may be credible. For example, 
the destruction of the central post office in Sarajevo, or the modem road bridges over 
the Neretva in Mostar, could be seen as attacks on legitimate military targets. The post 
office, for example, housed the central telephone exchange for Sarajevo, and thus 
comprised a vital element of Bosnian Army communications. In destroying it, the 
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Bosnian Serb Army could claim it was attacking an object of significant military 
potential to its adversary. Similarly, some of the bridges in Mostar could be seen as 
supply or transport routes for military purposes and thus destruction could be 
legitimised. 
However, the destruction of urban fabric is more widespread than these key 
buildings. In Sarajevo for example, the Bosnian Serb Army shelled the city without 
any real regard for the military significance of buildings. Moreover, buildings of no 
military significance were regularly shelled deliberately. And the shelling covered a 
wide variety of buildings: housing, public institutions, cultural monuments, utility 
buildings, open spaces. The National Museum, Oriental Institute, National Library and 
various mosques provide only a few, well known, examples of such targeting. In Just 
and Unjust Wars Waltzer talks about strategy as `a language of justification'. 4 We 
could see military necessity in a similar light. Claims that the destruction of a target 
was militarily necessary are post hoc narratives that seek to justify the destruction. In 
cases such as Sarajevo's central post office, or the Neretva road bridges such 
narratives are convincing since they can align themselves with the commonly 
understood meanings of what constitutes a military object or a military objective. 
However, in the case of the destruction of the urban fabric in which so much damage 
was done to buildings that could serve no such purposes, such narratives do not really 
serve to justify or explain the destruction of the urban fabric. 
The principal problems with analyses that treat the destruction of urban 
fabric as a contravention of the various rules/laws of war concerning military necessity 
and acceptable conduct are, therefore: a) that, in contradistinction to the idea that this 
destruction was militarily unnecessary, it should be evident that, when considered as a 
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whole, this destruction was both systematic and had a meaning of its own; and b) 
arguments that view this destruction as militarily unnecessary simply criminalise acts 
of destruction and, therefore, result in a total lack of explanation of the meaning of 
such destruction and what it discloses. In other words, it may appear that the 
widespread destruction of urban environments (such as occurred in Mostar or 
Sarajevo) might be satisfactorily analysed as cases of `wanton destruction of cites, 
towns or villages' (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
Statute, Article 3(b)). 45 That is, where the concept of military necessity obviously fails 
to account for instances of the systematic destruction of urbanity the notion of `wanton 
destruction' might be satisfactorily used in its place. 
However, this notion of `wanton destruction' is problematic in two significant 
ways. Firstly it rests on an idea of excess that is intimately linked to notions of 
military necessity. `Wanton destruction' circumscribes all those events that escape 
being classified as legitimate military actions. Moreover, the notion that such 
destruction is `wanton' implies a certain irrationality and bloodlust that suggests the 
destruction occurred for idiosyncratic reasons localisable to a potential indictee 
(person or group). Secondly, since the destruction is taken to be the wanton action of a 
person or group it is seen as a deviation from a norm of behaviour implicit in the 
various codifications of Rules of War and Crimes against Humanity. As such, `wanton 
destruction' is reduced to the status of immorality, irrationality or evil. Thus, in seeing 
the destruction of urban environments as instances of `wanton destruction' the 
targeting of urban fabric is seen merely as a criminal deviation from the norm. 6 In 
this way such accounts resist the urgent need to inquire into the meaning of such 
destruction, refusing to see such destruction as following another rationale or logic to 
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that of the putative norm of protecting civilians and civilian property during events of 
armed conflict. 
To put it another way (and to borrow from Arendt), whereas accounts that take 
the notion of `wanton destruction' to satisfactorily explain instances of urban 
destruction take these events as exceptions to the norm we should perhaps be 
considering them as instances in conformity with a norm (or logic) of their own. 
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What logic, or rationale do such acts of `wanton' destruction disclose? My argument 
would be that in order to pursue this question `wanton destruction' would be more 
productively understood as urbicide. 
From ethnic cleansing to cultural cleansing 
The second of the three interpretations of the destruction of urban fabric that I 
want to examine understands urban destruction as the destruction of symbolic 
buildings. This understanding arises in relation to the destruction of the cultural 
heritage of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Cultural heritage is protected under the 1956 Hague 
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. 
This convention offers protection for `moveable or immovable property of great 
importance to the cultural heritage of every people', a definition taken to include 
buildings such as museums, libraries and religious buildings as well as monuments or 
public buildings that are of specific cultural significance 48 During the drafting of this 
convention there was some disagreement concerning the protection of religious 
buildings. There was concern that the Convention would afford protection to all 
religious buildings that were not used for military purposes. Some parties were keen to 
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exclude this possibility since it may include buildings that were of little cultural value, 
whilst other parties were keen to afford protection to all such buildings since they 
viewed religion as a principle aspect of culture itself. 49 1 am not concerned with the 
specific extent of protection afforded to religious buildings since this is a matter of 
legal interpretation. Rather, I am interested in the logic that has been attributed to the 
destruction of cultural heritage in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Indeed the prevailing 
interpretation of the Convention seems to indicate that all religious buildings can be 
afforded protection - although in practice it is those that have a notable position in the 
heritage of a culture (i. e., those of specific architectural or artistic merit, those of 
specific significance for a given religion, and those that are especially ancient) that are 
thought most deserving of protection. 5° 
During the 1992-95 Bosnian war many buildings that would fall under the 
protection of the Hague Convention were destroyed. The shelling of the National 
Museum, National Library and Oriental Institute in Sarajevo and the dynamiting of the 
Ferhadija Mosque in Banja Luka, to name just four examples, clearly exemplify cases 
in which cultural heritage that would receive protection under the Hague Convention 
was deliberately destroyed. The destruction of the Stari Most can also be taken to 
constitute an instance of the destruction of cultural heritage since the Stari Most has 
been taken to comprise an `immovable property of great importance to the cultural 
heritage of every people' in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Interpretations of the widespread destruction of cultural heritage have sought 
to understand what the buildings represented such that they would become military 
targets. In attempting to find the logic behind the destruction of cultural property these 
analyses have tried to place the destruction within the wider context of the 1992-95 
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Bosnian War. As such they have commonly taken the destruction of buildings to 
comprise a means for fulfilling certain war aims. That is, it has been proposed that the 
cultural property represented something that the overall war aims sought to eradicate. 
Such an analysis shifts the focus of attention towards the overall war aims of the 
parties responsible for destroying cultural property. 
Accounts of the destruction of cultural heritage invariably see it as an element 
of ethnic cleansing. Ethnic cleansing can be defined as the attempt to remake `Bosnia- 
Herzegovina as a series of small, pure ethnic states'. 51 Insofar as ethnic cleansing is 
distinct from genocide, it comprises the ethnic homogenisation of territory through 
displacement or killing. The term was coined to indicate the manner in which the 
break-up of the former Yugoslavia was characterised by systematic ethnic purification 
of territory that was militarily gained. Although some interpretations of this term see it 
as an incidental attribute of territorial gains it is commonly recognised that the 
destruction or displacement of ethnic populations comprised a military objective in 
itself. 52 That is, the taking of territory was not sufficient in itself to constitute a war 
aim, rather the homogenisation of that territory was an integral aspect of the military 
objectives. This means that the destruction of, for example, the population of 
Srebrenica in July 1995 was not incidental to the territorial gains of the Bosnian Serb 
Army. Rather the destruction and displacement of this population was a war aim for 
the Bosnian Serb Army. Insofar as ethnic populations are, therefore, targeted because 
of their ethnicity, it is difficult to separate ethnic cleansing from genocide. 53 However 
`ethnic cleansing' was used to note that ethnicity is the factor that determines the 
target of military action rather than nationality (since it was widely held that there was 
no such thing as Bosnian nationality). 54 
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Ethnic cleansing as practised in Bosnia is a violent erasure of ethnic 
heterogeneity and the imposition of homogeneity in a given territory. It is precisely 
through seeing this violent erasure as the overall war aim (of the Bosnian Serbs and 
Bosnian Croats in particular) that the destruction of cultural heritage has been 
interpreted. The destruction of buildings that comprise cultural heritage constitutes, it 
is argued, an integral element of the war aims. That is, these buildings are destroyed 
because they represent what must be destroyed in order to achieve the aim of the 
erasure of, and thus purity of, ethnic identity on a particular territory. In order to note 
the specific targeting of buildings in the 1992-95 Bosnian War, the Council of Europe 
introduced the distinction between `ethnic cleansing', or the removal/erasure of ethnic 
populations, and `cultural cleansing', or the erasure of heterogeneous cultural 
artefacts. 55 However, this distinction, though indicating the extent of damage to 
cultural heritage, is something of a distraction since, as I hope to show, interpretations 
of the violence against buildings such as museums, libraries and mosques argue that 
this destruction is integral to the attempt to create ethnic purity/homogeneity. 
Interpretations of the destruction of cultural heritage have thus seen this 
destruction as a means to the achievement of the objective of ethnic/cultural 
homogeneity. These interpretations argue that certain buildings are destroyed because 
they represent ethnic/cultural heterogeneity. Such interpretations have been offered in 
the case of the destruction of the Stari Most. HVO leader Mate Boban's remark that 
`[i]t is not enough to cleanse Mostar of the Muslims, the relics must also be destroyed' 
is cited by Riedlmayer in support of the idea that the Stari Most was destroyed 
because it represented the ethnic heterogeneity of the community of Mostar. 56 
According to this interpretation the destruction of the bridge can be understood if one 
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understands the actions of the HVO according to the logic of the creation of the 
ethnically pure statelet of Herceg-Bosna. 
Andras Riedlmayer's work to draw attention to the destruction of the cultural 
heritage of Bosnia-Herzegovina provides a particularly cogent example of such an 
interpretation. Riedimayer argues that although our attention focuses on the people of 
Bosnia `we should also take a look at the rubble. ' This rubble, he argues, `signifies 
more than the ordinary atrocities of war... Rubble in Bosnia and Hercegovina signifies 
nationalist extremists hard at work to eliminate not only the human beings and living 
cities, but also the memory of the past. '57 This elimination of the memory of the past, 
argues Riedlmayer, is an integral element of the ethnic cleansing that characterised the 
Bosnian war. Riedlmayer argues that though `[w]e are... told that "ancient hatreds" are 
what fuel the destruction... this is not true'. That this is not the case is precisely what 
the buildings that are destroyed attest to. The museums, libraries, mosques, churches 
and monuments `speak eloquently of centuries of pluralism... in Bosnia. It is this 
evidence of a successfully shared past that the nationalists seek to destroy. '58 It is the 
nature of the nationalist project, the project that gave birth to ethnic cleansing, that 
drives this destruction. 
Ethnic cleansing is an integral part of the violent nationalism that characterised 
Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat attempts to carve out statelets in Bosnia. This 
nationalism seeks to naturalise the idea that the so-called `ethnic' groups in Bosnia are 
fated to live separate existences. The myth of `ancient hatreds' installs the idea that 
ethnic groups were always distinct and in antagonistic relationships. Nationalist ideas 
of separation and ethnic purity are the logical outcome of the acceptance of this idea. 
However, such ideas are simply the myths on which the nationalist edifice is built. 
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Indeed Bosnia has a long history of pluralism which exhibits a high degree of 
indistinction (such as inter-marriage) and co-existence between these supposedly 
distinct and incompatible ethnic groups. 59 It is precisely the built environment that 
represents this pluralism. The urban environment in cities such as Sarajevo and 
Mostar are testament to the pluralist character of Bosnia. The co-existence of 
Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian and vernacular buildings is a constant reminder that the 
nationalist project of ethnic separateness is a present day fiction belied by the past. 
Thus, to paraphrase Riedlmayer, nationalists sought to destroy evidence of a 
successfully shared past in order to legitimise a contemporary goal of ethnic 
separateness. The nationalists sought to naturalise the idea of ethnic separateness by 
propagating the myth of historical antagonism and difference between ethnic groups. 
However, `before inventing a new past [characterised by the fictional "ethnic 
hatreds"] the old must be erased'. 60 
The destruction of the buildings that comprise the cultural heritage of Bosnia 
is thus understood as an integral element of the logic of nationalism: a means to 
achieve the war aim of ethnic separateness. In one sense this account gets closer to the 
theme of the destruction of the shared spaces of Bosnia-Herzegovina than the previous 
account of destruction as the result of either collateral damage or military necessity. 
Indeed this account understands the destruction of certain buildings as part of the logic 
of nationalism that has at its heart the destruction of the conditions of possibility of 
pluralism, key among which is the evidence of co-existence provided by the built 
environment of Bosnia. 
However, this account suffers from its focus upon the symbolic buildings, or 
the cultural heritage of Bosnia. In other words it focuses upon the buildings whose 
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loss is judged to be a cultural loss. Analysing the destruction of urban environments 
on the basis of such examples is, therefore, problematic precisely because the 
destruction of buildings that are not regarded as being part of the heritage of a 
distinctive culture is overlooked. Indeed, it is partly the concern that analyses which 
focus on the destruction of cultural heritage are exclusionary in this manner that 
motivates the definition of the destruction of the urban environment as `urbicide'. 
Analyses that focus on the destruction of cultural heritage fail to recognise that 
the act of designating buildings/urban environments as worthy of cultural heritage 
status is necessarily exclusionary. There exist two understandings on the basis of 
which such designation can be made, one more narrow and formal than the other. 
Firstly, buildings or urban environments can be designated as comprising the physical 
heritage of a particular culture (be that a national/ethnic culture or the more generic 
culture of humanity) by either national governments and/or international governmental 
organisations such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organisation (UNESCO). These procedures produce the so-called `heritage lists' that 
comprise a canonical designation of the cultural heritage of both nations and, in the 
case of UNESCO, humanity. 61 Secondly, there is a more generic understanding of 
what comprises cultural heritage that might extend, in principle, to buildings beyond 
the narrow scope of the `heritage lists' compiled by national governments and 
international governmental organisations. 62 It is precisely this generic understanding 
of what constitutes cultural heritage that was deployed in respect of the destruction of 
urban fabric during the 1992-95 Bosnian war. Indeed most of the buildings that were 
destroyed were not listed by official organs of either national governments or 
international governmental organisations 63 
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It was thus according to a generic notion of what comprised cultural heritage 
that observers and participants in the 1992-95 war appealed for the protection of 
buildings taken to represent the cultural heritage of Bosnia from the widespread 
destruction that was occurring. These appeals were intended to point out the violations 
of the extant laws of war that were occurring in Bosnia and draw attention to the 
assault on culturally significant buildings that may have otherwise been overlooked 
given that most observers of, and participants in, the conflict were, at the time, 
predominantly concerned with the widespread human rights abuses (and purported 
genocide) that were taking place. This generic understanding comprises a more 
general concept of which buildings are representative of the achievements or character 
of a culture (invariably, however, this comprises religious buildings, monuments, 
cultural institutions and striking examples of indigenous architecture). 
However, the status of `cultural heritage' is bestowed only upon those 
buildings/monuments that are taken to either exemplify the achievements of, or typify 
the development and existence of, a given culture. Thus, as I noted above, during 
negotiation of the 1954 Hague Convention some of the parties resisted attempts to 
include all houses of worship in the scope of the treaty arguing (successfully) that it 
was only exemplary religious buildings that deserved the status of cultural heritage 
(according to this logic, ancient mosques such as the Ferhadija in Banja Luka are 
defined as cultural heritage, whilst more modern, and perhaps more modest, mosques 
are not). M 
Moreover, in endorsing either (inter)governmental, or generic, understandings 
of what constitutes the heritage of a distinctive culture, analyses that concentrate on 
the destruction of cultural heritage imply that those buildings not defined as such are 
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in some way dispensable for that culture. Thus the destruction of houses, office 
blocks, multi-storey carparks, and supermarkets is excluded from analyses of urban 
destruction that are focused on the violation of the laws of protection of cultural 
property that comprised one element of the devastation of the urban environment in 
the 1992-95 Bosnian war. The destruction of buildings not designated as cultural 
heritage is thus deemed to be the result of either poor targeting, military expediency, 
or excessive force. 65 Either way, this destruction is not of analytical consequence (it 
comprises merely the general rubble of war and can be explained as the result of either 
expediency or excess). 66 
On the whole this means that the buildings for which concern is shown are 
those that were striking examples of a particular cultural influence upon the pluralist 
history of Bosnia. Ancient mosques, grand National Library buildings, and 400 year- 
old bridges are the subject of this account as it is these that are the symbolic reminders 
of the pluralist culture of Bosnia. According to this account, these buildings were 
deliberately targeted as a way of achieving the war aims of nationalist political 
projects. However, the destruction of the urban environment is more widespread than 
these symbolic buildings. Indeed it encompasses buildings that have no distinctive 
cultural value, or are of indistinct cultural provenance (the bland modernism of the 
`Unis Co. ' tower blocks in Sarajevo [see Appendix 1, figure 4-1] or the hotels 
destroyed in Mostar serve as examples). 67 These buildings could not really be said to 
represent the pluralist heritage of Bosnia. And thus the interpretation of urban 
destruction as an attack on cultural heritage provides only a partial (though striking) 
account of the destruction of the urban environment in Bosnia. That is, urbicide 
comprises a more widespread phenomenon than the destruction of cultural heritage 
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and, hence, understandings of the destruction of the urban fabric of Bosnia will need 
to substantially elaborate upon this interpretation and extend its narrow focus upon 
examples of cultural heritage. 
Balkanisation, balkanism, ethnicity and despair 
I have referred to the third and final interpretation of urban destruction that I 
want to examine as a metaphoric understanding. That is to say, this interpretation of 
the destruction of the urban environment treats violence against buildings such as the 
Stari Most as a metaphor for, or symbolic instanciation of, certain political concepts 
deployed to understand the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. This understanding of 
urban destruction thus treats the assault on the Stari Most as an exemplary sign of the 
ideas and values at stake in the 1992-95 Bosnian war. Those who interpret the 
destruction of cultural heritage as an element of ethnic cleansing see buildings as the 
material symbols of culture, the concrete presence of a given culture and, thus, given 
the plurality of heritage in Bosnia, testament to the pluralism of Bosnian culture. 
However, the metaphoric interpretation (which understands the destruction as a sign 
of the concepts at stake in the war), do not treat the ruins in themselves, as material 
symbols of a culture, but, rather, as signs evocative of ideas and values (concepts). 
This interpretation is, therefore, a semiotic understanding that treats buildings as a 
sign that refers to a concept. 68 
The Stari Most provides an exemplary instance of such a semiotic 
understanding of the destruction of the urban environment in Bosnia. As a sign, the 
collapsing bridge embedded itself in the political imaginaries of those who observed, 
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participated in, or fell victim to the 1992-95 war. This sign gave graphic 
representation to the concepts and values that were taken to be at stake in the Bosnian 
war. 69 Insofar as this event became a sign that provided a convenient shorthand that 
summarised the tortuous complexities of the conflict, it had profound effects upon 
understandings of, participation and intervention in, and attempts to negotiate a 
conclusion to, the war. On the one hand the rubble of the Stari Most was a sign with 
assumed connotation that could be substituted for a comprehensive understanding of 
the conflict. On the other hand, this sign precipitated, solidified, or gave expression to, 
certain conceptual formations that framed the horizons of the political imaginaries of 
both participants and observers. As such then, this sign, and its interpretation, 
influenced courses of action taken by those whose political imaginaries it shaped. 
As a sign the ruined Stari Most (and the rubble of Bosnia in general) is 
associated with two specific concepts. Firstly, for observers of the conflict, the 
destruction of the Stari Most signified in graphic fashion the balkanisation of Bosnia. 
According to James Der Derian, `[b]alkanisation is generally understood to be the 
break up of larger political units into smaller, mutually hostile states which are 
exploited or manipulated by more powerful neighbours. 970 The destruction of the Stari 
Most by the HVO gave such an idea exemplary form. That is, the destruction of the 
last remaining bridge between the two halves of Mostar was performed by a group 
manipulated by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and effectively sealed the creation 
of two mutually hostile entities (east and west Mostar). Through such signs, the 
concept of `balkanisation' framed the political imaginaries of those that observed, or 
intervened in, the Bosnian war. However, balkanisation was not simply a technical 
term for the creation of mutually hostile states, but a more general concept that 
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referred to the violent fragmentation of territory into ever smaller exclusive 
communities. This concept found its exemplary signifier in the rubble of Bosnia, the 
ever proliferating signs of fault lines in a hitherto pluralist community. This elevation 
of the notion of balkanisation to the position of horizon of understanding, required the 
concept to be `transvalued' from a simple term referring to geopolitical machination to 
a motif capturing the concept of an inexorable, violent fragmentation of political 
landscapes. 7' Mike Davis, for example, emphasises precisely this motif of violent 
fragmentation that dominates the concept of `balkanisation'. In his discussion of the 
`power lines' that shape the urban environment in Los Angeles, Davis refers to 
`balkanised' cities such as Chicago or Boston. 72 In this manner the specificity of 
`balkanisation' to a correlate cartographic/geographic entity (i. e., the `Balkan' 
Peninsula) has evaporated. Rather the term connotes simply violent political and 
social fragmentation. 
The division of Bosnia into ever smaller, homogenous ethnic territories was 
clearly represented in the gulf opened up between the two banks of the Neretva by the 
destruction of the Stari Most. However, the balkanisation that this sign represented 
had an additional stratum of meaning. The destruction of the elegant Ottoman bridge 
not only signified the violent social and political fragmentation of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, but also the truly `Balkan' character of the violence by which this 
fragmentation was being achieved. That is, this destruction confirmed the stereotypes 
that observers held of those who were executing this balkanisation. These stereotypes, 
are best referred to, in keeping with the conceptual terrain of balkanisation, as 
`balkanist'. `Balkanism' can be seen as a `variation on orientalism'. 73 Orientalism, as 
Bakic-Hayden and Hayden note, `refers to pervasive patterns of representation of 
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cultures and societies that privilege a self-confidently "progressive", "modern" and 
"rational" Europe over the putatively "stagnant", "backward", "traditional" and 
"mystical" societies of the Orient. '74 Bakio-Hayden and Hayden demonstrate `an 
orientalist framework of analysis, primarily by Yugoslavs from the north and west 
parts of the country [Slovenia and Croatia], and by some foreign observers. '75 That is, 
Slovenes, Croats and foreign observers operated with a `political vision of reality 
whose structure promoted the difference between the familiar (Europe, The West 
"us") and the strange (the Orient, the East, "them")'. 76 Slovene, Croat and foreign 
political imaginaries assume their naturally progressive, modern, and European nature, 
whilst also assuming the backward nature of those in the eastern and southern parts of 
the former Yugoslavia. This orientalism manifests itself in, for example, the 
hierarchical division of the country according to religion. Croats and Slovenes regard 
Catholicism as naturally more rational and modern than Orthodox Christianity or 
Islam. As such this leads to the ascription of further characteristics on the basis of this 
hierarchy: Serbs are more warlike, Albanians are more traditional (backward), whilst 
Croats are more deserving of European recognition since they are, after all, 
Catholics. 77 
In Imagining the Balkans, Maria Todorova develops this `variation on 
orientalism' into the fully fledged concept of `balkanism'. 78 Todorova notes that 
`orientalism', as originally defined by Said, refers to a representational regime that is 
intimately connected to colonial structures of domination. Orientalism is a discourse 
that attempts to define, as an element of colonial domination, a geographical region 
that does not exist as a naturally pregiven entity. In contrast to this idea, Todorova 
notes that the Balkan peninsula is both a fairly well defined geographic location and, 
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though the subject of imperialism, never a truly colonised region. As such then the 
representational regime concerning the Balkans is not, according to Todorova, an 
orientalist discourse that circumscribes and classifies a colonial other, but rather a 
discourse that essentialises the characteristics of a region that forms the ambiguous 
edge of occidental Europe. 
Balkanism views the Balkans as a transitional bridge between occident and 
orient. The transition that can be observed in the Balkans is not only spatial, but 
evolutionary: the inhabitants of the Balkans are taken to be in the process of evolving 
into occidental Europeans. The Balkans are thus taken to be a reversion to a pre- 
modem stage of civility. Furthermore, balkanist stereotypes view the Balkans as a 
zone of flux (since all transition involves instability). Balkanism attributes an essential 
character to the Balkan peninsula that is the logical correlate of balkanisation. The 
reversion of civility to medieval standards coupled with the state of instability given 
by the transitional nature of the region entails perpetual and violent struggle, even 
conditions of mutual hostility and barbarity. Moreover, it is not only western 
observers that deploy balkanist stereotypes. Balkanism is rife within the Balkans, as 
each community attempts to characterise its neighbour as in some way less civilised, 
and themselves as in some sense more European (or Slavic) than Balkan. Thus, as 
balkanisation proceeds to fragment states into ever smaller entities, so balkanism 
fragments the cultural landscape into ever more mutually hostile groups who draw 
conceptual distinctions between themselves. 
The fragmentation of the political landscape thus proceeds according to ideas 
of civility. 79 Wherever the difference between groups is promoted, it is on the basis of 
being more or less civilised. The interpretation of the destruction of the Stari Most by 
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some observers of the conflict comprises a classic example of balkanism. The Stari 
Most was taken to be an exemplary instance of cultural heritage: a striking example of 
Bosnian culture and part of the universal heritage of humankind. The elevation of this 
bridge to the status of a monumental exemplar of the cultural heritage of variously, 
Yugoslavia, Bosnia, the Ottoman Empire, Europe and humanity, served to suggest 
that visiting, seeing, and conserving this bridge was the duty of those who held the 
value of human cultural endeavours in high regard. And so the destruction of this 
exemplar of cultural heritage was, invariably decried as an act of barbarity, savagery, 
or philistinism. Those who destroyed this bridge, it was argued could not hold human 
cultural achievement in very high regard. Of course, cultural achievement is only 
attained over time, as is regard for the artefacts this achievement leaves behind. One 
has to develop a cultural sensibility, it is the mark of a culture that has attained a 
degree of sophistication, a culture that has left behind its immature and barbaric past. 
What the HVO had done was taken to reveal a total lack of comprehension of the 
value of the artefacts produced by a culture, a comprehension that can only come 
through a sort of human maturity. The HVO, thus, could only be savages. 
Despite being meant as a harsh condemnation of the action of the HVO, a 
reprimand meant to make the HVO stop and see the value of what was being 
destroyed, the image of the fallen bridge came to represent the savagery and barbarity 
of the Bosnian war: the failure of (European) civilisation to extend into the Balkans. 
This idea framed the political imagination of those observing the conflict. Talk of 
`ancient animosities' was given new life by this supposed sign of ferocious barbarity. 
Leaders of western, `civilised' nations threw their hands up in despair: how can we 
help when these people don't share even the basic values of civilisation, they 
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reasoned, we should leave them to fight this conflict out amongst themselves. 80 The 
Stari Most, as a signifier of the barbarism of the Bosnian Croats (and by extension all 
Croats and even all Bosnians) thus gave the balkanism of western observers a form 
with which to associate such concepts. 
The second concept which the destruction of the Stari Most is taken to signify 
is that of the concept of the `bridging' of supposedly distinct ethnic groups. The idea 
that Bosnia was `a bridge', spanning and linking otherwise foreign cultures captured 
the political imagination of observers of, and participants in, the conflict. 81 Indeed, the 
gulf that the collapse of the Stari Most opened up between the left and right banks of 
the Neretva was for many observers the ideal metaphor to express the prevalent 
understanding of the Bosnian war as an `ethnic' conflict. The collapse of the bridge 
neatly summed up the widespread idea that Yugoslavia had been an artificial creation 
that had forced pre-existent national groups to live side by side. Without the firm hand 
of Tito it was assumed that these national groups would naturally separate out and, in 
places where this was not possible, there would be conflict. The crumbling bridge 
symbolised the death of Tito's ideal, the collapse of the remnants of a forced co- 
existence between the three naturally separate ethnic groups that occupied the territory 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina: `Serbs', `Croats' and `Muslims'. The rubble left in the river 
between the banks captured the sense that nothing but destruction would come out of 
attempts to create a so-called `multi-ethnic' Bosnia. 
This motif of bridging, signified by the ruined Stari Most before, during, and 
after its destruction, thus framed the political imaginaries of both participants and 
observers in the conflict. For the HVO, the link to Muslim east Mostar provided by 
the Stari Most threatened the attempt to establish the `ethnically pure' Bosnian Croat 
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statelet of `Herceg-Bosna'. With their political horizon framed by the notion that 
ethno-national identities were the natural order of things -a natural order which was 
artificially suppressed by the bridging accomplished under Tito's programme of 
`brotherhood and unity' - it was logical for the HVO to destroy that which represented 
such bridging. The bridge was the link that had artificially bound the otherwise 
separate ethnic groups in Mostar together. To destroy the bridge was to re-establish 
the natural separateness of Croatian, Catholic western Bosnia from Muslim, Turkic 
eastern Bosnia. 82 With their political horizons shaped by the logic of natural 
primordial ethnicities that was the logical underside of the metaphor provided by the 
image of the bridge, the HVO set about destroying that which threatened the purity of 
their `homeland'. 
In contradistinction to the vision of the HVO, the bridge provided a sign of 
hope for those who worked to resolve the conflict or to re-build Bosnia in the wake of 
Dayton. The destruction of the bridge, however, turned this sign of hope into one of 
despair. Bridge building has been a common theme in the rhetoric of diplomacy for a 
considerable time. References to the bridging of differences, or to building bridges 
that cross divides that separate cultures, nations, or ideologies litter the history of 
attempts to reconcile both global and local divisions. For example, on the occasion of 
being awarded the 1996 International Democracy Award, chair of the presidency of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic remarked that `Bosnia and Herzegovina is a 
country -a bridge - in which two worlds meet three cultures and four religions. That 
is why the issue of Bosnia is, here and now, the paramount question of democracy. '83 
Ironically (or perhaps tragically), the logic by which the bridge was elevated to this 
mythical status in the rhetoric of post-Dayton multi-ethnic democracy had common 
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roots with, and shared the same political imaginary as, the HVO. 84 This seemingly 
conciliatory metaphor rests on the assumption that there are indeed naturally existing 
and distinct ethnic groups such as `Croat' and `Muslim' who would naturally occupy 
distinct territories, the gaps between which would, of course, need bridging. This logic 
can also be seen to frame the political imaginaries of many of the agencies charged 
with the task of rebuilding Bosnia after the signing of the Dayton Agreement. The idea 
that the creation of a multi-ethnic polity required establishing links between distinct 
ethnic groups was prevalent in the rhetoric of bridge building employed by, amongst 
others, the European Administration of Mostar (EUAM). 85 The end result is that the 
rubble of Bosnia became a sign of the despair that these agencies expressed regarding 
the possibility of creating a multi-ethnic community. Of course, part of the problem is 
that the sign itself, in the way that it constitutes the idea that ethnic communities are 
naturally occurring separate entities that need artificially linking, leads to the 
pessimistic conclusion that such artifice is impossible (a conclusion that the HVO 
would heartily endorse). 
The problem with this interpretation of the rubble of Bosnia is that the 
destruction itself is not treated as an event worthy of attention in its own right. Rather 
the rubble is taken, appropriated we might say, as a sign connotative of a more general 
concept. I am not trying to revive a spurious distinction between the real and the sign 
at this point. Rather, I am trying to note that whilst urbicide may serve as the sign for 
several concepts this does not get us any closer to understanding the meaning of the 
destruction of urban fabric. To take an analogy, genocide can be taken as a sign of 
barbarity, and yet this obscures the question of what is occurring in the event of 
genocide. Which is to say, the concept drains the sign of its own specificity. If one 
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sees the Holocaust as a sign of German barbarity, the destruction of the Jews is not 
taken as something important in its own right, but rather the signifier of something 
else. This is, I believe precisely the point that Bauman makes when he notes that 
the exercise in focusing on the Germanness [or the special barbarity of the 
Germans] of the crime [the Holocaust]... is simultaneously an exercise in 
exonerating everyone else, and particularly everything else... [and] results 
not only in the moral comfort of self-exculpation, but also in the dire 
threat of moral and political disarmament. 86 
In a similar manner, accepting the idea that the destruction of the urban fabric of 
Bosnia is simply the sign of some sort of barbarism, or the working out of the linkages 
between naturally separate ethnic communities, the specificity of the destruction itself 
is ignored. This results in `moral and political disarmament' since it means that the 
question is not `what does the destruction of the shared spaces of Bosnia disclose 
about the fundamentally political nature of our existence', but rather `how can these 
aberrant concepts, signified by this destruction, be reversed'. 
It is thus my argument, following Bauman's, that this interpretation of the 
destruction of the urban fabric of Bosnia comprises a valuation of the event that is 
substituted for the far more urgent task of the analysis of the structure and meaning of 
the event itself. Which is to say that the destruction of shared space may become the 
sign that frames certain political imaginaries in relation to this war. However, we deny 
ourselves crucial political possibilities if we simply accept those significatory stories 
since we accept that this destruction is interesting only insofar as it connotes savagery 
or attempts to stitch communities back together. We must ask instead what is 
destroyed when the urban environment is destroyed, and what this reveals about the 
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political entailments of urbanity. In rather unfashionable terms, one could say that the 
question is not what the destruction signifies, but what the urban fabric is and what its 
destruction discloses. 
Urbicide restated 
Having reviewed three common interpretations of the destruction of urban 
fabric in Bosnia it is possible to restate the necessity of approaching the logics of such 
destruction through the concept of `urbicide'. It is precisely the partial and flawed 
nature of these interpretations that suggests that the destruction of urban fabric in 
Bosnia should be treated as a conceptual problematic in its own right. Thus the fact 
that this destruction cannot be treated as collateral damage (since it is seen to be the 
outcome of deliberate targeting strategies) demonstrates that we should view the 
destruction of buildings as an event in its own right rather than an incidental outcome 
of war. This leads us to ask why urban environments are destroyed. The proposition 
that they are destroyed out of military necessity is shown to be wanting since the 
destruction is too widespread and violates the accepted principles of military 
necessity. Attention then turns to understanding the destruction by understanding what 
is being destroyed. That is, it is argued that if we can show what is destroyed when 
buildings are destroyed we can say what the destruction means. 
Those that interpret the destruction of buildings in Bosnia as an element of 
ethnic cleansing begin to approach the question of what it is that is destroyed in urban 
devastation. This account shows that certain buildings may be destroyed because they 
are the material manifestation of a given culture, and, in the context of the urban 
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environment of Bosnia, testament to an ethos of pluralism that must be denied by 
ethno-nationalist political projects. 87 That is, elements of the urban fabric are 
destroyed because they manifest a pluralist heritage that must be destroyed in order to 
naturalise the mythology of mutual hatred on which the ethno-nationalist edifice is 
constructed. But this only accounts for the instances in which buildings that are 
recognisable as the manifestation of a given culture are destroyed. It does not account 
for the scale of the destruction or the targeting of buildings that are not recognisable as 
such symbols of culture (or are the heritage of non-ethnic cultures). Thus it represents 
only a partial account of what the urban fabric is and what its destruction means. It 
should be noted, of course, that the political entailments of this argument do point in 
the direction that I wish to go since this account intends to point out that the 
destruction of elements of the urban fabric is aimed at the shared nature of the urban 
environment. Those that are concerned with the destruction of cultural heritage are 
thus concerned to point out that the violence aimed against certain symbolic buildings 
is intended to deny the shared, or heterogeneous, character of urban space in Bosnia. 
However, this account only recognises certain buildings as evidence of this shared 
character and thus cannot comprise a full account of urban destruction. 
Finally the notion that the destruction is a signifier of the nature of the 1992-95 
Bosnian war brings us back to the question of what it is that is destroyed in the 
destruction of the urban fabric of Bosnia. That is, these accounts drain the actual 
destruction of any meaning, displacing this meaning onto the concepts that the 
destruction is taken to signify. As such this is a neat side-stepping of the issue of what 
it is that is destroyed in this widespread destruction. Moreover, the full scale and 
nature of the destruction is rarely grasped by these accounts since they take iconic 
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instances as exemplary signifiers. It is something of a separate endeavour to ask in 
what ways the destruction of the urban environment in Bosnia has been appropriated 
as a sign in the political imaginaries of observers, participants and victims of the war. 
In place of this question I want to ask, before this destruction is emptied of specificity 
and taken as an illustration of a general concept, what is the urban environment and 
what is the meaning of its destruction. 
Thus we are brought back to the concept of `urbicide'. As I argued before in 
my lexicographic delineation of urbicide, this concept is intended to turn our attention 
to the widespread destruction of the urban environment. Urbicide entails the notion 
that the destruction is meaningful only in relation to that which is destroyed. To 
paraphrase Lemkin, urbicide is a coordinated set of different actions aimed at 
destroying the urban environment. This destruction has the aim of annihilating the 
urban environment itself. Moreover, urbicide targets buildings (as those things that 
constitute urbanity), not in their individual capacity, but as elements of urbanity. 88 
Thus it is necessary to ask what the urban environment is and what its destruction 
discloses. It has been my argument previously that the urban environment is the basis 
for urbanity. Moreover, I have argued that urbanity is the condition of possibility of 
heterogeneity. As the basis of urbanity the urban environment is thus constitutive of 
shared, or heterogeneous spaces. It is thus this spatiality that is at stake in the 
destruction of the urban environment. Moreover, destruction of the urban environment 
discloses the fundamentally political nature of this spatiality and its role as the 
condition of possibility of the networks of identity\difference that are the basis of 
politics. In order to demonstrate these contentions, however, it is necessary to frame 
the problematic posed by urbicide in more specific terms. 
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Framing the problematic 
Insofar as my argument is concerned with the destruction of the urban 
environment in the 1992-95 Bosnian war, it is an argument about the logic of urbicide. 
Buildings are destroyed in urbicide because they are the constitutive conditions of 
possibility of urbanity. Moreover, if I am correct they are destroyed insofar as they are 
the conditions of possibility of the heterogeneity that is the characteristic feature of 
urbanity. Thus buildings are destroyed because they comprise that which is the basis 
of the heterogeneity of urbanity. This destruction is not directed at buildings in their 
individual capacities (as strategic targets, symbolic heritage, or as signs of political- 
sociological concepts) but as the constitutive elements of the heterogeneity that 
characterises urbanity. I have contended that buildings comprise such a condition of 
possibility insofar as they are constitutive of shared spaces. 
My argument, therefore, will comprise an enquiry into precisely the manner in 
which buildings are constitutive of the shared spaces, and, hence, heterogeneity, that 
comprise the conditions of possibility of urbanity. Furthermore, insofar as I am able to 
provide an account of the manner in which buildings are constitutive of heterogeneity 
(urbanity) it is necessary to ask what the meaning of their destruction is. That is to say, 
in destroying buildings what is lost, and what is achieved. Thus there are two 
questions which will, following from my exegesis of the concept of urbicide, guide 
my argument. First, I will examine the manner in which buildings (the target of 
urbicide) are constitutive of the heterogeneity that characterises urbicide. This 
examination is an enquiry into the spatialities constituted by buildings. Secondly, I 
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will elaborate upon what I will refer to as the `stakes of urbicide': what is lost and 
what is accomplished in the destruction of buildings. 
That such an enquiry is both relevant and necessary can be seen in the way in 
which there appears to be an "unquestioned consensus" as to the nature of buildings 
and their role in socio-political formations that prevents questions such as those above 
from being posed. 89 The three interpretations of urban destruction outlined above fail 
to understand the heart of the phenomenon of urbicide. This failure can be attributed 
to the fact that these interpretations do not treat buildings as constitutive elements of 
urbanity but as something else: strategic targets; symbolic heritage; or signs of 
political-sociological concepts. In this sense, these interpretations accept that 
buildings have a specific role without questioning exactly what place they have in 
urbanity. Another way of putting this - this time in terms used by both Martin 
Heidegger and Jean-Luc Nancy - is to say that each of these interpretations 
`presupposes an interpretation of beings without asking about the truth of Being' 90 In 
Nancy's terms the interpretations of the destruction of elements of the urban fabric 
that I discussed above suffer from a problem of `presumption'. That is they presume 
their fundamental categories: `military necessity', `cultural heritage', `symbolic 
buildings', `cultures', `ethnic groups' and so on. 1 
In contradistinction to these presumptive interpretations, my argument will 
approach the question of what buildings are as elements of urbanity. Moreover, it is 
only insofar as an answer to this question can be sketched out that we can begin to 
understand the stakes of urbicide. The sketching out of both the manner in which 
buildings are constitutive of heterogeneity and the stakes of the destruction of such 
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elements of urbanity is necessary in order to give an account of the logics, or 
conceptual meaning, of urbicide. 
In order to delineate this logic of urbicide, specifically with regard to the 
destruction of the Stari Most, I propose to consider the two framing questions I have 
outlined above through Martin Heidegger's discussion of the nature of Being-in-the- 
world. I will commence with an examination of the manner in which Heidegger 
argues that Being-in-the-world is characterised by an ineluctably heterogeneous 
spatiality constituted by the (built) things with which it engages on an everyday basis. 
I will develop these insights through Heidegger's account of the relationship between 
`building' as an aspect of `dwelling'. Through this philosophical inquiry I hope to 
demonstrate the manner in which building is the condition of possibility of a 
specifically heterogeneous spatiality that engenders what we know as urbanity. 
Moreover, I will argue that building is thus a fundamentally political event, since such 
heterogeneous spatiality is precisely that which comprises the condition of possibility 
of the networks of identity\difference on which the political is predicated. I will 
contend that if we do not understand the manner in which we are-in-the-world through 
events such as building, then we fail to grasp the fundamental structure of what we 
call `the political'. 
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CHAPTER 3 
FROM BEING-IN-THE-WORLD TO DWELLING: THE SPATIALITY OF EXISTENCE 
Dasein is essentially... spatial. ' 
The interpretation of the Being of space has hitherto been a matter of 
perplexity, not so much because we have been insufficiently acquainted 
with the content of space itself as a thing..., as because the possibilities of 
Being in general have not been in principle transparent, and an 
Interpretation of them in terms of ontological concepts has been lacking. 2 
In chapter 21 argued that during the 1992-95 Bosnian war buildings were 
destroyed not in their individual capacities but as elements of the urban environment. 
That is, I argued that those interpretations that explained the destruction of buildings 
solely in terms of their individual symbolic or strategic capacities failed to provide an 
adequate account of both what was destroyed and what the destruction disclosed. 
Instead, I argued that, in order to provide an adequate account of the destruction, it 
was necessary to note that the buildings which were destroyed were the conditions of 
possibility of urbanity itself. Moreover, I argued that it is precisely insofar as they are 
constitutive of shared space that buildings are the conditions of possibility of urbanity. 
Only if there is such shared space is the heterogeneity that urbanity comprises 
possible. This is the central assumption on which my argument rests. Only if it can be 
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shown that buildings are indeed constitutive of shared space is the term `urbicide' (as 
opposed to `cultural cleansing' or `strategic necessity', for example) appropriate for 
such destruction. 
Given this pivotal assumption, I want to show in this chapter that buildings, as 
elements of the urban environment, are constitutive of shared space. It is this shared 
space that is the condition of possibility of the heterogeneity that characterises 
urbanity. It is the constitution of such heterogeneity that will be, ultimately, my focus 
of concern. It has been argued that heterogeneity and its closure are the characteristics 
of the political. 3 That is, `the political' comprises an field of contestation characterised 
by agonistic networks of identity\difference. Such a conception of the political is 
captured well by Connolly in his notion of `the paradox of difference'. Connolly notes 
that `[i]dentity requires difference in order to be ... Identity is thus a slippery, insecure 
experience, dependent on its ability to define difference and vulnerable to the 
tendency of entities it would so define to counter, resist, overturn, or subvert 
definitions applied to them'. 4 
According to Connolly, for there to be identity there must always already be 
difference. Heterogeneity - or the existence of difference, or others - is thus a 
necessary condition of existence. Moreover, it is this heterogeneity and the strategies 
of identity\difference it fosters that comprises the field of the political. In this sense 
politics consists of the networks of differentiation that establish identities. Or, rather, 
it is the consolidation and contestation of such networks that comprises the field of the 
political. Insofar as they are constitutive of such heterogeneity, the shared spaces 
constituted by buildings are thus fundamentally political spaces. 
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In order to demonstrate this pivotal assumption of my argument, I want to turn 
to Martin Heidegger's account of the spatiality of Being-in-the-world. Heidegger's 
account provides a powerful critical tool for understanding the manner in which 
buildings are constitutive of a fundamentally shared (and, hence, heterogeneous) 
spatiality. By setting out Heidegger's argument it is possible to illuminate the manner 
in which urbicide comprises the destruction of the shared spaces that constitute 
existence as both heterogeneous and political. Before commencing my account of 
Heidegger's argument, however, I want to briefly re-state the importance of the 
assumption on which my argument rests: that the destruction of buildings is the 
destruction of shared space. A preliminary illustration of this contention can be found 
in the case of attempted refugee returns in Bosnia after the 1992-95 war. 
Urban space is always already shared space 
The 1992-95 Bosnian war was characterised by `ethnic cleansing'. That is, the 
forced displacement of ethnic groups comprised a war aim, rather an incidental 
consequence, of the conflict. 5 `Ethnic cleansing' in Bosnia followed a typical pattern 
of depopulation and re-population. 6 A town or village would be `cleansed' of a 
particular ethnic population and then resettled by members of the `cleansing' group. 
During the conflict an estimated 200,000 Bosnians were killed, a large number of 
whom were civilians who died as a consequence of such ethnic cleansing.? In addition 
to the deaths that resulted from ethnic cleansing an estimated 50% of Bosnians were 
displaced. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
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(UNHCR), 1.2 million Bosnians sought refuge in host countries other than Bosnia, 
whilst another 1 million were internally displaced within Bosnia. 8 The re-population 
of ethnically cleansed towns and villages was facilitated by such large numbers of 
displaced persons needing re-settlement. The Bosnian Federation town of Drvar 
provides an exemplary instance of this dynamic. As the International Crisis Group 
notes, 
Before the war, when Drvar was known as Titov Drvar, some 9,000 
people lived in the town and some 17,000 in the municipality, of whom 
97.3 per cent were Serbs and 2.7 per cent "others". In 1995, however, 
Drvar fell to Croat forces and its Serb population fled. The new Croat 
authorities have since repopulated the municipality with displaced Croats 
from municipalities in Bosniac and Serb-held areas of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina... The current civilian population in Drvar municipality 
numbers between 5,000 and 6,000. Of these, only 79 are Serbs, all elderly 
people who chose to remain after the Croats took control of the area - 68 
in the outlying villages and 11 in town. 9 
After the conflict ended, the large numbers of refugees and internally 
Displaced Persons (IDPs) complicated the post-war landscape of Bosnia. The 
resettlement of IDPs as part of ethnic cleansing had, for example, consolidated the 
gains made by nationalists. The problematic posed by refugees and IDPs was central 
to the project of rebuilding Bosnia insofar as the return of refugees to their places of 
former residence would be an indicator of both the reverse of the gains made by 
nationalist forces and the restoration of a pre-war ethnic mixing. However, this return 
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faced many obstacles including, though not restricted to, the war-time destruction of 
properties, illegal occupation of properties by `re-settled' refugees and IDP's, and 
nationalist intransigence. 
According to the Dayton Agreement, both the Bosnian Federation and 
Republika Srpska were to facilitate the return of refugees to the place from which they 
had been displaced. 1° A right of return was thus established that placed a duty upon 
both entities to ensure that displaced persons were assisted in returning to their former 
towns and villages. ' 1 The intent was to reverse the effects of ethnic cleansing and to 
restore Bosnia's pre-war ethnic heterogeneity. That is, these measures were intended 
to reverse the consequences of war-time destruction and displacement. 
So-called `minority returns' are particularly interesting in this regard. 
`Minority returns' refer to those instances in which the refugees/IDPs returning to 
their places of former residence will comprise a minority in the towns/villages to 
which they return. This minority status is a specific consequence of war-time ethnic 
cleansing. In a majority of cases the returnees in minority returns are returning to 
places of former residence in which they were part of a pre-war ethnic majority. 
However, as a consequence of the displacement-resettlement dynamic of ethnic 
cleansing the places of former residence of such returnees are now almost exclusively 
populated by another ethnic group. This can be seen in the case of Drvar mentioned 
above. In pre-war Drvar, Bosnian Serbs comprised 97.3% of the population. However, 
after ethnic cleansing the town was repopulated as almost exclusively Croat. In this 
situation, Bosnian Serb returnees will find themselves in a minority when they return 
to their places of former residence. 
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However, despite the undertakings made in the Dayton Agreement, returns 
(and minority returns in particular) have been hindered in the post-war period by both 
violence against returnees and the destruction of buildings to which displaced persons 
could be returned. In this sense the ethnic cleansing that was accomplished during war 
has been consolidated through a continuation of violence in the post-war period. 
The town of Drvar provides stark evidence of this violence. In October 1996, 
thirty five houses were destroyed after Bosnian Serbs displaced during the war 
returned to see their properties. Then, in May 1997, another twenty five houses were 
destroyed `after an international delegation... met with local authorities... to discuss 
the return of displaced Serbs to the area'. 12 This violence was not confined to Drvar, 
however. The International Crisis Group notes that `[t]he vandalism in Drvar is sadly 
not an isolated event but part of a sustained campaign [across Bosnia-Herzegovina] to 
prevent the return of minorities. ' 13 Indeed the destruction of houses and places of 
worship across Bosnia after the signing of the Dayton Agreement demonstrates that 
urbicide is not confined to situations of conflict. 
The destruction of buildings intended for returnees is an exemplary instance of 
the `ontopological' assumptions that underlie ethno-nationalist politics. 14 
`Ontopology', according to Jacques Derrida, refers to an `axiomatics linking 
indissociably the ontological value of present-being [on] to its situation, to the stable 
and presentable determination of a locality, the topos of territory, native soil, city'. 15 
In National Deconstruction, David Campbell demonstrates the ontopological nexus of 
territory and identity on which ethno-nationalist politics rest. 16 Ethno-nationalism 
seeks to indissociably link identity (what Derrida would call `present-being'), and 
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territory (Derrida's `situation... the topos of territory'). That is, identity is to be derived 
from the locality, or territory, it inhabits. Insofar as ethno-nationalist identity must be 
homogeneous and admit of no heterogeneity, the territory from which it derives value 
must be similarly homogeneous. This is the motor of ethnic cleansing. Ethno- 
nationalist groups displace all other ethnic groups from a given locality in order to 
claim it as a homogeneous territory. In this way their identity can then be gained from 
the fact that this territory is their sole possession. It is precisely this logic that can be 
seen in the idea expressed by the common Serbian saying that `Serbian land is where 
Serbian bones are'. '7 Since ethno-nationalism derives the value of its being from 
territory, it must assert that the ground in which Serbian dead are buried is and can 
only ever be homogeneously Serbian. It follows, therefore, that heterogeneous others 
must be expelled from such land. 
In the case of the destruction of houses and other buildings in order to prevent 
return an identical logic is at work. Moreover, this logic demonstrates the manner in 
which such buildings constitute a shared space that is always already the condition of 
possibility of heterogeneity. Insofar as ethno-nationalism links identity and territory, it 
derives its identity from ensuring the exclusion of heterogeneity from its territory. 
Minority returns effectively problematise this linkage of identity and territory by 
demonstrating the manner in which urban space is always already shared space and 
thus potentially heterogeneous. 
In the case of Drvar, and in the other cases where ethno-nationalist objections 
to minority returns have spilled over into violence, the destruction of houses intended 
for returnees discloses more than the simple destruction of the place where that 
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returnee was to live. Indeed, those who see this destruction as an obstruction through 
the elimination of places of residence forget that it is always possible to rebuild a 
house, or to refurbish another, and that the destruction of a house itself need in no way 
prevent the return of displaced persons. 18 Rather, the destruction of the buildings to 
which displaced persons were to return discloses the manner in which those buildings 
are constitutive of a shared space that fosters heterogeneity. Indeed, the destruction of 
such houses is best understood as an instance of urbicide since the house is destroyed 
not simply to intimidate the returnee, but as an element of urbanity. That is, to 
reaffirm the account of urbicide I gave in the previous chapter, the houses are 
destroyed not in their individual capacities as homes for returnees, but as elements of 
urbanity itself. 
Minority returns are the return of heterogeneity to territories that were 
homogenised through ethnic cleansing. This is possible precisely because the urban 
fabric of these towns and villages comprises always already shared spaces, and thus 
harbours an ineluctable possibility of heterogeneity. It is only possible to remove this 
possibility of heterogeneity by removing the shared spaces of that urbanity. And it is 
precisely because they are constitutive of the shared space that it is buildings that are 
destroyed. In order to maintain the ontopological foundations of ethno-nationalism, it 
is necessary to remove the possibility of the (re)emergence of heterogeneity (after the 
war) in these localities by destroying precisely that which, insofar as it constitutes the 
urban environment as an always already shared space, threatens to allow the return of 
difference: the buildings (in this case houses). 
109 
This brief examination of the manner in which buildings are destroyed in order 
to prevent minority returns is significant insofar as it details the lengths to which it is 
necessary to go to efface the shared character of urban space. The space constituted by 
the buildings that comprise the elements of towns and cities is always already a shared 
space. As such, this means that towns and cities such as Drvar are the sites of an 
ineluctable heterogeneity - even in the wake of sustained `ethnic cleansing'. This 
heterogeneity can take the form of antagonisms that generate destructive political 
forces such as those experienced in Drvar. But such destruction only serves to confirm 
the assumption that this ineluctable heterogeneity is possible precisely because the 
buildings that comprise the urban environment are constitutive of shared spaces. If 
this was not the case it would not be necessary to destroy buildings in order to control 
who has access to which urban areas. It is only because buildings constitute the urban 
space as a shared space that their destruction is deemed necessary. 19 The way in which 
buildings constitute the urban environment as an always already shared space must, 
therefore, be shown. 
In order to show how buildings constitute the urban environment as an always 
already shared space, it necessary to address two issues. Firstly, and most obviously, 
the manner in which buildings constitute shared space must be shown. Secondly, 
however, the `always already constituted' character of that shared space must be 
addressed. It must be shown that the space that buildings constitute is, prior to being 
anything else, shared space. If this cannot be shown then the heterogeneity said to be 
premised upon such shared spaces is not an ineluctable fact of urbanity. And thus the 
previous contentions regarding urbicide would begin to collapse. I will refer to this 
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second issue as the `pre-theoretical' character of the space constituted by buildings. I 
hope to show that the space that buildings constitute is always already shared: this 
`always already' implying that this space is shared prior to it becoming an issue for 
theoretical reflection or, indeed, political segregation, regulation or destruction. This 
will demonstrate that heterogeneity is similarly pre-theoretical, and all attempts to 
regulate or efface such heterogeneity are a posteriori operations that can never fully 
destroy the always already shared character of urban space. 
I want to address these two issues through the work of Martin Heidegger. It 
may appear somewhat perverse to address the constitution of shared space through the 
work of a thinker renowned for his temporo-centrism. However, I will argue that 
Heidegger's account of the fundamentally spatial character of Being-in-the-world not 
only provides a vantage point from which to consider the manner in which buildings 
constitute shared space, but also demonstrates the pre-theoretical nature of such space. 
Through Heidegger's work, it is thus possible to offer an initial interpretation of the 
manner in which buildings constitute the shared spaces that are a pre-theoretical 
feature of Being-in-the-world. Such an interpretation is a vital starting point for an 
inquiry into what exactly is disclosed by the destruction of the urban environment. 
A Heideggerian interpretation 
In a seminar in 1969 Heidegger `maintained that his thinking had traversed 
three periods, each with its own leading theme: Meaning, Truth, and Place'. ° For 
Heidegger, place necessarily implies the associated concepts of space, spatiality, and 
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location. Thus it would seem that, by his own admission, spatiality came to occupy a 
central place in Heidegger's thinking. However, the trajectory of Heidegger's thinking 
concerning space is not as simple as this remark might imply. Indeed, the idea that 
Heidegger's work comprises a clear path towards a thinking of place and space belies 
the indirection with which he proceeds along this path. 21 
In Division 1 of Being and Time Heidegger offers an account of the spatiality 
of Being-in-the-world. In this account Heidegger notes the centrality of spatiality to 
any understanding of Being-in-the-world. However, this account is, as Hubert Dreyfus 
notes, `fundamentally confused' insofar as it does not clearly establish how the public 
character of the space in which Being-in-the-world comes to be is to be reconciled 
with the individually centred character of each being's spatial experience. 22 That is, 
there is a failure to adequately explicate how the spatiality of Being-in-the-world is 
simultaneously public and yet individually centred. Given the rigour with which 
Heidegger usually sets out his concepts in Being and Time, this lack of clarity is 
somewhat surprising. Moreover, in section 70, Division 2 of Being and Time 
Heidegger attempts to derive spatiality from temporality. Heidegger thus compounds 
the confusion by subordinating the supposedly central concept of the spatiality of 
Being-in-the-world to temporality. This attempt places the centrality of spatiality in 
question, and thus problematises Heidegger's earlier assertion that Being-in-the-world 
is 'essentially ... spatial'. 
23 That Heidegger later rejected his own attempt to derive 
spatiality from temporality as `untenable' would seem to be further evidence of the 
confused nature of his thinking concerning spatiality in Being and Time. 24 
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Heidegger's later work is characterised by a turning (die Kehre) away from the 
fundamental ontology of Being and Time. This turning comprises what Casey refers to 
as `a (re)turning to Place and associated notions' such as spatiality. 25 It is worth noting 
that commentaries on Heidegger's later work have focused upon the way in which, 
after this turning, he is increasingly concerned to locate Being in language. 26 This 
understanding of Heidegger's later works as a turning towards language is based upon 
later essays such as `Poetically Man Dwells', and is in line with the general concern 
with language fostered by post-structuralism. 27 However, this understanding of 
Heidegger's later work tends to play down the centrality of spatiality to his thinking 
concerning Being. Although language becomes more central to Heidegger's later 
work, it is only one of several important themes, one of which is the locatedness of 
Being. To focus on language in Heidegger's later work is to lend support to a rather 
anthropocentric interpretation of his thought that plays down the possibilities that his 
thinking concerning the concept of `dwelling' opens up. 
It is in his writing on `dwelling' that Heidegger's later thinking concerning 
spatiality is especially evident. In his later work, dwelling becomes the central concept 
for understanding Being. This is most clear in the essay `Building Dwelling 
Thinking', in which Heidegger tackles the question of the relationship between 
building and Being. 28 For Heidegger this relationship is to be understood in terms of 
the locations which Being constitutes through building. In making such locatedness 
central to his later work, Heidegger returns to the essentially spatial character of 
Being-in-the-world. It is precisely this trajectory of thinking concerning spatiality - 
from Being and Time to `Building Dwelling Thinking' - that I wish to trace here in 
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order to demonstrate that buildings constitute the shared space that underlies 
heterogeneous urbanity. 
Being-in-the-world 
An exegesis of Heidegger's thinking concerning spatiality must start with his 
account in Being and Time of the essentially spatial character of Being-in-the-world. 
Central to this account is the concept of `Dasein'. Understanding what Dasein refers to 
is the key to understanding Heidegger's account of Being-in-the-world. The 
concatenation of da (there) and sein (to be) forms Dasein, meaning `to be there, 
present, available, to exist'. 29 As a term `Dasein' was in use in German prior to 
Heidegger's usage and `can mean "everyday human existence", ' or `the being or life 
of persons'. 30 For Heidegger, Dasein refers to precisely this everyday human 
existence. Dasein, however, is more than a term for identifying individual human 
beings as things that exist in the world. As Heidegger notes, `with the term `Dasein', 
we are expressing not its "what" (as if it were a table, house, or tree) but its Being. 931 
That is, Dasein does not tell us what individual human existence is (as if `it is Being- 
there' would suffice as an explanation of what a human being is), but indicates the 
way in which human beings exist. 
Dasein is thus used to refer to the generic features of being-human, or the way 
human beings are. Heidegger uses Dasein (and its derivatives) to refer to both `a way 
of being that is characteristic of all people' and to the way of being of individual 
human beings. 2 However, Heidegger does not want Dasein to be reduced to the 
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subjective individual consciousness that is the central character of traditional 
metaphysical ontology. Dasein is, as we shall see, certainly not the Cartesian cogito. 
And it is precisely for this reason that it is not so much what Dasein is (the individual 
beings that Dasein can possibly be), but the way in which it is (the essential structures 
that are the condition of possibility of human existence) that is the central concern of 
Being and Time. 
Division 1 of Being and Time comprises an analysis of this existential 
structure of Dasein. Heidegger notes that such an analysis must start with the `average 
everydayness' of Dasein's existence. 33 That is, Heidegger wants to begin with an 
enquiry into the pre-theoretical way in which Dasein is (that is prior to theoretical 
reflection about the way in which it is). Heidegger argues that Dasein is always 
already in-the-world. Being-in-the-world, then, is the average everyday state of 
Dasein. The way in which Dasein comprises Being-in-the-world is thus the starting 
point for Heidegger's existential analytic of Dasein. 
It is precisely in this explication of Dasein's Being-in-the-world that 
Heidegger notes the essentially spatial character of such existence. A clue to this 
spatial character lies in the fact that Dasein is literally Being-there. This `Being-there' 
is not the simple fact of taking up a particular position in the world. Dasein is not just 
another thing (or body) that has as one of its properties being in a particular position in 
space. Rather, as Heidegger notes, `[the] "There [das `Da']" is not a place [... ] in 
contrast to an "over there" ['dort']; Dasein means not being here instead of over there, 
nor here and over there, but is the possibility, the condition of oriented being here and 
being over there'. 34 If Being-there were simply the designation of the location of the 
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place of an individual Dasein in a three-dimensional space, this would refer only to 
what Dasein is: a thing in a specific location ('that thing there as opposed to this thing 
here'). But since Dasein refers to the way of Being of Dasein, Being-there must be 
understood as an opening of the place/space of Being. Moreover, this em-placement 
(of being-in-a-place) must be seen as constitutive of Being-in-the-world, a condition 
of its way of Being. That is, to be in-the-world is to be placed in that world - the 
world, therefore is to be understood as the space of Being. It is that event of em- 
placement that refers to as 'the condition of oriented being' that comprises Being- 
there (or Dasein). 
`Place' refers to a 'particular ... [or] definite.... situation... with reference to 
other bodies'. 35 A place is a particular locus of a specific set of references to other 
bodies/things. To be `in a place', then, is to be the locus of a set of references to other 
bodies/things. This is precisely what differentiates place from space. A place may be 
located in space but is not defined by the space it occupies. Rather, a place consists of 
the references a specific locus makes to other bodies/things. 
The `place' opened by Being-there is thus the constitution of a set of 
references to other bodies and things. It is precisely this referentiality that comprises 
`oriented being'. Orientation is to be understood as a positioning. This positioning is 
ascertained precisely in relation to other bodies/things. To be oriented is, essentially, 
to be placed or em-placed. 
Insofar as Dasein is always already em-placed, s/he is always already oriented 
to the bodies/things around him/her. It is precisely this pre-theoretical orientation that 
comprises worldliness for Heidegger. Worldliness consists of the manner in which the 
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things that Dasein encounters always already refer to one another in relation to 
Dasein's own situation. In this sense Being and Time is a primarily pragmatic text. 
Dasein's world consists of those things that satisfy certain needs. Thus, for example, 
Dasein's situation might be that of a carpenter. In this situation Dasein is oriented 
towards those things that satisfy his/her needs: hammer and nails, for example. 
Moreover, Dasein's world comprises the manner in which hammer, nails and wood 
refer to each other in the context of the workshop. This is what is meant by the em- 
placement of Dasein: Dasein is always already the opening of a place through its 
orientation to the bodies/things that comprise its world. 
This is precisely what Heidegger is getting at when he draws a distinction 
between `Being in' and `Being-in'. Though this distinction might appear to be an 
exercise in philosophical hair-splitting, it is indicative of the always already em-placed 
character of Dasein. Division I of Being and Time comprises a fundamental critique 
of the tradition of metaphysical ontology that Heidegger sees embodied in Descartes 
and Newton. For both of these thinkers Being takes place within a universal, 
objective, three dimensional space that pre-exists any beings. For these thinkers the 
concept of `Being in' is to be understood as the placing of an object into a region of 
space rather in the same way that we put water into a container. The space pre-exists 
the thing put into it and is unaffected (although it is occupied) by that thing. 
For Heidegger this account is somewhat back-to-front. Heidegger argues that a 
conception of the world as a uniform space into which discrete objects are placed at 
certain positions is a theoretical construct made possible by the fact that Dasein is 
always already oriented towards a worldly context. `Being-in' refers to the way in 
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which Dasein always already exists in relation to those things that it finds around itself 
in its everyday life. Those things that Dasein primarily encounters in its everydayness 
are those things which come in handy for practical tasks. For example, Heidegger 
argues that I do not see a chair, writing desk, pen, and paper as discrete entities in a 
particular container-like space. Rather, I see them as an `equipmental whole': things 
that do a particular task, or a context for accomplishing the task. `Being-in' then, is 
not simply being in a particular position in space, but is, rather, Being always already 
in-the-world. If Being-in is Dasein's basic state it means, moreover, that Dasein is 
essentially worldly. And this is precisely the meaning of Heidegger's assertion that 
Dasein is Being-in-the-world. Any other understanding of itself that Dasein may have 
is derived from its worldliness. 36 
This Being-in that the Being-there of Dasein comprises should indicate that 
spatiality is an essential characteristic of existence. That Heidegger refers to Being- 
there and not Being-contextualised should indicate that Dasein's way of Being is em- 
placement (and that Dasein is thus implicitly spatialised). But it is the characterisation 
of Being-there as Being-in that seems confirmation of the spatiality of existence. Even 
given Heidegger's rejection of the idea that Dasein is a thing in a container-like space, 
that Dasein is in, rather than out, of the world suggests a spatiality, a withinness. 
However, it is in his account of the way in which Dasein is oriented towards the place 
(the there) in which Being-there is present, that Heidegger explicitly turns to the 
question of spatiality. 
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The essentially spatial character of existence 
Heidegger derives the essential spatiality of existence from an account of the 
specific manner in which Dasein is in-the-world. As usual in Being and Time 
Heidegger's account is concerned with the everyday dealings of Dasein. Since Dasein 
is, first and foremost, a practical being, these everyday dealings comprise an 
orientation towards the accomplishment of tasks. It is precisely in this sense that 
Heidegger refers to the Being-in of Dasein as always already being oriented towards 
the equipmental wholes that enable the accomplishment of tasks. Heidegger is fond of 
referring to tools needed for the accomplishment of various tasks. 37 According to 
Heidegger, Dasein has a pre-theoretical understanding of the various ways in which 
tools relate to one another and materials. The equipmental whole is precisely made up 
by the various ways in which different things refer to one another. The hammer refers 
to the nails, whilst the nails refer to the wood, and the whole of hammer-nails-wood 
refers to the bench on which the work takes place. 
For Heidegger it is precisely these equipmental wholes that characterise the 
basic state of Dasein's Being-in-the-world. The world, Heidegger states, is a unitary 
whole. Worldliness for Dasein is composed of the various ways in which things that 
are found in-the-world refer to one another. Dasein's understanding of the world, 
moreover, is a pre-theoretical understanding of the various relationships and proper 
places that the things in the world have in equipmental wholes. And this is the radical 
meaning of the term 'Being-in-the-world': human Being is always already an 
engagement with a world of which we have a pre-theoretical understanding. This is 
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what is meant by Dasein's concernful dealings with, or orientation in, the world. 
Dasein is always already in, and understands, the various equipmental wholes that 
comprise the world. 
Heidegger derives the spatiality of Being-in-the-world from the equipmental 
wholes in which Dasein is always already oriented. `Equipment', notes Heidegger, 
`has its place, or else it `lies around'; this must be distinguished in principle from just 
occurring at random in some spatial position. '38 It is this fact that things have a place 
that is the basis of Heidegger's account of spatiality. Place is determined by the twin 
concepts of `closeness' and `direction'. Closeness refers to the way in which 
something is ready-to-hand. Closeness in this sense does not refer to a proximity 
measured in terms of a distance between two points. A given piece of equipment can 
be closer than another despite the relative proximity of either to Dasein. This 
closeness is thus an existential concept. That which is close is that which is handy in 
the context of a particular equipmental whole. 
Closeness is achieved through what most English translations of Being and 
Time call de-severance. That is, items of equipment (and, in Heidegger's examples, 
other human beings) are made close, and thus given a place in the world of a 
particular Dasein, by being `de-severed'. De-severance refers to the way in which 
Dasein engages with different elements of the world in different ways (what 
Heidegger refers to as the `circumspective concern' that Dasein exhibits towards the 
world). As Heidegger notes, `[w]hen for instance, a man wears a pair of spectacles 
which are so close to him distantially that they are `sitting on his nose', they are 
environmentally more remote from him than a picture on the opposite wall. '39 The 
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picture on the wall is what the man is engaging with, and is thus de-severed, whilst the 
spectacles are not an item with which Dasein is concerned, and, hence, are not de- 
severed. Heidegger explains this de-severance at more length in an example of a 
person walking along a street: 
One feels the touch of [the street] at every step as one walks; it is 
seemingly the closest and Realest of all that is ready-to-hand [as 
`equipment for walking'], and it slides itself, as it were, along certain 
portions of one's body - the soles of one's feet. And yet it is farther remote 
than the acquaintance whom one encounters `on the street' at a 
`remoteness' of twenty paces when one is taking such a walk. 
Circumspective concern decides as to the closeness and famess of what is 
proximally ready-to-hand environmentally. Whatever this concern dwells 
alongside beforehand is what is closest, and this is what regulates our de- 
severances 40 
In addition to being close, equipment also has direction. Direction consists of 
the relation between the various pieces of equipment in the equipmental whole. These 
various bits of equipment are not only close, they are also in particular position vis-ä- 
vis each other. It is precisely this directionality that is the source of the essential 
orientation that characterises Being-in-the-world. Insofar as it is always already in-the- 
world, Dasein has a pre-theoretical understanding of directionality through its 
engagement with equipmental wholes. However, it is not the closeness and 
directionality of equipment alone that gives Dasein its spatiality. 
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Although equipment constitutes the basic spatiality of Dasein, it is the way in 
which equipmental wholes relate to the worldly totality of equipment that completes 
Heidegger's sketch of the spatiality of existence. Heidegger notes that although each 
piece of equipment has its place, this place is not simply defined by its closeness 
(readiness-to-hand) to Dasein and its directionality vis-ä-vis other pieces of 
equipment. An item of equipment belongs somewhere, in a place. Moreover, this 
place is somewhere not only in relation to Dasein and other items of equipment. Each 
place is oriented within a larger context. This orientation of all possible places 
constitutes what Heidegger calls the `whither' of a place. It is this whither that makes 
it possible to say where a place is in general, not only in relation to Dasein and the 
other items in the equipmental whole. The workshop for example is a particular place 
that is oriented in relation to the house, the garden, the urban district and so on. This 
orientation `makes possible the belonging-somewhere of an equipmental totality as 
something that can be placed'. 1 
For Heidegger this orientation of all possible places occurs in relation to a 
`region'. The concept of region completes the basic sketch of the spatiality of 
existence. Were things only to have place because of their closeness to Dasein and 
relation to each other, there would be no account of the place one given equipmental 
totality had in relation to another. Or, rather, the account would revolve around the 
constitutive power of Dasein, and we would have effectively arrived at a Husserlian 
phenomenological position. Instead the concept of region offers a horizon of 
intelligibility that is external to Dasein which allows the placing of all the various 
places constituted by items of equipment. Dasein engages in this world in terms of its 
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closeness to ready-to-hand items and yet understands its overall position in this world 
in relation to the regional horizon. Thus Heidegger makes clear both the importance of 
Dasein, in terms of the way in which it interprets its own existence in terms of the 
closeness or readiness to hand of certain items depending on its everyday needs, and at 
the same time a certain public horizon that means that Dasein is not a solipsistic 
constructor of its own world. 
Dasein's spatiality is thus constituted by a dual movement. In the first place 
the possibility of spatiality - of Being-somewhere - is given by the places constituted 
by equipment. The various places constituted by equipment are themselves oriented 
within a horizon of intelligibility known as the region. It is only in relation to the 
region that the designation of a particular place as, for example, behind, above, 
beyond, or by the side of another place makes sense. However, Dasein has a 
constitutive role to play. Dasein opens the there from which this world is made 
intelligible. By bringing items of equipment close to it Dasein is oriented towards 
certain equipmental wholes and thus em-placed. Essentially Heidegger is noting that 
there is a certain orientedness in the world, but that without Dasein this orientation 
cannot become spatiality. 
It should be possible to glean from the above account that spatiality is not a 
question of distance in space and, hence, is something that is constituted, not 
discovered. The spatiality of Being-in-the-world is constituted jointly by items of 
equipment (and the regions that orient the entirety of places such equipment can 
occupy) and Dasein. This constitution occurs in what is best described as a `from-back 
to' movement. 42 Things are ready-to-hand for Dasein and thus it is Dasein that 
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effectively constitutes equipmental wholes. Dasein constitutes the items of equipment 
as ready-to-hand by establishing the closeness and remoteness of certain items. This is 
precisely the Being-there that is proper to Dasein. The `there' refers to a place 
constituted by the relationships that Dasein establishes by being engaged (and thus 
close to, or de-severed) with certain things and unconcerned with others. 
However, this constitutive activity of Dasein is not sufficient for there to be 
spatiality. It is the things themselves that establish the directionality that spatiality 
requires. That an item is close to Dasein is not sufficient; this item must have a place 
within the equipmental totality. And this place can only be constituted if the item has a 
directionality that indicates its location in relation to other items. It is this 
directionality that belongs to the items themselves. And it is in this respect that 
spatiality is constituted by the various items with which Dasein is concerned. In this 
sense, although Dasein establishes a `there' in which Being is possible, this `there' 
always already contains places for things (and the directionality these things have in 
potentially referring to one another) that make spatiality possible. 
In order for the various places in which equipment can possibly be to have a 
location vis-ä-vis each other, however, the directionality by which all the items in an 
equipmental whole refer to each other is not sufficient. Rather, a horizon of 
intelligibility must be established according to which all places can be located. This is 
`the region'. It is regionality that makes it possible to say one thing is above another, 
or behind it, or beyond it. The workshop, for example constitutes a region in which a 
number of places can exist, and through which the location of each place vis-a-vis 
another can be understood. The region is both oriented in terms of Dasein's concerns 
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(the workshop for example is a region because it is that in which Dasein is engaged, 
and that according to which Dasein's concern is oriented) and that which orients 
Dasein. 
Thus the constitution of spatiality passes from Dasein, to the items constitutive 
of the possibility of spatiality, to the region that orients all the places that these items 
can occupy and back again to Dasein whose concernful Being-in-the-world is oriented 
in terms of its place in the region. 
It should thus be clear that the spatiality with which Heidegger is concerned is 
very different from the absolute space with which thinkers such as Newton or Euclid 
are concerned. For Newton, for example, space is an absolute, metaphysical entity, 
separate from Being, in which beings can be located. This absolute space is a 
homogeneous, universal entity that is neutral towards Being and merely plays the part 
of (necessary) backdrop to existence. Moreover, this space has no places, merely 
locations that any object can occupy, including beings. In this way Newtonian space is 
indifferent to the kind of relationships that Heidegger is positing as the constitutive 
features of Dasein's spatiality. 43 
The contrast between Heidegger and Newton's accounts of spatiality can be 
seen in the centrality that Heidegger accords to the notion of `de-severance'. 
Heidegger explicitly notes that de-severance is not a matter of distance. Indeed, the 
example of walking along the street cited above makes precisely this point. Spatiality 
for Heidegger is not the creation of a uniform objective medium in which any thing 
can appear at any position. Rather spatiality is a matter of the constitution of specific 
places by specific things and the manner in which these places are both oriented 
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toward each other and concernfully engaged with by Dasein. That is to say, spatiality 
is a matter of the relationships that constitute a place: between the things in the place; 
between those things and the wider worldly context, or `region'; and the relationship 
of circumspective concern that Dasein has with the things in the world. 
It is in this sense that Heidegger sees physical space - space that could be 
understood as the volume inside an empty container - as being derived from 
existential spatiality. The space in a workshop, for example, is derived from the 
spatiality constituted by the things in the workshop and Dasein's circumspective 
concern with these items. This space is derived by the measuring of distance. 
However, distance does not exist prior to Dasein's circumspective concern with the 
world. And it is only because of Dasein's pre-theoretical understanding of closeness 
and directionality that it is possible to derive a system of measuring. Distance is a 
product of reducing the relationship between two points to a measurement. In other 
words, the relationship between two points is quantified according to a 
common/standardised, but nonetheless arbitrary, unit. 
According to Heidegger, however, it is only because of Dasein's understanding 
of its existential spatiality, its engagement with the world, that it is possible for it to 
relate certain items to each other, and thus arrive at a distance between them through 
measurement. The space of a town centre, for example, can only be arrived at because 
Dasein has a pre-theoretical understanding of the directionality that exists between the 
town centre's components (pavements, shops, offices, public buildings, and so on). 
Moreover, Dasein is able to de-sever these components such that they can be brought 
close and thus made the object of Dasein's concern (e. g., the office is an object of 
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concern as Dasein's workplace). Measuring is accomplished by relating one de- 
severed element of the town centre to another. The scale decided upon for quantifying 
that measurement is then that which produces the distance between items and 
according to which the magnitude of the physical space is determined (e. g., 
centimetres, metres, inches, feet, seconds, minutes, and so on). 
Finally, it is important to note that this existential spatiality (and the spaces 
that can be derived from it), is fundamentally public. The places established in this 
existential spatiality are independent of particular people. Whilst Dasein's de- 
severance is central to Heidegger's account of spatiality it is only part of the story. The 
place orientation effected by regions, and the directionality inherent to equipment, 
make this spatiality an essentially public one. The region is not constituted by Dasein, 
but exists as a principle of orienting all the possible places (for equipmental wholes) 
with which Dasein can be concerned. The workshop is not simply available to one 
Dasein, but is that which locates the places of tools that are in principle available to 
anyone. Moreover, these tools have a directionality that constitutes relations vis-ä-vis 
each other that are similarly in principle available to any Dasein that is concerned with 
them. 
The principle point here is that the spatiality constituted by these objects - the 
objects that form the world in which Dasein always already is - is a public spatiality, 
or a shared spatiality. Spatiality is neither a product of individual Daseins or a pre- 
existent objective fact, but is, rather a public aspect of existence constituted by the 
things with which Dasein is concerned. Dasein's world is therefore a shared world. 
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And this shared character is established by the fact that the places constituted by the 
things with which it is concerned are essentially public. 
To this point, I have traced out the manner in which Heidegger demonstrates 
that it is the things with which Being-in-the-world is concerned that constitute that 
world as a multitude of essentially public, and thus shared, places (and, by derivation, 
spaces). It is my argument that it is precisely this essentially public, and thus shared, 
spatiality that is constituted by the buildings that comprise the urban environment. 
Later in this chapter, I will demonstrate this argument by utilising the preceding 
conceptual schema to interpret the existential spatiality of an urban environment such 
as Mostar. First, however, it is necessary to extend the exegesis I have given of 
Heidegger's account of the spatiality of existence to say something about its 
implications in relation to urbanity. 
The spatiality of the urban environment 
An urban environment can be seen as both an equipmental whole and a region. 
The buildings comprise both the environment that orients all the possible places or 
things within it, and an ensemble that enables the accomplishment of a certain task, 
namely urban existence. As an equipmental totality, the urban environment is an 
ensemble of buildings that refer to each other in various ways 44 Just as the hammer 
and nails refer to each other in the workshop so residential houses refer to public 
buildings (such as shops, banks, libraries, hotels and so on) and to symbolic cultural 
buildings. Dasein has a pre-theoretical understanding of the directionality that makes 
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an urban environment into a whole. That is, the town is understood by Dasein qua 
town prior to becoming an object of theoretical reflection. Dasein understands the 
relationship between, say, the house s/he lives in and the places of worship s/he or 
others may use, the public buildings that may be places of work or of business, and the 
other spaces (such as parks and cemeteries) that are also part of the urban 
environment. That is, Dasein does not understand the role of individual buildings and 
then, as it were by a process of addition or straight-forward connection, compose them 
into an holistic ensemble. It is precisely this pre-theoretical understanding of the 
directionality in an urban environment that means that Dasein understands this 
environment as a town rather than a random collection of buildings. 
Moreover, this sense that Dasein has a pre-theoretical understanding of the 
town qua town is reinforced by the regionality that the town has for Dasein. The 
ensemble of buildings that comprises the town is a horizon of intelligibility that 
orients all the possible places that items may occupy within the urban environment. 
The town orients Dasein's immediate sense of here and there, before and beyond, 
above and below. It is within this immediate urban environment that Dasein finds its 
immediate orientation and is able to understand where the place of one item is in 
relation to anther. 
The urban environment thus constitutes a basis for Dasein's existential 
spatiality. In the context of the directionality established by the buildings themselves, 
it is Dasein's engagement with the urban environment - the manner in which Dasein 
de-severs certain aspects of that environment - that fully opens out the spatiality of the 
town. It is in this manner that we can explain individual experiences of the town, or 
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changing experiences of the town. Dasein may bring certain buildings close to it in 
certain circumstances. For example, if Dasein has to work, then places of worship may 
be more remote than the place in which that work is carried out. Furthermore, the 
town may change, some buildings may disappear and others be built. Dasein changes 
its de-severances with regard to these additions and its experience of the town 
changes. 
However, two points are vital. Firstly, the ensemble of buildings that 
comprises the town is a publicly available environment. Whilst individual Daseins 
may experience the town in different ways, the buildings constitute an environment 
that is pre-theoretically available to all. The town as region is not a private map, but a 
public horizon that makes the locations of all the places within it available to all. 
Moreover, because the buildings and their directional references are available to all, it 
is precisely in this environment that Dasein meets others. Indeed, Dasein is always 
already with others in this public environment. 
Secondly, since the spatiality that Dasein experiences is constituted by a 
fundamentally public directionality and regionality, the space that is derived from the 
various places within the urban environment is always already a shared space. That is, 
the space that is derived by measuring and quantifying the distances between buildings 
in a street is not a purely subjective phenomenon (the mental imagining of an 
individual Dasein). Rather, this space is derived from the fundamentally public 
directionality of the ensemble of buildings that Dasein experiences. The relationship 
between buildings is public and pre-theoretically understood by every Dasein. And 
this means that each and every Dasein can perceive the same spaces because they can 
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perceive the same points of reference between which measuring will occur. Moreover, 
when Dasein calculates the space that exists in a certain part of the town, it knows that 
the buildings that constitute the possibility of measuring are always already available 
to other Daseins and, hence, there is a pre-theoretical alterity loose in the urban 
environment. The urban environment is thus ineluctably heterogeneous. 
And it is precisely this possibility of heterogeneity that is at stake in urbicide. 
Urbicide comprises the destruction of that which constitutes the fundamentally public 
character of the urban environment. Literally, if buildings and their directionality in 
relation to one another constitute the urban environment in which Being-in-the-world 
occurs as a fundamentally public environment, then it is these buildings that must be 
destroyed in order to efface that public or shared character. 
It is in precisely this manner that the ethno-nationalist politics of the Bosnian 
Croat paramilitary organisation, the HVO can be understood. The buildings of the 
urban environment in Mostar formed an equipmental totality. It was in the context of 
all of these buildings taken as a town, rather than an aggregate of individual buildings, 
that urban living was accomplished by the inhabitants of Mostar. This urban 
environment was the region that oriented all the possible places in which they lived 
their daily lives. Moreover, the buildings gave directionality to the individual 
experience of the city. The bridge, for example, referred to both sides of the river, and 
thus constituted the relational designation of `east' Mostar as on the opposite bank of 
the Neretva to `west' Mostar. This directional reference was a property of the bridge, 
not of individual experiences of the bridge. Moreover, since the bridge and the 
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directional relationship it entailed was in principle available to all, it was a public, 
shared place. 
It is precisely the fact that the bridge was a fundamentally public place that 
sealed its fate. To leave the bridge standing is to leave intact the possibility of sharing 
Mostar. And it is this possibility of sharing the urban environment with heterogeneous 
others, and the alterity attendant to such sharing, that comprises the principal target of 
ethno-nationalist politics. Urbicide destroys the fundamental possibility of 
heterogeneity, the always already present alterity that the public character of the 
spaces constituted by buildings comprises. It is not only that east and west Mostar 
should be separated, but that any possibility of otherness within west Mostar should be 
eradicated. And this must start with the condition of possibility of such difference, that 
which intimates, in its public character, an ineluctable alterity: buildings. 
In this way we can demonstrate the manner in which buildings constitute the 
shared space that is at stake in urbicide. However, such an account is in itself fairly 
basic. In the first place it treats buildings as found objects. It takes the town to be an 
already existing thing with a set of directional relationships that individuals 
understand in the way they understand the relationship between, say a hammer and 
nails. Heidegger himself complained that this pragmatic focus on the everydayness of 
Dasein `was misunderstood' insofar as commentators thought that '[for Heidegger 
the world consists only of cooking-pots, pitchforks and lampshades; he has nothing to 
say about "higher culture or "nature". A5 
Whilst it is not necessarily true that Heidegger failed to engage questions of 
`higher culture' or `nature', it is certainly the case that throughout his work he `refused 
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the experience of the city, no doubt seeing in cosmopolitanism and cultural pluralism 
nothing but a rootlessness'. 46 Heidegger's work thus contains `an element of rural 
nostalgia', a preference for a simple and one might say rustic environment. 47 It is thus 
understandable that some readers of Being and Time (and indeed later work) might 
think that Heidegger's work spoke only of cooking-pots and pitchforks. It would also 
be easy to attribute this natural ruralism to Heidegger's association with National 
Socialism. It is certainly the case that Heidegger's concentration on the simple found 
objects that satisfy Dasein's everyday needs gives the impression that human 
existence is in some way rooted in its natural surroundings. This romantic tendency in 
Heidegger's writings might lead one to conclude that Dasein is a being that derives its 
presence from its territorial location. Indeed, when Heidegger writes about a cottage in 
the Black Forest in `Building Dwelling Thinking', there is certainly the implication 
that authentic existence is achieved by living close to the earth, without the 
distractions offered by modem, technological urbanism. 48 This idea points `towards 
the rootedness of dwelling in a soil, a theme which, at the time, was not exempt from 
ideologically ambiguous connotations'. 9 Whilst `in Heidegger's writings [this theme] 
was not associated explicitly with the theme of blood or with racism', we should note 
the problematic conclusions to which the pragmatic focus of Heidegger's early work 
might lead. 5° 
It is fair to say that Heidegger leaves the question of the urban environment 
open in Being and Time. Specifically he pays no attention to the role that building (as 
a constitutive activity) might play in the spatiality of existence. Indeed, my account 
above rests on the assumption that a building can be treated as a found object. Whilst 
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our principle everyday experience of buildings is as found objects, this neglects the 
fact that they are created objects. Moreover, in being created they constitute their own 
spatialities. One of the principal questions that Heidegger passes over in Being and 
Time is the manner in which directionality comes into being. There is an assumption 
that directionality is merely something that Dasein grasps pre-theoretically through 
everyday use. However, if directionality can be seen as the way in which an item 
refers to another, this reference surely has some sort of basis. This is particularly 
relevant in the case of the urban environment since the references that one building 
makes to another change Dasein's everyday experience of the city. Moreover, the 
creation of new buildings and the destruction of others alters the directionalities 
inherent to the urban environment. It is necessary, therefore, to enquire further into the 
manner in which building constitutes spatiality. 
Thinking in the context of the destruction of buildings 
In 1951 Heidegger delivered the lecture `Building Dwelling Thinking', to the 
Darmstadt symposium on Man and Space. 5 ' World War II left many urban 
environments in Germany in ruins. Allied bombing had reduced towns and cites to 
rubble. In the period immediately following the war there was, therefore, an urgent 
need to tackle questions of reconstruction. The pressing need to reconstruct destroyed 
urban environments necessarily raised questions concerning what such building 
should achieve. In Being and Time, Heidegger notes that one of the principal ways in 
which questions concerning the nature of Being-in-the-world are raised is when a 
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particular everyday item malfunctions, is lost, or destroyed. 52 The worldliness of 
Dasein's world is revealed precisely when that worldliness breaks down or is 
disturbed. In this situation Dasein must reflect on the world that s/he is always already 
in so that the problem may be perceived and dealt with. 
The implication of this methodological argument is two-fold. Firstly, that in its 
everyday Being-in-the-world Dasein simply and pre-theoretically understands the 
worldliness of that which surrounds him/her. In this sense, Being-in-the-world is 
unavailable for theoretical reflection since it is simply our everyday understanding of 
that which surrounds us. However, when an element of Dasein's world becomes 
unavailable, it is necessary to reflect on what that item is and its place in the world. In 
this way the worldliness of Dasein's world is discovered and made an object of 
reflection. Secondly, that such cases of `disturbance' make us ask questions that are 
ontological in character. When an element of the world is unavailable it is not simply 
a matter of making the malfunctioning item work again, or replacing the 
missing/destroyed thing. Rather, such events necessarily pose questions concerning 
Dasein's Being-in-the-world: how is that item part of the worldliness of Dasein's 
world?; and what does its loss mean? 
It is precisely in the context of such disturbance that Heidegger's lecture 
should be understood. 53 Heidegger himself never explicitly thematises the disturbance 
(or destruction) of the urban environment during World War II. This is, of course, in 
keeping with the reprehensible silence concerning the Nazi period that characterises 
his entire thought. That it is reasonable to assume that the destruction of the urban 
environment comprises the context of Heidegger's essay can, however, be found in 
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the brief mention he makes to `today's housing shortages'. 54 Moreover, it is precisely 
because Heidegger moves directly to pose ontological questions concerning building 
and dwelling, that we should see the radical disturbance of Dasein's everyday world as 
the context for the essay. Heidegger notes that his `thinking concerning building does 
not presume to discover architectural ideas, let alone give rules for building. '55 The 
radical loss of the built elements of Dasein's world cannot be understood simply by 
offering guidelines for the reconstruction of the lost elements. Rather this loss must, 
necessarily lead us to ask the following questions: `1. What is it to dwell? '; 2. How 
does building belong to dwelling? '. 56 In other words, the loss of the buildings that 
comprised the worldliness of Dasein's everyday Being-in-the-word, leads us to ask 
what is it to live in such a world, and in what way does building contribute to the 
experience of living in that world. 
Dwelling, gathering and locales 
Heidegger begins his enquiry by reversing the priority that exists in our 
everyday understanding of the relationship between building and dwelling. Heidegger 
notes that dwelling has been traditionally understood as a human activity that `man 
performs alongside many other activities. We work here and dwell there. '57 Buildings 
play a key role in this understanding of dwelling. Indeed, Heidegger notes that our 
traditional understanding of the relationship between building and dwelling has been 
in terms of a means-end relationship whereby dwelling is an activity performed in and 
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around certain buildings. For example, we dwell in our houses, not in our places of 
work. According to this understanding we build certain buildings in order to dwell. 58 
However, this understanding separates building and dwelling into two 
activities and subordinates the latter to the former. As long as this separation is 
maintained, argues Heidegger, we remain unable to see the `essential relations' 
between building and dwelling. Indeed, we will be confined to asking technical 
questions concerning whether a particular architectural design is a good or bad means 
towards the end of dwelling. In being confined to such technical questions we will 
overlook the ontological questions that the destruction of urban environments poses. 
It is precisely in order to investigate the essential relations between building 
and dwelling that Heidegger reverses the priority that exists in the traditional 
understandings of the terms. Thus Heidegger argues, contrary to the traditional 
understanding that views buildings as a means towards the end of dwelling, that we 
build precisely because we always already dwell. Building is thus that which 
embodies the fact that we are dwellers. Or in Heidegger's owns words: `we do not 
dwell because we have built, but we build and have built because we dwell, that is, 
because we are dwellers. 59 
In order to demonstrate that we build because we are dwellers, Heidegger turns 
to the etymology of building. Heidegger argues that `[i]t is language that tells us about 
the essence of a thing, provided that we respect language's own essence. '60 With this 
in mind, Heidegger asks `what does bauen, to build, mean? '. 61 Heidegger traces the 
contemporary German bauen, to the Old High German buan. Buan, Heidegger argues, 
means `to dwell'. Because we think of building as an activity that is a means to the 
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end of dwelling, we forget that it is etymologically rooted in the concept of dwelling 
itself. 
In this manner, Heidegger proposes that within our everyday language there is 
a covert etymological trace of the fact that building is always already a dwelling and 
that `to build is really to dwell. '62 However, this minimal etymological clue does not 
tell us anything about what the dwelling signified in building actually is. Heidegger, 
notes that when we think about dwelling we usually think of it as an activity that `man 
performs alongside many other activities. 63 No one merely dwells, to do so would be 
to exist in a state of 'virtual inactivity'. 64 What kind of activity, then, is dwelling? 
Again Heidegger turns to the etymology of bauen, arguing that the Old High German 
words `bauen, buan, bhu, beo are [the contemporary German] word bin in the 
versions: ich bin, I am, du bist, you are' and so on. 65 Ich bin, I am, is thus signified by 
the notion of dwelling. It is Being that is invoked in the concepts of dwelling and 
building. In some ways this is not surprising since both building and dwelling are 
ways in which Dasein is in-the-world, modes of Being. However, the direct linkage 
between bauen - to build as a dweller - and Being, suggests to Heidegger a 
fundamental relationship between dwelling and Being that is not the case for other 
modes of Being (such as working, or travelling, for example). Dwelling is thus said by 
Heidegger to be `the manner in which we humans are on the earth'. 66 Building as 
dwelling is thus what Heidegger now calls `being on the earth'. Dwelling is thus 
precisely Heidegger's term for Being-in-the-world in his later work. 
The derivation of such a central concept through etymology may attract a 
certain amount of criticism. Indeed the value of etymology and other such linguistic 
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devices is called into question by Heidegger elsewhere in his work. As Elden notes in 
relation to Heidegger's translations of certain Greek terms, `we get our knowledge of 
words in a foreign language from a dictionary, which is based on a preceding 
interpretation of linguistic concepts. A dictionary can give us pointers as to how to 
understand a word, but it is never an absolute authority to which we are bound. All 
translating must be an interpreting. '67 Thus what is important in Heidegger's 
etymology of bauen is precisely the way in which he interprets the significations of 
the term. Heidegger intends dwelling to be the existential condition of Dasein. That is 
dwelling is the way in which Dasein is in-the-world (or on-the-earth). And since 
dwelling is inextricably linked to building (indeed all building is a dwelling), it is 
building that will exemplify the manner in which we are on-the-earth (since we are 
never merely on the earth in an inactive state). 
Prior to considering the way in which building belongs to dwelling, Heidegger 
sketches out the way in which dwelling, as the way humans are on the earth, should be 
understood. Heidegger thus provides an outline of the concept with which he will 
replace Being-in-the-world in his later work. Through another etymological 
interpretation, Heidegger argues that the `old word bauen' is related to the Old Saxon 
wuon and the Gothic wunian. According to Heidegger, these words all mean `to 
remain, to stay in a place'. 68 But more significantly, these words all signify a specific 
way of remaining: Wunian means to be at peace, to be brought to peace, to remain in 
peace. '69 Again tracing a web of meaning through etymological association, 
Heidegger argues that peace, or Friede, actually means `free... preserved from harm 
and danger, preserved from something, safeguarded. To free, actually means to 
139 
spare. 00 Dwelling, argues Heidegger, is thus a `sparing'. This sparing has a positive 
connotation however. It does not merely signify allowing something to exist. Rather it 
means to `leave something beforehand in its essence', or to `return it specifically to its 
essential being'. 71 
As in much of Heidegger's work, this central concept has a somewhat 
ambiguous definition. How are we to understand this `sparing' of which dwelling 
consists? Heidegger indicates that what is spared, or returned to its essential Being in 
and through dwelling, is the way in which humans are on the earth. Specifically 
human beings are on the earth as mortals. It is this mortal existence that is returned to 
its essential Being by dwelling. 
Dwelling, or the `stay of mortals on the earth', consists of a fourfold 
relationship between earth and sky, man and gods. 72 It is this fourfold relationship, in 
which the four terms are distinct and yet inseparable, that is spared by dwelling 
(returned to its essential Being). Man is on the earth and below the sky, which is to say 
that earth and sky form the horizons of man's worldly existence. Throughout his work 
Heidegger differentiates between world, or that in and through which Dasein has 
existence, and earth, the natural realm that is the origin of the items that comprise 
worldliness. Earth is revealed by world insofar as the objects created by Dasein refer 
to their earthly components or basis. In `The Origin of the Work of Art', for example, 
Heidegger notes that a `temple reveals the rock on which it rests, the storm that buffets 
it, and the stone from which it is made... Earth is [thus] revealed as earth by the 
world. '73 The sky similarly features throughout Heidegger's work as a point of 
orientation for human existence. 74 
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The pairing of mortals and divinities is harder to fathom, refering not to the 
physical surroundings in which Dasein exists, but to the existential horizons of human 
Being. Dasein is, literally, mortal. Existence, or Being-in-the-world, is characterised 
by the finitude of Dasein (represented most clearly in the fact that Dasein will die). It 
is precisely the finitude of Dasein that leads to the relationship between man and gods. 
As a concept, gods remains ambiguous throughout `Building Dwelling Thinking'. 
This is not a theistic appeal for piety, nor a reference to specific gods. Rather, it 
should be seen as a reference to the various social and cultural attempts that are made 
by mortals to comprehend and overcome their finitude. The fourfold would thus 
represent the poles according to which existence on the earth was to be understood. 
Indeed these poles would be the horizons of intelligibility that orient Being on the 
earth. The world of mortals is constituted on the earth (as that which provides the 
material out of which a world is built) and under the sky (as that which orients 
existence, both directionally and temporally, especially in terms of the division of our 
lives into night and day). And mortals comprehend their existence on the earth as 
finite only in and through its attempts to overcome that finitude in appeals for 
communion with the divine. 75 
The fourfold itself is both enigmatic and unclear as a figure of thought. 
Perhaps it is best to interpret the fourfold as a drawing together of the poles, or 
horizons, according to which human existence is understood. If dwelling consists of 
returning Dasein to its essential state of Being, it is a gathering together of the 
horizons that make Dasein's existence intelligible as Being-in-the-world (or on-the- 
earth). Dwelling is thus a making-intelligible of the stay of mortals on-the-earth as 
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Being-in-the-world. Dwelling should thus be understood as the gathering together of 
the horizons that constitute worldliness. Rather than refer to the fourfold, therefore, I 
will refer to the world that is gathered in dwelling. 
While it is clear that, for Heidegger, dwelling is the basic existential state of 
human beings, the manner in which this dwelling occurs has not yet been discussed. 
Heidegger notes that dwelling is `always a staying with things'. 76 In this way 
Heidegger reintroduces the role of things into the argument. Indeed, Heidegger argues 
that it is things that gather the world together. In other words, it is things that 
constitute the world in which mortal existence occurs. It is in the things which Dasein 
encounters, then, that dwelling, or the gathering together of a world, is accomplished. 
And this is precisely how building belongs to dwelling. 
The bridge 
In order to demonstrate the way in which building belongs to dwelling, 
Heidegger examines a specific built thing: a bridge. The bridge, according to 
Heidegger, exemplifies the way in which built things gather the world together. 
Heidegger argues that if we see the bridge as a means to an end the fundamental 
character of the built thing is obscured. In particular, if we see the bridge as a simple 
means to an end then we presume that it was the answer to an already existing set of 
questions and circumstances. In this way it is presumed that the landscape preceded 
the bridge, which was built as a means to solve the problem of the disruption of 
movement by a river. 
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However, for Heidegger this obscures the essential character of the bridge. The 
built thing - the bridge in this case - is not just another object in the world, but is 
constitutive of that world in the way that it gathers the world together. Thus the bridge 
`does not just connect banks [of the river] that are already there. The banks emerge as 
banks only as the bridge crosses the stream. ''? Similarly, `[t]he bridge gathers the 
earth as landscape around the stream. '78 That is, our world exists only after it has been 
gathered together in various ways by built things. The banks of the river exist as 
opposing banks only after they have been joined together. The river is only an obstacle 
to transport or movement after the bridge has created ease of movement. The 
hinterlands behind each bank are connected together and thus brought into the same 
world by the bridge. And, if we follow Slavenka Draculic (in her `Elegy' to the Stari 
Most, discussed in the Introduction), the bridge brings humans together by expressing 
a durability that in some way transcends our individual finitude. 79 
The built thing thus constitutes the existential world by being a nodal point 
around which a gathering occurs. And this is precisely how the directionality that was 
central to Heidegger's early account of the spatiality of existence occurs. The bridge 
refers to either bank, and to the various towns that it joins by creating a route for 
goods and labour. When Dasein encounters the bridge it is this gathering that is 
implicitly understood as directionality. 
The built thing is thus a locale, a place in which gathering occurs. And it is 
only because of the built thing that a specific place exists. Indeed, there are many 
possible positions in which the bridge could have been built. But the particular locale 
that is created by the building of the bridge in a given position creates a place for that 
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bridge. The locale, or place, consists of a number of signifying relations constituted by 
the building. It is precisely these significations, established by the built thing, that 
create the world in which human beings exist. 
As a place, a locale could be said to be spatial insofar as the significations 
constituted by the building are directional, implying a here and there, right and left and 
so on. Moreover, the locale could be said to function in much the same way as 
Heidegger's earlier concept of region. The building is precisely that in relation to 
which all the other possible places in the world can be understood. In this sense the 
building functions as a horizon of intelligibility. `Horizon' should be understood in 
the Greek sense of horismos, not as something at which an entity ends but, rather, as a 
point from which something unfolds. 80 It is from the building that the world, as a 
series of significations and relations, unfolds. 
The space within this spatial world is a secondary and derived feature. 
Heidegger again argues that the places in which human beings exist are not simply 
arranged in a pre-existent space, but, rather, that space is derived from the spatiality 
constituted by the things that make up our everyday world. Space is derived by 
measuring the relationship between different elements of the world. These elements 
are of interest to us precisely because they are signified by the buildings that constitute 
the world. Thus it is that we measure the distance between home and work, or one 
home and another. This measurement takes the form of establishing a common unit of 
distance to which all measurements can be reduced. Thus spatiality, which may refer 
to the relationship between two elements of the world in colloquial terms (i. e., over 
yonder) is reduced to space (i. e., sixty kilometres, or an hour's drive). 81 
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Thus Heidegger makes building central to his account of the manner in which 
humans dwell on the earth. In the context of Darmstadt, Heidegger is noting that the 
destruction caused by allied bombing was more than the destruction of a means to the 
end of living. Rather, this destruction was an existential blow, destroying the world in 
which the existence of the citizens of the town had been possible. Moreover, this 
destruction altered the spatialities of the town, destroyed spaces (since it destroyed 
those things between which distances had emerged through measurement), and 
ungathered the world. In order to expand upon this argument, I want to briefly re-view 
the question of the destruction of the urban environment in Mostar during the 1992- 
1995 Bosnian war in terms of the conceptual schema Heidegger provides in his 
account of dwelling. 
The locale as a shared/public place 
Mostar's Stari Most provides an exemplary illustration of the manner in which 
a building constitutes a locale that gathers together the world, and thus comprises 
dwelling. Moreover, this example also returns us to the question with which this 
particular chapter is concerned, the always already shared character of the spaces 
constituted by buildings. 
As a building, the Stari Most constitutes a locale. The locale is a place that 
comes into being in and through the construction of the bridge. There are, of course, 
many possible locations along the Neretva river where a bridge could have been built. 
However, the construction of the bridge at that particular position constituted a 
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specific place. This place is defined by the manner in which the locale gathers together 
the world. The Stari Most gathers the two sides of the Neretva canyon as opposing 
banks. In this way the bridge gathers together the hinterlands and routes to distant 
regions on each side of the Neretva. This gathering together of the landscape around 
the bridge constitutes an unfolding of a certain directionality from the bridge itself. 
The settlements on either side of the river are brought near to each other (indeed made 
into a single town). The hinterlands to which access is now available via the road over 
the bridge are also directionally and proximally oriented: Croatia and the Adriatic are 
beyond the edge of the town, and so on. 
In addition, the Stari Most gathers together the town and orients it in a 
particular manner. The old quarter of the town at the foot of the bridge on the eastern 
side is oriented by the bridge in relation to the newer buildings built both beyond it on 
the same, eastern bank of the Neretva, and beyond the bridge on the western bank. As 
a locale the place established by the bridge can be understood as a complex relational 
network. This complex relational network unfolds from the bridge as the horismos 
against which orientation can be understood. Moreover, since every building 
constitutes a locale in this manner, the town consists of an infinitely complex 
intertwining of networks of relationality. The everyday experience of the town is 
precisely of such networks of relationality. Any place can be oriented a number of 
ways according to which locale . forms the locus, or horismos, against which one is 
oriented. 
Moreover, the space in which we think the town is located and which 
comprises the medium in which the buildings are distributed, is actually a derivative 
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of our everyday understanding of these complex relational networks. Indeed, the space 
of, for example, the road over the Stari Most, is derived from the reduction of the 
relationship between the two parapets to a quantifiable distance. The spaces of the 
town are simply distances, quantified according to an arbitrary but common measure, 
between nodes in the relational networks. The impression of objectivity that such 
distance achieves in the modern era can be attributed to the manner in which 
cartography no longer measures the distance from one locus to another as if it were 
embedded in the world, but attempts to give the impression that it is possible to 
measure the distances in the world as if one were not actually in that world. 82 
However, all distances are, in the end, simply the quantification of a relationship 
established by locales. 
Finally, the locale is a fundamentally public horizon. The gathering that a 
building such as the Stari Most constitutes is in principle available to each and every 
human being. The world gathered together by the bridge is not, therefore, a subjective 
one, but a public one. And it is precisely in this respect that heterogeneity is 
ineluctably present in each and every locale. The Stari Most gathers together a set of 
elements into a relational network. This relational network is in principle available to 
everyone who encounters the Stari Most. Individual experiences of the Stari Most may 
comprise an emphasis on certain elements of the relational network and an ignorance 
of others. Indeed, the bridge may be many things to many different people: a cultural 
object; an imperial remnant; a transport link between markets; a place to display one's 
diving prowess devoid of all cultural or historical significance. And yet no one 
experience of the bridge can exclude the other possible experiences. 
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Human experience of locales, of dwelling even, is always already a shared 
experience. That is, the relational network in which our existence is oriented, the 
spaces that are given to us always admit of other possible experiences, other possible 
uses, other possible users. The locale is never mine alone. It is not the human mind 
that gathers the world around locales, rather these locales are public places at which 
our shared world is gathered together. 
It is precisely this public gathering that is at stake in urbicide. The HVO's 
destruction of the Stari Most represents an assault on the public gathering that the 
bridge constitutes. According to the logic of ethno-nationalist politics, ethnic identity 
is grounded in the place in which it is. Moreover, this logic holds that for the 
grounding to be secure and uninterrupted, that place cannot simultaneously be the 
ground of any other identity. Ethnic identity is thus derived from territorial 
emplacement. The politics of ethnic cleansing draw upon this ethno-nationalist logic 
to argue that in order for an ethnic identity to be secured the ground upon which it is 
made present must be cleared of all traces of alterity. 
This clearing of the ground of identity is at work in urbicide. However, 
whereas it is possible to ethnically cleanse a territory by forcing out inhabitants 
identified as other, or heterogeneous, the buildings that remain, and the ineluctably 
public gatherings that they constitute, mean that the territory will always retain a trace 
of the possibility of alterity. It is this trace that urbicide attempts to eradicate. Urbicide 
is a radical ungathering of the world. This is especially evident in Mostar where the 
destruction of the Stari Most was the dissolution of the final relational network that 
gathered the settlements on both banks of the Neretva into the same world: Mostar. 
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The destruction of the Stari Most is, effectively the destruction of one world to create 
two: the destruction of Mostar to create east and west Mostar. The gathering that 
constituted multi-ethnic Mostar is dissolved thus creating two, ethnically distinct 
Mostars. 
It is precisely this ungathering that Andras Riedlmayer refers to when he notes 
that the urban environment of Bosnia `speak[s] eloquently of centuries of 
pluralism... It is this evidence of a successfully shared past that the nationalists seek to 
destroy. 43 The world gathered by the Stari Most was ineluctably plural, a world 
shaped by, among others, Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, and Bosnian influences in 
which the sharing of the places established in this gathering was clearly evident. The 
HVO sought to destroy this evident plural sharing and to re-gather their world as an 
ethnically homogenous one. 
The principal point to note here is that it is the always already present 
possibility of alterity (what Derrida might call an ever present promise of an alterity to 
come) in the gathering that constitutes dwelling. " In many cases that possibility is 
actualised, and the urban environment is a place in whose spaces heterogeneity 
flourishes (and where, in some cases, the agonism of difference becomes the 
antagonism of otherness). And it is this ineluctable trace of alterity that ethno- 
nationalist politics (and indeed all universalising/homogenising politics) must efface. 
This is precisely the logic of urbicide. 
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Towards co-ontology 
It is thus possible, through a Heideggerian interpretation of the nature of the 
spatiality constituted in and through buildings, to demonstrate the central proposition 
of my thesis: that urbicide is the destruction of buildings qua that which constitutes 
public/shared places and spaces. Furthermore, it is possible to assert that since the 
places and spaces constituted by building(s) are always already public and shared, the 
urban environment is ineluctably heterogeneous. 
The Heideggerian analysis of Being-in-the-world is thus particularly 
productive for the analysis of urbicide. Heidegger accounts for the way in which 
buildings are constitutive of an ineluctably heterogeneous, or shared, existential 
spatiality. This account is distinctive insofar as it treats spatiality as a network of 
relations constituted through a worldly engagement with (built) things. In this way the 
Heideggerian understanding, in contradistinction to those understandings that treat 
space as an absolute medium, can account for the manner in which buildings are 
constitutive of, and do not simply occupy, the spaces in which we exist. This account 
thus enables us to say something about what is lost in urbicide. If space is treated as an 
absolute medium in which buildings are located, the destruction of buildings will have 
no effect upon that space. Indeed, the space will remain after the destruction of the 
buildings. If spatiality is constituted by buildings, however, it is possible to say that 
the this spatiality is lost when the buildings are destroyed. 
Moreover, Heidegger's account stresses the ineluctable presence of others in 
the spaces constituted by buildings. Heidegger argues that the buildings constitutive of 
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these spaces are fundamentally public things, available for others. Moreover, it is clear 
from Heidegger's account that this public character of the things that constitute 
Dasein's world should be taken to imply not merely the possibility of alterity, but the 
real and ineluctable sharing of these things with others. Heidegger's account is thus 
distinctive insofar as it stresses the way in which Being-in-the-world is, precisely 
because of its constitution through an engagement with public/shared things, always 
already a Being-with-others. This Being-with-others, as I will argue in Chapter 4 is 
precisely what comprises heterogeneity. The destruction of buildings is thus not only 
the destruction of space, but the destruction of shared, ineluctably heterogeneous 
spaces. It is for this reason that the Heideggerian account will prove particularly 
productive in the analysis of urbicide. 
Heidegger alludes to the importance of this Being-with-others in his re- 
working of the concept of the polis. The polis is the site, the place in which Dasein 
comes to be. 85 Although much of Heidegger's interest in the concept of polis falls 
under the dark cloud of National Socialist thinking, the principal idea around which 
his interpretation of this term revolves is of interest. For Heidegger, polis names the 
site where Dasein is always already with others. As such the polis is the site in which 
history - which, for Heidegger, is generated from the agonistic relations of human 
beings - unfolds. Heidegger attempts to reserve the polis as a site for the deeds of great 
and creative men. Despite this, however, it is probably more in keeping with his 
designation of the polis as the site of historical Being in which antagonism, or 
openness to alterity is the principal motif, to note the co-incidence of the polls and the 
urban environment. Urbanity is the name of the site in which an ineluctable openness 
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to alterity is always already the case. This Being-with-others is precisely that which 
we understand as politics. And thus, although Heidegger councils against translating 
polis as `city', it is, I think, correct to note its coincidence with urbanity. 86 
Insofar, then, as the destruction of buildings is the destruction of public/shared 
spaces, it is Being-with-others that is at stake in urbicide. The very conditions of such 
Being-with-others are destroyed by those that raze towns and cities. And it is precisely 
to this Being-with-others that I want to turn in the next chapter. In this chapter I have 
looked at the manner in which, insofar as they constitute the places in which we dwell, 
(built) things provide the conditions of possibility of Being-with-others. However, this 
account only sketches out the conditions of possibility of such heterogeneity. This 
sketch merely demonstrates that Being-in-the-world, insofar as it is constituted by an 
engagement with buildings is always already a Being-with-others. I have, however, 
said nothing about this the nature of Being-with-others (or heterogeneity). To return to 
my initial formulation of Heidegger's project, it is possible to say that I want to turn at 
this point to the question of the way in which Being is with-others. It is this question 
that will reveal precisely what is lost in urbicide. 
This question of Being-with-others is taken up by Heidegger in his work on 
the concept of `Mitsein'. Mitsein represents the Being-with-others that necessarily 
follows from the public spatiality that characterises the existence of Dasein. I will 
examine Heidegger's account of the way in which Being-in-the-world is always 
already a Being-with-others. Moreover, I will look at the manner in which Mitsein is 
not simply a Being-with-other-humans, but is a fundamental Being-with that occurs in 
the public places established by built things. This Being-with comprises a fundamental 
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openness to alterity constituted in and through dwelling in locales. Moreover, this 
openness to alterity, or Being-with-others, always already implicates Being in 
community. That is, insofar as Being is always already a Being-with-others it is also 
community (since Being-with-others is the defining characteristic of community). My 
elaboration of Heidegger's account of Mitsein will thus also be an examination of his 
(reprehensibly misguided) understanding of community. Ultimately, in Chapters 5 and 
6,1 will suggest that it is this openness to alterity - or community - that comprises the 
target of urbicide. This would mean that urbicide is an assault on community/Being- 
with-others. In order to examine this meaning of urbicide - and its relationship with 
ethno-nationalism - it is, however, necessary to first of all sketch out the nature of its 
target: Being-with-others. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE NATURE OF HETEROGENEITY: FROM BEING-IN-THE-WORLD TO MITSEIN 
The world of Dasein is a with-world. Being-in is Being-with Others. Their 
Being-in-themselves within-the-world is Dasein-with. ' 
But if fateful Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, exists essentially in Being- 
with Others, its historizing is a co-historizing and is determinative for it as 
destiny. This is how we designate the historizing of the community, of a 
people. 2 
A preliminary analysis of the destruction of urban environments 
The urban/built environment in which we dwell is, insofar as it comprises a 
complex network of locales (or gatherings), a fundamentally heterogeneous space. 
This fundamental heterogeneity is derived from the manner in which the spatiality 
constituted in and through the locales that comprise the urban/built environment is 
essentially public, or shared. This public/shared spatial Being-in-the-world, or 
dwelling, is precisely what we refer to as the urban experience: an experience whose 
chief attribute is that of an ineluctable heterogeneity. In this sense a systematic attempt 
to destroy the constitutive basis of such heterogeneity is best understood as 
comprising `urbicide'. 
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The recognition that the destruction of urban environments comprises a 
phenomenon in its own right offers a vital insight into the seemingly excessive assault 
on buildings in conflicts such as the 1992-95 Bosnian war. Moreover, this recognition 
demands that analyses of such destruction should note the manner in which the urban 
environment in its entirety is the target of a systematic destruction. That is to say, 
insofar as buildings are destroyed because they are constitutive of urbanity, it is 
urbanity in its entirety - and the heterogeneity that characterises it - that is at stake in 
urbicide. Analyses of urban destruction should, therefore, no longer be confined to 
those individual cases in which violations of the extant laws of war have been 
perpetrated. This recognition of the manner in which urbicide is directed at the urban 
environment as a whole points to the inadequacy of the current juridico-legal 
framework for treating the destruction of urban environments. In particular it indicates 
that a focus on either of the two principal violations of the present laws of war - the 
destruction of cultural heritage (a violation of the 1954 Hague Convention for the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict) and militarily 
unnecessary destruction (a violation of, for example, the Nuremberg Charter 6(b), the 
1977 Geneva Protocol I 52(2), and the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 2(d), 3(b), (c) & (d)) - is too narrow to properly 
comprehend the destruction of urban environments. 3 
It is precisely in this regard that the concept of urbicide has its most significant 
utility. The publication of Mostar-92 Urbicid by a group of architects from Mostar 
was an attempt to draw attention to the fact that the destruction of the urban 
environment in the 1992-95 Bosnian war did not respect the conceptual limitations of 
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those analyses concerned with violence against cultural heritage. Moreover, this 
destruction did not respect the concept of military necessity or the correlate concept of 
collateral damage. The concept of urbicide was deployed to note that there was a 
systematic assault on the urban fabric throughout Bosnia which made all buildings 
targets for destruction. By arguing that buildings are the constitutive elements of the 
heterogeneity that comprises urbanity, and demonstrating that this is the case through 
an exposition of the manner in which buildings constitute the spatiality in which we 
dwell as always already public/shared, I have shown that this deployment of the 
concept of urbicide in relation to the destruction of urban fabric in the 1992-95 
Bosnian war is indeed more productive than the present juridico-legal concepts 
available to analysts of the urban devastation of Bosnia. 
From the analysis of urbicide to the question(s) of heterogeneity 
However, noting that such destruction comprises urbicide is, in itself, only a 
preliminary measure in the analysis of the destruction of buildings in conflicts such as 
the 1992-95 Bosnian war. That this definition of violence against the urban fabric as 
urbicide is a preliminary measure does not, of course, undermine the utility that the 
term possesses. Indeed, I hope that I have shown the utility of this concept both above 
and in Chapter 2. However, this preliminary measure largely comprises a vital ground 
clearing on which further analysis can be predicated. The concept of urbicide both 
notes that the destruction of the urban fabric is of vital concern to analysts of violence 
such as that witnessed in the 1992-95 Bosnian war and indicates the characteristics of 
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such violence (chiefly the assault upon the conditions of possibility of heterogeneity). 
However, as a preliminary step, the definition of the violence witnessed in Bosnia as 
urbicide, leaves important questions unanswered. 
Most importantly, the preliminary definition of urbicide leaves unanswered the 
question of what exactly it is that urbicide discloses. Since it is the conditions of 
possibility of heterogeneity that are attacked in the course of urbicide, it is, I think, 
safe to say that urbicide discloses something of the heterogeneity that characterises 
shared/public urban dwelling. That is to say, the observation that the destruction 
wrought during conflicts such as the 1992-95 Bosnian war comprises urbicide, or the 
destruction of the conditions of heterogeneity, begs the question both of precisely 
what is lost when such conditions of possibility are destroyed, and the political 
purpose/consequence of the loss of such heterogeneity. However, the preliminary 
definition of urbicide speaks simply of an assault on heterogeneity, sharing, and 
alterity without offering any further explanation of the nature of the Being-with-others 
that such terms imply. Thus it is the question of the character of the heterogeneity that 
was the target of gunners across Bosnia that has been left unanswered at this point in 
my argument. 
In Chapter 31 argued that Being-in-the-world (or dwelling, Heidegger's later 
formulation of Being-in-the-world) is an always already shared, or public, spatial 
experience. Moreover, I demonstrated that this spatiality is constituted in and through 
that which expresses the fact that we are dwellers: building. Buildings, as that which 
expresses our Being-in-the-world as dwellers (rather than being a means towards the 
end of that dwelling), constitute our world as a series of locales or gatherings (which I 
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characterised as complex relational networks). According to Heidegger the (built) 
things that constitute such locales are inherently public. That is to say, the world does 
not appear subjectively for a single Dasein (conceived as an ego-cogito). Rather the 
world in which we dwell is constituted through things that are in principle available to 
all those that have the character of Dasein. Thus the spatiality established in locales is, 
in principle, open to sharing with Others that have the character of Dasein. 
It was on this basis that I argued that I had demonstrated that buildings, as that 
which constitutes the world as a shared/public, spatial experience, are the condition of 
possibility of an essential heterogeneity. My assertion that `urbicide' is the correct 
term for the destruction of urban environments in conflicts such as the 1992-95 
Bosnian war rests on this basic proposition. Urbicide refers to the `killing' (by 
destroying its conditions of possibility) of that which characterises urbanity: 
heterogeneity. Since buildings constitute the spatiality of existence as fundamentally 
shared/public, I argued that I had demonstrated that destroying the buildings that make 
up the urban fabric, is essentially a destruction of the conditions of possibility of 
heterogeneity. Where that destruction has occurred, or is occurring, it is thus possible 
to say that heterogeneity itself is under assault. 
This demonstration of the link between dwelling, building, and heterogeneity 
rests on two interrelated assumptions: (1) that the shared/public character of the 
spatiality in and through which Being-in-the-world comes to be entails the possibility 
of alterity on which heterogeneity is predicated; (2) that the difference that 
heterogeneity entails is a self-evident matter (i. e, that the heterogeneity referred to - 
and the difference it implies - requires no further clarification regarding its character). 
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It is these assumptions that I want to address in the remainder of this chapter. I will 
turn first to the question of the (at present implicit) relation of sharing to difference 
(the basis of my claim that buildings constitute the condition of possibility of 
heterogeneity). By demonstrating that sharing (Being-in-a-world that is public and, 
hence, always also the world of Others) entails difference (that those with whom the 
world is shared are Other than me and thus different to, and not identical with, me), I 
hope to clarify that sharing constitutes the world as heterogeneous. I will then turn to 
the nature of the heterogeneity - the character of the Being-with that is implicit in 
Being-in-the-world-with-others - entailed in this concept of sharing. 
Heterogeneity: the difference implicit in sharing 
I want to start, then, by examining the first assumption that my previous 
exegesis of `urbicide' has made: that the sharing of essentially public (built) things 
implies heterogeneity. This examination of the manner in which heterogeneity is 
implicit in the sharing of existential spatiality will then lead later in this chapter to a 
consideration of the nature of this heterogeneity. 
Sharing is commonly conceived in one of two ways, either as the 
([un]even/[un]equal) distribution of goods among individual persons/subjects, or the 
communal partaking of a substance from which Being derives a certain value or 
meaning. These two concepts of distribution or communion typically circumscribe the 
two poles of political thought concerning the manner in which we share. The former 
position can be identified as that held by liberal political theories that adhere to an 
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underlying notion of `possessive individualism'. C. B. Macpherson coined the term 
`possessive individualism' to refer to the `unifying assumption[s]' on which `liberal 
democratic thought from John-Stuart Mill to the present' is premised. 4 The `unifying 
assumption[s]' that ground `possessive individualism' are summarised by Macpherson 
in seven propositions, the most important of which for my present argument are: 
`(i) What makes a man human is freedom from dependence on the wills of 
others'; 
`(v) Human society consists of a series of market relations'; and 
`(vii) Political society is a human contrivance for the protection of the 
individual's property in his person and goods... '5 
According to such theories sharing is conceived of as the reconciliation of 
claims to goods by those that make up the community. In this sense the distribution 
(or sharing out) of goods is necessary in so far as there is no inherent or originary 
possession of those goods. This problematic comprises the principle focus of concern 
for liberal political theories such as Rawls' Theory of Justice. 6 
Such theories are premised upon the assumption that sovereign free individual 
persons/subjects necessarily co-exist in the same space and, due to the competing 
claims to goods that arise in this state of co-existence, a system of distribution, or 
sharing out is thus necessary.? According to such theoretical positions sharing can be 
seen as the distribution of goods to individuals for their sole use (in this sense sharing 
is a sharing-out, a division of goods amongst, or their assignment to, individuals), or 
the designation of certain goods to be held in common by two or more individuals or 
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the political bodies they have chosen to represent them (in this sense sharing is a 
sharing-in or common usage of goods). 
The opposite pole of thought concerning sharing (that of a communion with, or 
partaking of, a substance from which all the members of a community derive the 
meaning of their Being) can be identified as a broadly Hegelian theme that resonates 
in, amongst other places, Marxist political theory and notions of Christian community. 
This theme comprises a teleological dialectic of reconciliation between the particular 
in the form of the political subject and the universal substance s/he embodies. In this 
dialectic, the final Aufhebung represents a recuperation of the particular to the 
universal substance from which it derives its Being (be that spirit, the class struggle, 
or the kingdom of God). 8 Sharing is thus a partaking-of a common universal 
substance held to be that from which any meaning of individual, particular Being is to 
be derived. 9 
In the terms established in Chapter 3, the liberal conception of the sharing of 
existential spatiality sees that spatiality as the neutral backdrop for individual 
existences in which the question of how the things constitutive of that spatiality will 
be possessed (either solely or in common) is the primary political problematic. In 
contradistinction, a secular dialectical conception of such sharing would treat the 
existential spatiality in and through which Being-in-the-world is possible as the 
common substance from which the meaning of individual lives was to be derived. 
Theistic variations of such dialectical conceptions might invest the existential 
spatiality outlined in Chapter 3 with certain divine attributes and thus hold that 
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existence within this space was a partaking of the divine substance which gives 
meaning to existence. 
And yet neither of these conceptions properly accounts for the heterogeneity 
that I have argued is implicit in the shared/public character of existential spatiality. 
For both conceptions sharing is an ancillary action - after the fact of the existence of 
either free subjects or the substance which particular individuals embody. In 
contradistinction, however, for Heidegger the point is not that we exist in the same 
space and then share-out (or share-in) its goods, or partake-of its meaning-giving 
possibilities. Rather, the things that constitute this spatiality constitute it as always 
already shared. That is to say, the things that constitute the shared spatiality (in and 
through which Being-in-the-world is possible) are always already shared. These 
things (which include, according to my argument in the previous chapter, buildings) 
are not simply extant in space, waiting to be distributed/assigned. Neither is the 
existential spatiality constituted by (built) things a substance that is partaken of by 
particular individuals. 
In other words, both of the common place conceptions of sharing fail to grasp 
the fundamental level on which Heidegger is arguing that the things with which we 
dwell are always already shared. It is worth, therefore, examining the understanding of 
sharing that can be found in Heidegger. In this respect, Jean-Luc Nancy's reflections 
on the sharing that lies at the heart of Heidegger's existential analytic (despite also 
being the basis of a thorough critique of the Heideggerian conception of Being-with- 
others) are instructive. lo 
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Nancy concurs with Heidegger's analysis that existence is a fundamentally 
shared phenomenon. Although Nancy does not approach the question of the 
constitution of existence through the analysis of its spatiality, he agrees with 
Heidegger's argument that Being-in-the-world is essentially a Being-with-others. It is, 
therefore, possible to read Nancy's comments concerning sharing as a commentary on 
Heidegger's account of the manner in which essentially public/shared things are 
constitutive of existential spatiality. Moreover, Nancy argues that sharing is the most 
fundamental event in the constitution of Being-in-the-world. Nancy's argument thus 
essentially concurs with Heidegger's analysis as it was set out in Chapter 3. For 
Heidegger, Being-in-the-world is not prior to the shared nature of things. Indeed, 
Being-in-the-world (or spatial existence) is constituted in and through things that are 
at the very same time always already shared. Thus the things that are constitutive of 
existence are fundamentally shared in the very moment of constitution of existence. 
This essential sharing that marks the constitutive moment of existence leads 
Nancy to propose a very different conception of what it means `to share' to those 
outlined above. It is important to note at this stage that whilst it is premised upon 
Heidegger's assertion of the fundamental sharing that is constitutive of the spatiality 
of existence, Nancy's conception of sharing is intended to form the basis of a 
thorough critique of the conclusions to which Heidegger comes concerning the way in 
which this sharing constitutes a certain way of Being-with-others. That is to say, 
whilst Nancy's account of sharing accepts and endorses Heidegger's basic 
propositions regarding Being-with-others, he deploys this concept in order to critique 
the conclusions to which Heidegger comes (especially in Being and Time) concerning 
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the way in which we share. At this point, however, I want to concentrate on Nancy's 
explication of the conception of sharing entailed by Heidegger's account of Being-in- 
the-world. I will turn to the manner in which Nancy deploys this conception of sharing 
as a critique of Heidegger's conclusions regarding community in Being and Time in 
Chapter 5. 
Shared things are, insofar as they are constitutive of existential spatiality, that 
which establishes a common existential `world' and that which intimates the presence 
of Others in that world. It is precisely the manner in which the thing intimates the 
presence of Others that is central to Nancy's conception of sharing. In one sense, 
insofar as they are shared/public, the things that are constitutive of existential 
spatiality are the common property of all who exist. In this sense things establish a 
relation between an individual Dasein and the Others that inhabit the `world' whose 
presence is intimated by the shared/public character of the things that constitute it. 
This relation is one of Being-in-the-world, Being in the same spatial existence, and 
having the character of Dasein. That is, these things intimate a relation between an 
individual Dasein and the other beings that have the character of Dasein for whom 
things also constitute the spatiality of existence. In this way the things that form 
Heidegger's favourite examples, such as the cloth made into garments by a tailor, 
establish a relation of Being-in-the-same-world between an individual Dasein (the 
tailor perhaps) and other beings that have the same character as that Dasein (such as 
the prospective wearer of the garment). 
However, things also establish a division that is co-extensive with, and equally 
as important as, the relation they establish. Insofar as things intimate the existence of 
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other beings with the character of Dasein (i. e., Others), they establish that each being 
is in some way different to the others and thus divide individuals from one another. " 
In other words the thing intimates the possible presence of an Other and in 
constituting the Other qua Other, divides a singular Dasein from its Others. Moreover, 
this division is the genesis of individuality. It is only insofar as the thing divides the 
self from Others that the self comes to exist as an `individual'. 12 This understanding of 
the genesis of individuality stands in stark contrast to the two common-place notions 
of sharing that I discussed above - both of which conceive of the individual as pre- 
existing the association with Others. 
This is the core moment in the constitution of existential spatiality as a 
fundamentally heterogeneous experience. The Other must be divided from, and thus 
essentially different to, that for whom it comprises an Other. If this was not the case 
then there would be no essential difference in Being-in-the-world, and dwelling in the 
existential spatiality constituted by (built) things would not be a fundamentally 
heterogeneous experience. 
Thus for Nancy the sharing that is a fundamental characteristic of Dasein's 
Being-in-the world, is both a relation and a division. Moreover, there is no way of 
surmounting this relation/division character. That is to say, the thing always both 
relates and divides and there exists no way to alienate the relation or reconcile the 
divisions. Which is to say things are never the sole property of an individual (because 
there is no way of alienating the relation things establish with Others), and a body 
constituted around things can never overcome the divisions within it that those things 
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establish (which means that the ideal of coming together to partake in the thing as 
substance and thus become one body is simply that - an ideal). 
Nancy's explication of the conceptual contours of the idea of sharing at work 
in Heidegger's conception of Being-in-the-world as essentially a Being-with-others 
leads him to note that since the fundamental experience of existence is a Being-with- 
others, community is to be taken to be co-extensive with existence itself. Existence is, 
therefore, always already the experience of community. That is to say, the experience 
of Being-with-others is fundamental to existence (not, as many political theories argue 
something contrived after the fact of individual existence). And it is sharing, the 
relation/division performed by the (built) things with which we dwell, that constitutes 
Being-in-the-world as co-extensive with the experience of community. As Howard 
Caygill notes, 
the share is the movement of inauguration and dissolution of 
community, not as a dialectical movement of loss and recovery, but as the 
folding of both into each other. In the share, the individual is neither 
master nor slave, neither owner nor owned, but is both divided from and 
joined with Others. The share violently sunders and brings together 
community, not in terms of a sacrificial liturgy in which violence is 
followed by redemption, but as a simultaneous and inseparable experience 
of founding and destructive violence. In this thought of the share, violence 
does not assail the community from without, but is ever implicated in it. ' 3 
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This conception of sharing, derived from Heidegger's argument that Being-in- 
the-world is essentially a Being-with-others (constituted in and through the way in 
which we dwell with things) thus establishes that existence is a fundamentally 
heterogeneous experience. Heterogeneity is always already implicated in the way in 
which the sharing of things (which is constitutive of existential spatiality) is always 
already a relation/division that constitutes Being-in-the-world as a Being-with-others. 
Moreover, since dwelling is an essentially shared experience (insofar as the gathering 
that constitutes locales is performed around shared things) it always already implicates 
Being in community. The question of the heterogeneous nature of existence is thus 
always already the question of community. 
In some respects this may appear to be a somewhat obvious statement. After 
all, the question of the nature of Being-with-others appears to be the question that has 
dominated the history of political thought. Indeed, concepts such as freedom, equality, 
justice, and ethics are all formulated against the background of an assumption that 
politics comprises the regulation of this basic condition of Being-with-others. 
However, the conception of sharing that Nancy outlines, derived as it is from 
Heidegger's work (especially in Being and Time), fundamentally reorients the 
question of Being-with-others as the essential political question. Not only does this 
conception of the sharing of existential spatiality locate Being-with-others as 
constitutive of Being-in-the-world, it also demands a re-conceptualisation of the 
manner in which Being-with-others is understood. That this is the case can be seen 
though a brief analysis of the manner in which the question of Being-with-others is 
approached by liberal political theory. 
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Anthropocentrism and plurality 
As I noted above, liberal political theory, premised as it is upon the ontological 
assumptions of possessive individualism, conceives of Being-with-others as an 
empirically unavoidable, yet essentially subsidiary, aspect of Being. That is to say, 
liberal political theory acknowledges that Being-with-others is an empirical fact. 
However, despite the facticity of this Being-with-others (which is the motivating force 
behind liberal attempts to reconcile the various competing claims to political 
entitlement), liberal political theory argues that this empirical situation is not an 
essential aspect of Being. Indeed, liberal political theory begins with the proposition 
that individual, sovereign, and free political subjects are the components from which 
any Being-with-others is contrived. 14 In other words those theories that are based on 
the assumptions of possessive individualism conceive of Being as the existence in and 
for themselves of sovereign free individuals. Society, community, or Being-with- 
others is thus, whilst factually the case, a contrivance that is supplementary to the 
basic state of human existence. 
Liberal political theory's conception of political subjectivity has a profound 
effect on its understanding of both Being-with-others and sharing. Firstly, the political 
subject is conceived of as an essentially free and sovereign individual. This sovereign, 
free individual precedes Being-with-others (and indeed Being-in-the-world). The 
world and others, whilst empirical facts of existence are precisely what constrain the 
realisation of this subject's essential ontology: sovereign freedom. Many liberal 
theories consist of a set of abstractive meditations designed to strip away the empirical 
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constraints which efface the essential ontological properties of political subjectivity. In 
this way, it is argued the proper conclusions regarding the way in which sovereign, 
free political subjects should live their lives can be ascertained. For example, in A 
Theory of Justice, Rawls argues that the most fair conception of justice can be arrived 
at by stripping away the empirical contingencies which shape human existence in 
order to look at the principles of justice from an `original position'. The `veil of 
ignorance' that shrouds this original position and prevents empirical contingency from 
perverting the derivation of justice from the basic ontological characteristics of 
political subjects - sovereignty (choice), freedom, and equality - divides the 
ontologically primary state of Being - the individual - from the world of empirical 
contingency in which human existence occurs. ' 5 Notwithstanding various attempts to 
amend this theoretical position, Rawls is essentially arguing that political subjects are 
first and foremost sovereign, free individuals and secondarily beings in the world. ' 6 
This understanding of Being leads liberal political theory to conceive of 
political subjects as `unencumbered and antecedently individuated ... [and thus] prior 
to society'. '? Liberal political theorists are right of course to protest against the 
misconception that they are ignorant of the empirical facticity of society. ' 8 However, it 
must be noted that this is not my point. My point here is that the ontology underlying 
liberal political thought, premised as it on the assumptions of possessive 
individualism, conceives of Being in terms of a sovereign, free individual existing 
prior to being in the world - at which point the individual becomes encumbered and 
constrained by the empirical contingencies of human existence. It is precisely on the 
basis of this ontological assumption that liberal political theory conceives of Being- 
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with-others as a secondary characteristic of Being. Being-with-others arises either 
through the contingencies of empirical circumstance or a voluntaristic association. 
That is, either it is the case that we must be with Others because contingent empirical 
circumstance is such that we coexist in the same space as Others or we chose to be 
with Others (often in a contractual way). 
It is this ontological assumption about the nature of the political subject that 
leads to the liberal conception of sharing. Since individuals exist prior to being in the 
world with Others, sharing can only be conceived of as an antecedent allocation of 
goods to these subjects. This allocation is deemed necessary for two reasons: 1) 
because, although their existential qualities are prior to the contingencies of the world 
it is an empirical fact that subjects exist in the world with others; and 2) as things are 
part of the empirical contingency of the world they are not intrinsically related to the 
subjects that inhabit the world - the subject is, since it is sovereign, existentially 
unfettered by any relations with things despite its empirical entanglements with 
questions of allocation of goods. The free, sovereign individual can own goods either 
solely or jointly, but cannot share in a more fundamental sense. To share in a more 
fundamental sense would be to violate the principle that the individual is essentially 
sovereign and free. Indeed, it would entail a constraint of freedom through the 
establishment of an ontological relation to Others. This is why liberal political theory 
is satisfied to pursue a fairly narrow range of questions concerning the manner in 
which individuals who have no essential relation to one another can allocate goods 
amongst themselves (either sharing them out through a system of market-style 
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mechanisms of possession, or holding them in common where the good(s) cannot be 
wholly possessed by an individual). 
The problem with such a conception of sharing, and the Being-with-others it 
entails, is that there can be no essential heterogeneity attendant to it. Heterogeneity 
may be an empirical fact of existence and yet it is not an ontological aspect of political 
subjectivity. Thus the heterogeneity that characterises urban environments can only be 
seen as an empirical contingency. Correspondingly the destruction of buildings cannot 
be conceived of as the destruction of the conditions of possibility of heterogeneity. 
That is, since heterogeneity is only empirically contingent to the urban experience, 
there is no essential link between the buildings that comprise urbanity and the 
heterogeneity that is characteristic of this urbanity. Indeed, though it is the case that 
empirically urbanity is characterised by heterogeneity there is, according to the 
ontological assumptions of liberal political theory, nothing about the structure of 
existence that would support the assertion that the destruction of urban environments 
necessarily comprises a destruction of heterogeneity. Although it might be conceded 
that, in the majority of empirical cases, heterogeneity might be so destroyed, it is not 
the case that each and every time a systematic assault on urban fabric occurs it is 
heterogeneity that is at stake. This is because heterogeneity, or Being-with-others is a 
contingent and entirely subsidiary aspect of human existence and, hence, has no 
essential conditions of possibility the destruction of which would, in each and every 
case, lead to the invocation of the concept of urbicide. 
The contingent nature of heterogeneity can be attributed to the essential 
anthropocentrism of the ontological assumptions that underpin liberal political theory. 
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And it is this anthropocentrism that bequeaths liberal political theory a particularly 
thorny problem. As I noted, the problem is that Being-with-others is regarded as an 
ancillary, subsidiary, and contrived aspect of political subjectivity. Whether one is 
forced into Being-with-others by contingent circumstance, or one chooses to enter into 
a Being-with-others, this community is conceived of as a constraining addition to the 
principal ontological characteristics of political subjects. These political subjects are 
conceived of as human persons unencumbered by any relationships and thus entirely 
free, or sovereign with regard to their lives. 
Whilst the individual human person may appear to be a common-sense starting 
point for a political theory, it is also a problematic starting point. Firstly, such theories 
rest on an idealised vision of the human person. Whilst conceiving of our bodies in 
isolation as the starting point of politics may flatter our sense of self-worth, it is 
ultimately something of a fantasy. 19 The notion of sovereignty that such an image 
implies is, after all demonstrably problematic since our choices are always already 
legislated by such things as the languages we speak, the social systems we live in, the 
tastes to which we subscribe, and our kinship and sexual relationships. That is to say 
the notion of a sovereign human person that is the origin of all political action is 
highly problematic. However, anthropocentrism has two further problematic 
consequences. 
Firstly, and most significantly, the seemingly innocuous assumption that the 
human person comprises the subject of politics leads to a central concern with the 
business of human individuals. The principal consequence of this concern is that 
ethics and politics concern themselves almost wholly with the conduct of humans 
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towards other humans (and in some cases the proper human conduct towards animals - 
though such concerns usually anthropomorphise animals). This means that political 
problems are identified as being those in which persons are affected. The consequence 
of this concern is that liberal-anthropocentric political theories devalue the theoretical 
importance of phenomenon such as the destruction of the urban environment. Indeed, 
such destruction is only of consequence insofar as it affects human individuals, makes 
them homeless, and deprives them of their sense of cultural identity through the loss 
of what is considered to be heritage. Where there is thought to be no direct 
consequence for human individuals then no political problem arises. 
It is for this reason that the destruction of the homes of prospective returnees 
in Bosnia is conceived of as an act of intimidation rather than as an act against the 
conditions of possibility of heterogeneity. 20 Moreover, it is why the destruction of 
Dubrovnik (a site listed on UNESCO's World Heritage List as part of the cultural 
heritage of humanity) - conceived of as an assault on the sense of cultural identity and 
civility possessed by persons in both Croatia and the larger world - is more important 
than the destruction of villages across Bosnia and Kosovo which have no buildings 
purporting to be of cultural significance. Indeed, in the case of the destruction of 
cultural heritage the irony is that anthropocentrism reads such destruction not as an 
assault on buildings but as an attack on individuals (and their collective groupings), as 
it is an attack on an identity possessed by those individuals through the existence of 
the buildings. Anthropocentrism thus displaces the meaning of the destruction of 
urban environments from the loss of those environments to the purported loss of 
identity suffered as a result by human persons. The destruction of buildings is not seen 
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as something to be examined in its own right for the meanings it discloses, but rather 
something that only matters in so far as it is instrumental in causing an injury to the 
identity of human persons. This means that anthropocentrism cannot admit that in 
each and every case of destruction of buildings the conditions of heterogeneity are 
under attack. Rather it is limited to assessing each case of destruction in order to 
determine whether some person or group has suffered an assault on their identity 
through the destruction of cherished buildings. It is precisely in this way that no one 
mourns the loss of ugly buildings, since their loss is not thought of as important for 
any person's or group's identity. 
However, this demand that a political problem have reference to a 
consequence upon individual human persons (i. e., that a political problem is defined 
by it being a problem for human persons, not in and of itself), is not the only problem 
that anthropocentrism bequeaths liberal political theories. Since the basic unit of 
analysis for such theories is the sovereign individual, the basic motivating force 
behind political action is taken to be choice. Moreover, such choice is conceived of as 
the execution of the intent to exercise one's freedom to choose in a particular manner. 
This means that every political problem must be traced back to the intent to choose a 
particular course of action. This seems to me to be the most damaging assumption that 
anthropocentrism bequeaths liberal theory. 
The effect of the centrality of anthropocentric assumptions for such accounts 
of politics can be seen in the hegemony of the concept of `intent' in international 
jurisprudence. The effects of the widespread anthropocentric assumption that political 
problems can be explained via the intent of sovereign individuals are at their starkest 
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in the problematic juridical definition of genocide. The 1948 UN Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide clearly states that genocide 
consists of the `intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or 
religious group'. 2' The consequence of such a definition is that for any individual or 
group to be found guilty of genocide this intent must be demonstrated. Moreover, and 
more importantly, it means that where intent cannot be demonstrated, genocide cannot 
be deemed to have occurred. Thus it is conceivable that a state could eradicate `a 
national, ethnical racial or religious group' as an unintended consequence of another 
action (e. g., flooding an area to create a dam for the purpose of generating 
hydroelectricity) without this eradication constituting genocide. 
That this problem of intention derives from anthropocentric assumptions 
should be made clear. It is because an idealised image (or gestalt) of the human person 
is taken to constitute the political subject that the concept of intent is given such 
prominence. It is productive to see this notion - or image - of human subjectivity 
through the Lacanian account of the formation of the self in the mirror phase (the 
point at which the infant enters into the imaginary order). According to Lacan the 
infant imagines - through identification with a specular (mirror) image of itself - an 
ideal image of him/herself in which their dependency upon their parents and Others is 
denied. In this ideal image the self is located in, and in control of, the unified/total 
body that the infant sees when it looks in the mirror. It is only later, in accepting the 
failure of attempts at self-sufficiency/being-unencumbered, and entering the symbolic 
order (specifically through the entry language), that the subject recognises the 
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impossibility of such a fantasy (though the imaginary order persists in attempts to 
realise the ideal of sovereign individuality). 22 
Intent is the logical corollary of the notion of sovereignty (which holds that the 
ideal human person is unencumbered by the constraints of Being-with-others and thus 
free to choose and choice, of course, postulates the existence of an intent to exercise 
one's freedom in a particular way). Specifically, in the imagined image of the self with 
which anthropocentric notions of political subjectivity work, it is the control over the 
unified body of the self that is of particular importance. For the model of 
unencumbered sovereign agency on which anthropocentrism relies to work, it must be 
the case that is the subject who causes their body/self to act in the way that it does. 
And this is only possible if the subject is in some way master of a unified body/self 
that is pliable and responsive to the instructions of the subject. It is precisely this 
model that Lacan sketches in his account of the imaginary order. The imaginary ideal 
is that every action of the self is derived from and ordered by the self. The reality that 
the derivation of our actions and indeed our capacity to influence the world in the way 
that a notion of sovereign unencumbrance implies is neither internal nor transparent 
and within our control, begins to problematise the reliance of liberal political theory 
and contemporary international jurisprudence on notions of intent. For the purposes of 
the present argument it is the consequences of such anthropocentric assumptions for 
analyses of the destruction of urban environments that is of principal concern. 
The hegemony of liberal political theory and its embodiment in international 
jurisprudence means that the destruction of urban environments is conceived only 
through the prism of anthropocentrism. I have noted that this means that destruction 
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is only of consequence when it affects human persons (typically through their death or 
injury, or their loss of identity through the loss of putative heritage). In this respect the 
concept of urbicide is a direct challenge to such anthropocentrism because it notes that 
the destruction of urban environments is of consequence in and of itself since it 
represents the destruction of the conditions of possibility of heterogeneity that is an 
essential aspect of Being-in-the-world. 
However, it is the anthropocentric assumption that the destruction of urban 
environments can only be described as such when it is possible to prove that an intent 
to destroy such environments existed that is more important at this point in my 
argument. The ICTY issues indictments for crimes committed against the urban fabric 
of Bosnia only where it can be shown that the intent to `wantonly destroy cities or 
towns' existed. 23 This means that it is not possible to assert that in each and every case 
in which an assault on the urban environment occurred, urbicide (or an assault on the 
conditions of possibility of heterogeneity) occurred. One can only argue for the 
consequence of destruction on a case by case basis where intent to destroy can be 
shown. 24 
Contesting the anthropocentric imaginary: subjectivity and Being-with-others 
It is precisely this anthropocentric hegemony of intent that the concept of 
urbicide contests. Indeed, the argument that the destruction of urban environments 
constitutes in each and every case an assault on the conditions of possibility of 
heterogeneity that are a constitutive aspect of Being-in-the-world, is intended to move 
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beyond arguments concerning the intent behind such destruction. In this manner the 
concept of urbicide demonstrates that the destruction of urban environments has a 
certain meaning and purpose in and of itself which must be recognised in order to see 
the full extent of the political problematic which such destruction poses. Moreover, if 
we are bound to anthropocentric assumptions concerning the meaning and 
consequence of such destruction we fail to note the fundamentally ontological 
problematic that this violence reveals insofar as it destroys the conditions of 
possibility of a heterogeneity that is a fundamental condition of existence. 
This contestation of the hegemony of anthropocentric assumptions can be seen 
in the conception of sharing which I have derived (via the work of Jean-Luc Nancy) 
from my preliminary analysis of the meaning of the destruction of urbicide. If my 
argument holds then urbicide is the destruction of an essential sharing that contests 
such anthropocentrism on a fundamental level. This should not come as too much of a 
surprise since Nancy's re-conceptualisation of Heidegger's thought concerning Being- 
with-others is driven by a fundamental agreement with the latter's project to contest 
the hegemony of subjectivism in western philosophy. Both Nancy and Heidegger 
identify the dominance of an anthropocentric conception of subjectivity (principally 
that conception which gives rise to instrumental modes of life) in our modem 
condition. 25 The concept of fundamental sharing at stake in urbicide is thus to be seen 
as a contestation of the political subject bequeathed to political theory by 
anthropocentric liberal modes of thought. 
That this sharing indeed represents such a challenge to anthropocentric 
subjectivism can be seen in the manner in which it posits a fundamental and 
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ineluctable alterity which de-centres the traditionally unencumbered subject of 
political thought. The fundamental sharing that both Nancy and Heidegger perceive to 
be constitutive of Being-in-the-world consists of an ineluctable relationality that 
sharply contrasts with the idea of a lone, unencumbered, individual political subject 
who approaches community as an empirical contrivance that either constrains or 
regulates the freedom/choice that is the inalienable character of this sovereign subject. 
Moreover, this relationality means that an ineluctable alterity is a constitutive element 
of the political subject. And thus the ideas of sovereignty, freedom, and choice on 
which the idea of the liberal political subject is premised are radically contested. 
However, it is not this constitutive relation with alterity (or fundamental 
community/Being-with-others) that is the most significant challenge to liberal political 
theory's vision of the unencumbered, sovereign individual. Liberal political theory 
conceives of the political subject as an ego-cogito, in principle prior to and distinct 
from the constraints and contrivances of the empirical world. In contradistinction 
Nancy's conception of sharing relies on a variation of Heidegger's existential 
ontology of Being-in-the-world. As I noted in Chapter 3, for Heidegger, nothing 
precedes the world, and the world is all that there is. 26 Being is never prior to, nor 
distinct from, the world in which it is. This is the fundamental point of the idea of 
Being-in-the-world. For Heidegger, as well as Nancy, Being-in-the-world is the basis 
of existence, and existence is all that there is. This is why it is with Descartes and 
Husserl that Heidegger most often engages in Being and Time and later works?? For 
Heidegger the pure philosophies of subjectivity that both of these philosophers 
develop represents a fundamental misreading of the character of human existence. For 
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Heidegger, these philosophies of subjectivity represent the corruption of the meaning 
of Being that has caused the decline of Western philosophy's ability to understand the 
true meaning of Being. 
According to Heidegger, Being is always already in-the-world. As such Being 
is, moreover, always already with Others. Ideas such as the ego-cogito or the 
sovereign, free political subject represent modes of thinking about Being-in-the-world- 
with-others. Furthermore, these modes of thinking are essentially deficient modes of 
thinking insofar as they represent attempts to deny the true meaning of Being as 
Being-in-the-world-with-others. One can conceive of the subject as sovereign and 
free, but only if one ignores, or disavows the essential community that characterises 
Being-in-the-world. This existentialism represents the most significant challenge to 
liberal political theory's conception of Being-in-the-world-with-others as the 
contrived coexistence of free, sovereign subjects. 28 
However, this leaves political theory with a distinct problematic: how do we 
understand the political subject in light of Heidegger and Nancy's contestation of the 
essentially Cartesian model of political subjectivity? Heidegger recognises this 
problem (though not in the register of political theory). In Being and Time, he notes 
that his analysis of Dasein as Being-in-the-world has radically challenged the 
Cartesian and Husserlian philosophies of subjectivity. Moreover, he recognises that 
the question of subjectivity is an important one, after all Dasein is that which `I' am, it 
is the Being that humans possess. 29 In common sense terms, Dasein would appear to 
comprise the kind of individual person on which liberal political theory, or 
philosophies of subjectivity are premised. In order to resolve this ambiguity, 
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Heidegger turns his attention to a question that he phrases as that of the `who' of 
Dasein. This question is one of the most significant and far reaching questions posed 
in Being and Time (though Heidegger's conclusions regarding this question may not, 
as we shall see, be that desirable). Who is Dasein? As that for which Being is a 
question, and that which represents the kind of Being that humans have, what kind of 
person is Dasein? Is it an individual subject or something else? 
These questions refer to the second assumption that I outlined earlier as being 
unexplored in my exegesis of `urbicide': that of the nature of heterogeneity. When 
conceived in Nancy's terms, the sharing of the existential spatiality characteristic of 
Being-in-the-world (and constituted by the locales gathered by buildings) entails an 
ineluctable alterity, or Being-with-others, that justifies referring to urbicide as the 
destruction of the conditions of possibility of heterogeneity. However, this leaves open 
the question of the nature of the heterogeneity that is under attack. That is, the 
demonstration that the sharing of the existential spatiality that is constitutive of Being- 
in-the-world shows only that Dasein's world is characterised by an essential 
heterogeneity. This bare Being-in-the-world-with-others needs fin ther explication if 
the political subjectivity implicit in my account of the stakes of urbicide is to be 
delineated. 
The importance of this question of the nature of the heterogeneity implicit in 
my previous accounts can be seen in relation to the above criticisms of liberal political 
thought. Liberal political thought has conceptions of sharing, difference and 
heterogeneity that it regards as being adequate to the task of determining conditions of 
justice, democracy, equality and so on. 30 In my criticisms above, however, I have 
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argued that the problem with such accounts are that the anthropocentrism in the liberal 
account of political subjectivity leads to an inadequate account of the sharing that I 
take to be under attack in urbicide. It would follow that I see the problem with liberal 
political theory to be a reliance on an anthropocentric political subject that is 
inadequate to the task of understanding the fundamental heterogeneity at stake in 
urbicide. If this political subject - which is conceived of as sovereign first and only 
secondarily in relations of difference - is inadequate to the task at hand, then this begs 
two interrelated questions: what is the nature of the political subject implied in the 
conceptions of sharing and heterogeneity outlined by Heidegger and Nancy?; and what 
does this political subject tell us about the nature of the heterogeneity that I have 
asserted to be fundamental to Being-in-the-world? 
These questions lead us, I think, to the proper stakes of my argument: the 
question of what it is precisely that is disclosed in the destruction of urban 
environments in conflicts such as the 1992-95 Bosnian war. It is insufficient to 
respond to this question by simply replying `heterogeneity'. Such a reply begs the 
(clearly ontological) question `what is this heterogeneity? '. In order, therefore, to set 
out what it is that is lost in urbicide - and thus answer the question of what urbicide 
discloses - it is necessary to outline the nature of the heterogeneity under attack. Only 
by showing precisely what this heterogeneity comprises, and how it is reconfigured by 
the destruction of urban environments, is it possible to set out what is at stake in 
urbicide. 
It is, therefore, to these questions, and Heidegger's responses, that I now want 
to turn. I want to set out Heidegger's analysis of the `who' of Dasein, in order to 
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elaborate upon the manner in which as Being-in-the-world we are always already 
implicated in community, or Being-with-others. By showing how Heidegger 
conceives of Dasein as always already being in an existentially constitutive 
relationship with difference (and, hence, as Being-in a heterogeneous existence), it is 
possible to begin to outline the nature of the heterogeneity at stake in urbicide. 
The `who' of Dasein 
In Division 1, Chapter 4, of Being and Time Heidegger recognises that his 
initial demonstration of Dauin's worldliness (Division 1, Chapters 2& 3) has been 
primarily concerned with establishing the mariner in which Being-in-the-world is 
constituted in and through Dasein's involvement with ready-to-hand things. Indeed, he 
notes that `[i]n our previous analysis, the range of what is encountered within-the- 
world [by Dasein] was ... narrowed down to equipment ready-to-hand or Nature 
present-at-hand, and thus to entities with a character other than that of Dasein. '31 This 
concentration on Dasein's involvement with the world of things privileges one of 
Dasein's `structures of Being' with the consequence that, at this point in Being and 
Time, not all of the `constitutive items' that comprise Being-in-the-world stand out 
`with the same phenomenal distinctiveness as the phenomenon of the world itself. '32 
It is with this in mind that Heidegger turns to consider a phenomenon that he 
asserts can be approached `by asking who it is that Dasein is in its everydayness. '33 At 
first glance the importance of this question to Heidegger's enquiry into Being-in-the- 
world may not appear entirely obvious. It is worth, therefore, considering why the 
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question of `who' Dasein is arises and what phenomenon, or structure of Being, it 
reveals. 
The initial account of worldliness in Being and Time could give the impression 
that Dasein is to be conceived of in a similar manner to the ego-cogito of Cartesian- 
Husserlian philosophy. That is, in giving an account of how Being-in-the-world is 
constituted by Dasein's situatedness in respect of the things it finds ready-to-hand (or 
present-at-hand) in the world, Heidegger could be taken to be conforming to an 
account of Being that asserts the priority of an individual's encounter with its world. 
However, Heidegger has already both problematised, and distanced himself from, 
such a conception. In the first place, Heidegger has `shown [through his discussion of 
`Being-in'] that a bare subject without a world never `is' proximally, nor is it ever 
given. '34 Nevertheless, despite having shown the situatedness of being, and because 
this account has been given through a consideration of a deliberately narrow range of 
phenomena, Heidegger's account of Being-in-the-world might still be seen to be open 
to the Cartesian-Husserlian idea that the individual self (and its consciousness, or 
experience of the world) is to be accorded an ontological priority. The problem with 
this idea is precisely its conception of an individual Dasein's relation to other beings 
with the same character as Dasein. The Cartesian-Husserlian conception asserts that 
the constitution of a world by an individual Dasein through its relation to the things 
that are within that world is the primary ontological moment. But this leads the 
Cartesian-Husserlian conception to treat other beings that Dasein encounters in the 
world in one of two ways. Either they are antecedent to the principal ontological 
moment in which the individual's worldliness is constituted, or these other beings are 
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simply the same as the things ready-to, and present-at, hand that make up Dasein's 
world. 
But Heidegger has already noted that neither of these possibilities can be the 
case. In the first place, Heidegger has already shown the fundamentally shared, or 
public, nature of the things, and thus the world, in relation to which Being-in-the- 
world is constituted. This means that `the world is always the one I share with 
Others. '35 More importantly, however, `[t]hese entities [the Others with whom I share 
the world] are neither present-at-hand nor ready-to-hand; on the contrary, they are 
like ... Dasein'. 
36 Which is to say, that although the individual Dasein has been treated 
as prior in Heidegger's preliminary account of the worldhood of the world, Dasein co- 
exists with Others who have the same ontological characteristics of Dasein. Moreover, 
this co-existence is not antecedent to Dasein's worldliness, but a constitutive aspect of 
it. 
The `who' of Dasein cannot thus be the individual subject proposed by 
Cartesian-Husserlian philosophy. The subject implied by Dasein is a situated Being 
which is always already a Being-with-others which cannot thus have the kind of 
subjectivity that has traditionally been attributed to it by modern philosophy: namely a 
sovereign individuality. The question of the `who' of Dasein is thus intended to 
introduce into Division I of Being and Time an account of Dasein's subjectivity. In 
asking `who' Dasein is, Heidegger is approaching the question of the nature of the 
subject referred to by Dasein. In particular Heidegger is concerned with the 
implications for such an account of Dasein's subjectivity of the relations Dasein 
always already has with those others that have the same kind of Being as Dasein. The 
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question of the `who' of Dasein is, therefore, fundamentally concerned with the 
phenomenon of heterogeneity and the nature of Being-in-the-world-with-others. And 
it is in this sense that this question (the `who' of Dasein) is an important one to pursue 
in an account of the heterogeneity at stake in urbicide. 
Heidegger immediately notes that the obvious answer to this question of the 
`who' of Dasein is that `Dasein is an entity which is in each case I myself: its Being is 
in each case mine. '37 However, Heidegger then notes, as I did in chapter 3, that 
average everyday existence is precisely that state which is the least available for 
Dasein's reflection. Dasein understands its everyday existence pre-theoretically and 
with no reflection. Where there is reflection and understanding about the world this is 
a product of Dasein turning its attention to its average everyday existence once this 
existence, and Dasein's pre-theoretical understanding, has been in some way 
disturbed. 
Following this line of argument, Heidegger notes that `[i]t could be that the 
"who" of everyday Dasein just is not the "I myself'. '38 Heidegger argues that that the 
notion that Dasein is the `I' (the `me' of the `mine' that Dasein is in each case) is in 
fact not the average everyday existence of Dasein, but rather a mode of Being that 
covers over the everyday `who' of Dasein. That is, the assumption by Cartesian- 
Husserlian philosophy that the `I' (or `Self) comprises the subject of Being actually 
covers over a more fundamental, everyday subject. The relation of the `I' (or Self) to 
Dasein's everyday mode of being is analogous to the relation of a hammer-head 
analysed by a scientist as a present-at-hand quantity of a certain metal to the hammer 
understood as ready-to-hand equipment within-the-world. That is, it is analogous to 
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the relationship between a thing reduced to its physical or chemical components and 
the thing understood as something which one uses, on an everyday basis, to 
accomplish an element of living. Nature considered as a present at hand, quantifiable 
ensemble of minerals and substances is a deficient mode of understanding the ready- 
to-hand equipmental wholes with which Dasein has an everyday familiarity. 
Understanding the hammer as a lump of iron attached to a wooden handle is thus a 
deficient mode of understanding it as something with which to accomplish the task of 
nailing two pieces of wood together. According to Heidegger, understanding a thing 
as a present-at-hand substance is the product of theoretical reflection. Thus conceiving 
of Dasein as a substantial `I', abstracted from its everyday circumspective concern for 
the world is a product of theoretical reflection. Moreover, such an understanding 
commits one to seeing Dasein as a present-at-hand thing in the same way that 
theoretical reflection commits us to seeing the things around us as present-to-hand, 
rather then ready-to-hand elements of equipmental wholes that accomplish tasks. And 
as Heidegger has already noted this is simply inconsistent with his previous argument 
that `presence-at-hand is the kind of Being which belongs to entities whose character 
is not that of Dasein. '39 
Heidegger is, of course, arguing here against an imagined interlocutor 
identifiable, as I have noted, as a Cartesian-Husserlian hybrid 40 This imagined 
interlocutor represents the tradition of subjectivism that has dominated the history of 
philosophical thinking concerning ontology (or the question of Being). This tradition 
is founded on, and propagates, the assumption that the subject of everyday Being (the 
`who' of Dasein) is the `I'/Self. The problem, according to Heidegger, is that the 
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history of philosophy has framed the question of the `who' of Dasein as one in which 
it is necessary to `start my marking out and isolating the `I' so that one must then seek 
some way of getting over to the Others from this isolated subject'. 41 If one starts from 
such an assumption one is, of course, easily led into the `pitfall' of seeing Dasein as 
the `I,. 42 
Of course, this is not to suggest that that conceiving of Dasein as an `I' or Self 
must simply be abandoned. After all, this is the way in which Dasein often proceeds in 
its activities in the world (which is to say that the history of philosophy has not simply 
been a flight of fancy, or a grave mistake). Rather this way of answering the question 
of the `who' of Dasein so beloved of the philosophical tradition (and exemplified by 
Cartesian-Husserlian thought) represents an account of, as I have noted earlier, a 
deficient mode of Dasein. Moreover, this is a mode in which Dasein misrecognises its 
`Self as something (literally some-thing) that has a character quite other than that 
already ascribed to Dasein by Heidegger in his explication of Being-in-the-world. 
Insofar as it is correct to speak of Dasein being `an entity which is in each case 
I myself this is, according to Heidegger an ontical, not an ontological statement 43 
Whilst ontology is concerned with the meaning of Being, the ontic refers to `the 
distinctive nature of particular types of [existent] entity' . 
4' The ontic thus denotes the 
actual ways in which beings exist. Ontic statements, therefore, concern `beings, not 
their [B]eing. i45 Heidegger notes that `[I]t may well be that it is always ontically 
correct to say of this entity [Dasein] that "I" am it. '46 However, an `ontological 
analytic which makes use of such assertions' should be cautious. 7 Indeed `[t]he word 
"I" is to be understood only in the sense of a non-committal formal indicator, 
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indicating' that ontically Dasein may be what `I' am, but that this `I' does not 
necessarily tell us everything of the ontological character of Dasein - specifically 
`who' Dasein is. 8 
In order to demonstrate that ontologically the isolated (sovereign) `I' is not the 
`who' (or subject) of Dasein, Heidegger turns again to look at the structure of Being- 
in-the-world, the basic, pre-theoretical condition of possibility of existence. In its 
average everyday Being-in-the-world, Dasein is typically absorbed into the world. 
This means that Dasein is unreflectively engaged with the ready-to-hand things that 
are the condition of possibility of the worldliness necessary for existence. However, 
Dasein is not a lone individual given a context by the things that exist solely for 
him/her. The things that underlie Dasein's existence do not exist for a single `I'. This 
is precisely what Heidegger is getting at when he stresses the shared/public nature of 
the spatiality of existence constituted in and through (built) things. 
Heidegger's explication of this point radically challenges the traditional notion 
of possessive individualism that underpins much thinking concerning Being-with- 
others. This thinking has often been framed in terms of the problem of `other minds'. 
Heidegger's explication of Being-with reverses the priority that this problematic has 
had within political philosophy, arguing instead that the problem of other minds is a 
particular, deficient mode of Being-with-others, one that can only be understood if one 
already understands the ordinary everyday way of Being-with others 49 The deficiency 
of the problematic of other minds, or understanding Dasein as the `I' can be seen in 
the way in which it requires that Dasein treat those entities with the character of 
Dasein as things (the problem of other minds treats others at impenetrable/inscrutable 
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things present-to-hand in the world, similar to rocks). 50 As I have already noted, 
however, the primary characteristic of all entities with the character of Dasein is that 
they are not things present-at-hand in the world ('Dasein is not such a substance, it is 
rather existence'). 51 Thus, if the Others with which we exist cannot be treated as 
things that exist in the subject-world of the individual Dasein (except in deficient 
modes - just as ready-to-hand rock can be treated as present-at-hand mineral for 
scientific purposes), how can the subjectivity of Dasein (its `who') be understood? 
In order to explicate the ordinary everyday way of Being-with-others, 
Heidegger returns to the way in which things constitute our average everyday 
existence/world as fundamentally public/shared. Heidegger notes that Dasein's 
average everyday relation to things, Dasein's `staying with things' as he will put in his 
later work, always already implies alterity - other beings with the character of Dasein. 
For example, in `the work world of the craftsman ... along with the equipment to be 
found when one is at work ... those 
Others for whom the "work"... is destined are 
"encountered too"'. 52 That is to say, in the work-world the thing always implies the 
person for whom it is destined. Moreover, the thing always implies the person from 
whom it has originated. As Heidegger puts it, there is an `essential assignment or 
reference' to Others in the ready-to-hand things with which Dasein is absorbed. 53 This 
`assignment or reference' signals that an experience of ineluctable alterity is attendant 
to Being-in-the-world. Heidegger offers several examples of the ways in which that 
alterity may be felt. For example, for a tailor, a garment 
[has a] reference to possible wearers... for whom it should be `cut 
to the figure'. Similarly, when material is put to use, we encounter its 
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producer or `supplier' as one who `serves' well or badly. When, for 
example, we walk along the edge of a field ... the field ... shows itself as 
belonging to such-and-such person, and decently kept up by him; the book 
we have used was bought at So-and-so's shop and given by such-and-such 
a person, and so forth. The boat anchored at the shore is assigned in its 
Being-in-itself to an acquaintance who undertakes voyages with it; but 
even if it is a `boat which is strange to us', it is still indicative of Others. 54 
The things that constitute the condition of possibility of Dasein's worldliness 
thus imply a coexistence of entities with the character of Dasein ('Others'). Even 
where an object does not have such a place in an economic chain (such as the `boat 
which is strange to us') there is always the intimation of alterity. Moreover, `[t]he 
Others who are thus `encountered' in a ready-to-hand, environmental context of 
equipment, are not somehow added-on in thought to some Thing which is proximally 
just present-at-hand; such `Things' are encountered from out of the world in which 
they are ready-to-hand for Others -a world which is always mine too in advance. '55 In 
this way, it is correct to say that `[t]he world of Dasein is a with-world [Mitwelt]. 956 
This is what Heidegger refers to as `Dasein-with' (Mit-dasein). Dasein-with is a 
fundamental Being-with that characterises Being-in-the-world. Worldliness consists of 
the intimation of alterity in all that constitutes the world. And this alterity takes the 
form of Others who are entities with the same character as Dasein. 
Now it could be said that this accords with the Cartesian-Husserlian view that 
the world is always a with-world, but that the individual encounters the world first and 
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then others. However, Heidegger argues that the primordiality of Dasein-with reverses 
the priority of such a formulation. Indeed, the fact that Dasein-with is a fundamental 
attribute of Being-in-the-world, indicates that Being-with (Mitsein) is a 
pre-ontological characteristic of Dasein. 57 This Being-with is prior to the Being-alone 
on which the philosophical tradition has previously grounded ontology (the `I' usually 
being first and foremost `I alone'). Indeed, Heidegger goes on to note that Being-alone 
(the fundamental predicate of possessive individualism) should be regarded as merely 
a deficient mode of Being-with: 
The phenomenological assertion that "Dasein is essentially Being-with" 
has an existential-ontological meaning. It does not seek to establish 
ontically that factically I am not present-at-hand alone, and that Others of 
my kind occur. If this were what is meant by the proposition that Dasein's 
Being-in-the-world is essentially constituted by Being-with, then Being- 
with would not be an essential attribute which Dasein, of its own accord, 
has coming to it from its very own kind of Being. It would rather be 
something which turns up in every case by reason of the occurrence of 
Others. Being-with is an existential characteristic of Dasein even when 
factically no Other is present-at-hand or perceived. Even Dasein's being- 
alone is Being-with in the world. The Other can be missing only in and for 
a Being-with. Being-alone is a deficient mode of Being-with... On the 
other hand, factical Being-alone is not obviated by the occurrence of a 
second example of a human being `beside' me... Even if these and more 
are present-at-hand, Dasein can still be alone. So Being-with and the 
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facticity of Being with one another are not based on the occurrence 
together of several `subjects'. 58 
It is important to note the point that Heidegger makes here about the 
implications of the primacy of Being-with over Being-alone. Were this primacy not to 
be shown (as Heidegger has done through his explication of the assignments and 
references to alterity inherent to equipmental wholes), Others would only ever be said 
to be factically/ontically present on a case by case basis. This would mean that the 
assertion of heterogeneity would rest on being able to show that, in a given factical 
case, Others were indeed present or implied. However, as Heidegger notes, when we 
find ourselves alone recognition of that state rests upon our prior knowledge of Being- 
with. That is to say, alterity is a constitutive attribute of Being because Dasein's world 
is always already a with-world. Whenever Dasein makes that world into an `alone- 
world', this is only possible through a negation of the with that characterises the 
world. This point resonates with, and provides vital support for, my earlier 
problematisation of the way in which liberal political theory is confined to assessing 
heterogeneity on a case by case basis, and thus prevented from recognising the way in 
which all assaults on buildings of the type seen in the 1992-985 Bosnian war 
constitute an attack on the conditions of possibility of an ontologically primary 
heterogeneity. 
At this point, however, Heidegger has merely shown, through the 
demonstration that Dasein-with is a fundamental aspect of Being-in-the-world, that 
Being-with is a fundamental aspect of existence. Despite problematising accounts that 
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take the `I'/Self to be ontologically primary, and Being-with to be ontically secondary, 
Heidegger has not answered the question `who is Dasein? '. And in this sense we have 
still not begun to approach the question of the nature of heterogeneity implied in 
Being-with-others. The nature of this heterogeneity will only be seen insofar as we can 
identify the subjectivity attendant to it (the `who' of the Being - Dasein - that always 
already finds itself in this heterogeneous existence). 
Heidegger looks for the `who' of Dasein in the problematic of how one knows 
what a thing is for, and what place it is assigned in the world. As I noted in the 
previous chapter, Being and Time is an existential analytic insofar as the essence of 
Being is existence (or Being-in-the-world). That is to say, it makes no sense to look 
for clues as to the meaning of Being in non-existential realms. As Heidegger argues 
`[T]he ontologically relevant result of our analysis [in Being and Time] is the insight 
that the `subject character' of one's own Dasein and that of Others is to be defined 
existentially - that is, in terms of certain ways in which one may be [in-the-world]. '59 
In this sense Dasein is what it does. 60 As Heidegger remarks, `proximally and for the 
most part, everyday Dasein understands itself in terms of that with which it is 
customarily concerned. `One is' what one does. 61 Everyday Dasein is, thus, what it 
does with the ready-to-hand world. For Heidegger the answer to the question of the 
`who' of Dasein lies, therefore, in the manner with which Dasein is constituted in its 
concern for, or absorption with, the everyday ready-to-hand world (of which Dasein- 
with is, correspondingly, a constitutive feature). 
Heidegger has already noted that, in its average everydayness, Dasein has a 
pre-theoretical understanding of the position and use of ready-to-hand objects. It is 
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precisely in this pre-theoretical understanding that Heidegger argues the answer to the 
question of the `who' of Dasein lies. In order to demonstrate that this is the case, 
Heidegger turns to look at the question of how everyday Dasein understands both the 
position and use for which ready-to-hand things are intended. What Heidegger wants 
to show at this point is that the `I' is not the source of such understanding. Heidegger 
hopes that this will conclusively demonstrate that Dasein, insofar as it is what it does 
(i. e., it is constituted by the understandings that enable it to do what it does), is not 
first and foremost an individual T. This represents an attempt to conclusively refute 
the Cartesian-Husserlian perspective which holds that indubitable knowledge must 
come from the `I', with knowledge derived from Others being either worthy of 
sustained scepticism, or of secondary worth. It will be Heidegger's argument that the 
way in which everyday Dasein's pre-theoretical understanding of the ready-to-hand 
things that comprise its world can only be attributed to its fundamentally Being-with- 
others. Moreover, in making this argument Heidegger hopes to move from a bare 
assertion that the world is a with-world - that Being-in-the-world is characterised by 
Dasein-with - to a more comprehensive account of the way in which Being-in-the- 
world is always already a Being-with. 
Heidegger's question at this point is simple: if everyday Dasein has a pre- 
theoretical understanding of ready-to-hand equipment, then it understands both the 
location in which that thing is available, and the purpose for which it is intended (or 
the norm that governs its use). We have already seen how the location of any ready-to- 
hand thing is essentially public. As Dreyfus notes, `[e]quipment is for "Anybody" -a 
general user. '62 This public availability does not merely imply the possible use by 
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Others and, hence, the possibility of the presence of Others in the world (as may have 
been implied in Heidegger's account of spatiality). Rather it means that things are first 
and foremost publicly available. Any way in which I make equipment mine is only 
possible because that thing is publicly available. Equipment is thus generally available 
as such. Dasein's absorption in the world is an absorption with things that are given to 
it from a public domain. 
However, Heidegger's most important insight is that regarding the way in 
which everyday Dasein understands the correct way in which to use equipment. As 
Dreyfus notes, `there is a normal (appropriate) way to use any piece of equipment. '63 
These norms of appropriate use are expressed in the form of `what "one" does'. ' 
Everyday Dasein has a remarkable and pre-theoretical understanding of `what "one" 
does' with the ready-to-hand equipment with which it is absorbed. Examples would 
include: one sits on a chair, one wears clothes, one eats with a knife and fork, and so 
on. 65 Everyday Dasein's understanding of the equipmental wholes that constitute its 
world is composed of these norms of appropriate use. 
It is important to remember here that Heidegger is arguing against the 
solipsism of an individualistic perspective. He is not, therefore, arguing that the 
individual is either ground down into acceptance of the norms, or that contravention 
of the norms is not possible. To propose either of these objections is both to 
misunderstand Heidegger's point and to commit oneself to a resolutely ego-centric 
perspective such as that exemplified by the Cartesian-Husserlian conception of the 
ego-cogito. Everyday Dasein is not compelled to submit to these norms of use, but, 
rather, has a pre-theoretical grasp of them prior to considering whether to accept them 
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or not. Such consideration would be a special mode of Being. Moreover, it is always 
possible, as Dreyfus notes, to stand on a chair. The point is that whether or not anyone 
does this does not change the fact that `one sits on a chair'. Or, as Dreyfus puts it more 
succinctly, `[a]nyone might try to cheat the Internal Revenue Service, but still, one 
pays one's taxes'. 66 The point is that any contravention of the norms of use is 
predicated on an understanding of them. It is only possible to talk of contravention 
against the backdrop of already having implicitly understood the use to which one puts 
a thing. 67 
The point is that Dasein's understanding of the world with which it is absorbed 
comes not from its `I', or self, but from a diffuse Other, the `one' referred to in the 
`one sits on a chair'. Heidegger's term for this `one' from which everyday 
understanding derives is `das Man'. In most English translations das Man is rendered 
as `the "they"'. 68 It is important to note, along with Dreyfus, that this term can be 
misleading if it is interpreted to suggest `that I am distinguished from them'. 69 Rather, 
this "they" is a diffuse Other (Dreyfus refers to it as `anyone) from which Dasein's 
everyday understanding derives. 
Recognising that Dasein's understanding of its everyday absorption with the 
world comes not from an `I'/Self, but a "they", entails a radical reversal of the 
traditional priority of the individual. If Dasein is what it does, its Being is derived 
from that which enables it to understand the world in order to do things with the 
things it finds. Thus the subjectivity of everyday Dasein is, as Heidegger had 
suspected at the outset, actually not the 1, but is derived from the "they". 70 This is 
precisely Heidegger's point when he notes that `[b]y `Others' we do not mean 
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everyone else but me - those over against whom the "I" stands out. They are rather 
those from whom, for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself - those among 
whom one is too. '7' What is of interest in the enquiry into the `who' of Dasein is not 
the differentiation of the `I' from Others, but the fact that in its everyday state Dasein 
does not differentiate itself from Others. We thus arrive at an initial answer to the 
question of the `who' of everyday Dasein. For Heidegger the `who' of Dasein is the 
"they" from which the everyday understanding of equipmental wholes constitutive of 
Being-in-the-world derives. 
In this sense Dasein's average everyday understanding of the world comes not 
from itself (as the possessive individualists would like to think), but from outside 
itself. Indeed `Dasein... stands in subjection to Others. It itself is not; its Being has 
been taken away by the Others. '72 The "they" is not some universal spirit or aggregate 
of individuals, but a circulating pre-theoretical understanding that enables Dasein's 
average everyday dealings with the world. Dasein can feel more or less distance from 
the "they", and yet this distance is not a function of Dasein's own, self-given 
subjectivity being out of line with the "they", but rather is a function of the way in 
which Dasein can try more or less to accord with the pre-theoretical understandings of 
the "they". Indeed Heidegger suggests that we should understand the ontical existence 
of the `I' as mode in which a deliberate distance from the "they" is created or felt. This 
distance enables Dasein to consider the "they" as a present-at-hand - and thus different 
- thing (an ontical `them'), rather than that from which it is not differentiated on an 
everyday basis. 
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The average experience of the understanding of the "they" is of always already 
Being-with-one-another. It is precisely for this reason that Heidegger argues that the 
`who' of Dasein (its subjectivity) is the 'they-self. Insofar as this is the case Being 
(the `who' of Dasein) is constituted by an ineluctable Being-with. Not only is Dasein 
always already with Others that have the same character (Dasein-with), but its own 
being is always already a Being-with (Mitsein). This Being-with is attested to by the 
fact that Dasein derives it's everyday understanding of the world not from itself but 
from the "they" - the condition of possibility of which is a fundamental Being-with. 
This means that not only is Being-with an essential characteristic of Dasein, 
but, moreover, that Dasein is not, in its everyday averageness, the T. Rather Dasein is 
defined by what is not-I, the "they". Sovereign individuality and all of the 
accoutrements of possessive individualism have to be understood as modes (and 
deficient modes at that) of this Being-with. 
Thus I have set out the manner in which Being-with-others is a fundamental 
feature of Dasein's everyday existence. This Being-with was hinted at in the previous 
chapter insofar as the things that are the condition of possibility of Dasein's existence 
constitute that existence as a shared/public spatiality. However, in the above 
explication of Heidegger's extension of this thought, I have shown how, starting from 
the ready-to-hand things that constitute Dasein's world, we can show that Dasein itself 
is, fundamentally a Being-with that is given its character by the "they". This is vital as 
it inverts the possessive individualist theses that accept the public space argument in 
chapter 3 and yet see that space as a container waiting to accept pre-existent 
individuals. The Heideggerian notion of Being-with strengthens the claim that 
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existence is constituted by the (built) things that are ready-to-hand and that existence 
is always already heterogeneous (a Being-with[-others]). 
Insofar as I am pursuing here the question of the character of this heterogeneity 
that is constitutive of Being-in-the-world, it is possible to begin to see its outline 
emerging. The heterogeneity that shapes Dasein is an essential openness to, 
orientation towards, and non-differentiation from Others with the same way of Being 
as Dasein. These others constitute a horizon of intelligibility that frames our 
understanding of Being-in-the-world. That is, insofar as the world is shared/public it is 
so because it is always already marked by the presence of such Others (Heidegger's 
Dasein-with). And insofar as Dasein is in-the-world it is so by virtue of an openness to 
the Otherness comprised by the "they" from which it derives its average everyday 
understanding that is the condition of possibility of the constitutive events of Being- 
in-the-world: understanding equipmental wholes (Heidegger's Being-with). 
This heterogeneity is not an aggregation of individuals or the partaking in a 
universal whole by ontically different particular subjects. Rather, it is an essential 
openness -a constitutive failure to constitute an individual `I'/Self - that holds 
existence open to the voice of otherness, the not-I, the experience of sharing. And, 
most importantly, this heterogeneity is precisely the kind of relation-division that 
Nancy outlines in his conception of `sharing'. Dasein is always in relation to both 
other Daseins and the "they", and yet is ever divided, or differentiated from these 
Others (either by recognising their Otherness, or by finding itself distanced from the 
"they"). 
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The question remains, however, what the existential structure of this 
heterogeneity is. Or, rather, insofar as I spoke earlier of this heterogeneity being 
always already a constitution of community, what is this community? After all, the 
"they" from which Dasein derives its everyday understanding of Being is, at this point, 
only a diffuse Being-with. Moreover, Heidegger asserts that the understanding that 
circulates in the form of a normative directions from the "they" about what `one' does 
are responsible for a continual levelling-down of the understandings available to 
Dasein. In other words, the "they" holds all the dangers of conformism. And yet the 
important point is that Dasein does not necessary conform, feeling ever varying 
degrees of distance from the "they". What does this tension of levelling-down and 
distantiality suggest about community? More specifically, how can the constitutive 
openness of Being-with be balanced against the conformism of the "they"? It is 
important at this point to turn our attention to precisely these questions. 
W(h)ither the individual? Dasein and authenticity 
Heidegger's account of Being-with begins to suggest the character of the 
heterogeneity/community that is revealed by the destruction of the urban environment 
that I have referred to as `urbicide'. Above all else, it suggests that the anthropocentric 
possessive individualism most commonly deployed to understand such violence 
cannot comprehend the stakes of the assault on heterogeneity that urbicide comprises. 
Possessive individualism fails to grasp that the sharing inherent to the spatiality 
constituted by buildings is not performed by pre-existing individual subjects who meet 
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in the locales constituted by buildings. It is not an encounter of pre-existent persons 
forced to compromise their sovereignty due to the contingent empirical (ontical) 
presence of other, similarly pre-existent, persons. Rather, this sharing is a fundamental 
Being-with, an always already existing, with and through, alterity that is constituted by 
the worldliness brought into being by buildings (and the shared spaces these buildings 
constitute). In short it is not a contingent, empirical heterogeneity comprised by the 
ontical existence of a number of individuals in a given space. It is a fundamental and 
constitutive heterogeneity that comprises a horizon of intelligibility against which any 
ontical existence of selves is to be understood. It is a heterogeneity that, like sharing, 
constitutes Being as open to alterity. 73 
Understood against the horizon of intelligibility of this constitutive 
heterogeneity, individual subjects are modes - and deficient (or denuded) modes at 
that - of Being-with. This means that individuals are not gathered together but are 
always already together by virtue of the Being-with that is a fundamental feature of 
Being-in-the-world, the worldliness of which is constituted in and through things and 
buildings. We must, therefore, see the destruction of this fundamental co-ontology, or 
community, in urbicide and ask what the political consequences of such an assault on 
Being-with are. 
The Cartesian-Husserlian (possessive individualist) interlocutor has, however, 
one final argument in opposition to Heidegger's exposition of the fundamental nature 
of Being-with. Moreover, this objection arises from Heidegger's own argument. This 
objection concerns Heidegger's indication that the "they" is an inauthentic mode of 
Being for Dasein. After his exegesis of the "they", Heidegger notes that `[t]he Self of 
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everyday Dasein is the they-self, which we distinguish from the authentic Self - that is, 
from the Self which has been taken hold of in its own way. '74 Moreover, Heidegger 
goes on to argue '[als they-self, the particular Dasein has been dispersed into the 
"they", and must first find itself. '75 As Mulhall indicates, this statement - which 
seemingly contradicts the effort to instate Being-with as an existential condition of 
Being-in-the-world - is motivated by a problematic central to the entire project of 
Being and Time: 
For Heidegger needs to explain how a creature to whom (according 
to his own analysis) an understanding of Being essentially belongs can 
have misunderstood its own Being so systematically [this must be 
explained or the task of `the destruction of the history of ontology' is 
rendered pointless]. But of course, if Dasein typically loses itself in the 
`they', it will understand both its world and itself in the terms that the 
`they' make available to it, and so will interpret its own nature in terms of 
the categories that lie closest to hand in... everyday life; and they will be as 
inauthentic as their creators. 76 
Heidegger's seemingly inconsistent argument that the `who' of everyday 
Dasein, while being essential to the structure of Dasein, is simultaneously inauthentic, 
is thus motivated by a deeper theoretical concern: to show that everyday Dasein 
consistently misunderstands its Being by virtue of its being the 'they-self. If Dasein 
has consistently misunderstood its own Being then the project embodied in Being and 
Time is a necessary one. However, this recognition of the inauthenticity of the `they- 
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self invites the Cartesian-Husserlian interlocutor back into the argument. Since the 
argument for the fundamental nature of Being-with is predicated on the notion that the 
`who' of average everyday Dasein (the primary instance of being) is the `they-self, an 
admission that this `they-self' is inauthentic invites a rejection of Being-with as 
similarly inauthentic. 
The objection might, therefore, be raised that, as an inauthentic mode of Being, 
the "they" or Being-with that Heidegger proposes as fundamental to existence is 
actually derived from individual subjectivity - which should be rightly seen as the 
authentic mode of Dasein. This objection deserves further consideration since the 
notion of authenticity is central to Heidegger's work, and Being and Time in 
particular. The Cartesian-Husserlian interlocutor is given more succour by 
Heidegger's assertion that authentic Dasein is `dispersed' into the `they-self and must 
`first find itself in order that it can be `taken hold of in its own way. ' Such statements 
give sustenance to the idea that the proper `who' of Dasein is an I-self that possesses a 
sovereign capacity to seize hold of itself, find itself, and determine, through choice, its 
own position in relation to any alterity that may threaten it with dispersal. 
The Cartesian-Husserlian interlocutor's objection asserts that the authentic 
mode of Dasein is necessarily the `I' since it is this authentic mode of being that is 
obscured by Dasein's everyday submergence in the "they". Heidegger counters such 
an objection by arguing that whilst the latter is the case, the former does not 
necessarily follow. Elaborating upon this counter to the Cartesian-Husserlian 
objection is hard since Heidegger's thought concerning the authentic modes of Dasein 
is often obscure and found mostly in hints and implications. However, at the end of 
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his exposition of the primordiality of Being-with to the structure of Dasein, Heidegger 
does speak directly to the issue of the relationship between authentic Dasein and the 
inauthenticity of the 'they-self. 
As I have noted, after concluding that the `who' of Dasein is the 'they-self', 
Heidegger adds that this they-self of everyday Dasein must be inauthentic as it is not 
the `Self which has been taken hold of in its own way', but, rather, the self taken hold 
of by the dictates and norms of Others. However Heidegger goes on to note that 
`Authentic Being-one's-Self does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject, 
a condition that has been detached from the "they"; it is rather an existentiell 
modification of the "they" - of the "they" as an essential existentiale. '77 Heidegger is 
pointing to vital distinction between the ontical (or actually existing beings) and the 
ontological (or the existential structures of being). For Heidegger, `existentiell' refers 
to ontically existent beings, whilst `existentiale' refers to the structures that are 
ineluctable features of Being (or existential/ontological conditions). 
This is a vital distinction that those who wish to assert the primacy of the 
individual subject easily forget or cover over by arguing that the existent concept of 
the individual person represents an ontological structure. Moreover, this distinction 
enables Heidegger to argue that it is possible to hold that Being-with is an existential 
condition whilst simultaneously arguing that the ontically existent `they-self (which 
is what Heidegger bases his argument concerning Being-with upon) comprises an 
inauthentic mode of Being. Ontic inauthenticity need not necessarily invalidate the 
ontological structure of Being-with. 
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Furthermore, Heidegger argues that authenticity, whilst not being found in the 
`they-self cannot be found in isolating an `I' from the "they". Authentic Dasein is an 
ontical modification of Being-with that rearticulates the conformism and dispersion of 
the `they-self . Such a rearticulation, or authenticity, is only possible, however, against 
the horizon of intelligibility provided by Being-with. The inauthenticity of Dasein's 
everyday `they-self is not due to the Being-with that the `they-self rests upon, but, 
rather, the manner in which the they-self `levels down' all attempts to articulate an 
authentic self in the context of Being-in-the-world-with-others. 78 
Heidegger himself does not at this point go on to outline exactly what an 
authentic Self worked out in the context of Being-in-the-world-with-others would be. 
He is merely emphatic that inauthenticity is not derived from the primordiality of 
Being-with. On the contrary, authenticity can only be achieved in the context of 
Being-with, though it is different from the everyday they-self. The concept of 
authenticity is thus deployed largely to draw the vital distinction between the ontic and 
the ontological and to thus hammer the final nail into the coffin of the traditional 
hegemony of the `I' as the subject of philosophy. 
Both Dreyfus and Mulhall do, however, attempt to indicate what an authentic 
self might comprise, with the latter's account being perhaps the most persuasive. 
Mulhall notes the way in which for Heidegger, Others appear to Dasein `as producers, 
suppliers, field-owners and farmers, booksellers and sailors - in short as bearers of 
social roles. '79 If Dasein is what it does, then it will appear to Others in the form of the 
social role assigned to what it is doing. These social roles are assigned by the "they": 
one suppliers or produces goods, one sells books, one is a sailor if one is on a boat, 
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one is a farmer if one owns a field and so on. These roles are `defined purely 
impersonally, by reference to what the relevant task or office requires; given the 
necessary competence, which individual occupies that office is as irrelevant as are any 
idiosyncrasies of character or talent which have no bearing on the task at hand. 80 Just 
as one sits on any chair, so field-owner is a role pertaining to anyone who owns a 
field. 
Mulhall then goes on to note, however, that `of course, just because such roles 
are defined in entirely impersonal terms, the individual who occupies them need not 
always relate to them purely impersonally. ' 81 It is precisely this that Mulhall sees as 
being the point that Heidegger is trying to make when he talks of the possibility of an 
authentic self for Dasein. That is to say, Dasein's `they-self may be inauthentic 
insofar as it is assigned impersonal roles, but Dasein can appropriate those roles and 
interpret them as an element constitutive of a singular individuality, thus generating an 
authentic self-understanding. However, Dasein necessarily begins this self- 
interpretation as the `they-self and any attempt to achieve authenticity `must be a 
modification rather than a transcendence' of the essential Being-with that structures 
Being-in-the-world. 82 In this sense `authenticity is always an [existentiell] 
achievement. ' 83 
However, these assertions regarding authenticity and, more importantly, the 
essential Being-with that characterises being-in-the-world, do not bring us closer to 
responding to the question of the nature of the community implicit in Heidegger's 
argument. At the most, Heidegger has demonstrated that the community implicit in 
being-with is not an aggregation of individual persons (as possessive individualists 
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would conceive it to be). Having rejected the individual `I' as the basis of such 
community by arguing that even the achievement of authenticity takes place against a 
horizon of intelligibility comprised by Being-with, the question of the nature of the 
community implied by this openness to alterity arises again. After the individual 
subject has been dismissed as a primary unit of ontological analysis, what does the 
account of heterogeneity, and the community it implies, put in its place? Such a 
question leads us, in Heidegger's case, to the figure of `the people' : that 
heterogeneous ensemble amongst whom Dasein always already is. It is in the figure of 
`the people' that Heidegger provides his most developed, and yet most problematic, 
account of the community (and thus the heterogeneity) constitutive of Being-in-the- 
world. 
From Being-with to the destiny of the people 
Political theory has traditionally recognised that the co-existence of difference 
is a, if not the, primary political question. From the very earliest assumption that the 
polis formed the fundamental unit of the political experience, community (the 
gathering of difference such that (ant)agonism arises) has formed the basic assumption 
(or the condition of possibility) for thinking concerning politics. Indeed `community' 
is the horizon of understanding that is both productive of the possibility of politics in 
the first place and from which the question of the politics of community arises. That 
this is the case can be seen in a number of cases. Perhaps most easily in the liberal 
assumption that it is the contingent existence of individuals together in a shared space 
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that leads to the fundamental questions of politics: the fair/equal distribution of goods 
(material or otherwise). Having shown that Heidegger's notion of Being-with 
(Mitsein) always already implicates Being-in-the-world in community and yet rejects 
possessive individualist accounts of Being-with-others, it is necessary to ask what 
kind of understanding of the co-existence of difference the Heideggerian schema 
produces. 
It is precisely when he comes to the question of community, however, that 
Heidegger loses his way. Indeed, it is at this point that not only the spectre, but the 
spirit, of Nazism rears its ugly head. Heidegger's thinking concerning the community 
produced by the kind of Mitsein he outlines in Being and Time can be found both in 
his thought concerning history in Being and Time, and in later work, particularly that 
written between 1928 and 1935.84 Reading these texts it becomes clear that though 
Heidegger has enshrined alterity as a constitutive condition of Dasein's existence, he 
then sweeps aside this difference in favour of a community that approximates the 
nationalist notion of a `people' (das Volk). 
Heidegger's thinking about community is located in his account of the 
temporal structure (or historicality) that he ascribes to Being. This account both refers 
back to, and develops upon, Heidegger's earlier thought concerning authenticity and 
thus is implicitly connected to the question of Dasein's Being-in-the-world-with- 
others. As we have seen, according to Heidegger, Dasein always finds itself thrown 
into the world and lost in the "they". That is to say, Dasein's essence is its existence as 
Being-in-the-world. Insofar as this is the case Dasein never chooses its world, but 
rather fords itself always already in-the-world. In being thrown into the world Dasein 
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thus inherits a heritage. This heritage must be seen both as a constraint (Dasein has no 
control over the world in which it finds itself) and a set of possibilities (in the positive 
sense of a set of opportunities). It is precisely this dual meaning of heritage that is the 
basis of Heidegger's previous argument concerning authenticity. In its average 
everyday existence, Dasein is lost in the "they" and thus inherits a world. It might 
appear that Dasein is thus always condemned to an inauthentic existence and, thus, 
that Heidegger's account is marked by an irreducible conservatism that argues one can 
never escape tradition and the constraints attendant to it. And yet the world in which 
Dasein always already fords itself is a world which offers Dasein possibility. And this 
presence of possibility raises the question of whether Dasein can grasp these 
opportunities in order to modify what it inherits and thus grasp and make for itself 
something of the circumstance into which it is thrown. This question is precisely the 
question of authenticity. 
Heidegger has already argued that Dasein can take hold of itself and achieve 
authenticity through an existentiell modification of its circumstances. Heidegger then 
develops this assertion in his account of the historicality of Dasein. In order to 
understand the historicality of Dasein, it is necessary to grasp the essential finitude of 
Being-in-the-world. Finitude refers primarily to the existential-temporal finitude of 
Dasein: its being-towards-death. Dasein's existence is finite insofar as it must, at some 
point, die. However, there is a further implicit meaning of finitude that relates to 
Heidegger's discussion of authenticity. Dasein is finite insofar as it is thrown into a 
world in which it co-exists with others. That is to say, Dasein is given a world and 
thus a set of possibilities that whilst they are multiple are certainly finite. Moreover, 
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Dasein is always already with others in a way that means that Dasein's ownmost 
possibilities (its everyday understanding of the world) comes not from itself but from 
Others. Hence Dasein is limited in the way in which it can assert mastery of itself and 
its world. Dasein's Self is existentially finite, a finitude introduced by the constitutive 
presence of Others and the Mitsein that this presence installs in the essential structure 
of Being-in-the-world. 
For Heidegger, authenticity consists of understanding this finitude and 
grasping it not as a constraint but as multiple opportunities. In its everyday existence, 
lost in the "they", Dasein does not do this. Indeed, Dasein is simply lost into the 
accident and circumstances into which it is thrown. This loss may well explain 
Dasein's most common response to such circumstance: the assertion of the 
transcendent `I'. This assertion denies Dasein's finitude and misrecognises the Being- 
with constitutive of Being-in-the-world, but it does offer the illusion of mastery over 
chance, accident, and heritage. For Heidegger, however, such a response must be 
inauthentic since it does not grasp the finitude that is proper to Dasein. 
Just as Mulhall notes that authenticity in the context of the 'they-self might 
consist of modifying the necessarily impersonal social roles offered to Dasein in order 
that individuality (not the individual) emerges, so Heidegger suggests that Dasein can 
grasp its heritage and choose to actualise certain possibilities rather than others. But to 
do so, Dasein must accept its finitude. It must accept the temporal horizon of death as 
that which makes resolute choice intelligible. Only a Being that is temporally finite 
can properly choose (since temporal finitude means precisely that it is not possible to 
do everything and thus that some things must be chosen over others). Moreover, 
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Dasein must accept its existential finitude, the manner in which it inherits, by virtue of 
Being-with-others (primarily as the `they-self) a world both constraining and 
pregnant with possibility. 
In grasping its finitude and modifying that which it is given, Dasein stands 
resolute in the face of accident and circumstance. Heidegger refers to this resoluteness 
as Dasein's `fateful' existence. `Fate' seems an odd term to choose for Dasein's 
authentic existence since it carries connotations of determinism and the constraint of 
possibility by higher powers (i. e., the assignation of one's future by intra/extra- 
worldly design). Fate, however, for Heidegger refers to the positive acceptance of 
Dasein's thrownness in the world. That is, it implies Dasein's self-understanding of 
itself as a finite being, and the actualisation of the possibilities such existence offers. 
Heidegger then goes on to argue that `if fateful Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, 
exists essentially in Being-with Others, its historizing is a co-historizing and is 
determinative for it as destiny. '85 That is, since Dasein is always constituted by an 
ineluctable Mitsein, its fateful existence can only ever be a co-existence of fateful 
Dasein's. It is this assertion that brings us closest to understanding the character of the 
heterogeneity that is constitutive of Being-in-the-world. This heterogeneity, the Being- 
with, is, in its authentic form, destiny. And this destiny is precisely, `the historizing of 
the community [Gemeinschaft], of a people [des Volkes]. 86 It is the grasping by 
Dasein, `in and with its "generation"' of the finitude, the inherited possibility, of 
Being-in-the-world. 87 
Thus we arrive at a certain, if slightly opaque, understanding of the nature of 
the heterogeneity that marks Being-in-the-world. This heterogeneity, which is a 
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constitutive finitude, or openness to alterity, is authentically grasped as destiny. Like 
fate, destiny is not to be understood in a deterministic sense, but rather as a grasping 
of the possibilities that thrownness presents. And yet this understanding of Being- 
with-others as destiny tells us little about the actual contours of the community that 
will share in this destiny. It is this question - the kind of community that shares this 
destiny - that raises significant problems with Heidegger's account. More specifically, 
it raises the issues of how Dasein achieves authenticity and what kind of `people' are 
envisioned as being the bearers of destiny. 
Dasein's fateful, authentic, historicity can be characterised as an inventiveness. 
That is, as a grasping of possibility as the basis on which to inventively modify one's 
existentiell possibilities. 88 However, the question must be raised as to how such 
inventiveness is possible. After all, Dasein's everyday existence is one characterised 
by being inauthentically lost in the `they-self. If Dasein, in its everyday existence, 
does not know its own possibilities, lost as it is in the "they", how can it begin to 
invent? That is, how does Dasein appreciate in the first place that its existence in the 
"they" is inauthentic, and that authenticity can only be achieved by invention? From 
where does the call come to Dasein to grasp its finitude and seize its fateful 
possibilities? 
Mulhall tackles this question of the call to authenticity directly in his 
commentary on Being and Time. He notes that there is a problem with Heidegger's 
account of fate and destiny since `if inauthentic Dasein has repressed [or lost] its 
capacity for authenticity [in its everyday submergence in the `they-self ], how can it 
utter or hear the call ... of that repressed capacity? '89 Mulhall suggests that Dasein 
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might hear the call of authenticity in the form of the awakening of `conscience' by an 
external interlocutor. This call to conscience would thus force Dasein into 
recognising, understanding and grasping its finitude and thus open the way for the 
achievement of authenticity. Whilst Heidegger seems, in his earlier discussions of 
fateful Dasein to reject the notion of conscience as Mulhall outlines, his later thoughts 
on destiny readmit it into consideration. 
Specifically, Heidegger argues that the moment in which the call of 
authenticity is heard constitutes a `moment of vision' in which Dasein may `choose its 
hero'. 90 This hero is that which serves as an exemplar which calls Dasein (individually 
and collectively) to grasp its thrownness and the possibilities this existence holds. 
This `hero' may be an individual exemplar (a person Dasein recognises as calling it to 
grasp its authentic possibilities), or an idea (that calls a "generation" to achieve its 
destiny). 
This moment of vision in which Dasein grasps its authentic potentiality by 
recognising its finitude through the figure of the hero has profound consequences for 
Heidegger's conception of community. On an individual level, it appears that Dasein's 
moment of vision is a simple explanatory tool that accounts for Dasein's resolute and 
authentic emergence (but not separation) from the "they". But on a collective level the 
disclosure of the destiny of a people in this moment of vision proves to be a highly 
problematic concept. Whilst the idea that authentic co-historicity might be achieved 
by the `choosing of a hero' seems, whilst slightly romantic, in itself inoffensive, it 
belies a serious, and ultimately ultra-conservative, misrecognition of the heterogeneity 
constitutive of the community in which Dasein always already finds itself. 
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The problem lies not in the opaque reference in Being and Time to a moment 
of vision in which the people hear the call of destiny through choosing a hero, but in 
the way in which Heidegger interprets the destiny of a the German people in his 
writings between 1928 and 1935. More specifically, it is the way in which Heidegger 
asserts that the destiny of the German people lies in the revivification of the nation 
promised by National Socialism and the concept of community that this implies which 
are particularly problematic. 
Heidegger's involvement with Nazism is both well documented and 
extensively discussed elsewhere. 91 I will not look extensively at Heidegger's 
involvement with Nazism here since I concur with Derrida's assessment that the 
"facts" of the matter have been `long known by those who are seriously interested in 
Heidegger. '92 1 should add that these "facts" (such as Heidegger's acceptance of the 
rectorate of Freiburg University) are largely undisputed. 93 No-one would seriously 
argue against the idea that that Heidegger was a Nazi, or that his thinking contains 
elements that were crucial in motivating this political decision. The question I want to 
approach is that of the idea of `a people' that is revealed in Heidegger's writings of the 
Nazi period. These ideas are, of course, intimately entwined with Heidegger's avowal 
of an idealised National Socialism that presumably led to his acceptance of the 
rectorate and his endorsement of Hitler. But perhaps, more seriously, these ideas show 
how, despite having argued that heterogeneity was constitutive of Being-in-the-world 
and, therefore, that Dasein was always already implicated in community, Heidegger 
effectively disavowed this heterogeneity by characterising community in nationalist 
terms as a Gemeinschaft or `people'. 
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In both the Rectoral Address and An introduction to Metaphysics, Heidegger 
refers to the destiny that he argued, in Being and Time, characterised the co-historizing 
of the community. In these later works, however, the destiny referred to is the destiny 
of the German people. Understanding the destiny of the German people gives us, I 
believe, an important insight into the kind of community characteristic of the essential 
co-historizing of Being, and thus the nature of the heterogeneity implicit in 
Heidegger's work. 
The theme of destiny runs throughout the work of the period 1928-35 (indeed 
it can be found throughout Heidegger's work) and is closely associated with his 
endorsement of the spiritual renewal of the German nation promised by the Nazis. For 
Heidegger, the German community is destined to greatness, alone able to halt the 
decline of the European nations into decadence. Caught between the `great pincers, 
squeezed between Russia on one side and America on the other', the destiny of the 
German people lies in reviving the spirit of European civilisation. 94 Heidegger's 
alliance of this idea of spiritual mission with the renewal promised by National 
Socialism is in keeping with his argument that authentic destiny is revealed in the 
moment of vision in which Dasein (or the community) chooses a hero. The hero on 
offer here is an ideal National Socialism and the idea of a Germany destined to 
spiritual greatness. 
And it is in this figure of the German people lead by National Socialism and 
pursuing a vision of cultural greatness that Heidegger finally outlines the kind of 
community that this co-historizing will effect. For Heidegger, the German destiny is 
one that will re-constitute the Volk: the people conceived of as a national community. 
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Moreover, destiny and fate are intertwined as the Volk is to be created by the binding 
together of individuals into the project of actualising the destiny of the people. In the 
Rectoral Address Heidegger names three so-called `pillars', or levels on which the 
fates of individual Germans are to be bound to the destiny of the people. In the first 
place individuals will be bound to the `ethnic and national community... through labor 
service. ' Secondly, members of the community will be bound to `the honor and 
destiny of the nation in the midst of the other peoples of the world... [through] military 
service. ' Finally, the `third bond is the one that binds the students to the spiritual 
mission of the German Volk': knowledge service. 95 
Community, it transpires, is thus an ethno-national, militarised and 
spiritualised entity. Moreover, it is clear that this conception of the Volksgemeinschaft 
is, in all forms, identical to the ontopological conceptions of the ethno-nationalists of 
Bosnia. This community is rooted in (a homogeneous, singular) ethnic identity. It is a 
communal identity is supported by the knowledge service that generates the spiritual 
ideals (the impersonal `heroes') that will call the people to grasp their destiny. And 
most importantly, this community is exclusionary: defence is a vital component for 
the realisation of the destiny of the German people. Defence itself is necessary only 
insofar as an ethno-national community wishes to assert an ontopological claim to 
sovereignty over the territory from which it draws its spiritual sustenance. This 
ontopological notion is clear in Heidegger, from his folksy love of the Black Forest, to 
the idea that it is Germany's cartographic position in the heart of Europe that assures 
its destiny. 
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The problem with such an idea is its disavowal of difference. Indeed, this 
ontopological idea undermines the constitutive role that had previously been assigned 
to Being-with-others, since it is not Others with which we find ourselves in the 
community of national destiny but only those who are the same as us (those who share 
our destiny). Furthermore, for destiny to be achieved and for the leader to guide the 
community to this destiny the Other, that which would split our efforts to achieve such 
destiny, must be removed. Somewhere in here we see the alliance that exists at a deep 
level between much of Heidegger's work and Nazism. This is not to indulge in an ad 
hominem critique, or an attempt to establish a "`guilt by association"' on the basis of 
which we should dismiss `any theoretical approach acknowledging an intellectual 
lineage that is vaguely Heideggerian'. 96 On the contrary, Heidegger's work poses deep 
and abiding questions concerning how we think about human existence. However, it is 
to note that many of the reservations that exist in regard to Heidegger are correct since 
there is a deep affinity between Heidegger's thought and Nazism. 
In Chapter 51 will consider this affinity further. Without pre-empting my 
argument, I think it is correct to say that Heidegger held to an idealised version of 
National Socialism. Moreover, Heidegger saw his work as legitimating such an 
idealised National Socialism. Thus, in some senses, Heidegger's support for Nazism 
was a logical extension of his philosophical arguments, particularly those regarding 
authenticity and destiny. However, in another sense, Heidegger's own ontic alignment 
with Nazism (in the form of accepting the Rectorship and expressing support for 
Hitler) was a decision made in a specific, contingent historico-political juncture. 
Whilst Heidegger's decision was legitimated by, and the logical extension of, his 
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philosophical work, it was not necessary, but contingent to the juncture he found 
himself in. 97 This should not, however, excuse Heidegger of the responsibility for his 
alignment with, and endorsement of, Nazism. After all, it is because his work has an 
affinity with an idealised National Socialism (particularly evident in the notion of the 
destiny of the people) that he aligned himself with Nazism in 1933. 
However, this is not to argue that Being-with is not constitutive of Being-in- 
the-world. Rather, it is to observe that the manner in which it is worked out by 
Heidegger, and the nature of the community he proposes as the authentic co- 
historizing of Dasein, is deeply problematic. Community is, of course, equally 
problematically worked out by possessive individualists (though they have not allied 
themselves quite so tragically with political regimes that embody such anti-democratic 
violence). Indeed, Heidegger's eradication of difference is merely the polar opposite 
of the liberal eradication of difference in so called pluralism. Whether difference is 
made separate, or subsumed, it is still violently subjugated. 
The problem with Heidegger's argument concerning the destiny of the German 
people is that it represents a rejection of the Being-with that is constitutive of Being- 
in-the-world. This rejection does not, however, mean that Heidegger's argument 
concerning Mitsein is incorrect. After all, it is Heidegger himself who notes that all 
rejections of Being-with-others take place against the background of always already 
Being-with. It is perhaps very disturbing then, that Heidegger could outline the 
constitutive heterogeneity of existence, and yet at the same time set out a conception 
of community that deprives Being of its constitutive difference. The 
Volksgemeinschaft represents precisely this: an attempt to deny and deprive Being of 
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its constitutive alterity. In its darkest moments this denial of constitutive alterity can 
never refute the co-existential nature of Being; instead all it can do is work harder and 
harder, with more and more violence, to eradicate difference. That is, insofar as it is 
possible to read Heidegger against himself, we might say that Heidegger's argument 
regarding Being-with comprises the horizon against which the rejection of Being- 
with-others in favour of the Volksgemeinschaft can be made. In this sense, despite 
himself, Heidegger undermines his own affirmation of National Socialism insofar as 
the thesis concerning Being-with will always undo the argument about the national 
destiny of Germany by positing an ineluctable openness to alterity as the existential 
condition of such supposedly homogeneous identities. The insight that Heidegger's 
concept of Mitsein offers, therefore, is that Being-with is primordial and subjugation 
of this difference merely denudes modes of Being of such Being-with-others. These 
denuded modes of Being are, moreover, achieved with considerable violence. 
Urbicide as the deprivation of Being-with 
That (ethno)nationalism represents precisely such a denudation of Being of its 
constitutive Being-with can be seen in the two phase nature of urbicide. Urbicide is a 
deliberate assault on the Being-with that characterises built spaces. It is a deliberate 
attempt to cover over, by destroying, the Being-with that is a primordial characteristic 
of Being-in-the-world. If the locale is that which is the condition of possibility of 
heterogeneity, and such heterogeneity is the basic condition of existence, both exist in 
a mutually reinforcing manner (this is what I suggested about the structure of Dasein 
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in chapter 3- that Dasein and worldliness, existence and the conditions of possibility 
of existence, are mutually reinforcing). To destroy the locale is not to destroy the co- 
existence that characterises being-in-the-world, but to cover it over. After all 
destruction is never complete - ruins, memories and histories always remain. But the 
destruction covers over the Being-with that the locale constituted. And this covering 
over effects a denudation of existence of its essential Being-with. If the destruction is 
successful, sustained, or allowed to go unchallenged over a long period of time (that is 
if the ruins are simply left to lie), then the denudation of Being-with is accepted. This 
is the second phase of urbicide, in which the institution of a mode of Dasein that is 
predicated on the covering over of Being-with results in a mode of existence that 
suggests that Being-with did not exist in the past and cannot exist in the future. 
It is precisely this covering over of Being-with that can be seen in the case of 
both the destruction of the Stari Most (Old Bridge) and the destruction of the 
Ferhadija mosque in Banja Luka, Bosnia. In the case of the Old Bridge in Mostar 
(discussed previously in the Introduction and Chapter 2), the destruction was aimed at 
reducing the locales that gathered the city to rubble. These locales constituted the city 
as a heterogeneous, or shared urban environment, opening the west bank of the river 
to the east bank. The destruction aimed to cover over this sharing of municipal 
spatiality. The destruction of the Old Bridge was symbolic in this regard, epitomising 
the covering over of the Being-with constituted by the buildings that gathered Mostar 
as a single heterogeneous urban environment. Apart from this symbolic act of 
destruction the built things that effected prominent gatherings such as the remaining 
bridges, the mosques, churches, department stores, and parks of Mostar were also 
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destroyed. More dramatically the front-line streets on the west bank of the Neretva 
were reduced to rubble, marking an attempt to effect a line intended to give the 
impression of ungathering the urban environment. A similar covering over of Being- 
with occurred in Banja Luka, where mosques such as the Ferhadija were dynamited 
and the rubble cleared in order to create open spaces that belied the gathering of 
existential spatiality that these buildings had formerly effected. 98 
In both cases it is possible to see the two phase character of urbicide and the 
way in which it is an assault on heterogeneity: an attempt to deprive Being-in-the- 
world of its essential Being-with. This destruction is targeted at removing the things 
that constitute the locales which gather existential spatiality and constitute it as 
essentially heterogeneous. The ethnic cleansers operate with the hope that in 
destroying these locales, Being-with, the heterogeneity constitutive of existence, will 
be similarly destroyed. The second phase of urbicide is aimed at covering over this 
heterogeneity with the suggestion that it in the absence of the buildings there can be 
no Being-with, no co-existence. And yet, as I have shown, co-existence is constitutive 
of Being-in-the-world. In order to destroy this Being-with, it would be necessary, 
fmally, to destroy the experience of the world. 9 
Whilst destroying buildings destroys specific gatherings, it can never destroy 
Being-with itself. If, as I have argued, Being-in-the-world and the locales of the world 
mutually constitute each other, what is lost in urbicide is the reinforcement that a 
specific instance of Being-in-the-world gains from the locales in which is it 
constituted. The Being-with that is an ineluctable feature of Being-in-the-world is not 
lost, however, but merely covered over. This is disclosed most clearly in those cases in 
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which the rubble is removed to create green-field sites. Ethnic cleansers hope to deny 
the existence of a locale and to thus deny any Being-with it may have embodied. And 
yet, Being-with persists. The destruction and the rubble that covers it over must 
continually work to deny this Being-with. Ethno-nationalist programs must 
continually reinforce, through necessarily violent means, this covering over of Being- 
with. This is the purpose behind ethno-nationalists continuing to destroy houses 
intended for returnees, and protesting against the reconstruction of mosques in Bosnia. 
If a covering over is left uncontested for long enough, it is, of course, possible 
that this specific denudation of Being-with will be accepted as a mode of Being-in- 
the-world. After all, Dasein has accepted the notion of the `I' as the subject of 
philosophy precisely because it has been affirmed repetitively throughout the history 
of western civilisation until it appears natural. The rubble of Bosnia is a different 
story, however, since it is a visible reminder of an attempt to cover over Being-with. 
And it discloses an assault on the community in which Being-in-the-world is always 
implicated. But more importantly, even after the rubble has gone, Being-with will still 
constitute the horizon of intelligibility of Being. And attempts to denude Being of its 
Being-with will still have to pursue, and cover over, Being-with with violence. 
The importance of Mitsein 
It is for this reason that the concept of Being-with, or Mitsein, set out by 
Heidegger is so important. Mitsein establishes that Being-with-others, or heterogeneity 
is an existential condition, a horizon against which all other modes of Being are 
articulated. Insofar as non-heterogeneous modes of Being are articulated, this is only 
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possible through a disavowal of the Being-with that is constitutive of existence. The 
importance of the concept of Mitsein lies in noting, contra the conceptions deployed in 
most attempts to understand the violence of the 1992-95 Bosnian War, that under all 
of the violence, Being-in-the-world-with-others is the primary condition and that the 
destruction is meant to cover over this condition in order to make separation and 
hatred appear natural and even desirable. 
The problem that is encountered here is that Heidegger's working out of the 
question of difference comprises a similarly monological notion to that of the 
possessive individualists (or anthropocentrists as I have called them). Although it 
appears (as communitarianism does) that Heidegger's notion is the polar opposite of 
such possessive individualism, the manner in which both show contempt for the 
fundamentality of Being-with-others (alterity) mean that neither is, in the end, a 
satisfactory working out of the question of community. Heidegger is tarred with the 
Nazi brush, and although possessive individualism cannot be equated with such 
violence, each of these monologics have their morally reprehensible sides. Liberal, 
possessive individualist theories should not be allowed to wriggle of the hook simply 
because they have not instigated, or had affinities with, genocides such as the 
destruction of the European Jews. Indeed, the logic of possessive individualism could 
be said to be largely to blame for the violence of the Balkan wars. 
David Campbell notes the way in which `international diplomacy [ostensibly 
grounded upon liberal principles and the international jurisprudence that stems from 
them] has been a conduit through which the tension between nationalist projects and 
the lived experience of [co-existence/Being-with in] Bosnia has been resolved in 
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favour of the nationalists. ' 100 This sorry state of affairs has arisen because the `limited 
imagination of the international community' is bound by a conception of difference 
derived from possessive individualist (or liberal) assumptions. 10' According to this 
conception - and the idea of `multiculturalism' in which it is embodied - difference is 
not a constitutive openness to alterity, but rather the identification of distinct groups. 
These groups are themselves taken to be homogeneous and only contingently 
(ontically) in contact with Others. The problem this conception admits is merely that 
of managing competing claims from these essentially closed groups. There is no 
essential Being-with here, merely the problematic of a contingent 
(forced/constraining) co-existence. 
This conception of difference leads, in its humane form, to an idea of 
tolerance. According to traditional conceptions of tolerance, difference is not 
constitutive of Being-in-the-world, but merely a fact about the world that must be left 
alone. Being is not open to difference but can be disciplined to allow ontical alterity to 
persist. The problem of course is, as Connolly notes, that tolerant `liberalism is 
attentive to [ontical] "difference" as already defined, heterodox identities in an 
existing network of social relations, but tone deaf to [ontological] "differance"', the 
Being-with constitutive of Being-in-the-world. 102 Ultimately liberalism is an 
ontopolitics like ethno-nationalism. Whereas ethno-nationalism fosters the belief of a 
homeland, liberalism fosters the idea of the contingent side-by-side existence of many 
distinct but, ultimately spatially located, different groups within the national civic 
polis. Whilst liberalism may indeed be more humane in respect of difference than 
ethno-nationalism, a denudation of Being with regard to its constitutive Being-with is 
225 
common to both. Moreover, as I noted at the beginning of this chapter, this disavowal 
of Mitsein that is evident in liberal notions of tolerance is attributable to the 
anthropocentric underpinnings of such a theoretical position. It is precisely this 
anthropocentrism, and the manner in which it posits a side-by-side existence of 
separate, tolerant individuals as its highest recognition of heterogeneity, that the 
Heideggerian notion of Mitsein contests. 
The task, then, is to work out the logic of Mitsein without eradicating the 
difference it entails. This, I would say is precisely what Jean-Luc Nancy attempts in 
his reformulation of Heidegger's concept of Mitsein. The notions of the `inoperative 
community' and `Being singular plural' that stem from his consideration of the 
problem of difference in light of the heterogeneity constitutive of Being-in-the-world 
represent a significant attempt to both effect a co-existential analytic and outline the 
nature of the heterogeneity at stake in urbicide. The next chapter will outline this 
notion in order to deepen our awareness of the way in which urbicide is a mechanism 
for naturalising a deficient mode of existence by covering over the fundamental 
heterogeneity of communities with the rubble of their buildings. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE AGONISM OF COMMUNITY 
The analytic of Mitsein that appears within the existential analytic [of 
Being and Time] remains nothing more than a sketch; that is, even though 
Mitsein is coessential with Dasein, it remains in a subordinate position. As 
such, the whole existential analytic still harbours some principle by which 
what it opens up is immediately closed off. ' 
[T]here is no "self' except by virtue of a "with, " which, in fact, structures 
it. This would have to be the axiom of any analytic that is to be called 
coexistential. 2 
The stakes of the argument 
At this point in the argument it is possible to say that the analysis of urban 
destruction is in one sense complete. That is to say, I have shown over the course of 
the argument so far what it is that urbicide discloses, what is lost (or covered over) in 
urbicide, and the (ineluctably political) stakes of such a loss. The destruction of urban 
fabric can be seen to have logic of its own. This destruction is aimed at destroying the 
conditions of possibility of urbanity. This urbanity, for which buildings are the 
condition of possibility, is, precisely, an experience of fundamental heterogeneity. 
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Buildings are constitutive of such heterogeneity insofar as they constitute the 
spatiality in which Being-in-the-world is possible as essentially public and shared. I 
showed that this is the case through an exegesis of the manner in which, according to 
Heidegger, Being-in-the-world is constituted in locales. These locales comprise 
relational networks constituted by the built things with which Being-in-the-world 
engages. It is precisely these relational networks that constitute the spatiality in which 
Being-in-the-world always already exists. These locales are, moreover, fundamentally 
public or shared insofar as the buildings that constitute the locales are themselves 
essentially available to any Dasein (Being-in-the-world). And thus Being-in-the-world 
is always already an exposure to, or opening onto, alterity. That is to say, the locales 
are both constitutive of the spatiality in which any singular Being-in-the-world exists 
and constitutively open to other such singular Being(s)-in-the-world. Being-in-the- 
world is thus always a Being-with-others. Existence, constituted in and through 
locales is, thus, heterogeneous, or constitutively open to alterity. 
Urbicide is thus an assault on the very conditions that constitute the possibility 
of this Being-with-others that is an ineluctable characteristic of existence. By tracing 
the logics of urbicide - by taking it as a phenomenon in its entirety, rather than simply 
apprehending isolated instances as examples of the violation of the extant rules/laws 
of war - it is thus possible to see the manner in which each and every attack on urban 
fabric comprises an assault on the heterogeneity that is constitutive of Being-in-the- 
world. 
It is precisely the constitutive nature of this Being-with-others that urbicide 
discloses. Indeed, it is this constitutive Being-with that is lost in urbicide and that 
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comprises the proper target of those perpetrating such destruction. The importance of 
noting that Being-with is constitutive of Being-in-the-world cannot be overstated. As I 
demonstrated in Chapter 4, this recognition of the constitutive nature of Being-with, 
or Mitsein, comprises a comprehensive challenge to the anthropocentric imaginary 
that has governed attempts by both liberal political theory and international 
jurisprudence to comprehend the destruction of urban environments. The recognition 
that Being is always already a Being-with contests the anthropocentric vision of the 
sovereignty of the unencumbered, pre-existing individual whose experience of 
heterogeneity is both ancillary to existence and contingent upon empirical 
circumstance. 
Being-with thus constitutes an ontological challenge to the metaphysics of 
subjectivity that have dominated both the history of philosophy and the various human 
endeavours influenced by the images that this history has produced (including, though 
not restricted to, jurisprudence, foreign policy, peace and reconciliation attempts, and 
(non)governmental efforts to reconstruct communities affected by war). 3 The 
recognition that existence is always already structured according to a constitutive 
relation to alterity installs heterogeneity rather than individual sovereignty as the 
central stake of political violence such as urbicide. 
If we follow Heidegger's account of Mitsein it is necessary to recognise that 
Being-in-the-world is constitutively structured according to an openness to alterity. 
This constitutive relation to Others (a Being-with) comprises an ineradicable horizon 
against which Being-in-the-world constitutes itself. The radicality of such an argument 
- and its most trenchant problematisation of the anthropocentric political imaginary - 
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lies in asserting that such a horizon can never be destroyed, sublimated, or ignored. 
Rather, the disappearance of heterogeneity is (and can only ever be) an effacement, 
covering over, or disavowal of this constitutive relation to alterity (or Being-with), 
achieved through considerable and continual violence. This is precisely what urbicide 
is: the covering over, and thus disavowal, of the constitutively heterogeneous 
character of existence with the rubble of the buildings that constitute and testify to the 
Being-with (Others) that constitutes Being-in-the-world. 
In the previous chapter I noted that, insofar as Being-in-the-world was always 
already Being-with-others, Being was implicated in community. That is, to speak of 
this constitutive Being-with (or heterogeneity) is already to speak of community. In 
this respect urbicide comprises the covering over of a constitutive community. I 
showed that, whilst Heidegger clearly demonstrates the heterogeneity in which Being 
is implicated, he disavows this community in favour of a nationalist vision of Being- 
with-others (or, rather, Being-separate from Others). In this chapter, therefore, I want 
to complete the analysis that I began with the exposition of Heidegger's notions of 
existential spatiality and Mitsein. Specifically I want to sketch out the contours of 
community at stake in, or covered over by, urbicide. That is, insofar as I have shown 
that Being is constitutively open to alterity, and that urbicide comprises a disavowal or 
covering over of such heterogeneity, I want, in this chapter, to outline precisely what 
this community is, and what such disavowal/covering accomplishes. In this chapter 
therefore, I will look at Jean-Luc Nancy's theorisation of community which elaborates 
upon the Heideggerian notion of Mitsein. Nancy's attempt to think about Being-with 
without disavowing the difference it entails provides an account of community that is 
230 
particularly productive for understanding the logics of urbicide. Following my account 
of Nancy's rearticulation of the notion of community, I will sketch out precisely what 
the logics of urbicide accomplish in their disavowal, or covering over, of 
heterogeneity/community. Such a sketch is, precisely, an account of what is at stake in 
urbicide. This delineation of the stakes of urbicide will provide a critical tool with 
which, in Chapter 6, to assess several prominent cases of urban destruction in order to 
disclose both what the disavowal of difference achieves and how the exclusion and 
homogenisation effected in urbicide can be contested in such cases. 
It is important to recognise that, insofar as urban destruction comprises a 
disavowal of Being-with/heterogeneity, nothing less than the political - by which I 
mean `the essence of things political' - is at stake in urbicide 
4 In speaking of `the 
essence of things political', I am referring to the characteristics that are taken to define 
the various phenomena that are designated as being `political'. In this sense `the 
political' is much broader than the narrow notion of `politics' found in extant modem, 
liberal-democratic societies/states. In such societies/states `politics' refers simply to 
the mechanisms of representation and organisation by which liberal-democratic 
polities are governed. It is, I think, a mistake to confuse the mechanisms of 
governance extant at a specific historical juncture as being coextensive with, and 
exhaustive of, all of the characteristics that define what can be said to be properly 
political. 
The question of the essence of `things political' is itself properly an 
ontological question. The domain of enquiry of ontology is `Onto, the really existing 
things'. 5 Perhaps, insofar as Onta are really existing things, it would not be a mistake 
231 
to see ontology and phenomenology as facets of a single project. Indeed, for 
Heidegger the two coincide: an ontological account can only be given through a 
phenomenology, by going `[t]o the things themselves'. 6 Ontology is thus the enquiry 
into the essence of that which exists: a positing of the properties and `fundamental 
logic' of reality beyond appearances, misapprehensions, and illusions. In this sense an 
ontological enquiry into `things political' aims to delineate the various existential 
characteristics of the range of events we call `political'. 7 
Of course, I should note here that the traditional concept of ontology - the idea 
of a `fundamental ontology' - is problematic insofar as it asserts a dualism between 
essence and existence (commonly perceived in the terms I have used as a dualism 
between essence and appearance, truth and sense apprehension). The domination of 
this dualism over the history of metaphysical thinking is noted by Heidegger in his 
Letter on Humanism. 8 In the Letter, he argues that such a dualism leads to a 
privileging of one of the two terms with problematic consequences, not least the 
subjectivism that stems from positing essence as prior to existence (and thus making 
existence the domain of the `projection' of a subject). 9 This problematic leads 
Heidegger to assert in Being and Time that `[t]he essence of Dasein lies in its 
existence'. 1° Heidegger is not adopting Sartre's reversal of the metaphysics of 
subjectivity (that `existence precedes essence') but rather noting that since Dasein is 
Being-in-the-world, the essential characteristics of Dasein, its existentials, are always 
already to be traced in and through the everyday existence of Dasein. " In this way 
Heidegger negates the priority of essence over existence and contests the metaphysics 
of subjectivity such a priority supports, arguing instead that ontology must always 
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pursue the question of Being in and through the everyday worldly existence in which 
Dasein always already is. 
Heidegger's contestation of the dualism that defines traditional projects of 
ontological enquiry does not, however, invalidate the ontological-phenomenological 
project of enquiry into the logics that underlie that which exists. Which is to say we 
must ask what common logics underlie things of a similar type: what is it for example 
that allows us to say of disparate events that they `are political'; what `logic' connects 
all these events that have the characteristic of `being-political '; 12 or, more simply, 
what is this being political that is to be found in `things political'? 
That such an enquiry is relevant to an analysis of urbicide could be said to be 
`common-sense' insofar as urban destruction would in everyday parlance be referred 
to as either `politically motivated', part of the `politics' of ethno-nationalism, or 
`political' violence. And yet what is it about this destruction that designates it as being 
a properly political event? After all, the violence itself is exterior to what we would 
ordinarily, in liberal-democracies, refer to as `politics'. Indeed, the idea of a `political 
settlement' is often counterposed to such violence. The idea operative in attempts to 
reconcile warring parties is thus precisely an opposition between politics and 
violence/conflict/war. What is it then, that necessitates speaking of `the political' 
being at stake in urbicide? 
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Agonism and the political 
Things political, I would contend, are characterised by an agonism: a struggle, 
conflict or combat (though not always in the literal sense). Here I am drawing on 
Foucault's notion of `agonism' derived from the Greek arcovtiaga meaning combat, 
contest, struggle or sport. 13 The concept of agonism is further developed by William 
Connolly in his discussion of `agonistic democracy'. `Agonistic democracy', 
according to Connolly, `affirms the indispensability of identity to life, disturbs the 
dogmatization of identity, and folds care for... diversity... into the strife and 
interdependence of identity\difference'. 14 This agonism derives precisely from the 
heterogeneity that characterises existence. The Being-with that constitutes Being-in- 
the-world structures existence according to a fundamental alterity. As such Being-in- 
the-world is a network of relations between identity and difference. This constitutes 
Being-in-the-world as an agonistic experience in which an ineluctable openness to 
alterity continually contests any possible Self/identity. This is precisely the essence of 
`things political'. Political events are those instances in which attempts to constitute 
identity are contested by the alterity in relation to which they are always already 
constituted. Identities may become ossified over time, even naturalised, but they never 
exist in isolation from a constitutive alterity whose very existence contests their 
identity, threatens to undo their efforts at self-identity or presence, and thus to open 
the social field up to an alterity that will ruin the presence any identity has achieved. ' 5 
In this sense heterogeneity is the essence of the political. Without 
heterogeneity, and the alterity on which it is predicated, there can be no properly 
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political events. Of course, this means we should be very sceptical about the 
restriction of the term `political' to the narrow range of activities of governance in 
liberal-democracies. These (party) politics are, as I will show later, more precisely 
technical refinements and mechanisms of organisation, far removed from the essence 
of things political. 
My analysis of urbicide thus leads us to two conclusions concerning the 
properly political character of urban destruction. Firstly, insofar as being-in-the-world 
is always already a Being-with, the conditions of possibility of `things political' are 
not supplementary to existence but constitutive of it. If we return to the 
anthropocentric imaginary that I outlined in the previous chapter, we can see that the 
heterogeneity which is the condition of possibility of the agonism proper to all things 
political is posited as an ancillary supplement to the existence of sovereign 
individuals. In such Schemas, therefore, the mechanisms devised for the governance of 
individuals (such as those set out by Rawls) are not properly `political' in the sense I 
have outlined. If heterogeneity is seen as supplementary to existence, the focus of 
political theory (and politics itself) will become the accomplishment of a state in 
which that heterogeneity does not constrain the sovereignty proper to individual 
beings. In many case, therefore, the anthropocentric imaginary (and liberal politics in 
particular) guides the accomplishment of a state in which the agonism proper to 
`things political' is attenuated/effaced. Indeed, the attenuation of the agonism proper 
to the political characterises much of what we call `politics' today. But by effacing 
heterogeneity liberal political theory (and the wider anthropocentric imaginary) 
effectively denies itself the possibility of being properly political, becoming instead an 
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abstract, mechanistic schema of governance in which the agonism that characterises 
`things political' is entirely absent. 
Secondly, we can see that the covering over of heterogeneity that occurs in 
urbicide is a fundamental disavowal of the political. It is an empirical effacement of 
the constitutive alterity that structures existence. Given that urbicide is primarily the 
preserve of ethno-nationalism, it is possible to extend this bare statement further and 
say that ethno-nationalism is, itself, a denial of the agonism that characterises the 
political. 16 This denial takes the form of an effacement of heterogeneity that attempts 
to re-constitute existence as being comprised of separate homogeneous, sovereign 
individuals/groups. This effacement of heterogeneity in the rubble of war is necessary 
precisely because ethno-nationalism is founded upon the myth of homogeneity. `The 
millennial identity of the Croatian nation and the continuity of its statehood' affirmed 
in the 1990 Constitution of the Republic of Croatia is an example of such a myth. " 
The preamble to the 1990 Constitution serves to legitimate the ethno-nationalist claim 
that Croatia is a state for the Croats alone. This fictitious history serves to constitute a 
unified and homogeneous ethnic body by tracing out the manner in which it has been 
such a body for 1000 years. '8 This millennial history thus serves to establish the 
Croats as an ethnic body, to legitimate their claim to the state of Croatia, and, insofar 
as their history shows how Croats have been denied a state, to legitimate the violent 
exclusion of those Others who would deny that claim to a state. 19 
Ethno-nationalism is, therefore, constituted by a logic that disavows the 
heterogeneity of existence, trading instead on myths of separateness, self- 
determination and ancient hatred. For ethno-nationalism to succeed it must deny that it 
236 
is constituted by alterity, despite the historical and empirical evidence that it is always 
in a relation of some kind with others. To do this ethno-nationalism attempts to 
naturalise the idea that heterogeneity is a contingent fact that can be undone through 
the creation of homogeneous territorial domains. And yet the rubble this project leaves 
in its wake is not merely a contingent fact, but rather testimony to the constitutive 
nature of heterogeneity. Alterity persists as a horizon of existence, returning to haunt 
the ethno-nationalist project. In Bosnia, the issue of rebuilding mosques and the 
destruction of houses intended for returnees are merely the most visible face of this 
way in which heterogeneity haunts ethno-nationalism. 
The issue of the rebuilding of mosques destroyed in the 1992-95 war has been 
prominent in the politics of post-war Bosnia. Some 618 mosques were destroyed in 
the 1992-95 Bosnian war. Four hundred and fifty of those mosques were in Republika 
Srpska. The systematic nature of this destruction can bee seen in the fact that all of the 
15 mosques in the town of Banja Luka (the post-war capital of Republika Srpska) 
were destroyed 20 As I discussed in the Introduction, the most prominent mosque to be 
destroyed was the Ferhadija mosque in Banja Luka. However, this act of destruction 
was not enough to erase the trace of Bosnian Muslim difference in the Bosnian Serb 
entity. Indeed, repeated requests to rebuild this mosque have been made and, despite 
Bosnian Serb intransigence, a foundation stone was finally laid in June 2001.21 Thus 
the difference that such a building represents has returned to haunt the ethno- 
nationalist statelet of Republika Srpska. 
Moreover, as I discussed in Chapter 3, the post-war return of refugees and 
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) to their places of former residence has further 
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problematised the homogenising politics of ethno-nationalism. The Dayton accords 
established a right for all refugees and IDPs to return to their places of residence prior 
to the 1992-95 Bosnian war. It is so-called `minority returns' in particular that contest 
the homogeneity on which ethno-nationalism is predicated. As a consequence of 
ethnic cleansing a large number of returnees were faced with the prospect of returning 
to areas in which they would comprise an ethnic minority. This situation arose 
because of the way in which ethnically cleansed towns and villages were repopulated 
by the cleansers with members of the cleansing ethnic group. In the majority of cases 
minority returnees had been part of ethnic majorities (or members of an ethnically 
mixed population) in the places of pre-war residence. But, due to war time killing, 
displacement, and repopulation, these returnees now comprised minorities. Many saw 
such minority returns as a test of the Dayton accords' ability to restore Bosnia's ethnic 
heterogeneity. 
Minority returns have been hampered by a lack of will on the part of the so- 
called `international community' and intransigence on the part of ethno-nationalist 
politicians. Indeed `[a]s of August 1999, minority returns throughout Bosnia 
numbered a mere 100,714, less than 5 per cent of all the refugees and displaced 
persons created by the war. '22 However, this situation has changed radically in the past 
two years. In 2000 alone, `[s]ome 67,445 minorities returned to their 
homes... representing a 60% increase compared to 1999'. 23 The upward trend in 
minority returns has continued in 2001. We should not confuse minority returns with 
minor, or small returns. Minority returns comprise a substantial contestation of ethno- 
nationalist homogeneity. The large number of refugees and IDPs returning to the 
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places from which they were displaced by ethnic cleansing constitute the return of 
heterogeneity to purportedly homogeneous ethno-nationalist territories. In this way 
minority returns haunt the ethno-nationalist project across Bosnia. 
The urbicide practised by ethno-nationalists is an effacement of the political 
precisely because the agonism that characterises the political contests the very myth at 
the heart of nationalist projects: homogeneity. Moreover, urbicide effaces the political 
in a manner that is entirely congruent with the anthropocentric imaginary that 
characterises the liberal political theory typically taken to oppose so-called `political' 
violence. The sovereignty that underpins the anthropocentric vision of subjectivity is 
similarly a myth of homogeneity. This sovereignty is, as I noted in Chapter 4, a myth 
of an idealised subject acting according to a unitary rationality. All notions of unitary 
reason trade on a myth of homogeneity. Just as the infantile gestalt is, according to 
Lacan, a myth of homogeneous control over the infant body (an idealised notion of 
overcoming the uncoordination that frustrates the infantile desire to control the body, 
its surrounding world, the mother and, ultimately, language), so anthropocentrism is a 
myth of the homogeneous subject acting out their intentions in a world that does not 
expose them to heterogeneity (contingency, exteriority, alterity). 24 In the case of both 
ethno-nationalism and liberal political theory the agonism of the political is covered 
over in favour of technical solutions that do not challenge the myth of homogeneity 
that founds these projects. Whilst ethno-nationalists look to the technical instruments 
of diplomacy, cartography, and resettlement to cover over the agonism that festers in 
the rubble of Bosnia, liberal political theory covers agonism with increasingly 
elaborate juridical schemas of fairness, justice and equality. It is important to note of 
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course, that although both liberal political theory and ethno-nationalism share a 
similar logic, they do not share motivations. Whilst ethno-nationalism seeks to cleanse 
a territory of difference in order to establish an ethnic statelet, liberal political theory 
seeks justice, equality and fairness. However, this difference in desires should not 
obscure the manner in which political theories guided by an anthropocentric imaginary 
share a logic of homogeneity (albeit the homogeneity of the political subject) with 
ethno-nationalism (which is predicated upon the homogeneity of ethnic territory). 
Mitsein and the question of community 
The stakes of urbicide are thus the political and the heterogeneity that 
comprises the agonism that defines the political. At stake in urbicide is thus the Being- 
with-others that ethno-nationalism is so determined to cover over in its determination 
to establish homogeneous ethnic statelets. Insofar as this is the case, the concept of 
Mitsein, or Being-with, can be seen to be central to any understanding of the stakes of 
urbicide. If Being-with-others is at stake in urbicide, comprehending this Being-with, 
through the concept of Mitsein, is central to understanding the stakes of urbicide. 
It is precisely in relation to the fundamentally political stakes of urbicide that 
the importance of the concept of Mitsein, or Being-with, can be seen. According to 
Heidegger, the importance of the concept of Mitsein lies in noting that alterity, 
difference, or heterogeneity is constitutive of Being-in-the-world (or existence). 
Existence is, therefore, always already characterised and structured by heterogeneity. 
In other words, existence is fundamentally agonistic, comprised of relations of 
240 
identity/difference and networks of self and other. Existence is, thus, ineluctably 
political. All cases where heterogeneity is effaced or covered-over, are, therefore, 
modes of Being denuded of their properly political character. 
Thus by recognising the constitutive nature of Being-with the political is 
installed as an ineluctable characteristic of existence. This is the central point that 
distinguishes the argument I have set out from those derived from the anthropocentric 
imaginary. This distinction is facilitated insofar as my account is derived from 
Heidegger's understanding of Being-with which is part of his critique of the 
anthropocentric philosophy of subjectivity. Indeed, it as a contradistinction to 
anthropocentric/subjectivist accounts, that a Heideggerian account commends itself to 
the analysis of urbicide. 
According to the anthropocentric imaginary, politics is an ancillary 
phenomenon, secondary to the schema of transcendentally free, sovereign subjects. 
The political is, according to this schema, a fact contingent to certain empirical 
circumstances (specifically the constraints placed upon sovereign individuals by their 
empirical existence alongside others). Politics is thus restricted to a narrow range of 
transactions between individuals in certain empirical circumstances. It would be 
instructive to read this restriction of the political to an ancillary, empirical event in 
light of the historical development of liberal theories of multiculturalism. Such 
theories have only evolved as a response to the dawning awareness that many western 
societies are empirically multi-cultural/heterogeneous. Forced to accept the factual 
existence of such a state of affairs, liberal political theory has to respond by theorising 
the constraints such a fact places upon sovereign individuals. In other words, 
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heterogeneity has been seen as resolutely ancillary (both theoretically and historically) 
to the principal subject matter of liberal political theory: the sovereign individual. The 
question one might pose to such theorisations of multiculturalism is that of the 
historical novelty of multiculturalism. Might it not be the case that existence is 
ineluctably heterogeneous and that this heterogeneity has been effaced by the great 
projects of nation-building and colonisation/imperialism that characterised the 
Eighteenth, Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries? Thus we might say that 
multiculturalism is not an ancillary factual condition which sovereign individuals 
must negotiate. Rather sovereign individuality is a mythical notion derived from the 
effacement of a constitutive heterogeneity. 25 
The problem with a such a restriction of the political is twofold. Firstly, it 
demands that all claims concerning the destruction or effacement of heterogeneity be 
examined on a case-by-case basis. Since heterogeneity is not a constitutive aspect of 
existence, it is not possible to assert that it is always already at stake in any destruction 
of the urban environment. Secondly, violence such as that which characterises 
urbicide, can only be said to be political in cases where heterogeneity empirically 
exists. And this heterogeneity can only be recognised in the guise of competing 
demands. That is, since heterogeneity is conceived of as an empirical condition that 
constrains individuals, it is assumed that it is competing demands which denote the 
existence of such constraints upon sovereign individuals. And thus, where competing 
demands do not arise, it is assumed that there are no political stakes. 
The depoliticising effects of such an understanding of the nature of 
heterogeneity can be seen in the diplomatic-cartographic dissection of Bosnia that 
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characterises the Dayton accords. 26 The Dayton accords are premised upon an idea of 
heterogeneity derived from the limited understanding of the political offered by the 
anthropocentric imaginary. The conflict in Bosnia was taken to be evidence of 
competing claims and thus of a heterogeneity that was constraining the sovereign 
autonomy of (ethnic) groups (or, rather constraining individuals who were seen as 
being aggregated in unitary ethnic groups). The anthropocentric imaginary offers only 
two solutions to this heterogeneity: tolerance and division. Since tolerance requires 
peaceful circumstances in which a benign neglect of the constraints heterogeneity 
places upon sovereign, autonomous individuals can be practised, it was ruled out at an 
early stage of the peace process. War, it was argued, had put paid to the idea that 
tolerance could rescue this heterogeneous society. It was necessary, argued successive 
commentators, diplomats and war-lords to create the peace in which the benign 
neglect of tolerance could be practised by first solving the problem of competing 
demands due to which the conflict had arisen. 
Thus the various plans for the internal division/partition of Bosnia were 
proposed. All of these plans were motivated by the idea that sovereignty and 
autonomy could be restored by minimising the empirical condition of heterogeneity 
that had given rise to such violent competing demands. 27 The proposals that ultimately 
crystallised in the form of the General Framework Agreement were thus predicated on 
the idea that if tolerance were to be practised it would only arise through a 
minimisation of heterogeneity (or, rather, the competing demands that were taken to 
signify this heterogeneity). By dividing and partitioning it would be possible to 
minimise the constraints that the irksome heterogeneity of Bosnia had placed on the 
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sovereign autonomy that is the purported essence of political subjectivity. In this way 
it would be possible to create a condition of least constraint from which a kind of 
tolerance might emerge: after all, if no Bosniacs remained in Republika Srpska, then 
the Bosnian Serbs would be effectively sovereign and able to practice a benign 
indifference towards those living in the Muslim-Croat federation. 8 
However, such an understanding bequeathed Bosnia a specific problem. First, 
by mis-recognising the constitutive nature of heterogeneity, it failed to see the manner 
in which the homogenising project of ethno-nationalism would always be haunted by 
an alterity it felt compelled to eradicate. And thus, despite having minimised the 
competing demands of heterogeneity through partition, the violence continued - 
turning to homes belonging to displaced persons, ruined mosques that were scheduled 
to be rebuilt and so on. Despite having given the ethnic parties quasi-sovereignty, the 
Dayton accords could not minimise agonistic relations of identity\difference precisely 
because the heterogeneity on which such agonism is predicated is constitutive of, not 
contingent to, existence. 
Secondly, the partition effected by the Dayton accords depoliticised a range of 
essentially agonistic phenomena. The assumption that heterogeneity was both only 
present in cases of competing demands, and that this heterogeneity was a constraint 
upon the sovereign autonomy essential to political subjectivity and thus to be 
minimised, has a specific consequence: politics is reduced to only those circumstances 
in which competing demands arise. The politics of ethno-nationalism and the 
opposing forces of multiculturalism are restricted to a narrow range of cases in which 
there are competing demands for recognition. Thus politics in Bosnia has become 
244 
crystallised around a number of high profile issues in which there are demands for 
recognition. More specifically it has become crystallised around competing demands 
for territorial control and the right to rebuild and resettle. The principal political 
phenomena in post-Dayton Bosnia are thus, typically, those concerning minority 
returns and the rebuilding of ruined heritage (mosques and churches in particular). 
Minority returns, as I noted earlier, are those instances in which refugees and 
IDPs return to places of pre-war residence where, as a consequence of ethnic 
cleansing, they constitute a post-war minority. Minority return is an event constituted 
by ethnic cleansing since, prior to the war, returnees would have belonged to an ethnic 
majority (or an ethnically mixed municipality). Minority return is thus an event 
constituted by the logic of the reduction of heterogeneity in the service of self- 
determination (sovereignty). Insofar as minority return problematises the homogeneity 
of ethno-national statelets, it embodies an agonism. According to the anthropocentric 
imaginary, such agonism is to be understood as competing demands arising from the 
constraints placed upon sovereign individuals by an empirical multiculturalism. 
Insofar as the issue of minority return is reduced to a question of competing demands, 
it is reduced to either a security problem (the management of violence resulting from 
competing demands) or the assertion of a right (and thus the implicit demand to be 
free from the kinds of constraints that heterogeneity necessarily places upon 
individuality). 
A similar reduction of the political can be seen in the issue of rebuilding. 
Rebuilding has been stalled. This stalling has often been rationalised by Bosnian Serb 
and Bosnian Croat authorities on the basis that there are competing demands arising 
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from reconstruction projects. What such claims amount to is an expression of the idea 
that the rebuilding of mosques, for example, would place constraints upon Bosnian 
Serb/Croat nationalists (since they would not be able to perform their ethno-nationalist 
sovereignty unhindered). This problem is similarly reduced to a question of the 
reconciliation of competing demands and the potential for maximising the sovereignty 
of parties to the problem. 
Thus whilst the letter of the Dayton accords can be understood to provide for 
the reconstruction of an agonistic polity in Bosnia, the `spirit of Dayton' (its 
implementation and interpretation by the international community) is rooted in an 
anthropocentric understanding of multiculturalism. The spirit of Dayton fails to 
recognise the constitutive agonism of Bosnia, reducing it instead to the competing 
demands of purportedly sovereign individuals and groups. In this manner the de facto 
partition of Bosnia is never problematised comprehensively, since it is seen as a 
natural outcome of the failure to reconcile the competing demands that have arisen out 
of the constraints placed upon sovereign individuality (and its correlate ethnic groups) 
by the empirical heterogeneity of Bosnia. In this manner the spirit of Dayton remains 
resolutely blind to the constitutive heterogeneity of Bosnia. In particular it remains 
blind to the manner in which claims to self-determination and sovereignty (individual 
or group) are both constructed upon and efface that constitutive heterogeneity. Insofar 
as the politics of Bosnia are reduced to the reconciliation of competing demands, the 
domain of the political in Bosnia is effaced. 
Moreover, whilst both minority returns and reconstruction are important, they 
are certainly not the only phenomena that could be called political in Bosnia- 
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Herzegovina. The effect of this restriction of the meaning of the political to instances 
of competing demands has been to depoliticise a range of issues concerning the 
alterity that structures Bosnian society. Moreover, it effaces the urbicide that 
decisively shaped the post-war terrain of Bosnia and encourages interpretations of 
urban destruction that concentrate upon ruined cultural heritage (since it is in the case 
of such heritage that competing demands most often arise). Conflict is likely to 
emerge around the question of mosque rebuilding, rather than around more mundane 
questions of reconstructing essential infrastructure (such as water supplies, phone 
networks, supermarkets and so on). 
Furthermore, the anthropocentric imaginary underpinning this depoliticisation 
of a range of instances in which the agonism proper to the political is evident, has 
actively encouraged further depoliticisation. The assumption in the wake of the 
Dayton accords has been that the solution to the conflicts arising from competing 
demands is to further minimise any such heterogeneity (and thus perpetuate 
division). 29 Thus, recent attempts to rebuild mosques (which have given rise to unrest) 
have been contested on the basis that they are `provocative'. 30 Such claims are an 
attempt to halt mosque rebuilding programs and perpetuate the division of Bosnia by 
refusing to compromise the homogeneity of the ethno-national entity of Republika 
Srpska. In this way the political, already reduced to instances of competing demands, 
is further threatened by a concerted effort to minimise such instances of `politics'. In 
this way the constitutive heterogeneity of Bosnia - to which ruined mosques are a 
testament - is disavowed/effaced. 
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However, it is necessary to recognise that in this way a twin assault on the 
agonism proper to the political is perpetrated. Firstly, it is assumed that this agonism 
only exists in a narrow range of circumstances in which conflicting demands for 
recognition are articulated. And secondly, it is assumed that the proper response to 
such agonstic outbursts is a minimisation through division. This has the effect of both 
effacing the constitutive heterogeneity revealed in and through the urbicide to which 
Bosnia was subjected, and suggesting that the ideal settlement for Bosnia would be 
one in which politics was reduced to the technical management of a society in which 
agonism is effaced. Such a situation it is assumed would be indicative of the 
maximisation of the essential sovereignty of individuals/groups to the point where the 
heterogeneity that constrains such autonomy is effectively managed. 
And yet such depoliticisation is constantly undone by the return in multiple 
instances of the heterogeneity that is constitutive of existence. The only manner in 
which such depoliticisation can, thus, succeed is to continually and aggressively 
partition the places in which agonism arises. And yet this division is never a response 
to constitutive heterogeneity, merely an attempt to efface it through an increasing 
number of barriers, boundary lines, checkpoints and enclaves. Reducing politics in 
this way to the high profile cases of conflict and a response to such competing 
demands that takes its aim to be the minimisation of difference in order to create the 
conditions for the technical management of autonomous individuals fundamentally 
mis-recognises the importance of Mitsein: the constitutive nature of heterogeneity. 
Despite recognising the importance of Heidegger's notion of Mitsein, 
however, a question still remains. What, exactly, is the nature of this heterogeneity 
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beyond being a constitutive openness to, or structuring by, alterity? Perhaps this 
question is better posed as the question of community. If, as I said in Chapter 4, the 
constitutive nature of heterogeneity always already implicates Being-in-the-world in 
community, then the question must be what is the nature of the community in which 
we always already are? Such a question is important insofar as this community 
(agonistic heterogeneity) remains a defuse and ambiguous phenomenon in my 
argument. That is, in my argument so far I have simply posed a constitutive 
heterogeneity against the logic of urbicide and noted that the latter is a disavowal of 
the former. The task must thus be to sketch out in more detail the stakes of urbicide: 
how is community constitutive of existence?; how exactly does urbicide disavow such 
community?; and how does community undo the work of urbicide? Such questions are 
necessary if I am to give an account of both the manner in which urbicide disavows 
agonism (how, exactly, destruction accomplishes the task of effacing heterogeneity) 
and the manner in which that agonism returns to contest urbicide. 
Heidegger and the question of community 
In the previous chapter I attempted to outline the nature of the community in 
which Being-in-the-world is implicated. I followed Heidegger's development of the 
notion of Mitsein from an outline of the constitutive heterogeneity of existence to the 
destiny of the people in which that heterogeneity is authentically present. I noted that 
Being-with is a constitutive horizon for Being-in-the-world, one that can be effaced 
but not eradicated. If this is the case it is because existence is shared in the sense 
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ascribed by Nancy: any Being-in-the-world is both related to, and divided from, 
others. That is to say any Dasein is, like other Daseins, in the same world, and yet, 
insofar as each Dasein is a singular instance of Being-in-the-world, it is divided from, 
or at least distinct from, the others it finds itself in the world with. Thus the 
heterogeneity constitutive of existence is an ineradicable exposure that is both 
constitutive of, and yet contests, the singularity of any Being-in-the-world. This 
Being-with is a community insofar as `community' is, minimally, the name of the 
experience of Being-with-others. Dasein, according to Heidegger and Nancy, shares 
its world and is thus always already with others. Even when Dasein is alone, it is only 
so in relation to (by rejection/effacement of) this horizon of Being-with from which 
existence unfolds. 
Heidegger recognises the need to sketch out the nature of the community in 
which Dasein is always already implicated. And yet, as I showed, Heidegger's account 
of this community represents an ultimately disturbing retreat from the insight offered 
by his arguments concerning Mitsein. Heidegger expands his minimal recognition of 
the constitutive nature of Mitsein into the notion of the destiny of the people. That is, 
Heidegger argues that since existence is always already a Being-with, or community, 
Dasein's temporality is always already a co-historizing. However, this co-historizing 
is, according to Heidegger, only authentic insofar as it takes the form of the 
assumption of a common destiny. This destiny is chosen in a moment of vision in 
which individual fates are bound together through the choosing of a hero. The most 
disturbing aspect of this conceptualisation of the authentic form of community as 
being the destiny of a people is its explicitly nationalist character. For Heidegger, as 
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the Rectoral Address makes clear, the destiny of the people (the Germans are 
Heidegger's specific focus of concern) is to be realised through the creation of a 
territorially bounded, spiritually unified, nation-state. 31 Despite Heidegger's possible 
attempt to distance himself from those who racialised Nazi ideology, the destiny of the 
German people remained, for him, the creation of an ethno-national polity that shares 
both a spiritual mission and a territorial homogeneity. 32 
In Heidegger's vision of the destiny of the people as the authentic realisation 
of the community (or co-historizing) in which existence is always already implicated, 
we can see the idealisation of the principles of National Socialism that was ultimately 
responsible for his involvement with Nazism. Heidegger's conception of a 
spiritualised people resisting the inauthenticity of technology is intimately connected 
to an idealised vision of the National Socialist revolution. Heidegger never rejected or 
apologised for holding to such an idealisation of the principles of National Socialism 
(despite resigning the rectorship and purportedly opposing various aspects of the Nazi 
regime). 33 Moreover, it is precisely the concepts of authenticity, spirit, destiny and 
vision that formed the cornerstone of Heidegger's idealisation of National Socialism. 
These concepts are integral to his account of community as the common destiny of the 
people. 
In the previous chapter I noted that it has been argued that we should reject the 
Heideggerian corpus on the basis of the idealisation of National Socialism that so 
clearly haunts it. 34 And yet I suggested (and here I aligned myself with thinkers 
including Derrida, Lacoue-Labarthe and Habermas) that this was not necessarily 
necessary nor desirable. 35 It is one thing for a thinker to be associated, even intimately, 
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with an abhorrent regime, it is another to dismiss the entirety of his corpus on these 
grounds. As Derrida notes, whilst one should not ignore the entwinment of 
Heidegger's thought with Nazism, one should also recognise that 'Heidegger's 
"thought" destabilises the deep foundations of philosophy' and thus demands that we 
`seek to think beyond comfortable and convenient schemas [such as the dismissal of 
Heidegger's work through his association with Nazism], and justly to understand [the 
questions Heidegger asks, the responses he outlines and the contestation of philosophy 
he effects]. '36 Bearing this in mind, I suggested that there were two ways in which we 
could understand Heidegger's development of the insights concerning the constitutive 
nature of Mitsein into the notion of the authentic destiny of the German people. 
Firstly, as I have already noted, we should see Heidegger's commitment to an 
idealisation of National Socialism (expressed in An Introduction to Metaphysics as 
`the inner truth and greatness of this movement') as entirely in keeping with, though 
not necessarily following from, his thought in Being and Time. 37 That is to say the 
themes of authenticity, destiny, and fate in Being and Time certainly set a scene in 
which the appearance of the (nationalist) Volk, or the theme of `the encounter between 
modem man and global technology' (in which there is a sense in which, for Dasein, 
authenticity consists of an overcoming of the decadence brought about by the 
globalisation of technology) are not out of place. 39 Which is to say that one can, 
certainly trace a Nazi text in Heidegger's earlier work (from Being and Time to An 
Introduction to Metaphysics). However, as Derrida rightly points out, Heidegger's 
texts are multiple and demanding, never wholly yielding to one over-determined 
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reading. Whilst the Nazi text exists, so too does one that could equally resist such an 
(ethno)nationalist politics. 
In one sense we enter here into the murky realm of the relation between an 
author and his/her texts. Which is to say that we are asked to comprehend Heidegger's 
acceptance of the Rectorship and membership of the Nazi party in relation to his 
work. Whilst the question of the relation of author and text is beyond the scope of the 
present argument, it is possible to make one point in this regard. It is, I think, 
problematic to argue that a text must be interpreted as both the product of a unitary 
subject and a unitary statement of intent. That is to say, it is problematic - especially 
given Heidegger's avowed opposition in this regard - to read Being and Time 
retroactively as a statement of intent on the part of Heidegger the Rector of Frieburg 
University. It is problematic, therefore, to argue that since Heidegger regarded his 
acceptance of the Rectorship as in some way congruent with his thought, that his 
thought is, in its entirety, a justification of, or foundation for, Nazi politics. 
Rather, given the multiple nature of Heidegger's texts, and in particular the 
way in which they continually resist singular interpretations, it might be better to see 
Heidegger's involvement with Nazism, and the support drawn from his texts for this 
engagement, as wholly contingent. Perhaps this contingent entwinment of thought and 
political engagement is, finally, a properly political decision (in the sense in which 
such a decision might be understood by Derrida). 39 One could, along with Lacoue- 
Labarthe, note that though the texts of Heidegger's early thought offer succour to 
National Socialist thinking, it is, in the end, the contingent ensemble of events that 
surround his acceptance of the Rectorship that draw the texts into an intimate 
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relationship with Nazism. 40 Of course, we should not excuse Heidegger of 
responsibility, nor cease to decry his silence on both his involvement with Nazism or 
the Holocaust, but we should note that the activation of the Nazi text in Heidegger's 
writing by his acceptance of the rectorship acts in some ways to efface the other 
multiple texts at work in Being and Time. 
Which is to say, finally, that in Heidegger's case, despite the convergence of 
text and political involvement in 1933 (and the failure to disavow this nexus) we 
should not reduce his thought to this singular motif. This brings me to my second 
point. If my argument is correct, it would follow that we can say that even though 
Heidegger disavows Mitsein by articulating a profoundly homogeneous conception of 
community, he has sown the seed of difference in making Being-with a constitutive 
moment of existence. In this sense Mitsein is the element of the text that resists the 
National Socialist nexus of thought and political involvement. Moreover, this seed of 
difference - Mitsein - should not be cast aside by a sort of `guilt by association'. 41 
Despite the legacy that haunts Heidegger's work, we should not fail to see the 
importance of Mitsein and the manner in which it is precisely disavowed by Heidegger 
because it represents the element of his work that resists the idealisation of National 
Socialism that he will, later, pursue. 
Mitsein is not amenable to Heidegger's engagement with National Socialism 
precisely because it represents the installation of an alterity at the centre of Being that 
notions of blood, soil and Volk cannot recognise. In this sense Heidegger's 
engagement with National Socialism should be seen as a disavowal of the principle of 
difference/alterity that is enshrined in the concept of Mitsein. Despite this however, 
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we should recognise the way in which Heidegger's own undoing lies in the way in 
which Mitsein has been conceived. Mitsein can be disavowed, covered over, or even 
effaced (in ever more violent ways) and yet it cannot, according to Heidegger's 
reasoning, by done away with. Mitsein is a horizon from, and against which, existence 
unfolds. Disavowals of Mitsein are merely attempts to ignore/disavow this horizon, 
but are never successful eradications of this horizon. That is, since Mitsein is a 
horizon of Being it is not possible to eradicate it, merely to disavow it, to cover it over 
or to ignore it. But such disavowal does not render the concept/horizon any less 
important/constitutive. 
Heidegger's disavowal of Mitsein is principally derived from his privileging of 
Dasein in the analysis of Being and Time. As Nancy notes, Heidegger remains 
resolutely committed to the priority of Dasein throughout Being and Time. 2 In this 
way Heidegger subordinates Mitsein to Dasein, alterity to identity and Others to 
Being. This privileging of Dasein is problematic since it means that ultimately 
Heidegger fails in his project of destroying the metaphysics of presence/subjectivity. 
Dasein becomes that which can resolutely grasp hold of itself, that which can disavow 
Others and be alone, that which can either realise its fate or submerge itself in the 
destiny of the people. In short Dasein is, as the privileged term of analysis, that which 
brings itself to presence, has identity, and which can, ultimately disavow its relation to 
alterity. 
This privileging of Dasein is, then a maintenance of the metaphysics of 
presence/subjectivity in the Heideggerian text. This is probably the clearest way in 
which to see the relationship between Heidegger's thought and National Socialism. 
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Heidegger privileges the metaphysics of presence/subjectivity in his text (though this 
metaphysics is contested by the alterity installed by Mitsein) whilst National Socialism 
dreams of pure, homogeneous presence. It is understandable, then that a nexus 
between thought and political engagement emerged in 1933. Furthermore, the 
privileging of the metaphysics of presence/subjectivity installs an anthropocentrism at 
the heart of Heidegger's work. Particularly in Being and Time, Dasein remains 
modelled on a sovereign individual, a being that possesses Being, and chooses to 
resolutely assume its fate. 
The question thus remains, in the wake of Heidegger's privileging of Dasein, 
what the nature of the community to which he gestures with the concept of Mitsein is. 
The task must be, if we heed the directions indicated by the preceding argument, to 
think Being-with without subordinating it to Being. That is, it must be to think Being- 
with itself as that which is properly primary in any existential analytic. Only in this 
way can the community in which we always already find ourselves, against which any 
subjectivity/presence is traced out, and which constitutes Being-in-the-world as 
exposed to an ineluctable alterity, be properly delineated. This, I would propose, is 
what Jean-Luc Nancy has attempted to do in his reconsideration of Mitsein. 
Nancy and the question of community43 
Jean-Luc Nancy's work is explicitly concerned with the questions raised by the 
concept of Mitsein. For Nancy the task bequeathed philosophy by Heidegger is to 
think through the implications of the constitutive heterogeneity that structures 
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existence. That is, for Nancy, after Heidegger (and his retreat from the thought of 
difference), the question that remains is to elaborate on the being-with that is 
constitutive of being. As Simon Critchley notes, `Nancy is attempting an existential 
ontology of being-with which has the ambition of being a first philosophy' 44 As I 
noted, the task posed by Heidegger's disavowal of Mitsein is to outline an existential 
analytic that takes proper account of the constitutive nature of being-with. That is, it is 
to sketch out an ontology that does not privilege being over being-with. However, this 
is not just a case of finding the right balance, so to speak, between being and being- 
with, Dasein and its Others. Rather, being is only insofar as it is constituted through 
being-with. And thus it is this being-with that is the central concern of any ontological 
enquiry. 
It is for this reason that Nancy refers to his most complete sketch of the 
meaning of being-with as a `co-existential analytic'. In this way Nancy indicates that 
any existential analytic (such as that set out in Being and Time) that privileges being 
will disavow the heterogeneity constitutive of existence. In order to get to grips with 
this problematic, therefore, it is necessary to note that any existential analytic is 
always already a co-existential analytic. In this way our attention is turned from the 
metaphysics of presence/subjectivity to the task of thinking about the heterogeneity 
that is the constitutive horizon of any such presence. Moreover, this co-existential 
analytic is, according to Nancy, a first philosophy in the strict sense ascribed to this 
term by western thought. In a manner similar to, but divergent from, Levinas, Nancy 
notes that we must think about the constitutive heterogeneity that structures all 
existence if we are to understand that existence in any way. 45 First philosophy refers to 
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that which must be thought prior to all other thinking. As Nancy notes, `we cannot 
understand this task [that remains in the wake of Being and Time] unless we first 
understand what is most at stake.. . 
in philosophy'. 46 
And yet if the foundation for thinking is to be heterogeneity, it would be at 
odds with this thought to see this first philosophy as the kind of monological ground 
that first philosophies (all of them ontotheologies) have aspired to be. 47 In this sense 
then this first philosophy is to be seen much more as an `ethos', a `social ontology' (an 
inquiry into the logic of the heterogeneous socius that really exists), or perhaps a 
response, finally to the question that hangs in the air in the wake of Being and Time: 
the Mitseinsfrage (the question of the meaning of being-with). 8 
Nancy's responses to this Mitseinsfrage are multiple and dispersed across his 
work. Whilst Being Singular Plural represents the fullest attempt he has made to 
sketch out a co-existential analytic as first philosophy it is not, for my purposes the 
most eloquent of his responses to the question of the meaning of being-with. In Being 
Singular Plural Nancy addresses the question of the meaning of being-with out of the 
context of the social that is said to determine this ontology. That is, to say, Nancy 
addresses being-with in a formal sense, outlining the principle philosophical contours 
that a thinking of the constitutive nature of being-with would follow. And yet, this 
formal thinking of being-with seemingly neglects the manner in which being-with is 
co-existent with community. That is to say, when we speak of being-with we are 
always already speaking of (extant) community. In this sense Nancy's most eloquent 
outline of the constitutivity of being-with is to be found in his most explicit reflection 
upon community: The Inoperative Community. 
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For Nancy, thinking about community demands a confrontation with the 
manner in which community has been thought by the tradition of western philosophy - 
according to a metaphysics of presence/subjectivity. For Nancy this is explicitly 
framed as a confrontation with the problems bequeathed to any thinking concerning 
community by political theories that privilege the individual. The problem faced in 
such theories is, as I have already noted, the manner in which being-with is taken to be 
either ancillary to individuality or to be minimised/eradicated in order to grant 
sovereign autonomy to the individuals that compose the socius or the empirical 
phenomenon of community. 
Neither of these understandings of being-with can grasp the nature of the 
constitutivity of the `with'. If the with is seen as either an ancillary or a contingent 
(and undesirable) limitation of transcendent autonomy, there can be no meaningful 
explanation of the manner in which being-with is constitutive of existence. That is to 
say, such understandings confront heterogeneity as an accidental rather than essential 
property of being. And in doing so, these understandings deny themselves of a cogent 
account of the existential fact of community. Indeed, insofar as these understandings 
account for the sociality of political subjectivity it is not in terms of a constitutive 
inclination to alterity, but as a grudging acceptance (albeit as a contingent, ancillary, 
accidental aspect of being) that political subjects appear to co-exist empirically. 
Liberal theories of community, for example, can only explain the apparent 
sociality that frames our empirical existences as an ancillary aspect of being. There is 
no explanation forthcoming regarding the way in which it appears that individuals are 
inclined towards one another. Thus social contract theory comprises an ex post 
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explanation for the seemingly contradictory co-existence of fundamentally 
autonomous individuals. Or, to put it another way, a theory of sovereign autonomy 
cannot explain why the Hobbesian state of nature is transcended, why individuals can 
and do co-exist, and the manner in which this coexistence is constitutive of their 
existence. In Hobbes, the fictive narrative of the Leviathan thus serves not to explain 
the constitutive openness to alterity characteristic of political community, but as an ex 
post facto rationalisation of the fact that, despite the posited sovereignty of 
individuals, it seems that there is, empirically, some way in which subjects 
compromise that supposed autonomy for sociality. This is why for many liberal 
theories abstraction remains preferable to the phenomenological examination of 
everyday life: if such an examination were undertaken the constitutive nature of the 
heterogeneous socius characteristic of mundane existence would be laid bare. 
Furthermore, those who see being-with as an undeniable, but ultimately 
regrettable fact of existence see heterogeneity as a similarly accidental (if not 
necessarily ancillary) aspect of being. Being-with can thus be disavowed in order to 
give full presence to being (this may well be the drift of the privileging of Dasein in 
Being and Time). Perhaps the clearest model of such thinking might be Christian 
asceticism. The ascetic takes the empirical fact of sociality to comprise an accidental 
property of his/her essential being. Essential being (in which a communion with the 
divine is fully revealed) can thus only be realised by a strict practice of disavowal of 
the accidental characteristics of being (such as sociality). 49 
But, as Nancy notes, such understandings neglect the manner in which being- 
with/community constitutes a horizon from which any understanding of 
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existence/being unfolds. To put it more clearly both understandings are an attempted 
negation of the community that is constitutive of existence. And yet this negation is 
never complete, but only ever a covering over, effacement or destruction (that leaves 
ruins and memories). 50 In order to understand Nancy's argument concerning the way 
in which these conceptions of community cover over or disavow being-with, it is 
necessary to quickly sketch out his understanding of community. 
`Community', according to Nancy, is the name given to that in which our 
`being-in-common' is revealed. The western philosophical tradition - the metaphysics 
of presence/subjectivity - understands the `common' of this being-in-common as a 
`substance uniformly laid out "under" supposed "individuals", [or as a substance] 
uniformly shared out among everyone like a particular ingredient' :5' an understanding 
of being-in-common as a common substance of being. Community thus understood is 
either a sharing in a common substance of Being (from the Christian sacramental 
figure of communion with the divine, to the Marxist notion of the privileged agent of 
history), or an aggregation of entities that are substantially/essentially the same (that 
is, in essence, identical - most commonly seen in the notion that humans are `born free 
and equal'). 52 
In the schemas of the metaphysics of presence/subjectivity the realisation, or 
bringing to presence of a common substance of being is taken to be the organising 
principle of community. That is, community is the realisation of the transcendent 
substantial essence of being. Hence from Rousseau through to Hegel and Marx, the 
structure of communal existence is organised around the realisation of a common 
substance of being (through either the social contract, the dialectic of Geist, or the 
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emancipation that will arise from the proletarian revolution). The important thing to 
note is that in such accounts the common substance of being is immanent to the 
various communal arrangements of being. One can see this in liberal political theory 
where community is conceived of in terms of the elimination of those contingent 
features of existence that obscure or limit the realisation of a sovereign autonomy 
taken to be the transcendental essence of beings. 53 Similarly, Hegel's vision of the 
historical dialectic of Spirit traces out 4 trajectory in which absolute knowing (the 
immanent substance of being) is realised through the sublimation of the contingent 
contradictions of existence. 54 For Hegel it should be noted that the conditions of 
absolute knowing are immanent tg being - the dialectic of Spirit merely traces out the 
path of realisation of that absolute knowing. 
In both cases, the point is that community is the name for the conditions under 
which a pre-existent, and thus im11 anent, substance is to be realised. Community thus 
names the problematic of the conditions tgder which immanence is to be realised. As 
such community is, for the modem metaphysics of presence/subjectivity, not an 
experience in itself but the conduit through which an immanent substantial essence of 
being is realised. Commonly `community' thus refers to a problematic of overcoming 
the supposed constraints and limitations that empirical contingency places upon the 
realisation of such substance. 
The problem raised by this conception of community as the name of the 
conditions under which an immanent substantial essence of being can be realised, is 
central to Nancy's understanding of the political. Simply stated, the problem is that, 
since the essence of being-in-common - the common substance of Being - is taken to 
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be simply immanent to community, what it is to be in-common is never questioned. 
That is, discussions of community focus on the problematic of realising (bringing to 
full presence) a supposedly pre-existent substantial essence of being. This means that 
in discussions of community it is only the mechanism of the realisation of this 
common substance of being that is discussed. The nature, or even desirability, of the 
posited common substance is not questioned. Thus, for example, liberal political 
theory tends to concentrate on the question of realising autonomous individuality, 
rather than questioning the nature of such individuality (and hence is blind to the 
considerable negative consequences of the individualist vision of the supposed 
essence of being). 
This understanding of community as the realisation of an immanent common 
substantial being, is rooted in the metaphysical assertion that there is an essential 
identity which constitutes what it is to be-in-common. For example, it might be 
presupposed that the being-in-common of community lies in being `human'. Hence 
`humanity' becomes installed as the common substance of being that defines 
community. The problem that concerns Nancy and other writers who similarly 
recognise this manner in which community is understood by the metaphysics of 
presence/subjectivity is that politics becomes reduced to questions concerning how an 
immanent substance of being (such as `humanity, or `individuality') is to be realised. 
Questions concerning the meaning of this immanent substance (e. g., 
`humanity'/` individuality') are suspended as it becomes consensus that this is simply 
the essence of being. Community is thus that mechanism which realises this immanent 
substantial essence of being. To challenge this idea is to contest what is taken to be 
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`common sense'. After all if the immanent substance of being is understood to be 
`humanity' or `individuality' then alternative understandings of being will be relegated 
to the level of contingency/accident. That is, once the immanent substance of being is 
defined, all contrary understandings of being must be taken to be contingent (and thus 
temporary) confusions or mis-recognitions of being. What sense, it will be argued, 
does it therefore make to elaborate alternative understandings of being, as the essence 
of being will, in the end, transcend all such empirical contingencies. 
Such understandings of community thus harbour two distinctly pernicious 
problematics. Firstly, as I noted, in taking a certain concept to be the essence of being, 
discussion of the meaning of that concept, its contours, and its consequences, is 
suspended. The installation of a certain concept as the embodiment of the essential 
identity of being takes the form of a naturalisation of a certain consensus. And in 
insofar as this concept is taken to be the substance of being it becomes an entirely 
uncontestable concept. This concept becomes a reiterable marker of the foundation on 
which a certain ideal system would be constructed. Thus, for example, in discourses 
about democracy or human rights the concepts of freedom and humanity are reiterated 
as markers of the common substance of being without any close scrutiny of their 
meaning or specificity. For to scrutinise them would be to realise that they are 
historically specific, born of certain historico-conceptual junctures, and thus far from 
the universal essences that such substances are purported to be. 
Secondly, insofar as a concept is taken to be the immanent substance of being 
all other competing concepts are either marginalised or reduced to the status of 
contingent impediment to the realisation of that essence. Moreover, questions of what 
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it is to be-in-common are reduced to discussions not of the nature of being but the 
technical refinements of empirical contingency that must be accomplished in order to 
realise the essence of being. In this way the modem metaphysics of presence bequeath 
modern society a bureaucracy that delivers the most profound depoliticisation. That is 
to say, the agonism of the political is marginalised in so far as being is given a 
universal essential identity that admits of no contestation. In the absence of agonistic 
contestation, community becomes the mere refinement and perfection of the concept 
taken to embody the essence of being. This is precisely what is proper to bureaucracy: 
the refinement ad infinitum of a system for the realisation of a supposedly universal 
essence. Bureaucracy is blind to the consequences of such technical perfection without 
limits: capable of marginalisation, institutionalisation, or even destruction in order to 
remove the empirical contingencies that prevent the realisation of the substance of 
being. The modem metaphysics of presence/subjectivity thus proceed in step with a 
profound depoliticisation of the question of community and a terror hidden behind the 
banal face of bureaucracy. 55 
This definition of community as the bureaucratic/technical realisation of an 
immanent common substance of being comprises what Nancy refers to as `the 
figuration of the political'. 56 `Figuration' denotes the manner in which the 
metaphysics of presence understands community. That is, the metaphysics of presence 
understands community as the realisation of a figure: a concept taken to be the 
embodiment of the universal/substantial essence of being the realisation of which both 
grounds the technical bureaucratic organisation of society and suspends the agonistic 
question of community (what it is to be-in-common). Figuration is thus that through 
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which the metaphysics of presence is able to represent itself to itself: as objective, as 
substance, as presence. 57 The figure of, for example, `the human' becomes the image 
through which the metaphysics of presence represents its presence to itself. There are, 
of course, many such figures: legal person; state; demos; citizen; subject; object; 
rationality; and so on. 
Figuration, immanentism, totalitarianism 
Figuration accomplishes an important function throughout the history of the 
metaphysics of presence/subjectivity. Nancy refers to this as the operation of 
`immanentism'. 58 Immanentism is the foreclosure of the question of community (what 
it is to be-in-common) that is performed in taking a particular figure as the substance 
immanent to being and thus the principle according to which society/community is to 
be organised. Figuration is thus an immanentism, the performance of a 
closure/presence that represents the presence society/community to itself by positing a 
figure of the substance immanent to being at the heart of that society/community the 
realisation of which is that society/community's technical task. Moreover, the 
immanentist figuration of the political transforms community into communion (either 
sharing of common substance, or being of common substance) and makes this 
communion into a work, something to be accomplished. 
How should we understand this immanentism, this community understood as a 
communion that is properly a work to be accomplished? For the purposes of this 
discussion there are two key moments to immanentism. Firstly, at the level of 
266 
fundamental ontology, the figure of the substance of being that institutes the 
communion-work must be conceived of as absolute. For the modem metaphysics of 
presence/subjectivity to come to presence, it must represent itself to itself as the 
universal (and thus only) substance/essence of being-in-common: the single measure 
of the common substance of being. The figure must have meaning beyond relation 
with other figures in order to be the (properly universal) foundation in which the 
communion-work originates. For if the figure is defined in relation (to anything) then 
the founding moment is complicated by exteriority. The figure constituted by 
exteriority is merely a value, dependent on relational definition for its meaning -a 
meaning, therefore, that cannot be the single (universal) measure of the common 
substance immanent to being. 
The figure/figuration is, therefore, according to Nancy, a resolution of a 
contradiction central to the modern metaphysics of presence. Specifically it is the 
resolution of the contradiction raised by the desire for presence, particularly for a 
fullness of presence. This contradiction is elaborated by Nancy as the paradox of 
being-alone. 59 The metaphysics of presence offers, insofar as it proffers the possibility 
of a fullness of presence a vision of the subject of being existing alone. This is 
precisely the vision offered by liberal conceptions of the pre-existing, unencumbered 
subject of being. This subject is defined as an embodiment of a universal substance. 
Universal substance does not derive its meaning (or value) in terms of a differentiation 
from an Other, but exists, fully present in and for itself. In these terms, figures of full 
presence offered by the metaphysics of presence must represent presence as the 
possibility of being-alone. And yet, Nancy notes, the possibility of being-alone is 
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framed in terms of a relation. That is to say, being-alone is a mode of being-with: a 
separation from an other defined precisely as a standing apart from, or existing in the 
absence of, others. 
It might be possible to assert that such a separation is possible: that the 
realisation of a figure might allow the subject of being to enclose itself and thus divide 
itself from its others. And yet even this enclosing, insofar as it is a closure from others 
is a relation. To be properly alone (or as Nancy puts it to `be alone being alone') 
requires that this relation established by the enclosure of the subject of being be 
enclosed itself. 60 That is, the enclosure itself must be separate from the others it closes 
itself off from and thus the relation severed. It is precisely this impossible double 
enclosure that the immanentist metaphysics of presence attempts through figuration. 
That this double enclosure is impossible can be seen by noting the manner in which 
the enclosure must always be a closing off from alterity (a general otherness or 
specific others). Any enclosure is thus a relation, since if there were truly no alterity 
with which a relation existed, then there would be no need for enclosure, no need for 
figuration and the simple existence of presence. 61 
And yet immanentism is precisely this operation of an impossible double 
enclosure continually asserting/perfonning representations of the fullness of the 
subject of being. Moreover, the paradox of the double enclosure that lies at the heart 
of the metaphysics of presence/subjectivity is both that which necessitates 
immanentism and that which fuels the desire for the accomplishment of the 
communion community in which fullness of presence is achieved through the figure. 
The immanentist metaphysics of presence/subjectivity posits the figure as that with 
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which all subjects of being have a communion and then organises the 
society/community as a perpetual work to enclose this community in order to establish 
being as present in and for itself. That this is an increasingly violent work should be 
noted. The enclosure on which such immanentism is predicated is, precisely an 
exclusion: an exclusion of the alterity in relation to which the enclosure that 
establishes presence is performed. Figuration, this enclosure, is thus a laying out of 
boundaries, a drawing of a line that encloses a conception of the substance of being 
that all those in the society/community share. It is a bounding on which the fiction of 
the substance of being existing in and for itself is based. 
Secondly, the supposedly absolute and immanent (and thus ahistorical) figure 
is in fact a myth that calls into being (that is, institutes/constitutes) the community as a 
communion-work. 62 Through this myth the communion-community is given presence. 
Though the figure of, say, `the citizen' tells a story about the genesis of community 
whereby sovereign, autonomous individuals predate the community (see Hobbes or 
Rousseau), this is merely part of the myth itself. `The citizen' is constituted in the 
myth (along with its pre-communal past), as is the milieu of the individual (the 
bounded state/demos). That is, the unencumbered sovereign individual does not pre- 
exist the community as it proclaims but is constituted qua unencumbered and pre- 
existent in the mythic figure. 
Similarly, the myth that institutes/constitutes the communion-community 
according to an absolute figure, is co-extensive with the performance of the enclosure 
on which figuration rests. It is in the reiteration of the mythic figure that the 
community is enclosed, the individual is enclosed. The enclosure removes the 
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community and individuals from the possibility that identity could be defined 
relationally. Identity is defined only as the immanent completion of the absolute 
figure. And thus this mythic founding of the communion-community is the closure of 
the political, the closure of the terrain of agonism, of the relational contestation of 
identity, the alterity and difference that is constitutive of existence. Ultimately, 
although the immanentist myth performs in the name of community it is, in fact, the 
closure of this question: the suspension of the question of what it is to be-in-common. 
It is in relation to this (en)closure that Nancy talks of immanentism as 
totalitarianism. By this Nancy does not mean that the mythic figuration is performed 
by some sort of party who take it upon themselves to exterminate all those who are not 
included in the figuration. 63 Rather, all communities conceived of according to a 
mythic figuration are totalitarian in form; atrocities such as the Holocaust are 
historically specific instances of the extremes of which figured communion- 
communities are capable. The totalitarianism of the communion-community 
conceived of as the work demanded by figuration, arises from the manner in which the 
figure is taken to permeate all being-in-common such that politics is reduced to the 
technical accomplishment of the realisation of immanence. 
The consequence of this totalitarianism of the figure can only be the 
evaporation of the political into a technicism according to which it is no longer 
necessary to question being-in-common. 64 According to this technicism a mere 
calculation of the ways in which to achieve the realisation of immanence is taken to be 
all that is required. Hence, in our present time the political evaporates into technical 
discussions concerning the manner in which society can be best engineered to suit to 
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operation of a supposedly free market, or to correspond to the discursive regimes of 
science. Or the political evaporates into legalistic arguments concerning the minutiae 
of government. For some, of course (such as Fukuyama), immanence has already been 
realised and all that remains is to broaden the geographic reach of that immanence. 65 
Shared community 
It is precisely this immanentist communion-community that is the target of 
Nancy's critique in The Inoperative Community. In order to appreciate Nancy's 
critique it is necessary to underline the manner in which figuration is a work, a 
technical operation to secure the enclosure of the community. Work is, in Nancy's 
terms, an operation that proceeds according to the telos of the figure. That is to say, 
the figure establishes a ground for an operation of enclosure. This operation holds the 
realisation of the figure as its telos. This telos, or horizon (in the sense of enclosure) is 
simultaneously the logos of the communion-community: that which expresses the 
horizon of enclosure towards which the technical operation of realisation is orientated, 
and the foundation on which the being of the communion-community is grounded. 
Insofar as figuration is performed it institutes/inaugurates a technical operation 
oriented towards the achievement of the enclosure/bounding given in the figure. A 
figured communion-community thus works to secure the enclosure established in the 
figure. It is, properly, an operative (in the sense of working) community whose 
technical organisations function to secure the enclosure of the figured community. 
271 
It is in contradistinction to this operative (working), figured communion- 
community that Nancy outlines the notion of the `inoperative' community. This 
inoperative community is not a dysfunctional or poorly implemented communion- 
community. Nor is it a principle of disruption of the communion-community. In fact it 
is not posed strictly in opposition to the communion-communities established by the 
modern metaphysics of presence/subjectivity. For if it were to be posed in opposition 
to the communion-community, Nancy would be accepting at least the terrain on which 
the modem metaphysics of presence/subjectivity operates. In contradistinction, Nancy 
elaborates a first philosophy that challenges the principle assumptions of the modern 
metaphysics of presence/subjectivity concerning community. This first philosophy 
suggests that community itself can never be made operative, can never properly work 
(in the sense of realising a figure). It suggests, contrary to the modem metaphysics of 
presence/subjectivity, that community is not a sharing of substance. Indeed it suggests 
that the very notion of community as a gathering of those who share an essential 
substance of being is mistaken. 
Instead Nancy suggests that community should be understood as the name of 
an existential condition of inoperability, a constitutive heterogeneity that leaves any 
enclosure continually unravelling in the loose ends of an exposure to alterity. 66 In tWS 
sense Nancy is questioning the very idea of community as a bounded expression of 
substantial identity that has governed the history of western thought and suggesting 
another understanding of what it is to be always already implicated in community. 
And this `other' understanding is derived in response to the question of what it is to 
be-in-common. 67 In this sense Nancy is responding to the constitutive heterogeneity of 
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existence recognised by Heidegger in the concept of Mitsein. Moreover, this response 
directly challenges Heidegger's subsequent privileging of Dasein over Mitsein by 
asserting that the principle question is not that of being, but that of being-with, or 
being-in-common (a sharing of the public spatiality of existence that I have previously 
demonstrated to be constituted in and through buildings and at stake in urbicide). 
That the constitution of community according to absolute figures is deeply 
problematic can be shown by returning to the proposition that community is that in 
which being-in-common is revealed. Being-in-common cannot be a process in which 
individuals come together to discover commonality, for in absolute individuality there 
is no inclination towards other individuals (as there are, strictly speaking, no other 
individuals). Such discovered commonality would be a mere contingent fact ancillary 
to the sovereign autonomy proper to being. In this sense such commonality is not 
being-in-common but a contingent commonality of beings. Correspondingly the 
individual understood as only a moment in the totality cannot reveal being-in-common 
as there can be no sense of differentiation (which there must be for the notion of 
being-in-common to have any meaning). Indeed, such individuals are merely particular 
incarnations of a common (because it is universal) being. Being-in-common, like 
sharing, thus requires both a constitutive relation of commonality and yet a distinction 
that establishes the alterity of those with whom we are in-common. 
Being-in-common, therefore, can only be seen as being-with: being-separate 
only makes sense in relation to a being-in-common that is a being-with. That is to say, 
community is the experience of being-self by virtue of being-with: this is the being-in- 
common that is revealed in community. 68 Such a being is never absolute, it cannot 
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perform the separation required to bring itself to presence without relation. 
Community is thus the name of a relation, an originary exposure to alterity, an identity 
that consists precisely in the impossibility of self-identification but which draws its 
sense from the being-with that is the condition of possibility of being-in-common. 
Community in this sense is not communion, but communication. 
This conception of community radically re-orients our understanding of being- 
in-common from the enclosed figure (commonly realised in the nation-state or ethno- 
national group) to an understanding of being-in-common as a constitutive relation 
with alterity. This constitutive relation -a constitutive heterogeneity since it 
constitutes existence as always already a relation with others - is a communication in 
so far as it is an opening to, and receiving of identity from, alterity. Which is to say 
that this relation is not a crossing over of a pre-existent distance between the self and 
other. Rather it is a constitution of self and other in and through sharing. And since 
sharing is at once a distinction and a relation, it is proper to see this relation with 
alterity occurring precisely at those places where the distinction that makes possible 
the relation (and thus sharing) takes place. 
The relation is, strictly speaking, a surface of contact between self and other 
that is at the same time both relation (a shared surface is in common) and yet a 
distinction (the surface separates self from other). It is in this sense, therefore, that the 
relation is best seen not as a conduit through, or crossing of, a distance separating self 
and other but a line shared between self and other. The line that separates self and 
other is thus in-common (it is part of both self and other) and yet is a line of 
distinction that separates (and thus constitutes) self and other. It is in this sense that 
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community is a communication since the boundaries the self has in-common with the 
other are precisely that from which the self derives presence/meaning. The difference 
of self and other is thus communicated in and through this shared boundary. In this 
sense being is, for Nancy, an ecstatic event, a communication/constitution of self from 
beyond the self across the boundary of self-other that is both shared and yet separates. 
In this sense community is not the name of a distinct, separate territorial 
domain, space, or association. `Community' is the proper name of the constitutive 
communication of difference experienced in and through being-in-common. 
Community is the network of communications (in the sense of exposure to alterity) in 
which a differentiated articulation of contingent singularities (the social terrain) is 
constituted. It is in this sense that being is, in Nancy's phrase `singular plural'. Or 
rather, to give it proper articulation, `community' is the event/experience of `being 
singular plural' 69 
Community is thus a `a reticulated multiplicity, which produces no result': an 
inoperative network of singularities constituted by the loose ends of a communication 
of difference constitutive of self and other. 70 And yet this communication of 
difference constitutes a limit that establishes a distinction of self and other that is 
coexistent with a sharing of a common distinctive boundary. And in this sense the self 
is always already in-common with the other and thus any attempt to enclose the self 
and put distance between it and the other are perpetually unworked. The sharing 
constitutive of this being singular plural continually unworks the attempts of the 
metaphysics of presence/subjectivity. And thus Nancy places the concept of 
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community, a being singular plural that is predicated on a being-with in the position of 
a first philosophy. 
This reorientation of our understanding of community is, as any first 
philosophy should be, profound. It asserts that community is the proper name of the 
constitutive heterogeneity - the being singular plural that characterises existence - that 
structures/constitutes Being-in-the-world (to use Heidegger's terminology). In this 
sense it contests the notion inherent to the metaphysics of presence/subjectivity that 
community is ancillary to the substantial essence of being, a contingent and wholly 
secondary aspect of being-in-the-world. That is, it contests the idea that being is a 
transcendental substance existent prior to the world in which it always finds itself and 
thus sees community not only as an empirical fact, but also as a fundamental aspect of 
existence. Moreover, it answers the question of the nature of community by outlining 
the sense in which community is not the association (forced or voluntary) of 
individuals, but, rather the name of the being singular plural in which the self is 
constituted by virtue of being-with others. 7' 
Agonism, antagonism and community 
This conception of community as the being singular plural constitutive of 
existence is particularly productive in relation to understanding the heterogeneity 
disclosed by, and lost in, urbicide and the political stakes of this destruction. More 
specifically, Nancy's understanding of community indicates that the stakes of 
urbicide, hitherto understood as heterogeneity (or constitutive openness to alterity) is, 
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properly, agonism. Hence, Nancy's reorientation of the understanding of community 
suggests that the target of urbicide is `the political'. It is a constitutive agonism, the 
plurality of singularities, that is at stake in urbicide and, as such, it is the very 
condition of being-political that is in question. And in this sense we can begin to 
sketch out a response to the question posed in the wake of Heidegger's disavowal of 
Mitsein: what is the nature of this heterogeneity? 
Heterogeneity - specifically the constitutive heterogeneity constituted in and 
through the locales in which Being-in-the-world always already is and for which 
buildings are the condition of possibility - is co-extensive with the agonism that 
defines `things political'. This agonistic, properly political, heterogeneity is, 
ultimately, in Nancy's work nothing more, though nothing less, than the inoperative 
nature of community. Heterogeneity is thus the properly political (agonistic) 
unworking (desoeuvre) that comprises community. This unworking (desc euvre) is not 
to be understood as a destruction of the community envisaged in the figurations 
inspired by the metaphysics of presence/subjectivity. It is a constitutive unravelling of 
all such attempts to bring to presence a substantial identity for the subject of being. It 
is the perpetual loose ends at the edge of any figured community that mark the 
constitutive alterity by virtue of which any identity is present. 
These loose ends, this fraying, is constitutive of existence, it marks an 
agonistic heterogeneity that structures the presence of the self or its collective 
arrangements - insofar as such presence is achieved - and opens that presence to a 
continual agonistic contestation. The response to such agonism ranges from a benign 
neglect of alterity through the indifference practised in tolerance to the violent 
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assertion of separation, homogeneity and radical difference characteristic of ethno- 
nationalism. But in all cases the constitutive nature of this agonism and thus the 
political is undeniable. And even where the political is effaced it remains at stake 
despite its absence (it remains at stake precisely because of its absence). 
It is precisely this agonistic nature of the constitutive heterogeneity at stake in 
urbicide that I want to outline further at this point to indicate two specific moments 
visible in the destruction of urban environments: 1) the attempted effacement of the 
political; 2) the manner in which this effacement is left with/at loose ends, continually 
unworked by the constitutive agonism which it disavows. 
In order to set out the effacement of the political effected by urbicide, it is 
necessary to sketch out the agonism that underpins Nancy's conceptualisation of 
community in further detail. This agonism is not simply an openness to alterity, nor 
the mere unravelling of the best laid plans of figuration, rather it is properly the 
sharing of divisions. This sharing of divisions is the constitutive moment of existence. 
It is division, or more properly distinction or differentiation, that is the constitutive 
moment of the singular networks of identity that characterise existence. That is, it is 
from the sharing (out and in) of divisions that senses of self, other, nation, ethnos, 
state and so on are derived. And it is only because the divisions/differentiations are 
shared that such networks of identity are constituted. In the differentiation of self and 
other, for example, it is only because the distinction between self and other is shared 
by both self and other (as a limit of either identity) that either term is given meaning. 
This sharing of divisions then is both a relation and a division, a distinction (and thus 
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a line, limit or boundary) that is both common to both self and other and yet divides 
self from other (and vice versa). 
That this sharing of divisions is agonistic can be seen, as I have argued, in the 
manner in which it structures differentiation according to a logic of alterity. That is to 
say, there is no self that does not share something (even if it is a limit at which a 
distinctive difference is constituted) with its other. It is precisely this commonality of 
a line, a distinction, that opens any self to its other, makes a relation with the other 
constitutive. And in this sense it installs the other as the constitutive moment of the 
self. In this sense, the self cannot gather itself into itself in order to bring itself to 
presence only in and for itself. It is always already a self for the other. And in this 
sense the self always finds that its efforts at enclosure (specifically the double 
enclosure of figuration I spoke of earlier) trail the loose ends of shared divisions 
from/with the other that cannot be recuperated, gathered or woven into a figure of 
substantial self-identity. The self is always at loose ends in relation to the other, 
unable to continue its work of figuration due to the constitutive nature of the other. 
And this unworking, or being-at-loose-ends, that characterises the shared divisions of 
community (in Nancy's sense) is properly an agonism. It is a constitutive struggle or 
contest in which the self attempts to recuperate itself in the work of figuration and yet 
finds only loose ends (both a fraying and an idleness that is the simple sharing of 
divisions which thwarts all works). 
That this agonistic sharing of divisions is the inauguration of the political can 
be seen insofar as it constitutes power relations. In talking of the nature of power 
Foucault notes that `[p]ower is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as 
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they are free. '72 That is, Foucault distinguishes between those situations in which a 
confrontation ossifies into a situation of domination or a stalemate and those in which 
an essential freedom to act exists and which thus necessitates practices to modify any 
resulting actions. 73 It is these practices that modify actions that constitute power for 
Foucault. 74 That is, power is precisely the exercise of a capacity to modify the actions 
of others. And for such a capacity to be realised the other must be free to act as a 
condition of possibility of there being modification of such action. In cases where that 
freedom does not exist (for example, where domination is realised) power is no longer 
present (and is transformed into violent force). 
For Foucault, power is agonistic insofar as it is `a relationship which is at the 
same time reciprocal incitation and struggle; less of a face-to-face confrontation which 
paralyses both sides than a permanent provocation. ' 75 Only insofar as there is 
incitement to government and a provocation of that government is there a field of 
possibility for practices of modification of the actions of others: the practice of power. 
In this sense power is an agonistic relation constituted by a 'provocation'. It is 
precisely this kind of agonism in which a permanent provocation (the sharing of 
divisions) exists which constitutes existence. Indeed, Nancy notes that `... there would 
be no power relations... if the political were not the place of community - in other 
words, the... existence of being-in-common, which gives rise to the existence of 
being-self [or singularity]'. 76 
Thus Nancy folds the three central terms of political analysis - community, 
power and the political - into one statement of first philosophy. The relation of power, 
community and the political is set out quite simply by Nancy. Community names the 
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constitutive heterogeneity of existence that comprises a sharing of divisions, or a 
communication in which the meaning of self is given by, and at, the distinction from 
the other (a differentiation/division that can be neither recuperated into, nor alienated 
from, the self). In this sense the `reticulation' of existence, its constitution as a 
network of singularities structured by the plurality/heterogeneity of existence, is a 
mobile mosaic of inclusions and exclusions. The singularities of self, other, state, 
nation, ethnos and so on constituted at any given juncture are established precisely 
though the constitution of temporary and contingent limits of differentiation at which 
self and other are distinguished and thus constituted. These limits include what it is to 
be part of the identity of the self and other and exclude what is to be taken to be 
foreign to it. In this sense the division shared by self and other is a mark of both 
inclusion and exclusion. 
This differentiation, inclusion and exclusion, is precisely the operation on 
which the practice of power (and specifically government) is founded. Government is 
a classification and disciplining that is productive of particular/singular selves and 
others. Government constitutes the limits between itself and alterity - thus establishing 
a communal, or societal, identity - and then exercises power over those `Other' 
singularities (the mad, the criminal, the sexually deviant) in order to draw them into, 
or expel them from, the boundaries of the communal/social. And yet government is 
constantly provoked by the alterity with which it shares a constitutive division. 77 It can 
never escape this provocation because it can only ever delimit itself with a shared 
division. And thus power carries on practising itself, seeking new terrain on which to 
practice the modification of action (witness psychiatry moving out of the hospital into 
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the community, or the art of correcting the soul of the criminal or the idle moving 
from prisons and asylums to workfare programs). And this agonistic inauguration of 
power that is also community according to Nancy is thus coextensive with the 
political since it constitutes a contestation in which the distinction of self from other is 
at stake. This is precisely the characteristic of things political, the (necessarily 
impossible) struggle to constitute singular presence. 
This agonism at the heart of Nancy's conception of community exposes the 
ineluctably political character of this being-in-common. Moreover, this agonism is the 
condition of possibility (perhaps of necessity) of power relations (understood in the 
Foucauldian sense). It is this congruence of power and the political/agonism, and 
Foucault's understanding of this coincidence in particular, that provides a purchase on 
the manner in which the political is at stake (and yet perpetually resurgent) in urbicide. 
As I have noted, Foucault distinguishes between the exercise of power 
(coincident with the political) and conditions of domination or confrontation. These 
latter situations are ones in which either the freedom of action necessary to the 
exercise of power has evaporated, or ones in which a violent confrontation emerges in 
which a force is exerted on bodies or things that is no longer the response of power to 
a provocation but an attempt to eliminate the freedom to act. These latter 
circumstances either evolve into states of domination or become confrontations in 
which parties separate from each other refuse to yield to one another. Confrontation is 
an elimination of the political insofar as it is the face-to-face opposition of one figure 
to another. The freedom to act is negated by the figuration of either party insofar as 
the party presents itself not as a provocation to the other but as an essential substance 
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un-amenable to governance. In this situation each figure presents itself as a thing with 
a substantial essence and the opposing party is reduced to exerting force upon that 
thing. In this situation the division shared by both parties is taken to be an 
unbridgeable gap that thwarts the exercise of governmental power over actions. This 
is the reduction of provocation or contestation to confrontation. It is, I would argue, 
the translation of agonism into antagonism. 
This translation of agonism into antagonism is a strategy deployed by the 
metaphysics of presence/subjectivity in its work to secure figuration. It is an attempt 
to efface the political insofar as it attempts to translate both division into separation 
and provocation into confrontation. This is a dual event insofar as the translation of 
division into separation is a necessary precursor to confrontation and to the extent that 
the constitution of a confrontation is necessary for the establishment of a separation. 
Antagonism brings a figure to presence insofar as it disavows the shared division 
between itself and its others by constituting that division as a separation. In 
constituting the figure and its Others as separate figures confronting each other 
antagonism is also a depoliticisation. Insofar as agonistic provocation is reduced to 
antagonistic confrontation the political is reduced to technical management of such 
oppositions (albeit a technics that is, properly, a violence). The being-in-common of 
being singular plural is thus effaced. 78 
It is precisely this effacement of the political through its translation into the 
politics of confrontation that is at work in the logics of urbicide. Urbicide targets 
buildings because they are conditions of possibility of the provocation of alterity that 
constitutes agonism. Insofar as buildings are that which constitute existential spatiality 
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as fundamentally heterogeneous, they are also that which constitute existence as 
agonistic. It is in the network of relations constituted by buildings that the shared 
divisions which give rise to self and other are constituted. The destruction of buildings 
is thus an attempt to efface the shared division they constitute and the provocation of 
alterity that any identity is thus constitutively open to. 
This destruction shapes the urban terrain into opposing, antagonistic figures. 
Key front-line zones are destroyed in order to create zones of separation. 
Heterogeneous buildings (such as mosques in so-called Serb areas) are destroyed in 
order to render those areas purportedly homogeneous and thus representable as being 
of a single ethnic substance. Moreover, in the wake of the naturalisation of the 
antagonisms carved out on the terrain of Bosnia, the implementation of the 
agreements reached in the Dayton accords reinforce this depoliticisation by 
establishing literal zones of separation between supposedly antagonistic parties. 79 
Urbicide thus attacks the political itself, translating the agonistic provocation 
of heterogeneity into the antagonistic opposition of separate, figured parties. In 
chapter 61 will illustrate the manner in which zones of separation were established in 
the urbicide that characterised the 1992-95 Bosnian war. Indeed, as I will demonstrate, 
the destruction of the Old Bridge in Mostar creates a one of separation (the Neretva 
gorge) between west and east Mostar that is the foundation of an antagonism between 
Bosnian Croats and Bosniacs that is vital to the performance of the presence of the 
Bosnian Croat ethnic statelet of Herceg-Bosna. Thus in and through the destruction of 
the Old Bridge the Bosnian Croats translated the agonistic provocation of 
heterogeneity that the urban environment of Mostar comprised into the antagonistic 
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separation of `Croat' west Mostar and `Muslim/Bosniac' east Mostar. This separation 
and antagonism was achieved by reconfiguring the urban terrain as separate entities, 
thus lending credence to the claim that these were substantially separate parties 
opposing one another in a confrontation. The destruction of mosques, front line 
streets, public places and finally bridges followed this logic, destroying the shared 
spaces of Mostar in an attempt to establish that Mostar was comprised of two distinct 
opposing parties who shared nothing, had no being-in common. 
And yet as I noted above, this translation of agonism into antagonism is 
perpetually unworked. The translation of agonism into antagonism is, thus never 
entirely secured. As agonism is constitutive of existence it can only ever be effaced, 
disavowed, or cover over, but never replaced or destroyed. In this way it is not an 
either/or choice between agonism and antagonism, but a reduction of the political 
through a disavowal of agonism embodied in attempts to constitute an antagonism. 
Antagonism is predicated on agonism and constitutes a performative disavowal, or 
ongoing negation, of the provocation issued by the agonism of being-in-common. 
In both the rubble of Bosnia and the remaining urban locales this being-in- 
common remains, unworking the loose ends of the ethno-nationalist project that was 
embodied in urbicide. The buildings and rubble of Bosnia continually reassert the 
shared divisions that constitute the networks of singular identity that comprise Bosnia 
today. And as such they are the provocation that unworks the figures of ethnic 
antagonism and zones of separation. Mosques in Banja Luka, and Trebinje, bridges in 
Mostar, and houses for returnees across Republika Srpska are all agonistic 
provocations in which the political returns to haunt ethno-nationalist antagonisms. In 
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these remnants and survivors of urbicide we can see precisely what was at stake in 
such destruction: the disavowal of heterogeneity and the being-in-common it entails. 
Tragically, of course, the return of the agonistic provocation is greeted with further 
violence, further attempts to secure the figures of ethno-nationalism: the destruction of 
houses intended for returnees, and the prevention of mosque rebuilding being the most 
visible instances. 
Shared spatiality and ethno-national spaces: the territorialisation of antagonism 
This constitution of antagonism in and through urbicide and the concomitant 
reduction of the political to the violence of ethnic confrontation is particularly 
important in relation to the central question with which I began this argument: that of 
the logic behind the targeting of the shared spatiality of Bosnia. This constitution of 
antagonism through urban destruction discloses, finally, the manner in which it is 
spatiality that is at stake in urbicide. 
In Chapter 31 demonstrated the manner in which Being-in-the-world, or 
existence, is ineluctably spatial. I also showed that insofar as this spatiality is 
constituted by buildings it is fundamentally shared/public. It was on this basis that I 
argued that existence is constitutively heterogeneous. If it is the conditions of 
possibility of a shared existential spatiality that are attacked by urbicide, what is the 
fate of this spatiality? 
At this point it is necessary to point to a distinction between spatiality on the 
one hand, and space on the other hand. Perhaps we might say (with Edward Casey) 
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that space has traditionally been conceived of as a homogeneous medium bounded 
within certain limits. 80 From the earliest Greek origins of the metaphysics of presence 
to Newton and Kant, space has been conceived of as analogous to the interior of a 
vessel -a given space, within particular bounds, contained, and finally a medium in 
which things may be located and through which they may move. It has become 
possible to speak not only of space as a universal medium, something within which all 
objects have locations and through which all objects move, but also of spaces. These 
spaces, different experiences of space in different discursive contexts, may differ in 
their limits and the locations they offer to objects, but they are essentially identical -a 
medium existing inside specified limits in which objects are located and which is akin 
to the interior bounded by the wa11$ of a vessel. 
Spatiality, on the other hapd, refers to the relationality, dimensionality and 
orientation that comprises Being-its-the-wprld. This spat1plity is quite unlike the space 
in which objects are located. Spatiality does not provide an a priori set of co-ordinates 
in relation to which any object can be located. Rather spatiality comprises an 
engagement with things that is constitutive of the worldliness of Being-in-the-world. 
That is, spatiality contains no co-ordinates and is not prior to Being-in-the-world. 
Rather it is, as I discussed in Chapter 3, precisely the complex networks of relations 
that comprise Being-in-the-world as an everyday engagement with, and an orientation 
towards, the things with which it is concerned. In this sense spatiality is not an 
abstract medium, or universal substance, but a set of relations established by the 
everyday concerns of Being-in-the-world. It is in this sense that Heidegger can say that 
though the spectacles on someone's nose may be closer in terms of space than the 
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picture on the opposite wall at which they are looking, the picture is closer in terms of 
spatiality because it is that with which Dasein is concerned. 81 
Space is, as Heidegger notes, derived from spatiality. Space is generated by the 
establishment of a common measure against which the relations of engagement that 
constitute existential spatiality can be measured (feet, inches, miles, centimetres, 
metres, kilometres and so on). This is what Heidegger means when he says that 
spatiality affords 
the possibility of measuring things... according to distances, spans, and 
directions, and of computing these magnitudes. But the fact that they are 
universally applicable to everything that has extension can in no case 
make numerical magnitudes the ground of the essence of spaces and the 
locales that are measurable with the aid of mathematics. 82 
Spatiality is thus the ground of spaces. Space comprises the reduction of the 
existential spatiality of Being-in-the-world to arbitrary magnitudes. 
Moreover, spatiality is, as I have demonstrated in Chapter 3, fundamentally 
shared/public. That is to say the things in engagement with which spatiality is 
constituted are available to each and every singular instance of Being-in-the-world. 
Space, however is a different proposition. Space, however, is a substantial thing 
providing the co-ordinates of location within given limits (i. e., a thing may be said to 
be located in the space of the room). It is, therefore, a metaphysical concept, a 
homogenous substance. In one sense space admits of heterogeneity insofar as any 
object can be located within it. However space is not shared. Indeed, the fundamental 
rule of spatiality is that no two objects can occupy the same space. The closest to 
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sharing possible in space is for two things to be adjacent to, or touching one another. 
And yet these things are differentiated as having no common border, but rather as 
touching one exterior surface against the other. 
This is precisely the sense in which antagonism presents the confrontation of 
opposing parties - as the being-adjacent, or touching of two bounded entities in which 
the surface at which touching occurs is not a common surface, but the meeting of two 
exterior surfaces and, hence, despite touching, the separation of both entities. It is not 
hard, therefore, to see that the antagonism constituted in and through urbicide is 
coextensive with the constitution of spaces of ethno-national homogeneity. That is to 
say, antagonism is a territorialisation of figuration. Antagonism is the translation of 
shared existential spatiality into adjoining, but bounded, spaces (or territories). Put 
simply figuration stakes out a territorial space, bounds it, and admits of no 
heterogeneity other than that of a confrontation with opposed/antagonistic territorial 
spaces. 
It is precisely this territorialisation of antagonism that can be seen in urbicide. 
The destruction of the urban environment is a laying waste of the locales whose 
spatiality cannot be recuperated to ethno-nationalist spaces. The spaces that ethno- 
nationalism seeks to construct are territorialisations of the figures of ethnic presence 
on which they are predicated. It is in this sense that mosques (and to a lesser extent 
churches) are destroyed as reminders within the territories carved out by ethno- 
nationalists of the heterogeneity on whose disavowal these spaces rest. Moreover, and 
perhaps more importantly, it is the residential districts of Bosnian towns, the public 
squares, parks, shops and so on that are locales whose fundamentally public and, 
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hence, heterogeneous, spatiality cannot be recuperated to these projects of the 
territorialisation of figures. And, hence, an assault on these shared locales is an 
integral part of the campaign by ethno-nationalist forces to bring to presence the 
figures of ethnic identity. In this way ethno-nationalist forces hope to create the 
condition of confrontation in which it suggested that figured ethnic groups live in 
adjacent spaces (touching at, but not sharing, their borders) with no common spaces. 
Hence, it is necessary, argue the forces of etlulo-nationalism, to legitimate ethnic 
cleansing, partition Bosnia, and deny the heterogeneity constitutive of existence. 
And yet as I suggested earlier, the territorialisation of figuration in and through 
antagonism unravels in a variety of places. Territorialisation have to be continually 
re-territorialised in order to maintain the spaces of ethno-nationalist figuration. This 
re-territorialisation takes the form not just of a continuing post-war urbicide, but also 
of continued expulsions predicated on the antagonistic state of affairs. 83 This 
continuation of what constitutes, in Walker's words, an `unstable dialectic of 
inclusion and exclusion', is a perpetual unravelling of territorialisations necessitating 
their reterritorialisation. 84 
Finally, the political, agonism and shared spatiality returns perpetually as an 
ineluctable trace of alterity/heterogeneity necessitating this continual play of 
reterritorialisation. In the laying (or not) of a foundation stone for a mosque, the 
raising of the ruins of the Old Bridge from the river Neretva in Mostar, or the 
refurbishment of the homes of returnees, the traces of the heterogeneity constitutive of 
existence return to haunt ethno-nationalism. Of course, as long as the antagonistic play 
of confrontation is allowed (particularly by the so-called `international community') to 
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remain the status quo, this return of the political will be fleeting. And yet, the point is 
to note that it is precisely this constitutive heterogeneity glimpsed in brief moments 
prior to the reterritorialisation of figures of ethnic identity that is at stake in urbicide. It 
is this heterogeneity that is disavowed in urbicide. And that is the same as saying that 
the logic of urbicide is the reduction of the agonism of the political to the antagonism 
of territorial politics. 
By way of conclusion of this argument I would like to turn, therefore, to look 
at several instances in which we can clearly see these stakes of urbicide. In the first 
place I would like to look at three specific issues in present day Bosnia: the rebuilding 
of mosques, the return of displaced persons, and the task of urban reconstruction in 
Mostar. I would then like to turn to look at three further cases which, I think, broaden 
the scope of the question of urbicide from Bosnia to cases of similar urban destruction 
thus showing the manner in which this conceptual schema sketched out in relation to 
Bosnia is analytically productive in relation to wider questions of the destruction of 
urban environments. In the first case I want to look at questions raised by the de facto 
partition of the town of Mitrovica in Kosovo after the 1999 Kosovo conflict. I will 
then look at the destruction of Palestinian homes in the Occupied Territories by the 
Israeli Defence Force. Finally I will look briefly at the extreme consequences of 
urbicide as seen in the destruction of the Chechen capital Grozny by Russian forces. I 
want, in order to conclude this argument, to use these cases to illustrate what I think 
urbicide both discloses and means and the manner in which, at present, 
anthropocentrism prevents us from grasping this. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE STAKES OF URBICIDE 
[T]he Yugoslav People's Army, the bloody cartographer... cut to pieces 
the structures of the city [Vukovar], so as not merely to conquer it, but to 
keep it forever.. . on the map of Greater Serbia. 
Such map-illusions murder and rape reality to encircle territory of 
the imagination... "Ethnic cleansing" means cleaning a city's contents of 
unclean substance. But changing the ethnic picture of a city with genocide 
cannot guarantee that the picture will never take shape again. This is why 
it was necessary [in Vukovar] to foreclose on resettlement and renewal. ' 
Mostar joined the ominous club of divided cities.. . 
in which the bridges 
are replaced by walls... [Mostar was thus] reduced to a battleground of 
opposing political interests, with its architecture and urban fabric turned 
into ... military targets. The two sides 
in Mostar... allied along ethnic 
lines... breach the basic covenant of the city: to be open for all. Thus they 
engage in the futile game of claiming what they can never get 2 
The city and philosophy 
In Being Singular Plural Jean-Luc Nancy notes that `as long as philosophy is 
an appeal to the origin, the city, far from being philosophy's subject or space, is its 
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problem. '3 Insofar as the western metaphysical tradition of philosophy is a 
foundationalist project to sketch out the transcendental logos (or universal substance) 
of community, it can never simply inhabit or regulate the city. The city, as a space of 
fundamental heterogeneity is precisely that which continually unworks such 
philosophical articulations of a ground or logos of community, opening this project up 
to an agonistic alterity. In this sense `the city is... the bringing to light of being-in- 
common as the dis position (dispersal and disparity) of the community represented as 
founded in interiority or transcendence. '4 
Figurative representations of the city-community as a universal substance 
(logos) are unravelled by the agonistic networks of identity-difference constituted by 
the buildings that comprise the city. Insofar as the city is constituted as public/shared 
by the buildings that comprise its conditions of possibility and, hence, defined by its 
heterogeneity, the project of philosophy will always fall idle in its streets, squares and 
buildings, unable to perform the work of figuration. Despite this, figuration returns 
again and again to work on the city. It is as if the city offends those who attempt to 
carve out a logos (or substance) on which to ground a city-community. Mostar, 
Sarajevo, and Vukovar are only three of the most visible of these offending cities. 
Urbanity has repeatedly been subjected to the ravages of projects inherently opposed 
to the agonism harboured by cities. The ravages of this `appeal to the origin' have 
been seen in diverse locations including, though not limited to, Beirut, Belfast, 
Hiroshima, The Occupied Territories, Berlin and Grozny. 5 It is in this sense that 
Nancy notes that `philosophy is the problem of the city'. 6 Philosophy, this `appeal to 
the origin', is a problem for urbanity insofar as it `covers over... "community"', 7 
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reducing being-in-common to rubble that disavows the heterogeneous co-existence 
characteristic of the city. 
Nancy's framing of the question of the destruction of urbanity by figuration in 
terms of the relationship that exists between philosophy and the city is characteristic 
of his concerns in Being Singular Plural: namely, first philosophy. It is appropriate in 
an enquiry (such as Nancy's) into the very first principles that govern thinking about 
existence to return to the question that has haunted the metaphysics of 
presence/subjectivity from its Greek inception. It is precisely the question of the 
relation of the ruler, or philosopher, and the city that is framed by Plato in the 
Republic, and taken up by Aristotle in the Politics. 8 That both of these philosophers 
take the regulation of the city by philosophy as their theme might be attributed to the 
context in which both thinkers wrote: that of the city-state. And yet, this would miss 
the point that Nancy makes. For Nancy it is not so much whether a writer speaks 
explicitly of a/the city, but rather of a relationship between the appeal to an origin that 
characterises the metaphysics of presence/subjectivity, and a principle of fundamental 
heterogeneity found in urbanity. `The city' and `philosophy' thus name two opposing, 
and yet inextricably related, principles at work in the history of western thought: 
alterity and metaphysics. And this relationship recurs persistently throughout western 
political theory: in, for example, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau and the liberal 
tradition .9 Indeed, insofar as modem liberal political theory is concerned with the 
question of the regulation of the state by an appeal to an origin (of ethics, justice, or 
equality), it treats the state as the city writ large. 
At stake, therefore, in Nancy's elaboration of the relationship between 
philosophy and the city is the broader question of the relationship between an appeal 
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to an origin characteristic of the western metaphysics of presence/subjectivity and a 
fundamental heterogeneity characteristic of urbanity. This is precisely the relationship 
that I sketched out in Chapter 5 between figuration and community (or being-in- 
common). Moreover, it is this relationship that is embodied in the disavowal of 
difference by ethno-nationalism that characterised the 1992-95 Bosnian war. And in 
this regard Nancy's account of philosophy's resentment of the city is productive in 
understanding the manner in which the relationship between ethno-nationalism and 
difference generates so much urban destruction. Ethno-nationalism, founded as it is on 
the western metaphysics of presence/subjectivity, is an appeal to an origin. In this 
sense ethno-nationalism is what Connolly might call an `ontopolitical' claim. 
According to Connolly, an `ontopolitical' claim `invokes a set of fundaments 
about [the] necessities and possibilities of human being, about, for instance, the forms 
into which human beings may be composed and the possible relations humans can 
establish'. 10 These are claims concerning the onta, `the really existing things', or 
rather, claims concerning the basis on which such `really existing things' are 
possible. " These claims establish a horizon of understanding of the nature of all that 
is taken to `really exist'. That is, ontopolitical claims articulate the `conditions of 
possibility' of all that really exists, the limit beyond which what is taken to really exist 
has no proper grounding. It is precisely the fact that these claims set out the conditions 
of possibility of really existing things that makes them inherently political. In 
assuming reality is grounded in a particular manner, a limitation of the possibilities of 
existing things is imposed. This limitation rules that reality is such and such a way and 
no other. Which is to say that really existing things have such and such an ontological 
character and thus certain existential possibilities are ruled out. 
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It is precisely the establishment of such limitations of the inherently agonistic 
existential possibilities of reality that constitutes the fundamental political moment. 
As I noted in Chapter 5, the political must be understood as a fundamentally agonistic 
moment in which limits are established which include some `necessities and 
possibilities of human being' and exclude others and through which identity is 
constituted. And yet the paradox of this political moment is that the agonism is not 
dispelled, but merely delimited. The ontopolitical claim of ethno-nationalism is an 
appeal to an origin that might enable a delimitation of the evident heterogeneity of 
existence into clearly separate ethnic statelets. 12 
Ethno-nationalism's appeal to an origin takes the form of a claim to territorial 
sovereignty for supposedly pre-existent and naturally homogenous ethnic groups. In 
this sense ethno-nationalism attempts to delimit the agonism of heterogeneous 
existence by appealing to a metaphysical ideal that posits ethnicity as a pre-existent 
human attribute. Moreover, ethno-nationalism asserts that since ethnicity is a pre- 
existent attribute of each and every individual, the natural state of affairs is for 
individuals to aggregate in homogeneous groups. Preventing such aggregation is taken 
to be an artificial and contingent constraint of the real basis of human existence. It is 
this ontopolitical claim that legitimates ethno-nationalist claims to self-determination, 
for the aggregation of the various enclaves they have carved out through violent 
means into statelets. 
It is in this way that we can recognise the problem the city poses for ethno- 
nationalism (and conversely the problem ethno-nationalism poses for the city). Insofar 
as urbanity, and in particular the buildings that are its conditions of possibility, reveal 
the ineluctably shared and heterogeneous nature of existence (our being-in-common), 
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it comprises a constant, agonistic provocation to the ontopolitics of ethno-nationalism. 
It is important to note that urbanity in this sense involves more than that which 
happens inside a/the city (as if those in rural districts did not experience such 
heterogeneity). Urbanity, or a fundamental being-in-common, comprises an existential 
condition that constitutes all existence as always already shared. It is in this sense that 
Heidegger is right to note that `dwelling' is not merely the act of living in a house, but 
a more comprehensive existential condition of, as he would put it, `staying with 
things'. 13 This is not to say, in an enthusiastically modem way, that `we are all city 
dwellers today'. 14 But it is to say that the sharing of existential spatiality that always 
already implicates existence in community is not confined to cities but occurs in all 
those conditions in which the things with which we engage on an everyday basis 
intimate an ineluctable alterity in our world. It is also to say that the destruction of 
villages or farms is no less important than the assault upon the historic core of 
Sarajevo or Mostar. 
In order to assert its appeal to an origin, ethno-nationalism thus strikes at the 
conditions of possibility of the agonism that constantly provokes it: the (built) things 
that constitute existence as fundamentally shared (a being-in-common). This assault is 
a `covering-over' of the heterogeneity that unworks the origins on which ethno- 
nationalism bases its claim to legitimacy. As I argued in Chapter 5, this assault 
attempts to naturalise the claim that ethnic groups are naturally distinct and separate 
by constituting the relationship between groups as an antagonism. This is an attempt 
to deny the ecstatic communication, the network of identity\difference in and through 
which these groups are constituted. This naturalisation of separation covers over the 
297 
agonism of existence, transforming it into the antagonism of competing interests 
(what we commonly call `politics'). 
As I noted in Chapter 5, this is precisely what Nancy refers to as figuration: an 
appeal to a figure that is taken to be the origin, or universal/transcendent substance of 
being. The figure establishes an `unstable dialectic of inclusion and exclusion' in and 
through which the fiction of being-separate rather than being-in-common is 
instituted. 15 In this way the figure is the institution of a community understood as a 
communion -a sharing (in or out) of a universal substance that is the origin of all 
those who belong in the community. The communion-community only exists insofar 
as it is able to clearly delineate those who are included in, and those who are excluded 
from, the communion: those who either partake, or are the embodiment, of the posited 
substance of being. When the figure is established, the community can claim to have 
achieved presence, to be able to exist alone, rather than in relation to others. And this 
can only be accomplished through the expulsion and then exclusion of that which is 
other than the figure. Every figure is, after all, defined in and through the agonistic 
networks of identity\difference, the being-in-common, that characterises existence and 
must thus suppress/cover over this agonism in order to achieve presence. 
Figuration thus denies agonism, closing itself off from the Other(s) in relation 
to which it is defined, and claiming a separateness predicated on an appeal to an 
ontological foundation. Moreover, when this separation is effected, the presence of the 
communion-community can be taken for granted by its members. The universal 
substance on which the figure is predicated is taken to be the natural origin of the 
community members, and, hence, never questioned. The communion-community thus 
becomes a technical-bureaucratic entity that works to refine the figure and never 
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questions the appeal to origins made in this figuration. In this way the ethnic statelet, 
once established, never questions its substantial presence but works, with ever 
increasing ferocity to refine its homogeneity - its separateness from its others. This 
work is the consolidation of the antagonisms through which the figure covered over 
the agonism of existence. Thus destroyed buildings are not rebuilt for lack of permits, 
minority returns fail to happen because of `security fears', and non-ethnic institutions 
fail to operate because they are said to lack legitimacy. 16 These are bureaucratic 
responses that effect a consolidation of the ethno-nationalist figure whilst never 
questioning the origin on which this figure is predicated. 
These are, as I noted in Chapter 5, the stakes of urbicide. Urbicide is the 
visible manifestation of the problem philosophy (or ontopolitical thought) poses for 
the city (or being-in-common). At stake in this problem is the agonism (or being-in- 
common) that urbicide covers over. The ethno-nationalist/figurative resolution of the 
problem the city poses for philosophy is the transformation of being-in-common, or 
agonism, into a being-separate, or antagonism. This transformation, which is the 
accomplishment of figuration, is effected through the territorialisation of antagonism, 
the carving out of distinctions upon the terrain of Bosnia: the destruction of shared 
spatiality and the naturalisation of the separateness this destruction is perceived to 
establish. 
And yet as I also noted, this figuration is perpetually unworked by the agonism 
proper to existence. Across the borders that set out the antagonisms that shape post- 
war Bosnia difference communicates itself, insistently. Figures find their work falling 
idle, or unravelling as alterity makes its constitutive presence felt. And it is for this 
reason that figured communion-communities relentlessly destroy heterogeneity, expel 
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difference, and cover over being-in-common in ever increasing territorialisations of 
the antagonisms that constitute their claim to separateness. However, these continuing 
post-war violences are also evidence of the manner in which such antagonism is 
contested and unworked by the agonism of existence. 
One can see these stakes of urbicide in a multiplicity of instances of everyday 
violence, conflict and exclusion. That is, one can see these stakes played out in the 
everyday territorialisation and reterritorialisation of antagonisms. To demonstrate this 
I want to outline in this chapter a number of cases where the covering over, or even 
uncovering, of the being-in-common proper to existence in Bosnia-Herzegovina can 
be seen. Specifically, I want to look at three instances of post-Dayton politics that 
reveal the stakes of urbicide: the progress (or lack thereof) of mosque rebuilding; the 
return of refugees and displaced persons to their former places of residence; and plans 
for the reconstruction of destroyed urban fabric in Mostar. In this way, I hope to 
recapitulate the central claims of my argument and consolidate the case I have made 
for considering the destruction of the urban environment in the 1992-95 Bosnian war 
as urbicide. 
Furthermore, if I am right, the stakes of urbicide are not only played out in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. I want to consider, therefore, three further examples beyond the 
borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina in which the logics/stakes of urbicide can also be seen: 
the Kosovan town of Mitrovica; the demolition of Palestinian homes by Israeli 
security forces; and the devastation of the Chechen capital Grozny by Russian forces. 
In this way I hope not only to consolidate my argument but to open up productive 
avenues for future thought. 
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Rebuilding Ferhadija 
As I noted in Chapter 5, a total of 618 mosques across Bosnia were destroyed 
during the 1992-92 Bosnian war, 450 of which were in Republika Srpska. In the Banja 
Luka area 90 mosques were destroyed including all 15 of the mosques in the town of 
Banja Luka itself 17 This destruction should be seen as a systematic assault, by ethno- 
nationalist forces upon heterogeneous cultural heritage. Bosnian Serb forces were not 
the only ones to engage in this urbicide. For example, Bosnian Croat forces destroyed 
all of the mosques in the Stolac municipality. 18 However, lest we should think that 
such destruction was merely the consequence of war, and that all sides engaged in 
such destruction we should note that there are very few instances in which Bosnian 
Army (or Bosniac) forces destroyed cultural heritage belonging to either Bosnian 
Serbs or Bosnian Croats. 19 
Such destruction was integral to the kind of ethnic cleansing practised by 
Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat forces. These mosques were destroyed `not by 
artillery but by explosives [and in the majority of cases] still remain nothing but a pile 
of rubble'. 0 In many cases even the rubble was cleared to leave no trace at all of the 
mosques' existences. Perhaps the most (in)famous mosque to be destroyed was the 
Ferhadija in Banja Luka. The Ferhadija was begun in 1567 by Ottoman authorities in 
Bosnia and `was considered one of Yugoslavia's national monuments'? ' The mosque 
was destroyed on 6t' May 1993, its remains removed by the Serb authorities, and the 
empty site turned into a car park. 22 
The fate of the Ferhadija has become a focal point of post-Dayton Bosnian 
politics. Despite effectively partitioning Bosnia, the General Framework Agreement 
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(GFA) contains provisions for the restoration of Bosnia's pre-war heterogeneity. 23 
Within the framework of two effectively autonomous entities, the Dayton accords 
mandates both the United Nations' High Representative and the national government 
institutions to institute programs to uphold human rights, to ensure the return of 
displaced persons to their place of former residence (or provide compensation for loss 
of property where this is not possible), and for the rebuilding of urban fabric in order 
to facilitate this return. 24 Given such a concern for returns, reconstruction and the 
upholding of human rights, the rebuilding of mosques is a central issue in post-Dayton 
Bosnian politics. In order to facilitate the return of displaced Bosnian Muslims to their 
places of former residence in areas now held by Bosnian Serbs or Bosnian Croats, and 
to uphold the right to the freedom of religion, it is argued that the requisite cultural 
infrastructure must be restored. Moreover, the rebuilding of mosques is not simply a 
case of the provision of a cultural infrastructure to support returning communities. The 
progress of such rebuilding is also taken as a wider indicator of the implementation of 
the Dayton accords. Insofar as the GFA is intended to diminish the power of ethno- 
nationalism in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is argued that the rebuilding of mosques is a 
good indicator of progress on this front. Where mosques are rebuilt it will be evidence 
of a growing acceptance of ethnic diversity. 25 
Attempts to rebuild mosques in Republika Srpska have been continually 
stalled by Bosnian Serb nationalist authorities. In June 1999 this intransigence 
prompted the Human Rights Commission (the body established under the GFA to 
uphold individual human rights and adjudicate in cases where discrimination was 
thought to have occurred) to order the Republika Srpska authorities to issue the 
relevant permits. 6 The Republika Srpska authorities continued to refuse to issue the 
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permits and in August 2000 `[t]he Bosnian Islamic Community announced ... it would 
go ahead with the rebuilding work, with or without the necessary permits from the 
local authorities. '27 Permits were eventually granted and a ceremony to lay a 
foundation stone commemorating the rebuilding of the mosque was planned for May 
7d' 2001 (symbolically eight years to the day after the mosque's destruction). A similar 
ceremony was planned to commemorate the rebuilding of a mosque in the town of 
Trebinje on May 5t' 2001. 
Both ceremonies were halted by violent mobs who assaulted those who had 
gathered to attend the laying of the foundation stones. 28 Neither the Republika Srpska 
police nor NATO Stabilisation Force (SFOR) troops acted to stop the mobs from 
disrupting the ceremonies. The violence prevented either foundation stone from being 
laid and attracted strong condemnation from, amongst others, the High Representative 
Wolfgang Petritsch. 29 Both the Republika Srpska authorities and the President of 
Yugoslavia argued that although the violence was regrettable, the rebuilding of 
mosques on Bosnian Serb territory was provocative and, hence, bound to inflame 
ethno-nationalist passions. 30 The foundation stone for the Ferhadija mosque was 
finally laid on 18th June 2001. On this occasion Republika Srpska riot police 
contained Bosnian Serb protesters sufficiently to allow the ceremony (attended this 
time by Republika Srpska president Mirko Sarovic) to proceed. 31 
The rebuilding of the Ferhadija provides a clear illustration of the stakes of 
urbicide. The destruction of mosques in Bosnia was particularly intense in those areas 
claimed as a part of Republika Srpska territory. It is important to see this intense 
assault on mosques not as a simple attack on cultural heritage but as a integral 
moment in the logic of urbicide. Indeed, it is in the context of the logics of urbicide 
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that we can see this destruction, and the subsequent protracted attempts to rebuild 
mosques such as the Ferhadija, as an integral moment of the figuration of an ethno- 
nationalist communion-community. 
Republika Srpska is a communion-community predicated on the disavowal of 
the agonistic heterogeneity of existence in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Bosnian Serb ethno- 
nationalism is predicated on a figure that disavows, excludes and destroys difference. 
This figure is, in Nancy's terms, both an appeal to a metaphysical origin and the 
positing of a universal substance of being which disavows agonistic being-in- 
common. This figure is predicated on a dual logic of ethnicity and exclusion. 
Interestingly this figure combines a corporate (Hegelian) understanding of the 
substance of being with a liberal notion of self-determination that legitimates 
exclusion and homogenisation. Firstly, ethnicity is posited to comprise the universal 
substance of being. In other words it is claimed that every being is ethnically 
determined. The problem with this assertion is that although it posits ethnicity as a 
substance `laid out "under" supposed "individuals"' it also asserts that insofar as two 
beings may have different ethnicities they are substantially different. 32 Which is to say 
the figure claims that every being is in the first place marked by an ethnicity, there is 
no commonality except amongst those of the same ethnicity. This figuration is, thus, 
clearly an ontopolitical claim in so far as it takes all beings to be intelligible only on 
the basis of ethnic affiliation. In this sense this figuration excludes all understandings 
that might claim that beings have some other substantial basis 33 
Ethno-nationalism is a corporate-Hegelian understanding of being insofar as it 
asserts that a given ethnicity is a universal substance which particular individuals 
embody (a universality of which particularity partakes). Individuals are thus particular 
304 
embodiments of this substance. Contrary to the liberal notion that beings are 
substantially the same (that is, each and every being is made of the same substance but 
has the freedom to shape the possibilities determined by this substance), ethno- 
nationalism holds that a given ethnicity is a universal teleological principle of which 
particular beings must partake and which thus determines those beings' existence. In 
this sense ethno-nationalism does not conceive of being as a substance shared-out 
amongst beings but something that beings share-in. 
Secondly, the ethno-national figure realises itself as a community present to 
itself through the exclusion of both differing ethnicities and those forms of life that 
refuse to conform to the understanding of being it proposes (i. e., forms of life that 
refuse ethnic-identification). In order to become present for and to itself, the ethno- 
nationalist figure must disavow the relations in and through which its identity is 
constituted by performing an enclosure around its substantial essence. It is in the 
accomplishment of this violent exclusion that the logics of urbicide become visible. 
As the ethno-nationalist figure must disavow its constitutive relationships with 
alterity (other ethnicities and other forms of life) it practices a two-fold regime of 
exclusion. In the first place it lays claim to a logic of self-determination that holds that 
since ethnicity is the fundamental substance that determines being, beings should be 
free to pursue their ethnic-affiliations without impediment. Or, rather, it claims that, 
despite the best efforts of multiculturalism, ethnic affiliation will always claim the 
primary allegiance of beings and, hence, political regimes should be predicated upon 
recognising the separate needs of different ethnicities. This claim is consolidated by 
myths of ancient enmity between different ethnic groups. TM 
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Secondly, in and through urbicide, a separation is effected between ethnic 
groups. This separation is a territorialisation of boundaries. These are not the shared 
boundaries constitutive of being-in-common, but dead zones between groups that 
naturalise the idea that there is no sharing or commonality between different 
ethnicities. This separation is then consolidated by an urbicidal program of destruction 
within the territory carved out by the zones of separation. This program achieves a 
homogeneity that disavows the existence of heterogeneity within the territory 
controlled by the ethno-nationalist figuration thus giving the fictive appearance of 
presence to the ethno-nationalist figure. It is in this manner that the agonistic existence 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina is transformed into the fractured and antagonistic landscape of 
post-Dayton Bosnia. 
The Ferhadija was destroyed as part of the homogenisation of the 
territorialisation of the figure of Bosnian Serb ethnicity. It was not sufficient to carve 
out Republika Srpska by establishing zones of separation at the front lines held by the 
Bosnian Serb Army. Indeed, the creation of front-line zones of separation that marked 
the extent of Bosnian Serb territory, was ancillary to (and motivated by) a systematic 
eradication of traces of difference within Republika Srpska. In this way the 
communion-community could be established: a homogeneous entity, defined by its 
ethnic substance, existing next to, but separate from, its others (specifically the 
Muslim-Croat Federation). 
As with all such communion-communities, Republika Srpska is a work that is 
perpetually seeking to refine its homogenisation through the exclusion and destruction 
of difference. It is for this reason that it was not sufficient to destroy the mosques. The 
clearing of the rubble constitutes part of the work of ensuring agonism cannot return 
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to the communion-community and undo/unravel the work it has accomplished. This 
work is, as I noted in Chapter 5, primarily bureaucratic and technical. 35 The figure, 
once territorialised, and thus given presence as an antagonistic entity separate from its 
others, is naturalised and, hence, suspends questions of its own meaning and 
legitimacy. Indeed the unquestioning acceptance of the figure is vital to the continuing 
existence of Bosnian Serb nationalism. In never questioning the meaning and 
consequence of the figure under which they live Bosnian Serb nationalists are able to 
maintain the fictive presence of the communion-community named Republika Srpska. 
This unquestioning simple-mindedness can be seen in the manner in which the ethnic 
predicates of the Bosnian Serb nationalist figure are reiterated in ever more outrageous 
claims. In statements that proclaim `Srbija do Tokija' ('Serbia as far as Tokyo'), the 
Bosnian Serbs demonstrate that questions concerning the meaning or implications of 
the claims concerning the substance of being effected in this ethno-nationalist figure 
have been suspended. 6 That Serb nationalists think that, because of ethnic kinship 
and expansionist dreams, they can claim such a territorial expanse demonstrates an 
unthinking acceptance of the myth of ethnic self-determination on which their 
nationalist figure rests. 
The technical bureaucratic nature of Bosnian Serb ethno-nationalism can be 
seen in the various efforts made by the Republika Srpska authorities to halt the 
rebuilding of mosques by refusing to grant the requisite permits. Although seemingly 
obstinate and relatively petty, it is precisely this kind of bureaucratic obstruction that 
Nancy is referring to when he talks of the immanentist communion-community 
accomplishing its work through technical means. The territorialisation and 
homogenisation of the figured community is performatively maintained by a 
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proliferation of ordinances and regulations that both prevent the return of agonism to 
the ethnic statelet and promote the homogenisation of its territory. 
Rebuilding comprises a contestation of the antagonisms that the war sought to 
naturalise through the destruction of urban fabric. It is precisely by rebuilding 
buildings that are testament to the heterogeneity of existence in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
that the ethno-nationalist figure can be challenged. These buildings mark the return of 
the agonism of existence to the territorialised antagonistic statelets. These buildings 
regenerate networks of identity\difference and are constitutive of a public/shared 
spatiality that radically unworks the attempt to establish a homogeneous ethnic 
territory. In the locales reconstituted by rebuilding these destroyed buildings the 
agonistic constitution of identity is laid bare. Moreover, these locales reveal the 
ecstatic communication that is constitutive of any sense of self. For it is these 
buildings that make it clear that any sense of Serbian self is only generated by virtue 
of being-with Muslims (and Croats and Bosniacs). This is precisely the being-with to 
which Nancy refers in Being Singular Plural, a being-with that is the condition of 
possibility of the articulation of a being-distinct-from. 37 Serbs are with Muslims in the 
sense that being-Serb is only possible insofar as it is articulated as a being-different- 
from-Muslims and, hence, a relation, a division accomplished at a shared border of 
distinction. 
Excursus: lest we think rebuilding is simple or sufficient 
Whilst rebuilding is vital to a contestation of the ethno-nationalist figuration 
that was effected in and through urbicide, it should not be treated as a panacea. 
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Indeed, we should not think that rebuilding destroyed urban fabric will necessarily 
reinstate the pre-war locales and networks of identity\difference and, hence, dissipate 
the ethno-nationalist antagonisms forged in urbicide. That is, whilst it is necessary to 
rebuild destroyed urban environments in order to contest ethno-nationalism it is not 
sufficient to simply erect a building and believe that this will necessarily give rise to a 
renaissance of heterogeneity. Moreover, it would be wrong to interpret my account of 
urbicide as an argument that ethno-nationalists never build on the ruins they create. 
Ethno-nationalism is not only a destructive force, it is capable of building monuments 
to its achievements amidst the rubble of the urban fabric it has destroyed. 
Andras Riedlmayer notes that there are `a number of examples of the... 
destruction of [a] non-Serb (or non-Croat) monument, [followed by] erasure of the 
traces, [and] erection of a triumphalist new Orthodox or Catholic church to signal the 
new, `ethnically cleansed' status of the community. '38 It is important to note, however, 
that Rieldmayer cautions that whilst these new structures are built amidst the rubble of 
urbicide, `they do not necessarily replace [the destroyed building] on the same 
building site'. 39 Riedlmayer cites examples including: `the erection of a gigantic new 
Orthodox church in the centre of Banja Luka... directly across the main square from 
the [ruined] Ferhadija'; a new Orthodox church in Trebinje `where all 10 of the 
town's mosques had been razed'; and a similar church in the ethnically cleansed town 
of Zvomik. 40 In both Mostar and Srebrenica crosses have been built on the hillsides 
overlooking the town to assert the primacy of the ethnic cleansers [See Appendix 1, 
figure 5] 41 Perhaps the most stark illustration, however, of this program of rebuilding 
to consolidate ethno-nationalism is the threat made by Bosnian Croats in Stolac who 
are reported to have told the Mufti of Mostar, 'if you start building a mosque, we will 
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build a [Catholic] church on its cornerstone' 42 And it is precisely for this reason that 
we should note that it is always possible to rebuild after urbicide, but that such 
rebuilding does not necessarily comprise a contestation of the antagonistic figures that 
lie at the heart of urbicidal logics. 
In this sense we can note an asymmetry in the logics of urbicide. Whilst the 
destruction of buildings comprises a disavowal of the heterogeneity of existence, 
rebuilding destroyed urban environments need not comprise a reciprocal avowal of 
such heterogeneity. This asymmetry reveals an important aspect of the stakes of 
urbicide. The key to this asymmetry lies in the manner in which buildings constitute 
the conditions of possibility of the shared/public and, hence, heterogeneous character 
of existential spatiality. Urbicide destroys buildings because they constitute the 
conditions of possibility of the heterogeneity that characterises urbanity. Insofar as 
buildings are the condition of possibility of such heterogeneity, destroying urban 
fabric will disavow such being-in-common. In urbicide, then, heterogeneity is 
necessarily disavowed as its conditions of possibility are effaced. And yet, in 
rebuilding a different event is constituted. Rebuilding is the (re)constitution of the 
conditions of possibility of heterogeneity. Rebuilding (re)establishes a locale that is 
always already fundamentally shared. And yet, this (re)construction of the conditions 
of possibility need not necessarily give rise to the emergence of an non-antagonistic 
polity. 
How might we explain this asymmetry? After all, if buildings are the condition 
of possibility of heterogeneity is it not enough to rebuild and thus open up the urban 
fabric to an ineluctable alterity? This may appear to be the logical extension of my 
argument and yet I do not believe it to be the case for one important reason. Although 
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urbicide comprises a devastation of the urban environment, it is only in rare cases 
total. That is to say, insofar as urbicide is the transformation of agonistic existence 
into an antagonism of homogeneous and separate figures, it is often sufficient to carve 
out zones of separation and destroy those buildings that, as either shared spaces or 
spaces of alterity, comprise a contestation of the homogeneity of the figured 
communion-community. It might be simplistic, but we should remember that the 
communion-community still needs housing stock to house its members. And so, 
urbicide does not - except in rare cases - raze towns and cities in their entirety. 
In order to explain this aspect of urbicide, we must return to the character of 
the locale. Insofar as the locale is a public network of relations of identity\difference it 
is open in regard to its meaning. It is, in the truest sense, a site of agonism. Which is to 
say it is a site open to multiple contrasting networks of meaning. It is properly public, 
or shared. In Mark Wigley's terms we might say that the locale 'trembles'. 43 For 
Wigley, this trembling is a mark of the manner in which a building is constitutive of a 
number of relational networks of meaning (or discourses). Wigely notes that although 
a building may appear to be stable it is always already the terrain of a number of 
discourses that effect a destabilisation of the meaning of the building. That is, the 
building is a contested ground: a contestation of the meaning of the building, or the 
primacy of one of the relational networks constituted by the building over the others. 
In this sense, the buildings that comprise the constitutive condition of locales tremble: 
being constitutively open to being the condition of possibility of a multiplicity of 
networks of meaning. In this sense the building is many things for many such 
networks. 
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It is precisely this `trembling' (or what Nancy terms 'dis-position'), that 
regimes that adhere to the `appeal to an origin' on which the western metaphysics of 
presence/subjectivity is founded are opposed to. The appeal to an origin is a claim that 
intends to arrest this trembling that characterises the very conditions of possibility of 
our Being-in-the-world. This is exactly what I have called the `ontopolitical claim'. 
The ontopolitical claim attempts to refute the trembling multiplicity of existence and 
impose a single meaning upon existence. It is this dynamic that is, ultimately, at work 
in urbicide. Urbicide is the final act of frustration at the inability to prevent the 
buildings that are the condition of possibility of our always already heterogeneous 
Being-in-the-world from trembling. 
As I noted earlier in this chapter, urbicide is perpetuated by bureaucratic means 
in the absence of conditions of armed conflict. Indeed, every figured community 
constantly strives to fix the trembling of its buildings. This attempt to arrest an 
agonistic trembling is an event short of destruction that consolidates urbicide. And it 
is because figuration can arrest the trembling of buildings that it can both afford not to 
effect a total destruction of the urban environment and simultaneously rebuild upon 
the rubble it generates. This is the explanation for the asymmetry that problematises 
the rebuilding process. It is possible that a building may be rebuilt and yet may not 
tremble. In such cases, where the building is rebuilt, but where its constitutively 
heterogeneous character is effaced, rebuilding does not mark a proper return of 
agonism to the figured community. " 
Interestingly, one can see this asymmetrical dynamic at work in the 
reconstruction of mosques by Saudi aid agencies in both Bosnia-Herzegovina and 
Kosovo. Saudi Wahhabi charities have given both financial and construction aid to 
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reconstruct Islamic buildings in, amongst other places, Sarajevo and Djakovica. There 
has been substantial concern that these reconstruction projects have actually harmed, 
rather than helped, the reconstruction process. 5 The Wahhabi workers have 
implemented a strict interpretation of Islamic principles regarding the construction of 
mosques and have in several cases used this interpretation as legitimisation for the 
destruction of mosques that survived the war. Indeed Wahhabi workers have promised 
to `rebuild... damaged mosques "twice as big and twice as Islamic"', but only if they 
conform to their strict interpretation of Islam. 46 In Vuciturn in Kosovo this has meant 
the destruction of Ottoman gravestones in the cemetery of the Hadum mosque because 
the Wahhabis consider them to be idolatrous. 7 Wahhabi workers have also destroyed 
or whitewashed the interiors of mosques (because they contain representations not in 
keeping with strict interpretations of the Koran). Finally they have rebuilt in a manner 
out of keeping with the ottoman style in which Bosnian mosques were built. 48 
The Wahhabi destruction of mosques (in the name of reconstruction) is 
predicated on claims about the (in)authenticity of Bosnian mosques. One can see these 
claims as attempts to figure the Bosnian Muslim community as a Wahhabi Muslim 
community. That is to say the Wahhabis are making a specific claim about the 
substance that defines an Islamic community (be it Bosnian or Saudi). Such a claim is, 
properly, a figure that attempts to establish a communion-community. Interestingly, 
perhaps the most distinctive feature of so-called Bosnian-Muslims is that they 
consistently contest their figuration as a confessional communion-community. 49 The 
Wahhabi destruction is, in the face of the heterogeneity of so-called Bosnian-Muslims, 
an attempt to fix these trembling mosques as `properly Islamic' houses of worship. 
The mosques of Bosnia present a specific challenge in this regard. They were built by 
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Ottoman authorities and catered to Slavs who converted to Islam and yet also 
comprise elements of the heritage of Bosnia (taken as a state) itself. Oscillating 
between these meanings the mosques tremble in a multitude of networks of 
identity\difference. And in this context, the Saudi Wahhabi reconstruction means they 
are destroyed once again in an attempt to halt their trembling. Hence, it might be fair 
to say in this case that we can see that rebuilding need not automatically lead to the 
return of agonism but can be as antagonistically figured as destruction itself. 
House burnings and the question(s) of return 
The stakes of urbicide are similarly posed by the question of the return of 
refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs) to their places of former residence in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. 50 In the process of minority returns an ongoing logic of 
urbicide/figuration is visible that clearly illustrates the stakes of urbicide. 
Minority returns are those instances in which refugees or IDPs `[r]eturn to 
areas controlled by a [sic] ethnic group other than the returnees'. 51 In this sense 
minority returnees are those refugees and IDPs who return to places of former 
residence in which, as a consequence of ethnic cleansing, they are now in an ethnic 
minority. As I noted in Chapter 3, these returnees would, in the pre-war period, have 
constituted ethnic majorities (or an element of a mixed ethnicity polity) in their places 
of former residence. Minority return is thus a direct consequence of the logic of ethno- 
nationalism. It is important to stress that minority returns are occurring in large 
numbers (some 67,000 in 2000) and, hence, constitute a significant contestation of 
ethnic cleansing (and the logics of ethno-nationalism). 52 
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The progress of minority returns has been taken to a key indicator of the 
success of the GFA in reversing ethnic cleansing, restoring Bosnia's pre-war 
heterogeneity, and establishing conditions for the emergence of a plural (non- 
nationalist) polity. There are a number of central problems which the minority returns 
process must confront. Firstly, the logics of urbicide have left much of the housing 
stock, infrastructure and cultural heritage of minority returnees in ruins. Secondly, 
many minority returnees find that if their houses have not been destroyed they are 
occupied by those of the controlling ethnic groups in the area to which they wish to 
return. Finally, there is an ongoing figuration of the ethno-nationalist communities to 
which minority returnees wish to return that has given rise to a continuation of 
urbicide in post-Dayton Bosnia. Specifically, urban fabric intended to provide the 
conditions of possibility of minority returns has either been destroyed or its rebuilding 
otherwise impeded. 53 
The minority returns program must, therefore, solve two problems. In the first 
place it has to establish a program of reconstruction in and through which the 
conditions of possibility of the return of an agonistic heterogeneity to ethno-nationalist 
communities are established. A first step in such a program is the rebuilding of 
destroyed urban fabric, a reconstruction of locales that open up the possibility of the 
return of minorities. Secondly, the returns program must confront the legal questions 
raised by the transfer or occupation of property during the 1992-95 war. 54 Minority 
returnees were, for the most part, expelled from the areas to which they wish to return 
during the ethnic cleansing of the 1992-95 period. Those expelled in ethnic cleansing 
were often forced to sign documents transferring ownership of their property to the 
ethnic cleansers. 55 Moreover, after the ethno-nationalist communion-community was 
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established, part of the homogenisation process consisted of allowing (or even 
encouraging) the occupation of property belonging to those who had been expelled. 56 
A returns process has to confront these property issues to be successful. 
In Bosnia these legal issues have been resolved with the implementation of a 
number of legal measures to allow the return of property seized from minority 
returnees (or compensation where return is not possible or desired) and the eviction of 
occupants who are preventing the return of such property. 57 This has been a slow 
process that will not be complete for some time. Needless to say it has been resisted 
by ethno-nationalist communion-communities. 
Both the continued destruction of property and the legal problems impeding 
the returns process should be seen as intertwined elements of the figuration of 
community and should both be seen, therefore, as aspects of urbicide. Both constitute 
aspects of the attempt to exclude difference from, and homogenise, the communion- 
community. Moreover, the persistence of both the occupation of property and 
impediments to its return comprise an attempt to foreclose on the openness to alterity 
that remaining buildings offer. This latter foreclosure of openness is an integral aspect 
of the homogenisation of the ethno-nationalist territories carved out in and through 
urbicide. 
In this sense a contestation of ethno-nationalist figures in and through minority 
returns will comprise both a program of reconstruction/rebuilding and the resolution 
of the legal issues that hinder return. It is precisely this dual approach that has been 
undertaken by the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and those who wish to 
implement the program of minority returns. Indeed, in 2000, this contestation of 
ethno-nationalism yielded significant minority returns. 58 Some 67,000 minority 
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returns took place in 2000 and figures for 2001 indicate that returns have continued at 
a high level (with 30,123 returns registered by 3 1st May 2001). 59 These returns 
represent a clear return of agonism to antagonistic ethno-nationalist communion- 
communities. Not surprisingly, these returns have been met with violence and 
obstruction as the ethno-nationalist figure attempts to re-territorialise the antagonisms 
through which the communion-community became present to itself. Moreover, the 
ethno-nationalist figures have worked through typically bureaucratic means to impede 
those returns that do happen, refusing to issue travel permits, to implement property 
laws, to evict those found to be in illegal occupation of housing stock, and to provide 
a secure environment for returnees. This persistence of urbicide and the logics of 
figuration clearly illustrate the manner in which returnees represent an agonism 
intolerable to the ontopolitical claims of ethno-nationalism. The agonism that returns 
comprise can be seen in the remarks made by the president of Yugoslavia, Vojslav 
Kostunica (after the riots that prevented the laying of the foundation stone for the 
Ferhadija mosque on 7`h May 2001) that the rebuilding of mosques (which is integral 
to the process of return) constituted a provocation. 60 
As I noted in Chapter 5, agonism is characterised precisely by such 
`provocation'. Agonism is that provocation of the other that initiates the operations of 
power. Or, in other words, agonism is that provocation of the Other that constitutes a 
shared line of distinction between self and other, that lays bare the being-with that 
characterises existence and, hence, contests the ethno-nationalist figure. In so far as 
the Other provokes me, s/he provokes me into making a distinction between self and 
Other. This is exactly what Nancy means when he speaks of being-self by virtue of 
being-with. It is for this reason - because it lays bare the fiction of figuration and the 
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manner in which it is merely a covering over of being-in-common - that the ethno- 
nationalist figure resists the agonism of minority returns. 
Urban reconstruction: the dominance of anthropocentrism 
Urban reconstruction is, then, at the heart of a return of agonism to the ethno- 
nationalist communion-communities of Bosnia. That is, it is reconstruction, and an 
associated program of returns that will contest the disavowal of heterogeneity that 
characterises urbicide (and ethno-nationalist figuration) in Bosnia. Reconstruction, 
therefore, reveals the stakes of urbicide (and the figuration to which it is integral). 
Insofar as reconstruction reveals the logics of urbicide it also lays bare the being-in- 
common that characterises existence. That is, the provocation of reconstruction 
exposes both the manner in which urbicide disavows agonism and the manner in 
which buildings constitute existential spatiality as fundamentally heterogeneous. 
However, reconstruction in Bosnia has not necessarily been recognised in such 
terms. Indeed, in many cases reconstruction is taken to be the simple repair of 
equipment for living. This might not sound so objectionable insofar as it is important 
to house the population of Bosnia and meet their basic needs through infrastructure. 
However, the common perception that reconstruction is a technical problem exterior 
to the political problems posed by ethno-nationalism means that the role 
reconstruction (or lack thereof) plays in post-Dayton Bosnia is poorly understood. 
Moreover, this framing of the problem of reconstruction as a technical problem 
exterior to political problems is consistent with, and compounds, the failure to 
recognise the stakes of urbicide. 
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This failure can be attributed to the anthropocentric imaginary that has 
dominated the agencies tasked with implementing the GFA. Moreover, this 
anthropocentrism has given rise to a figuration of its own that tends to exclude 
consideration of the role that (the destruction of) urban fabric plays in ethno- 
nationalism. It is perhaps not surprising that anthropocentrism has dominated the 
process of post-Dayton reconstruction. After all, implementation of the GFA has in a 
large number of cases been effected by agencies that construe their mission to be 
`humanitarian'. The European Union Administration of Mostar (EUAM), the Office 
of the High Representative (OHR), The United Nations High Commission for 
Refugees (UNHCR), and a multitude of non-governmental organisations are in one 
way or another guided by a logic that is essentially `humanitarian'. That is, these 
organisations take their role to be one of intervening in a (post-)conflict context to 
ameliorate the life circumstances of fellow human beings (on the basis that as human 
beings they deserve a better standard of life replete with the individual rights the 
international community sees as indicating such a `better' standard of life). 
As David Campbell notes, such humanitarianism is predicated on a humanist 
model that conceives of sovereign individuality as the basis of human life. 61 This 
humanism is thus always an intervention to uphold (or implement) rights or 
entitlements considered to define the conditions of possibility of such sovereign 
individuality. Humanitarianism is, as Campbell notes, an ontopolitical claim that sets 
the limits according which we understand what human life comprises by appeal to the 
sovereign individual as the (epistemological) origin of that humanity. Accounts that 
understand existence as a material, or worldly, event agonistically constituted in and 
through locales and, hence, through an ecstatic communication that transgress the 
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boundaries of sovereign individuality are thus excluded from consideration. This 
humanitarianism is, therefore, a figuration that effects an exclusion of consideration of 
the stakes of urbicide. 
Though perhaps more benign than ethno-nationalism, humanitarianism is a 
figuration nonetheless. It is important to note the exclusion of consideration of the 
stakes of urbicide this figuration effects and the technical work it establishes. Since 
human life is claimed to comprise sovereign individuality the things with which 
humans engage are taken to be mere materiel (or equipment) put at the disposal of 
humans and forming the background against which they live out their lives. Buildings, 
infrastructure and monuments may be seen as enabling conditions for human life, but 
are ultimately secondary to that life. Humanitarianism takes the reconstruction of such 
built things to be important, but ultimately ancillary, to the task of reconciliation 
amongst human beings. In this way humanitarianism regards reconstruction to be 
exterior to the task of encouraging diversity. Pluralism is thus the goal of 
humanitarianism, the fostering of communities of mixed ethnicity. However, this 
pluralism is a weak form of heterogeneity. It is an understanding of heterogeneity as 
the admixing of individuals who can, through tolerance, be indifferent to (or even 
enthusiastic towards) other individuals. 
This work to establish the humanitarian figure gives rise to a technical 
bureaucratic occlusion of the nature of reconstruction. Humanitarian projects reduce 
reconstruction to mere engineering projects. These projects are removed from all 
discussion of the political and given over to technicians as a problem to be solved, 
rather than a condition of possibility of being-in-common to be restored. 62 Indeed, 
Bosnia has given rise to a number of programs for the reconstruction of urban fabric 
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that propose technical formulas by which to replace the urban spaces destroyed in war 
time. 63 In this way urban reconstruction has been taken out of its properly political 
position and reduced to technical programs. This is an exclusion of urbanity from the 
figure of humanitarian reconstruction by removing it from political consideration and 
placing it in the hands of technicians that proceed according to a plan that simply 
seeks to replace the equipment lost in conflict. 
One can see in the humanitarian figure the anthropocentrism of which I spoke 
in chapters 4 and 5. The humanitarian figure treats heterogeneity as an ancillary aspect 
of the existence of sovereign individuals. Moreover, it treats urbanity (that which is 
characterised by heterogeneity) as a secondary aspect of political reconstruction. The 
tight grip of this anthropocentrism means that the stakes of urbicide have remained 
largely invisible in post-Dayton Bosnia. Since the urban environment is not 
considered to be constitutive of existence, but merely that against which sovereign 
individuals exist, the manner in which its destruction announces the disavowal of 
agonism has not been comprehended. And so long as this is the case, the return of 
agonism will be overlooked: projects will not seek to reconstitute fundamentally 
shared/public locales, but to merely provide the equipment with which the separate 
ethno-nationalist communion-communities can continue to live as they are. 
Breaking the anthropocentric grip: proposals for the reconstruction of Mostar 
The uncovering of the agonism proper to existence of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
rests on a contestation of this anthropocentric-humanist grip on reconstruction. There 
are, however, cases in which a contestation of the reduction of reconstruction to a 
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technical problem exterior to the political project of the implementation of the GFA 
can be seen. The OHR's treatment of the rebuilding of the Ferhadija as an event 
central to reconstruction and return might be construed to be one such occasion. One 
can see a similar problematisation of the anthropocentric treatment of reconstruction 
as ancillary to the implementation of the GFA in at least three further cases: the 
central zone for Mostar proposed by The European Administration of Mostar 
(EUAM); the reconstruction proposals prepared by students involved in Columbia 
University's Master of Science program in Architecture and Urban Design; and the 
problematic status of the project to rebuild the Old Bridge in Mostar. 
The Central Zone 
Mostar is one of the most divided cities in Bosnia. In 1994, after the signing of 
the Washington Agreement between Bosnian Croat and Bosnian Government 
('Muslim') forces, Mostar was placed under European Union Administration. The 
EUAM, established in a Memorandum of Understanding, was tasked with 
reconstruction and reconciliation in Mostar. M It is significant to note that when the 
EUAM began its task in 1994, the Bosnian war had not ended. Although the 
Washington Agreement brought fighting between Bosnian Coats and Bosniacs to an 
end, the combined Bosnian Croat and Bosniac forces were still engaged in fighting 
with the Bosnian Serb Army. The EUAM thus faced the task of beginning its 
reconstruction of Mostar in a climate of conflict, with attendant insecurities and 
logistical problems this entails. 
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When the EUAM arrived in Mostar it was a divided city, cut in two by the 
Neretva river. The west of Mostar was held by Bosnian Croat nationalists who had 
expelled Bosniac inhabitants. 65 The Bosnian Croats had established a figured 
communion-community named `Herceg Bosna' and claimed west Mostar as its 
capital. The east had become a Bosniac ghetto, the only area of the city in which they 
could live. Freedom of movement between these two halves of the city was severely 
restricted (control of movement was facilitated by the fact that to cross from east to 
west, or vice versa, one had to use the remaining bridges across the Neretva). The 
EUAM was mandated to restore freedom of movement to the city and to build multi- 
ethnic institutions, effectively reversing the gains made by Bosnian Croat ethno- 
nationalism. 
For a variety of reasons the EUAM was unsuccessful in its attempts to contest 
ethno-nationalism. Multi-ethnic institutions were created, but were constituted in such 
a manner that they actually consolidated, rather than reversed, ethno-nationalism. 
Parity between Croat nationalists and Bosniacs representatives on these institutions 
meant that they were effectively deadlocked from the very beginning. Freedom of 
movement was restored over time although it was hindered by paramilitaries and the 
lack of infrastructure (such as bridges) to promote this movement. Moreover, with the 
city antagonistically divided, there was little point in crossing from one half of the city 
to another. It appeared that the antagonism was being effectively naturalised. Indeed, it 
appeared that Mostar had split into two separate cities with few spaces of 
commonality between them. This would have represented the complete naturalisation 
of a territorial antagonism disavowing any being-in-common between Bosnian Coats 
and Bosniacs. 
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The EUAM set about reconstructing the city, concentrating on the restoration 
of housing stock and the repair of basic infrastructure. 66 This project was tasked to 
engineers who treated it as a technical problem ancillary to the political work being 
carried out by the European Union Administrator, Hans Koschnick. Koschnick, 
however, understood fairly clearly that the reversal of ethno-nationalism would 
depend on innovative solutions to the reconstruction of urban fabric in Mostar. He, 
therefore, drew up plans to establish a central zone in Mostar in which commerce 
would be encouraged and the main institutions situated [See Appendix 1, figure 6-1 
and figure 6-2]. 67 Freedom of movement would be unrestricted in this central zone. 
Moreover the zone would be held as a condominium and, hence, would not be 
controlled by ethno-nationalist forces. 68 It would, in effect be a neutral urban zone into 
which both parties would be drawn to make use of the commercial facilities and 
political institutions sited there. 
The proposed situation of the central zone was particularly provocative, and 
hence hotly contested (in particular by Bosnian-Croats whose ethno-nationalist gains 
would be rolled back by the central zone). During the war, the Bulevar Nardone 
Revolucije on the west bank of the Neretva had become the front line of fighting. This 
street was reduced to rubble and formed a `natural' zone of separation that delineated 
the two antagonistic halves of the city. Rather than allow the Bulevar to be one of the 
borders of the central zone, Koschnick proposed that the central zone would straddle 
this zone of separation effectively refusing to recognise its proposed function as a 
marker of the limits between the two communities. As Yarwood notes, the `central 
zone would break the confrontation line'. 69 Had the central zone been fully 
implemented, the Bulevar would have no longer been a no-mans land between 
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communities but the centre of a mixed district. It would, therefore, have no longer 
been that which legitimated the ethno-nationalist assertion of a separateness between 
the two communities. In addition the central zone would have included part of the east 
bank of the Neretva thus encouraging Bosnian Croats to cross the Neretva. 
However the central zone plans failed to win the requisite support and were 
not implemented. 70 Because of the intransigence of ethno-nationalists and the failure 
of European Governments to support such a plan to restore an agonistic heterogeneity 
to Mostar, Koschnick resigned. 71 Indeed, although freedom of movement has been 
restored to Mostar, the EUAM became a de facto caretaker of the ethno-nationalist 
status-quo. 72 The fact that the Bosnian Croat nationalist party, the HDZ, maintains its 
base in Mostar is testament to the ineffectiveness of EUAM attempts to reverse the 
gains of ethno-nationalism. The central zone project does, however, illustrate the 
manner in which urban reconstruction must be treated as central to, rather than an 
ancillary aspect of, the return of the agonistic heterogeneity proper to Bosnia. 
New Urbanisms 
With damage to the urban environment of Mostar widespread (although 
disproportionately divided between east and west with more extensive and serious 
damage done to the east), the question of reconstruction was a pressing one. 73 The 
urbicide perpetrated in Mostar (largely by Bosnian Croat forces) left the urban fabric 
of the city devastated. The damage was not restricted to specific buildings but covered 
housing stock, public buildings, commercial buildings, public spaces and monuments. 
In the short term, post-Dayton, the EUAM focused on the reconstruction of housing 
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stock, public (institutional) buildings and a select number of monuments. In the 
context of the insistent demands of post-war reconstruction (such as the provision of 
shelter in time for the onset of winter), larger questions of urban planning were 
somewhat neglected. 74 
The relative lack of urban planning meant that the question of reversing the 
gains of ethnic cleansing was not given a comprehensive treatment. Whilst it should 
be noted that a total plan for the city would have been as violent as the status quo 
(because of the manner in which it would exclude other competing plans), the lack of 
consideration of plans to restore Mostar's pre-war heterogeneity was problematic. For 
example the ad hoc reconstruction of houses meant that no specific plans were 
considered to build new housing stock that might foster heterogeneity. The rebuilding 
of houses in both east and west Mostar resolved the demand for shelter and yet in no 
way problematised the de facto partition of the city. 
It is in this light that the plans drawn up by students from Columbia University 
are particularly interesting. 75 These plans are guided by the aim of restoring, through 
urban development, the heterogeneity proper to Mostar. All of the projects consider 
the way in which urban planning can contest the present partition of the city. Two 
points raised by these projects are worthy of mention. In the first place it is noted that 
urban development has two options. On the one hand development can continue in a 
North-South direction. 76 The problem with such development is that the line of 
antagonism runs North-south through Mostar. Hence development in a North-South 
direction in no way problematises this line of antagonism. Indeed it encourages the 
parallel development of two distinct halves of the city without ever transgressing the 
line of separation. On the other hand East-West development might offer the promise 
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of contesting the line of fracture and, hence, fostering the uncovering of the 
heterogeneity of Mostar. That is to say, if west Mostar develops to the east, and east 
Mostar to the west, the line separating the two will at some point be transgressed and 
its naturalised status as a line of separation and antagonism will be called into 
question. In this sense plans to develop the Bulevar and, in particular, to disrupt its 
function as a line of separation are worthy of consideration. 77 The student plans aimed 
to disrupt the straight line of separation that the Bulevar presented. By disrupting this 
line and developing the commercial and residential potential of the area to the east and 
west, movement across this line would be encouraged thus contesting the antagonistic 
disavowal of heterogeneity it represents. 
In addition the consideration of the networks of identity\difference constituted 
by the built locales of Mostar is vital to comprehending the way in which agonism 
might return to this city. In this regard the consideration of pedestrian routes in the city 
is especially interesting. 78 One of the ways in which antagonism is accomplished is by 
determining the manner in which networks of movement can or cannot function. By 
laying waste to areas of the city urbicide accomplishes a hindrance of movement that 
does not need paramilitary reinforcement. Why would anyone transgress rubble strewn 
streets if there is either no passage through the rubble or no reason to go there? 
Reinserting the pedestrian into the urban space by planning the restoration of urban 
fabric that encourages such movement is a reconstruction of the reticulated networks 
of singularity (identity\difference) that embody the being-in-common proper to 
urbanity. 
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The fate of the Old Bridge 
Of course, overshadowing all of these questions is the spectre of the ruined 
Stari Most (Old Bridge). As I noted in the Introduction, the Old Bridge was, for a 
variety of reasons emblematic of the antagonistic division of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is 
understandable, therefore, that efforts to reconstruct Bosnia, and to thereby contest 
ethno-nationalism, should be haunted by the question of the reconstruction of this 
emblem of division. After the Dayton accords were signed, a project to reconstruct the 
Old Bridge was begun. Divers were sent to the bottom of the river to recover the 
masonry with the ultimate aim of using it to rebuild the bridge. Despite recovering this 
masonry, however, the bridge remains in ruins at present. 
Whilst its seems inevitable that the bridge will be rebuilt (although how long 
this will take is a matter of speculation), the planned reconstruction raises a larger 
question. Specifically, it raises the question of the meaning of such a reconstruction. 
For those involved in rebuilding the bridge the project is a vital element of the steps 
being taken at present to reject the ethno-nationalist division of the city of Mostar. 79 
That is to say, the rebuilding of the Old Bridge is taken to constitute an important 
symbol of an intent to recover the agonism proper to Mostar. In this sense rebuilding 
the bridge could be said to be a symbol of hope. And yet, in the absence of other plans 
to foster the recovery of the agonism proper to the city's locales, such a project, whilst 
symbolic, may prove to be simply a gesture (though no doubt an important gesture). 
This feeling was summed up by an EU official who stated that `[t]he bridge 
should be rebuilt at the end of the reconstruction'. 80 The bridge would thus be the last 
act of the contestation of ethnic partition, a crowning of this achievement. It would 
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symbolise the successful restoration of pre-war heterogeneity. Moreover, the EU 
official cautioned that it would be dangerous to rebuild the bridge at present - as a 
symbol of hope and intent - as it might encourage the idea that heterogeneity had 
returned to Mostar. It might, therefore, cause a false sense of accomplishment that 
might misrecognise a certain symbolism for the actual recovery of the being-in- 
common proper to Mostar. 81 
Central to this observation is the contention that the antagonism that divides 
Mostar must be contested in order for the agonism of existence to be laid bare. The 
reconstruction of the bridge will not, on its own, bring about the contestation of the 
divisions that fracture this city. In this respect it is worth briefly mentioning Leo 
Modrcin's proposal for the fate of the Old bridge. In 1994 Modrcin won the 
Membrane architecture competition with a proposal for the temporary bridging of the 
gap left by the destruction of the Old Bridge [See Appendix 1, figure 7]. 82 Modrcin 
proposed that two screens be hung in place of the span of the bridge, facing north and 
south. The screens would be composed of fibre optic threads and would be connected 
to computer terminals at either end of the span. Communication between these 
terminals would be displayed on the screens. This membrane would be literally a 
tissue both connecting and dividing either side of the Neretva river. The membrane 
would physically connect the two banks, and the terminals would connect those on 
either side. And yet, at the same time the membrane would prevent actual movement 
across the space left by the destruction of the bridge (since it would not be constructed 
to allow the passage of pedestrians). The membrane would thus constitute an 
interstitial event in which a being-in-common would be revealed. It would be both a 
connection and a distinction, a moment of ecstatic communication in which being- 
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with would be revealed. Whilst Modrein's proposals may seem somewhat idealistic 
they are, at least, thought provoking. In the end the question is not whether to rebuild 
the Old Bridge (that rebuilding is necessary is, I think, beyond doubt), but how such 
rebuilding can play a constitutive role in the contestation of the antagonisms that 
partition Mostar. 
Beyond the borders of Bosnia 
Throughout my argument I have concentrated on providing an account of 
urbicide in (and after) the 1992-95 Bosnian war. The antagonisms carved out in this 
war shaped the terrain of post-Dayton Bosnia. Indeed, these antagonisms are starkly 
evident in the everyday fractures that divide and partition Bosnia and consolidate the 
ethno-nationalist communion-communities of Republika Srpska and Herceg Bosna. 
However, the account I have provided has a wider scope and is applicable to other 
contexts in which the destruction of urban fabric has accomplished the 
territorialisation of antagonism or the covering over of agonistic being-in-common. I 
want, therefore, to briefly indicate three instances in which the account I have given of 
urbicide might provide productive insights. 
Mitrovica 
The town of Mitrovica in Northern Kosovo has been a focal point for ethno- 
nationalism in the wake of the 1999 conflict between NATO and Yugoslavia. After 
the withdrawal of Yugoslav troops and paramilitaries, Mitrovica came under the 
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jurisdiction of NATO and the United Nations mission in Kosovo (UNMiK). The town 
was, prior to the conflict, a heterogeneous mixture of Kosovan Albanians and 
Kosovan Serbs. During the war the town was a victim of urbicide, with Serb 
paramilitaries burning and bulldozing Kosovan Albanian homes, shops and a 
mosque. 83 After the war, the town became divided into two ethnic enclaves. In a 
manner similar to Mostar, Mitrovica is divided by a river (the Ibar) that runs east-west 
splitting the town into northern and southern districts. The ethnic partition of 
Mitrovica was consolidated by the division effected by the river Ibar. Central to this 
consolidation was the role played by the bridge that connected north and south 
Mitrovica. 84 
NATO forces were instrumental in the division of the town insofar as they 
established a checkpoint on the bridge that restricted movement from north to south 
(and vice versa). As the partition of the town proceeded with ethno-nationalists on 
either side encouraging (via discourses of fear and acts of terrorism) the formation of 
separate enclaves, NATO placed barricades on the bridge to prevent clashes between 
rival ethno-nationalist groups. Whilst this may appear to be a logical security response 
to a situation in which violence was an everyday occurrence, it is a clear example of 
the manner in which the figurative politics of separation were consolidated in Kosovo. 
NATO reinforced, and naturalised the perception that the Kosovan Albanians 
and Kosovan Serbs comprised distinct and separate groups. 85 The naturalisation of 
this perception was encouraged by NATO's establishment of a literal zone of 
separation between these two parties in the form of an un-traversable bridge. This 
fostered the ethno-nationalist figuration of communion-communities which, not 
surprisingly, began their work of homogenisation, creating a situation in which 
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Kosovan Albanians could not return to north Mitrovica without armed guards, and 
Kosovan Serbs could not return to south Mitrovica without similar protection. 86 
Interestingly, the division of Mitrovica by NATO was instrumental in 
establishing, rather than simply a response to, ethno-nationalism. Protests at the bridge 
were directed against NATO and those forces of ethno-nationalism that fostered the 
politics of the enclave. 87 These protests contested the territorialisation of antagonism 
that had been effected by NATO's closure of the bridge, expressing a desired for 
freedom of movement. 88 The division of Mitrovica by NATO could, therefore, be seen 
as a (possibly benign, or at least unintended) act of urbicide. That is to say, this 
division, whilst not a destruction, represents an assault on a built thing as the 
condition of possibility of heterogeneity. It represents a delimitation of the networks 
of identity\difference such that the bridge no longer trembles in many networks of 
relationality but becomes, effectively a dead zone, a space of separation. Indeed, 
though the building still stands it can no longer be called such since it is no longer 
constitutive of a locale that would constitute networks of singularity. And yet, insofar 
as NATO's occupation of the bridge is contested by protests, the agonism constituted 
by this built thing insistently returns to contest the antagonism consolidated and 
naturalised by NATO. 
The Occupied Territories 
The logics of urbicide can also be seen the Israeli policy of demolishing 
Palestinian houses (in both the West Bank, and Gaza). B'Tselem (The Israeli 
Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories) notes that `since 
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1987 till 1998, the Israeli authorities have "administratively" demolished at least 
2,200 Palestinian houses in the territories, and hundreds of other structures. '89 This 
destruction of the urban environment has continued in the present `intifada'. 90 Israel 
has implemented a dual program of destroying the houses of Palestinians. 91 On the 
one hand it has deployed its defence forces to destroy those houses that are thought to 
harbour terrorists. 92 The liberal use of this military force has, however, led some to 
doubt the military necessity of such destruction arguing instead that it comprises 
collective punishment. 93 On the other hand Israel has utilised stringent planning 
regulations to ensure that Palestinians cannot build on land adjacent to Jewish 
settlements (that are themselves built on occupied territory and deemed illegal in light 
of UN resolutions) or in contested areas such as East Jerusalem. These planning 
regulations have been reinforced by an aggressive policy of demolition where houses 
are found to have been built without the requisite permission. It is fairly clear that this 
policy is aimed at securing the territory necessary for the expansion of settlements and 
at preventing Palestinians from building in areas (such as Jerusalem) deemed to be 
homogeneously Jewish. 
Israeli urbicide exhibits the dual logic detailed in my account above. On the 
one hand this destruction comprises the establishment of zones of separation which 
naturalise the perception that Arabs and Jews are distinct and separate. 94 This 
consolidates the figuration of the Jewish communion-community as a homogeneous 
entity predicated on a claim to an origin distinct from that of the Arabs. These zones 
of separation naturalise the exclusion of Arabs who are regarded as both 
heterogeneous to, and thus not welcome within, the Israeli-Jewish communion- 
community. On the other hand this urbicide comprises a homogenisation of the 
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communion-community established by Israel. The destruction of houses in East 
Jerusalem is particularly instructive in this regard. Jerusalem is, potentially, a site of 
agonistic contestation. In order to territorialise the Israeli communion-community 
such that it encompasses Jerusalem, it is necessary to implement a program (work) of 
homogenisation and, hence, to destroy those buildings that resonate with the 
ineluctable alterity that characterises the being-in-common proper to Jerusalem. 
Seen as urbicide, the demolition of Palestinian houses is exposed as a covering 
over of being-in-common and a territorialisation of an (ethno-nationalist) 
communion-community. Moreover, if this destruction is seen as urbicide, it becomes 
clear that it is precisely this territorialisation of separation that must be contested if the 
being-in-common characteristic of existence is to be laid bare. 
Grozny 
In all of the cases above, urbicide comprises an integral element of the logic of 
ethno-national figuration. In these cases urbicide represents the destruction of 
buildings insofar as they comprise the conditions of possibility of heterogeneity. 
Moreover, in all of these case buildings are destroyed as a consequence of one of two 
logics. On the one hand urbicide comprises a disavowal of agonism in and through the 
territorialisation of antagonism. This territorialisation is accomplished in and through 
the laying waste of front-line zones, an action that naturalises the figurative claim to 
being-separate (rather than agonistic being-in-common). On the other hand, urbicide 
comprises a homogenisation of the territory of the figured communion-community: an 
erasure of those buildings that tremble with the openness to alterity characteristic of 
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existence. One might say that in all of the above cases, whilst destruction is 
widespread, it is nonetheless targeted. 95 The widespread nature of urbicide is evidence 
of the manner in which heterogeneity is not a contingent, geographically isolated 
phenomenon, but characteristic of existence itself. That is, it is necessary to destroy 
buildings on a large scale if one is to establish a figuration of community. However, in 
all of these cases urban destruction is not total. Indeed, it is only because we can 
identify those buildings destroyed as those which tremble with an ineluctable alterity 
that we can speak of a logic of urbicide, a specific conceptual coherence identifiable 
through scrutiny of the patterns of destruction. That is to say, the destruction is neither 
random, accidental, nor total and, hence, when analysed can be identified as 
comprising a specific logic. 
The logics of urbicide do, however, entail a far more devastating consequence: 
urban annihilation. One might say that this consequence is the end point of urbicide, 
its highest stakes. Moreover, urbicide tends, asymptotically, towards this point despite 
rarely reaching it. This end point of urbicide can be seen in the destruction of the 
Chechen capital Grozny by Russian forces in 1999 and 2000.96 Chechnya can be said 
to be in an agonistic relation of identity\difference with Russia. Russian identity is 
both constituted in relation to, and contested by, Chechen ambitions for independence. 
That this is the case can be seen in the role Chechens play in Russian discourses of 
security. When bombs destroyed residential buildings in Moscow the blasts were 
blamed upon Chechen terrorists. Regardless of whether this attribution of blame is 
correct, this exclusionary distinction comprises an example of the performance of 
identity in and through the enactment of a distinction which is also a commonality. 
Insofar as Chechens are de jure members of the Russian Federation, there is a 
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commonality between them and Russians. But insofar as they are designated as 
terrorists and ethnically other, they are excluded as heterogeneous to Russian identity. 
This agonism continues insofar as Russian forces sent to reassert Russian control over 
Chechnya have to determine between Chechen separatists and Chechens/Russians 
loyal to the Russian Federation. There is a clear agonism in this problematic, one in 
which Chechnya is seen on the one hand to comprise part of the Russian Federation, 
and, hence, to be a territory commonly held by both Russians and Chechens, and on 
the other hand to be a zone which harbours a dangerous heterogeneity that must be 
excluded if the Russian Federation is to be properly established. 
Russian forces failed to make this exclusion in the 1994-96 war. 97 During this 
war the stakes of urbicide were already evident. 98 The capital Grozny was damaged 
out of all proportion to military necessity. Moreover, this was not a random act of 
barbarism. During this campaign it became clear that Russian tactics were to destroy 
the urban fabric that harboured Chechen resistance. However this destruction was out 
of all proportion with the number of Chechen fighters actually sheltering in Grozny. 
Rather it seemed that Russian forces were destroying Grozny because it harboured 
heterogeneity itself. The buildings of the capital city established a fundamentally 
public/shared space that harboured an alterity intolerable to the Russian project to 
exclude difference and homogenise the identity of the Federation. 
Ultimately, this fear was proved well founded insofar as the city remained 
open to Chechen resistance and ungovernable by Russian forces . 
99 The fundamentally 
public/shared character of this urbanity proved both too elusive and too agonistic for 
the Russian homogenising claim. Despite this, Russian forces returned to Chechnia in 
1999 to finish what had been started earlier. In October 1999 the stakes of urbicide 
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were starkly set out when Russian forces announced their intention to raze Grozny. 100 
Russian forces clearly identified Grozny with an ineluctable (and, hence, un- 
pacifiable) alterity. Importantly, the Russian action in Chechnia comprised a figurative 
ethno-nationalist claim. Specifically it was a reassertion of the ethnic homogeneity 
and integrity of the Russian Federation. This claim comprised a figuration of the 
Federation as a communion-community in which difference could, possibly, be 
tolerated - so long as it was both secondary to, distinct from, and subservient to, 
Russian identity. Since this was not possible, given resurgent Chechen separatism, a 
program of separation and homogenisation was the necessary adjunct to figuration. 
Insofar as it was not possible to establish zones of separation between Russians and 
Chechens, the logic of urbicide became a program of homogenisation in which all that 
revealed the agonistic being-in-common proper to the Russian Federation was to be 
disavowed/effaced. 
This is the end point of urbicide: a relentless and total destruction of urban 
fabric that lays waste to all that can possibly offer testament to the heterogeneity 
proper to existence. Urbicide will naturally, if left unchecked, tend towards this 
infinite ruination of the urban fabric. Since the urban fabric always already constitutes 
existence as being-in-common it always offends the figured communion-community. 
As we can see in Bosnia, it is possible for figures to exercise power over the 
provocation of the city such that it becomes domination. However, insofar as this 
provocation is intractable and insistent, the figured communion-community will 
always struggle to maintain its domination. And this domination will be effected 
through a sustained work of urbicide, destroying and controlling those built things that 
threaten to uncover the agonism disavowed by the figure. In Grozny this provocation 
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proved too insistent and ineluctable for the Russian army. The logical consequence is 
a total destruction of the city, a laying waste to the very possibility of heterogeneity. 
Insofar as there is no city, there can be no provocation of the figured communion- 
community. 
This instance of total devastation of the urban environment is a fitting point at 
which to bring the argument to a close. In the devastation of Grozny it is possible to 
see the stakes of urbicide thrown into stark relief. This total devastation comprises an 
encounter between the agonistic being-in-common characteristic of existence and the 
figuration of communion-community. This encounter comprises the disavowal of 
heterogeneity and the constitution of being-separate in and through the 
territorialisation of antagonism. This territorialisation of being-separate that is 
accomplished through the ruination of the built things that constitute existence as 
fundamentally public/shared and, hence heterogeneous, is most clearly seen in the 
relentless destruction of Grozny. The stakes of urbicide are thus agonistic being-in- 
common itself. And the logics of urbicide can be seen in every figure that, in laying 
claim to a substance of being as it origin, attempts to effect a separation and 
homogenisation through the destruction of buildings. 
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CONCLUSION 
One thing at least is clear: if we do not face up to such questions, the 
political will soon desert us completely, if it has not already done so. It 
will abandon us to political and technological economies, if it has not 
already done so. And this will be the end of our communities, if this has 
not yet come about. Being-in-common will nonetheless never cease to 
resist, but its resistance will belong decidedly to another world entirely. 
Our world, as far as politics is concerned, will be a desert, and we will 
wither away without a tomb - which is to say, without community, 
deprived of our finite existence. ' 
Coda: contesting antagonism and anthropocentrism 
Recapitulation 
In the Introduction I argued that the shared spaces of Bosnia are at stake in 
urban destruction such as that which characterised the 1992-95 Bosnian war. I argued 
that the destruction of the Old Bridge in Mostar provides an exemplary instance in and 
through which to see this assault on shared space. 
In Chapter 1I argued that in order to conduct an enquiry into the destruction of 
the shared spaces of Bosnia we must turn our attention to the nature of these spaces - 
their constitution and the meaning of their loss in particular. It is for this reason that I 
began with a brief discussion of the ways in which space has been analysed in the 
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western philosophical tradition. I argued that it was not sufficient to demonstrate that 
the spaces in which we live our lives are the product of ontopolitical regimes of 
spatiality. Such a recognition is enough to re-politicise the ossified spaces on which 
regimes of territorial sovereignty are predicated (by suggesting that such regimes are 
only one way - and an exclusionary way at that - of interpreting the space in which we 
exist). However, this re-politicisation of the space in which we live does not address 
the fundamental issue at stake in an enquiry into the nature of the spaces lost in urban 
destruction. More specifically, accounts of the ontopolitical regimes of spatialisation 
(such as territorial sovereignty) do not question the seemingly intuitive assumption 
that space is a necessary adjunct to existence. This assumption, which I argued is best 
seen in the work of Kant, forecloses any discussion of the nature of space. We may 
politicise various spatial regimes, but we do not question the necessity of space as a 
medium of existence. And this means that we cannot fully address the central question 
raised by the destruction of shared spaces - how are such spaces constituted and, 
hence, what is the meaning of their loss/destruction? 
I suggested that it was in the work of Martin Heidegger that we might find a 
way to approach such questions. It is Heidegger, I argued, that makes the most 
sustained analysis of the manner in which existence is spatialised and, hence, of the 
constitutive features of such spatiality. Heidegger argues that buildings constitute 
Being-in-the-world (or `dwelling', as he refers to it in his later work) as a 
fundamentally shared event. In this manner buildings constitute dwelling as a Being- 
with-others. Existence is, therefore, according to Heidegger's understanding, 
fundamentally heterogeneous. In many ways the argument I have set out here is an 
exegesis and extension of Heidegger's insights - an account of the constitutive 
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features not of space as a necessary medium in which existence takes place, but of 
spatiality as a fundamental moment (rather than medium) of being. 
In chapter 21 began the analysis of the destruction of shared space by 
addressing the nature of the violence directed at these spaces. I argued that the nature 
of this violence - what it was directed towards/what it destroyed - provides a vital 
starting point for the analysis of the spatiality embodied in shared spaces. 
Contemporary attempts to understand urban destruction are derived from extant norms 
of international jurisprudence. In some ways this might seem unobjectionable insofar 
as the destruction occurred as a result of (non)international armed conflict. Hence it 
might seem appropriate (indeed pressing) to address the question of whether such 
destruction can be understood according to the extant norms of international law (in 
particular whether we should see this destruction as a (punishable) breach of these 
laws). It is for this reason that urban destruction is primarily understood in terms of 
military necessity (or the lack thereof) or as an attack upon cultural heritage. 
I demonstrated, however, that these understandings of urban destruction are 
insufficient. Indeed the widespread destruction of the shared spaces of Bosnia cannot 
be seen as either a military necessity or an attack on cultural heritage alone. The 
notion of military necessity leaves us with a crude recognition that the destruction of 
villages, towns and cities in Bosnia was not necessary. However, it gets us no closer to 
understanding the nature of this destruction. Moreover, it encourages us to attribute 
the destruction to some excess of barbarity, an evil that is beyond comprehension 
other than as an individual or collective failing to uphold the values of civilisation. 
This does not help us in our enquiry into what this destruction accomplished, nor into 
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what it is that shared spaces comprise such that their destruction might effect this 
accomplishment. 
I argued, therefore, that the widespread urban destruction that characterised the 
1992-1995 Bosnian war should be seen to comprise a `logic' of destruction. That is, 
taken as a whole, this destruction comprises an assault directed at that which is 
constituted by the buildings that comprise the shared spaces of Bosnia. I argued that 
this logic of destruction can be productively understood under the name of `urbicide'. 
Urbicide is the destruction of the urban. Or, more specifically, it is the destruction of 
that which provides the conditions of possibility of the urban: buildings. At stake in 
`the urban', or in the destruction of the buildings that constitute `the urban', is 
heterogeneity. Urbicide is an assault on buildings as the conditions of possibility of 
heterogeneity. I suggested that urbicide is a particularly productive concept if we note 
that it implies that the destruction of buildings is, each and every time, a destruction of 
the conditions of possibility of heterogeneity, and, hence, of heterogeneity itself. 
In chapter 31 noted that outlining the concept of urbicide cannot serve as a 
conclusive account of the destruction of urban environments in Bosnia, but is, rather, 
a departure point for the analysis of spatiality that I had previously suggested is 
necessary in light of the destruction of shared spaces in urbicide. Although urbicide 
names the logic of destruction at work in urban destruction, it tells us little about the 
nature of the shared spaces destroyed - specifically their spatiality. In particular we 
must ask what it is about buildings - what spatiality they are constitutive of - that 
makes them the conditions of possibility of heterogeneity (and thus the target of 
urbicide). It is only in addressing this specific issue that we will find the meaning of 
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urban destruction (specifically what is lost in urban destruction, and what this loss 
means). 
I argued that it is heterogeneity that is at stake in urbicide precisely because 
urban space is always already shared space. That is to say, it is the always already 
shared nature of urban space that bequeaths it the heterogeneity at stake in urbicide. I 
suggested that an understanding of how this is the case, and the relationship between 
buildings (as the target of urbicide) and heterogeneity (as the stakes of urbicide) can 
be found in Heidegger's account of the spatiality of existence. 
For Heidegger, Being-in-the-world is a mutual constitution of Being and world 
in and through each other. Without Being there is no world and without the world 
there is no Being. Heidegger simplifies this as the existence of Dasein. Being-in-the- 
world is constituted in and through the (built) things with which Dasein engages in 
everyday activity. These things are constitutive of a spatial existence: a relational 
network that contains both distance direction and orientation, or, as the later 
Heidegger would put it, the locales in which we dwell. This is the spatiality of 
existence. And because this spatiality is constituted in and through things that are 
fundamentally public, it is an always already shared existence. That is to say, 
existential spatiality is always already heterogeneous. It is this heterogeneous 
existential spatiality that is at stake in urbicide. The destruction of buildings is the 
destruction of things that constitute the spatiality in which we exist. This destruction is 
a deliberate targeting of these things precisely because they constitute existence as 
fundamentally heterogeneous. In destroying these things heterogeneous existence is 
destroyed. 
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In chapter 41 noted that although Heidegger's argument provided a productive 
account of the logic of urbicide, it left the question of the nature of the heterogeneity 
at stake in the destruction of the shared space of Bosnia unexamined. The account of 
Being-in-the-world provided in chapter 3 accounts for the manner in which the 
destruction of buildings is indeed the destruction of the shared spaces, or the 
heterogeneity constituted in and through the existential spatiality established by (built) 
things. However, it tells us nothing of the sharing or heterogeneity implied in the 
Heideggerian account of existence as fundamentally public and thus always already 
haunted by an ineluctable alterity. Which is to say, I started the argument by noting 
that it was the shared spaces of Bosnia that were under attack, I then noted that this 
destruction was aimed at buildings as the condition of possibility of heterogeneity and, 
finally, showed how buildings constitute existence as always already shared and, 
hence, heterogeneous. I have thus shown precisely how each and every time a building 
is destroyed in urbicide shared space (construed broadly) and heterogeneity is at stake. 
And yet, to that point I had said nothing of the nature of this heterogeneity, or sharing, 
and the meaning of its destruction in urbicide. 
I argued that Heidegger's analysis should be taken to be distinct from those 
other analyses of politics that are constituted according to an `anthropocentric 
imaginary'. That is, the fundamental heterogeneity of existence set out by Heidegger, 
and the sharing of existential spatiality on which this heterogeneity is predicated, 
comprises a significant challenge to both liberal political theory and Marxist-Hegelian 
visions. In such anthropocentric accounts heterogeneity is taken to be ancillary to the 
essence of Being, contingent upon empirical existence. Through an exposition of the 
concept of Being-with as it is set out by Heidegger, my account suggests that this 
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cannot be the case. Rather, Being-in-the-world is, because it is constituted in and 
though (built) things and the spatiality of which they are constitutive, always already 
heterogeneous. Being is a fundamental openness to alterity. Moreover, this is to say 
that Being is always already implicated in community. It is the question of the 
contours of this community then that are at stake in the analysis of urbicide since it is 
the heterogeneity coextensive with community that is destroyed by urbicide. 
I noted that whilst Heidegger radically contests the anthropocentric imaginary 
he ultimately subordinates the notion of Being-with to a nationalist vision of 
community in keeping with his idealised understanding of National Socialism. In 
order, then to conclude the analysis of the community at stake in urbicide I took up the 
question of the Being-with that is subordinated to Dasein in Heidegger's analysis. In 
chapter 5,1 set out Nancy's understanding of this being-with as the fundamental event 
of existence. For Nancy, community (or being-in-common) is a reticulated network of 
exposure to alterity. It is precisely the conditions of possibility of such networks that 
are at stake in urbicide. I noted that urbicide works to turn the agonism of being-with 
into the antagonism of being-separate. Moreover, I noted, especially in the case of 
Bosnia, urbicide works to territorialize this antagonism converting the agonistic 
spatiality of existence into the separate and distinct spaces of territorial sovereignty. 
In Chapter 6,1 set out the stakes of urbicide. I argued that urbicide comprises a 
dual logic insofar as it both constitutes zones of separation through urban destruction 
and homogenises the ethno-nationalist community through systematic destruction of 
buildings that testify to the heterogeneity of Bosnia. I illustrated the manner in which 
urbicide comprises an exclusionary and homogenising figuration of ethno-nationalist 
community through three examples of post-Dayton politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina: 
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the rebuilding of mosques; the return of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons; 
and the reconstruction of the urban environment in post-war Mostar. In these instances 
of urban destruction it is possible to see both the logic of urbicide and the manner in 
which the constitutive heterogeneity of existence unworks the war-time gains of 
ethno-nationalist figures. Moreover, I noted that my analysis was not only applicable 
to Bosnia. I demonstrated the manner in which the stakes of urbicide are also visible 
beyond the borders of Bosnia: in the Kosovan town of Mitrovica; in the Occupied 
Territories; and in the Chechen capital Grozny. I argued that these instances of urban 
destruction demonstrate both that figuration is a pervasive logic at work in global 
politics and that the constitutive heterogeneity of existence returns inexorably to 
contest the figuration accomplished in urban destruction. 
Implications 
In light of the argument I have made there are two specific points I would like 
to emphasise by way of conclusion. I hope that both of these points indicate 
productive avenues for further thought. Firstly, the account of urbicide that I have 
presented should alert us to the manner in which the antagonistic politics of territorial 
sovereignty comprise a covering over of the being-in-common (or heterogeneity) 
proper to existence. If my argument is correct, the claim to sovereignty in and through 
territorialisation comprises the central event of the figuration of a communion- 
community. Such communities are both exclusionary and homogenising insofar as 
they rest on a disingenuous claim to being-separate and are consolidated through an 
elimination of difference. My argument should suggest that a sustained questioning of 
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territorial sovereignty issues as an insistent demand from the heterogeneity disavowed 
in the institution of such figurative communion-communities. Which is to say we 
should recognise the way in which figuration destroys the conditions of possibility of 
the heterogeneity proper to existence in order to represent itself to itself. In particular 
we should be alert to the manner in which it is the destruction of buildings, or, at the 
very least, actions to dominate and determine their meaning in networks of 
identity\difference, that signifies such territorialisation/figuration. We should contest 
such events and foster an agonism that gives being-in-common its due. 
Secondly, we should note that the anthropocentric imaginary serves, rather 
than contests, such antagonistic, territorial figuration. The anthropocentric imaginary, 
and its relegation of heterogeneity to a contingent/ancillary condition, forecloses on 
the political insofar as it disavows the agonism that characterises `things political' 2 
The principle problematic such a recognition raises is that of the tight grip that the 
anthropocentric imaginary exerts upon responses to figuration. In humanitarianism, 
conflict resolution, liberal theories of multiculturalism and, most importantly, the 
norms of international jurisprudence, the imprint of anthropocentrism is strong. It is 
impossible to comprehensively contest figuration, and the politics of ethno- 
nationalism in particular, if one obeys the precepts of the anthropocentric imaginary. 
To contest figuration (and ethno-nationalism) one must uncover the being-in-common 
that characterises existence. And yet this is not possible if such heterogeneity is taken 
to be ancillary to the existence of sovereign individuals. 
This problematic is particularly clear in respect of international jurisprudence. 
To put it bluntly, urbicide demands justice. As the founding gesture of the 
exclusionary-homogenising politics of ethno-nationalism that has delivered misery, 
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suffering and death to people across the world, urbicide must be contested by norms 
of international conduct. And yet such contestation is not forthcoming. Indeed, it is 
not possible, as I have shown, to contest urbicide on the basis of contemporary 
international jurisprudence. At best it is possible to mount a piecemeal contestation of 
instances that exemplify the destruction of cultural heritage and or so-called `wanton 
destruction'. And yet the anthropocentric tenet of sovereign individuality that 
underwrites international jurisprudence institutes a demand that justice prove an intent 
to cause such destruction. This focus upon the supposed interior cognition of an 
individual lacks the critical power to approach the question of the destruction of the 
very conditions of singularity (and, hence, individuality) itself. The destruction of 
buildings is not an intentional act, co-ordinated as a plan implemented with intent. It is 
a widespread ruination of urbanity that, taken as a whole, comprises a territorialisation 
of antagonisms and a disavowal of the heterogeneity proper to existence. 
In this sense jurisprudence must seek a deeper understanding of the manner in 
which exclusion, displacement, and liquidation can be effected by an assault on the 
very conditions of our being-in-common. It must seek to contest such destruction by 
contesting the manner in which claims to a substantial origin of being are enacted 
through a disavowal of the being-in-common that is constituted by the (built) things 
with which we engage on an everyday, mundane basis. 
Urbicide calls for a materialist understanding of the constitutive features of 
existence. At a very minimum such an understanding should recognise and endorse 
the pain Slavenka Draculie felt in watching the destruction of Mostar's Old bridge. ' If 
we feel no pain when buildings are destroyed it is clear evidence that the agonism 
proper to existence has been effectively disavowed. In feeling such pain, in defending 
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the urban environment, and in contesting the destruction of towns, cities and villages, 
we acknowledge the agonism constitutive of being-in-common. Moreover, we 
acknowledge the manner in which it is only in and through such being-in-common 
that the reticulated networks of singularity that comprise our everyday identities 
emerge. At stake, therefore, in the destruction of buildings in and through urbicide is 
precisely this agonism, its disavowal, or uncovering. Similarly at stake is the 
contestation of the exclusions effected by such disavowal or the return of 
heterogeneity promised by the uncovering of being-in-common. Thus, if we are to 
understand the ineluctable alterity constitutive of our existence, recognising the logics 
of urbicide would, I believe, comprise an important and provocative step. Moreover, 
as Nancy notes, a failure to recognise the logics of urbicide, comprises a failure to 
recognise the being-in-common (or community) that is constitutive of existence. Such 
a failure risks both depriving us of the resources necessary to nurture the agonism 
constitutive of the political and condemning us to `wither away' in the technicism of 
figuration. 4 
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Note on Sources 
In research such as this - where it is important to keep abreast of developments 
in Bosnia and beyond - the Internet is a valuable tool for scholars. Indeed, a significant 
number of the sources referred to in the following endnotes and bibliography are 
derived from Internet sources. It is important to note that all of the information 
scholars gather is, ultimately, contestable. In this respect I find the Internet no less 
valuable than libraries, archives and print media. If one applies the same standards one 
would apply to non-electronic sources, the Internet is a valuable source for a multitude 
of illuminating and credible resources. 
However, the use of Internet sources requires a number of words of 
clarification. Firstly, as far as I am aware the addresses (URLs) referred to in the 
endnotes and bibliography are valid at the time of writing. It is, of course, possible 
that they may not be valid in future. This is regrettable, but unavoidable. In as many 
cases as possible, therefore, I have given enough bibliographic data to enable these 
sources to be traced to the organisations that produced them. 
Secondly, it is important to point out that the majority of the Internet sources 
consulted are derived from respected organisations who have a significant off-line 
presence. In this respect, organisations such as the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees and Human Rights Watch are not Internet based 
organisations. Most, if not all, of their reports are also available off-line. In this 
respect the Internet is a tool for increasing the dissemination of their information. 
Moreover, whilst there are valid critiques of the quality of information found on the 
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Internet, the information provided on the Internet by such organisations is of the same 
quality one would expect to find in libraries and archives. 
Thirdly, one of the most important resources for research concerning Bosnia is 
electronic mail digests. These electronic mail services disseminate news from 
international and local sources on a daily basis. In this way it is possible to ensure that 
one keeps abreast of as many events, issues, and debates regarding developments in 
Bosnia as possible. I have made particular use of two digest services, BosNet and the 
International Justice Watch Discussion List (JustWatch). 
BosNet is a moderated, non-partisan news service that disseminates local and 
international news concerning Bosnia. It collects news articles from a wide variety of 
sources and does not discriminate between sources on a political or ethnic basis. 
JustWatch is a discussion list concerned with questions of international justice in, 
among other places, the former Yugoslavia. It is a loosely moderated forum for 
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Notes to Chapter 4 
1 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarie and Edward Robinson 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1962), p. 155. 
2 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, pp. 436. In the original, the final sentence of this 
quotation is written as follows: `Damit bezeichnen wir das Geschehen der 
Gemeinschaft, des Volkes'. The significance of Heidegger's use of `des Volkes' to 
denote the `people' whose co-existence can be said to comprise `destiny' will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
3 See my discussion of the inadequacy of either understanding of urban destruction in 
Chapter 2. For the relevant legal texts see, Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff, 
Documents on The Laws of War, Yd Ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
Documents 15 (p. 177), 21 (pp. 374-375), 24 (pp. 449-450), and 29 (p. 569) contain 
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Armed Conflict, Article 1, (a) defines `cultural property' as `movable or 
immovable property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people' 
including `monuments of architecture' whilst 1(b) extends protection to `buildings 
whose main and effective purpose is to preserve or exhibit... movable cultural 
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[cultural property] to destruction or damage' and to refrain `from any act of 
hostility directed against such property'. 
" The 1977 Geneva Protocol I, Article 51 prohibits `indiscriminate attacks' defining 
these as `those not directed at a specific military target' such as `attack by 
bombardment... which treats as a single military objective.. .a city town or village'. 
In addition, Article 53 protects `cultural objects and places of worship'. 
" The Statute of The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 
Article 2(d) restates that `extensive destruction... of property, not justified by 
military necessity and carried out wantonly' constitutes a `grave breach of the 
Geneva Conventions of 1949'. Article 3 includes the following in its extensive list 
of `violations of the customs of war'; `3(b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or 
villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity; [3](c) attack, or 
bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or 
buildings; [3](d) seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions 
dedicated to religion... [and] historic monuments'. 
4CB Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to 
Locke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. v-vi. 
5 Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, pp. 263-264. The 7 
assumptions summarised by Macpherson can be said to comprise the ontological 
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among always already constituted sovereign and free political subjects is based. 
6 For example, Rawls notes that `[t]he social system is to be designed so that the 
resulting distribution is just however things turn out. ' John Rawls, A Theory of 
Justice, revised ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 243. 
Hobbes' hypothetical state of nature represents the classical formulation of the 
notion that sovereign free individual person/subjects necessarily co-exist in the same 
space and that this situation gives rise to competing claims. Indeed, the war of all 
against all stems from the manner in which political subjects must exercise their 
sovereignty and freedom in a situation of necessary co-existence. This will necessarily 
lead, according to the classical, Hobbesian formulation to competition amongst 
political subjects as each tries to exercise their sovereign freedom without respect for 
the constraints that co-existence places upon them. See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, 
edited by Richard Tuck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
8 On this sublimation of the particular into the universal see Ernesto Laclau, 
`Universalism, Particularism and the Question of Identity' in Ernesto Laclau, 
Emanciaption(s) (Oxford: Verso, 1996), pp. 20-35. 
9 In International Relations theory this notion of sharing is best seen in Andrew 
Linklater's formulation of cosmopolitanism as a broadly Habermasian discourse 
ethics. According to Linklater, particular subjects, with their attendant (and 
specifically Habermasian) human interests, partake of a common discursive ethos. It is 
by partaking in this discursive ethos that the emancipation of particular subjects into a 
global cosmopolitan community (where diversity/particularity thrives) can occur. The 
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Aufhebung in Linklater's dialectic is found in the sublimation of particularity into the 
universal ideal speech community. In this sublimated state particular being is insofar 
as it partakes of the universal substance of discursivity. The key theme that identifies 
Linklater's account as an essentially dialectical account of sharing is the stress on the 
contestation of exclusivity through partaking in a universal discursive ethos. This 
appeal for greater inclusivity (that is an admission, in principle, of all to the ideal 
speech community) comprises an argument for emancipation through partaking-of the 
universal substance (a cosmopolitan discursive ethos) from which the meaning of 
individual Being (as a diverse range of differences) is to be derived. See Linklater, 
The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical Foundations of the Post- 
Westphalian Era (Cambridge: Polity, 1998). 
10 The early formulation of Nancy's commentary/critique concerning the Heideggerian 
notion of Mitsein (a Being-with that Nancy, rightly in my view, takes to entail an 
essential sharing) is to be found in Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community, 
trans. Lisa Garbus, Peter Connor, Michael Holland, Simona Sawhney (London: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1991), pp. 1-42. Nancy refines this formulation in Jean- 
Luc Nancy, The Experience of Freedom, trans Bridget McDonald (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1993) especially pp. 66-80; Nancy's most recent and comprehensive 
account of Being-with can be found in Jean-Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, trans 
Robert D Richardson & Anne E O'Byrne (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2000). 
See also: Howard Caygill, `The Shared World: Philosophy, Violence, Freedom' in 
Darren Sheppard, Simon Sparks and Colin Thomas, eds., On Jean-Luc Nancy: The 
Sense of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 19-31; and Simon Critchley, 
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`With Being-With? Notes on Jean-Luc Nancy's Rewriting of Being and Time', in 
Critchley, Ethics-Politics-Subjectivity: Essays on Derrida, Levinas and Contemporary 
French Thought (London, Verso, 1999), pp. 239-253. 
11 See Nancy, The Inoperative Community, p. 6; Heidegger, Being and Time, p. 152. 
121 should note here that I concur with William Connolly in finding the notion of the 
individual slightly problematic in this context. In The Ethos of Pluralization, Connolly 
notes the he `prefer[s] the language of individuality to that of the individual because 
the [latter] suggests the uniform standard of the normal individual while the [former] 
suggests the value diversity across and within selves. ' (William E Connolly The Ethos 
of Pluralization (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), p. 200 fn. 3 -I 
have put the terms `latter' and former' in parentheses here since in the original they 
have been mistakenly reversed thus inverting Connolly's intended meaning. 
Confirmation that this is indeed a mistaken reversal in the original has been provided 
in correspondence with the author (William E. Connolly, `Re: A Brief Question', 
Email correspondance with author, 6`h April 2001). 1 think that Connolly is right to 
retain the notion of individuality (as a concept of singular subjectivity) whilst noting 
that the individual is problematically associated with the Cartesian ego-cogito. Dasein 
retains a sense of individuality and yet, insofar as it is constituted as a Being-with- 
Others, is not an individual in the accepted, Cartesian sense of the term (See also 
William E Connolly, IdentitylDifjerence: Democratic Negotiations of Political 
Paradox (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991), Ch. 3 (`Liberalism and Difference') 
pp. 64-94). 
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15 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Part One, pp3-168. 
16 On Rawls' reformulation of his position (in Political Liberalism), and the manner in 
which his later work enables certain responses to critiques of his position in A Theory 
of Justice, see Stephen Mulhall & Adam Swift, Liberals And Communitarians, 2 "d ed. 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 167-246. For confirmation that Rawls' later position 
still holds that political subjects are first and foremost sovereign, free individuals see 
Richard Rorty's discussion of Rawls in `The priority of democracy to philosophy' (in 
Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism and Truth: Philosophical Papers I (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 175-196). Rorty tries to mitigate Rawls' 
retention of the sovereign individual by arguing that we should see this individual as 
merely our own historically situated idea of the democratic subject. In this sense Rorty 
is able to argue that Rawls has not argued that the sovereign individual is a 
transcendent ahistorical subject. However, this is a slightly disingenuous argument as 
Rawls goes on to argue that, since we accept the sovereign individual as the basis of 
our own historically specific notions of justice and democracy, it should be the 
minimal condition of possibility of any discussion of justice and democracy (i. e., that 
this - albeit historically specific - individual is the one found behind the veil of 
ignorance). This means that Rawls does, contrary to Rorty's protestation, have a 
political anthropology (albeit one that Rawls thinks is historically specific to our own 
modem era) on which notions of justice are predicated. The vision of anthropos that 
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19 Indeed the idea of persons being located (territorialised) in the unified bodies that 
they control can be read along Lacanian lines as the primary fantasy responsible for 
the initial formation of a sense of self. In the Lacanian account of the mirror phase - 
which marks the emergence of the infant into the imaginary order - the specular, or 
mirror, image of the body as total, unified and complete is the gestalt with which the 
infant (who lacks motor co-ordination and a unified sense of body or, indeed, self) 
identifies. As Grosz notes, in identifying with the gestalt seen in the mirror image, 
`[t]he child sees itself as a unified totality ... The child's identification with its specular 
image impels it... to seek and anticipatory or desired (ideal or future) identity in the 
coherence of the totalised specular body. ' (Elizabeth Grosz, Jacques Lacan: A 
Feminist Introduction (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 39). It is this anticipation of, or 
desire for, an imaginary unity that liberal political theory satisfies by identifying the 
person with the gestalt of the human body. In this sense liberal political theory is 
firmly anchored on a misrecognition necessary if a unified self is to be constituted out 
of a dispersed, fragmentary, and diverse subject. Whilst the body may indeed have a 
vital place in political theory, I would contend that it is neither unified, nor the home 
(territory) of the person conceived of as the agent that comprises the sovereign, free 
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sovereignty of the political subject gives him/her a logical inscrutability (for sovereign 
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capacity to choose in certain murderous ways. 
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to the reconstructed Franciscan monastery) 
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